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Abstract 
This study seeks to determine whether the government of Saudi Arabia, in promoting its 
Vision 2030 project, can strike a balance between safeguarding the Kingdom’s Islamic 
heritage and protecting the interests of foreign investors in Saudi Arabia. Following a critical 
review of the extant literature, it establishes that the government has been unable so far to 
achieve that delicate balance because of the rigid interpretation of the Shari’ah by 
traditionalist and anti-Western (anti-international) doctrinaire scholars who became 
prominent after ‘the closing of the gates of ijtihad’ (independent reasoning). The study also 
establishes that the Shari’ah has been fundamentally flexible from the earliest times, and 
that early Muslims embraced free trade, and preferred arbitration as dispute resolution 
mechanism without gender bias. Thus, this study tests the hypothesis that the rigid 
interpretation subsequently imposed by doctrinaire conservatives explains why the use of 
the Shari’ah to settle disputes constitutes an obstacle to FDI in Saudi Arabia. In order to test 
the hypothesis and achieve the research aim, a mixed methods approach is employed that 
involves both doctrinal and empirical methods. The latter is used because the Shari’ah is not 
codified and courts are not required to comply with any precedent, making it difficult to 
predict outcomes either in Saudi courts or in arbitral tribunals, wherever in the world 
arbitrators sit. The study reveals that although the rigid interpretation and application of 
the Shari’ah is an obstacle to FDI, the Hanbali fiqh should be interpreted and applied in a 
flexible manner in regard to commercial matters, including international 
commercial arbitration. Moreover, other Schools of Jurisprudence, such as the Hanafi, are 
much more flexible than the Hanbali School of Jurisprudence. As such, it is important to 
determine whether judges and arbitrators in Saudi Arabia, and arbitrators sitting outside 
Saudi Arabia, may refer to a Sunni School of Jurisprudence other than the Hanbali School in 
order to invoke another interpretation of the Shari’ah that is more advantageous to trade 
and investment in Saudi Arabia. This is in line with the istihsan principle that enables Islamic 
judges to choose more equitable solutions where a literal interpretation of the Quranic verses 
may not promote the public good, or may cause a detriment to the general public in Saudi 
Arabia. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as a key member of the Organisation of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), is the world’s largest producer and exporter of oil.1 As such, 
Saudi Arabia has attracted foreign investors since the discovery of oil in its territory in early 
19th century. This is evidenced by the first oil concession granted by the government of Saudi 
Arabia to the Standard Oil Company of California in 1933.2 It has been asserted that Standard 
Oil, a company incorporated in the United States, exploited the naiveté of the government of 
Saudi Arabia, especially in the crucial stages during the drafting of the concession agreement 
between the parties, to the detriment of Saudi Arabia.3 The concession agreement generated 
commercial success for Standard Oil Company and also stimulated the Saudi economy. 
Nonetheless, the government of Saudi Arabia terminated the concession agreement and 
nationalised Standard Oil Company in 1972 so as to control its own natural resources and 
industries.4  
 
This decision further catalyzed the economy of Saudi Arabia and has made it one of the 
largest free markets in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).5 Further, its position as a 
critical player in the oil market has also ensured that Saudi Arabia is the largest recipient of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the Arab World.6 However, there has been a growing and 
                                                
1 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (2016)   
<https://www.saudiembassy.net/about/country-information/energy/oil.aspx>, accessed 23 April 2017.  
2 ARAMCO, ‘Our History’ (2006) <http://www.aramcoservices.com/Who-We-Are/Our-History.aspx>, 
accessed 23 April 2017. 
3 Andrew Stern, Who Won the Oil Wars (Conspiracy Books 2005) 35-37.  
4 See Talal Al-Emadi ‘Joint Venture (JVCs) Among Current Negotiated Petroleum Contracts: A Literature 
Review of JVCs Development, Concept and Elements’ (2010) 1 Georgetown Journal of International Law 645, 
646-648. 
5 Institute of International Finance (IIF), IIF Regional Overview on Middle East and North Africa “Arab Spring 
Countries, Struggle, GCC Prospects Favorable (2013)  
<http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/52d36d80405cc4fb93d09382455ae521/p_SIinMENAReport.pdf?MOD=
AJPERES>, accessed on 20 June 2018. 
6 Santander Trade Portal, Saudi Arabia: Foreign Investment (2016) <https://en.santandertrade.com/establish-
overseas/saudi-arabia/foreign-
investment?&actualiser_id_banque=oui&id_banque=44&memoriser_choix=memoriser>, accessed 20 June 
2018. 
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continuous realization by the government of Saudi Arabia that it has to diversify its economy 
and mitigate its country’s dependence on oil.7 This is important, especially when one 
considers this under two main auspices. First, the climate and environmental impact of the 
use of fossil fuels; and second, the variability of the price of oil. There has been a continuous 
trend to limit the effects of global warming. Scientific and technological searches for 
alternative fuels derived from resources other than petroleum are increased and the 2015 
United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris in which 195 countries adopted the first-
ever universal, legally binding global climate deal; an agreement that sets out a global action 
to put the world on track to avoid dangerous climate change by limiting global warming well 
below 2 degrees C.8 Second, the great plunge in oil prices, from a peak of USD$115 per 
barrel in June 2014 to under USD$35 at the end of February 2016, caused mainly by slowing 
growth in emerging markets, most importantly in China, has led to sharp drops in commodity 
prices almost across the board, which in turn has affected countries around the world, 
especially oil-dependent OPEC members, including Saudi Arabia.9  
 
The government of Saudi Arabia seeks alternative sources of finance to diversify the 
economy, provide further employment opportunities, and stimulate technological 
developments. The Saudi Arabian government has sought to address this situation since 
1970; however, their significant efforts to modernize its economy have been stalled by 
prevailing protectionist attitudes, fostered by the government’s desire to maintain national 
control completely over its economic activities and its need to preserve its traditional cultural, 
moral and religious values.10 This approach has failed to provide adequate solutions to 
address its need for economic diversification and has undermined efforts to attract even more 
FDI.11  
 
However, at the turn of the 21st century, the attitude of the Saudi Arabian government 
                                                
7 Ibid.  
8 See U.S. Department of Energy, Alternative Fuels (2016)  
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/paris/index_en.htm>, accessed on 20 June 2018. 
See also, European Commission, Climate Action (2016) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/paris/index_en.htm>, accessed on 23 April 2017.  
9 World Bank Group, ‘The Great Plunge in Oil Prices: Cause, Consequences, and Policy Responses, 
Development Economics’ (2015) Policy Research Note 
<http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Research/PRN01_Mar2015_Oil_Prices.pdf>, accessed on 
25 April 2017; World Economic Forum, What’s Behind the Drop in Oil Prices? 
<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/03/what-s-behind-the-drop-in-oil-prices/>, accessed on 25 April 2017. 
10 World Bank Group, ibid. 
11 Supra Santander Trade Portal (n 6). 
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changed, leading it to subscribe to the general global trend towards encouraging more 
multinational companies to access Saudi markets and ensuring that the investments of foreign 
investors are legally protected under Saudi Arabian law. This resulted in considerable 
changes in the existing legal framework, including the replacement of the Foreign Capital 
Investment Law of 1979 with the Foreign Investment Law of 2000 and the establishment of 
the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA)12. 
 
Since the turn of the 21st century, there have been more than 36 bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) and several multilateral conventions that the government of Saudi Arabia has entered 
into.13 Moreover, the government enacted the Arbitration Law (2012), which replaced the old 
Arbitration Regulation (1983) in an attempt to attract FDI and demonstrate the effectiveness 
of its legal system to provide legal protection for foreign investments and investors.14 Whilst 
the Arbitration Law (2012) is laudable, problems continue to persist for foreign investors, 
especially those who are not accustomed with the role that traditional religious laws and 
values, especially Shari’ah law, plays in Saudi Arabian legal system.  
1.2 The Concept of Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) can be defined as capital provided by an investor to acquire 
ownership of a business unit in a foreign country or transfer from one country to another of 
material or intangible assets that will be used in that country for the purpose of producing 
wealth under the entire or partial management of the owner of the assets.15 This essentially 
means that FDI involves capital transactions, including the transfer of the ownership of a 
business in the host country to a foreign investor and the relocation of intangible assets, such 
                                                
12 The Foreign Investment Law (2000) was issued by Royal Decree No. M/1, dated 5/1/1421 AH (10 April 
2000). This replaced the Foreign Capital Investment Law (1979) that was issued by Royal Decree No. M/4, 
dated 2/2/1399 AH (1 January 1979).  
13 Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) 
<https://www.sagia.gov.sa/Pages/PageNotFoundError.aspx?requestUrl=https://www.sagia.gov.sa/en/Investment
-climate/Some-Things-You-Need-To-Know-/Laws/>, accessed on 28 July 2017.  
14 Faris Nesheiwat and Ali Al-Khasawneh, ‘The 2012 Saudi Arbitration Law: A Comparative Examination of 
the Law and Its Effect on Arbitration in Saudi Arabia’ (2015) 13(2) Santa Clara Journal of International Law 
443, 446. 
15 Uche B Onwe, ‘Leveraging Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria Through International Securitisation’ (2015) 
1(5) International Journal of Economics and Financial Research 76, 76-84. See also, M Sornarajah, The 
International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge University Press 2010) chapter 2. 
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as expertise and access to global market, from the foreign investor’s home country to the host 
country, for the production of wealth.16  
 
Most international institutions, however, define FDI in quite broad terms, placing emphasis 
on the investor’s management of the business unit or asset in the host country. Thus, Article 1 
of the US Model Bilateral Treaty (2004) for example, defines investment as “every asset . . . 
that has the characteristics of an investment.” Similarly, the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) Secretariat defines FDI as “when an investor based in one country (the home country) 
acquires an asset in another country (the host country) with the intent to manage that asset.”17  
Furthermore, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines 
FDI as “a category for investment that reflects the objective of establishing a lasting interest 
by a resident enterprise in one economy (direct investor) in an enterprise (direct investment 
enterprise) that is resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor. The lasting 
interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the 
direct investment enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the management of the 
enterprise.”18  
 
This management aspect is the distinguishing factor differentiating FDI from other types of 
foreign investment, such as portfolio investments in stocks, bonds and other financial 
instruments.19 In other words, the investor is an active participator in directing the regular 
management of the acquired business in FDI, whereas portfolio investments attract passive 
investors who only earn returns without contributing to the management of the business. 
Additionally, portfolio investors can easily pull out of an investment and transfer their 
investment to another portfolio, whereas FDI investors cannot easily withdraw investments 
from host countries.  
 
It is also important to stress that there are distinctions in the approaches favoured by 
developed and developing countries in defining FDI.20 There is a tendency for developed, 
                                                
16 James D Nolan, ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Laotian Law in Foreign Investment, the World Bank 
Guidelines on the Treatment of the Foreign Direct Investment, and Normative Rules of International Law of 
Foreign Direct Investment’ (1998) 15(2) Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 663, 663.  
17 WTO News “Trade and Foreign Direct Investment,” News release, 9 October 1996  
<https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres96_e/pr057_e.htm>, accessed on June 20 2018.  
18 OECD, Glossary of Foreign Direct Investment Terms and Definitions (4th edn, OECD Publishing 2008) 11.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Sornarajah (n 15) chapter 2. 
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capital-exporting countries to broaden the definition and scope of foreign investment, 
including the addition of equity capital, because such countries desire maximum legal 
protection for investments incurred by their nationals.21 This is understandable when one 
considers the nature of FDI as a long time business involvement in the host state.22 As such, it 
is imperative for foreign investors to be aware of applicable rules and regulations in the host 
state that may affect their business. Conversely, developing capital-importing countries tend 
to support a narrower definition of FDI so as to minimise their liberalisation obligations in 
international agreements, and to highlights their desire to retain maximum national sovereign 
and infrastructure control.  
 
Various scholars and international trade organisations have therefore provided wide-ranging 
definitions of FDI, varying from simple definitions principally concerned with the 
investments of foreigners,23 to more complex definitions encompassing activities that 
completely cover the value-chain of investment either by equity capital, the creation of new 
production entities, or controlling profitable assets.24 These wide-ranging definitions, 
majority of which were provided in the aftermath of the Second World War, indicate the 
relationship between globalisation and FDI.   
 
It has been asserted that globalisation was responsible for ensuring the ease of trade and 
movement of traders, which eventually materialised into FDI.25 However, FDI existed even 
before the onset of globalisation.26 FDI was the core of international trade and therefore a 
catalyst for globalisation. Thus, it is believed that as FDI played a significant role in 
integrating several local economies in the global open market, which in turn modernised 
national economies, which consequently led to economic boosts.27 Also, FDI has assisted 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
22  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), ‘World Investment Report 2007: 
Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development’ (2007) 245 
<http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2007_en.pdf>, accessed on 16 January 2018. 
23 Fath EA El Shiekh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and Saudi Arabia (2nd edn, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2003) 26. 
24  UNCTAD, Series on issues of International Investment Agreements, Scope and Definition (UNCTAD 1999).  
25 OECD, Foreign Direct Investment and International Trade: Complements or Substitutes? Directorate for 
Science, Technology and Industry, Paris, France, 14-15 October 1993< 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/788565713012>, accessed 29 December 2017.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Petr Hlaváček and Petra Olšová, ‘Impact of Globalization and Foreign Direct Investment on the Regional 
Economies: The Case of the Czech Republic’ (2011) <http://conference.osu.eu/globalization/publ2011/70-
75_Hlavacek-Olsova.pdf>, accessed on 29 December 2017. See also, John H Dunning and Phillipe Gugler, 
Foreign Direct Investment, Location and Competitiveness (Elsevier 2008) 17.  
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countries worldwide, especially developing countries, to enter into and effectively compete in 
the global open market.28 However, this can negatively and positively impact host states and 
foreign investors, particularly Transnational Corporations (TNCs). On the one hand, FDI can 
positively affect national economies because it provides access to tangible and intangible 
assets that help liberalise and modernise national economies i.e. host state economy. On the 
other hand, FDI can negatively affect host state economies. For example, TNCs can abuse 
and exploit the rights of host states (e.g. human rights) in the pursuit of resources. 
Nonetheless, the negative and positive impact of FDI depends on the policy of the host state 
in question.  
 
1.3 The Importance of the Study 
 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been blessed with vast reserves of oil and gas.29 However, 
there has been a realisation, especially by the Saudi government, that these reserves are not 
inexhaustible,30 and as such, alternative economic sources must be pursued. For several years, 
Saudi Arabia has been developing an alternative economy by seeking and attracting foreign 
investors to the Kingdom.31 As such, the Kingdom has become one of the most largest 
growing economies in the world.32 For this process to continue, foreign investors need to be 
assured that there are trustworthy legal processes that secure their numerous investments in 
Saudi Arabia, as the host State.33 However, it is shown here that there is uncertainty in the 
way in which Shari’ah law is implemented, as well as actual and potential conflicts between 
the laws in place in Saudi Arabia and multilateral treaties (MITs) that govern FDI. Saudi 
Arabia is as much a subject of globalisation as any other sovereign State and it must, 
therefore, be wise as to the ways in which it continues to attract FDI. Equally, foreign 
investors need to be cautious as to investing in a sovereign territory that carries with it not 
merely commercial, political, and secular legal risks to foreign investments but also 
                                                
28 Sornarajah (n 15). 
29 Adne Cappelen and Robin Choudhury (2000) ‘The Future of the Saudi Arabian Economy, Possible Effects on 
the World Oil Market’ (2000) <https://www.ssb.no/a/publikasjoner/pdf/rapp_200007_en/rapp_200007_en.pdf>, 
accessed on 15 June 2018.   
30  Ali Al-Sadiq, ‘Economic Convergence in Saudi Arabia” (2014) 
<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Interactives/2014/thinktank20/chapters/tt20-saudia-arabia-
economic-convergence-al-sadiq.pdf?la=en>, accessed on 15 June 2018. 
31  The Saudi Arabian General Investment Authorities <https://www.sagia.gov.sa/en/Investment-climate/Some-
Things-You-Need-To-Know-/Laws/>, accessed on 29 December 2017. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Hussein N Agil, Investment Law in Saudi Arabia: Restrictions and Opportunities. (Unpublished Dissertation, 
Victoria University 2013) 26. 
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theological jurisprudence risks.34 There is, therefore, a perceived threat to foreign investors 
both to investment and to dispute resolution methods in and with regard to Saudi Arabia.35  
However, these threats might be reduced by comprehensive analysis of the theological and 
philosophical underpinnings of the rules of law applicable in the Kingdom to investment and 
dispute resolution, with specific focus on the role of arbitration.  
 
As such, this thesis seeks to investigate FDI and investment arbitration issues arising from 
Shari’ah law and Arabic philosophy in the context of Saudi Arabia’s future. The importance 
of this research is that it seeks to unveil shortcomings of the legal system in Saudi Arabia, 
especially its dispute resolution methods and the ambiguity of its investment law that may 
hinder the Saudi’s government efforts to encourage FDI within its territory. This research 
also targets foreign investors themselves as it seeks to aid individuals and companies that aim 
to invest in the region by ensuring that potential risks stemming from theological 
jurisprudence, as well as legal risks, are investigated.     
 
The analysis of investment in the Saudi Arabian environment is also crucial to academics, 
capital exporting countries, and international organisations with an interest in Saudi Arabia. 
This study contributes to a clearer understanding of the legal framework for conducting 
business by non-Saudi investors in Saudi Arabia and to a better appreciation of difficulties in 
pursuing such investments. It is important that the Saudi Arabian government and foreign 
investors are aware of the extent to which the legal framework provides protection for 
investments, especially foreign investments, in the country and also the extent to which such 
a framework is actually effectively enforceable. It is hoped that this study will encourage 
more foreign investors to trust the legal system in Saudi Arabia and invest further in the 
country.  
 
The motive for carrying this research stems from the absence of recent and comprehensive 
work that address the subject. There are few legal studies that have analysed the FDI 
                                                
34 See Mohamed A Ramady, Political, Economic and Financial Country Risk: Analysis of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (Springer 2014) 67-93. 
35 Faisal Alqahtani, Legal Protection of Foreign Direct Investment in Saudi Arabia. (Unpublished Dissertation, 
University of Newcastle 2009) 29. 
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environment in Saudi Arabia36. Thus far, most research conducted have focused on the oil 
industry and provided mainly descriptive findings37. The few studies conducted on foreign 
investment examined the legal framework before the enactment of the Foreign Investment 
Law (2000) and Arbitration Law (2012)38. As such, this thesis intends to fill this gap and 
contribute to the development of more effective regulations controlling and protecting foreign 
investment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is hoped that this study will provide a greater 
insight into the reality of foreign investment in Saudi Arabia, which may in turn help allay 
apprehension felt by foreign investors seeking to invest in the country.  
 
1.4 Rationale of the Study 
 
Saudi Arabia is desirable for foreign investors for several reasons. The main reason stems 
from the fact that Saudi Arabia is a key leader in the Middle East. This is especially appealing 
when one considers the richness of its natural resources, including oil. As such, foreign 
investors and TNCs invest in Saudi Arabia to exploit the natural resources. Consequently, 
laws governing the application of FDI are created to provide favourable conditions that will 
attract more FDI to Saudi Arabia. However, the lure of the Saudi Arabian economy is often 
hampered by legal risks, the bureaucratic nature of the governmental bodies and public 
concerns of the erosion of the traditional values, its need to ensure continuation of cultural 
and religious (including religion and law), and control over its resources. This is especially 
difficult when one considers that Muslim-majority countries encounter particular problems 
intrinsic in relationships that attempt to incorporate FDI policies into Islamic legal and 
political systems while attempting to safeguard the inherent nature of the country. All 
                                                
36 See Mohammed Al-Sewilem (2012), The Legal Framework for Foreign Direct Investment in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabi: Theory and Practice. Also, Al-Mohaidib, M (1997) Arbitration as a means of setting commercial 
disputes (national and international) with special reference to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
37 See HE Ali Al-Naimi (2006) Saudi Arbia Oil and Gas Investment Outlook and Strategies. Third OPEC 
International Seminar, Vienna). Also, Alkahtani F (2009) Legal Protection of Foreign Direct Investment In 
Saudi Arabia  
38 Al-Samaan Y, ‘The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes by Means of Domestic Arbitration in Saudi 
Arabia’, (1994) 9(3) Arab Law Quarterly 217. Also, Al-Jarba M (2001) Commercial Arbitration in Islamic 
Jurisprudence: A study of its role in the Saudi Arabia Context. 
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possibilities of reinterpreting Islamic law are dependent on the attitude of religious 
establishments, as well as the level of commitment and willingness on the part of the Saudi 
Arabian government to instigate such changes. This is especially important when one 
considers the status of Saudi Arabia as a leader in the MENA region.  In other words, Saudi 
Arabia ought to be setting a precedent for other Muslim-majority hosts of FDI to integrate 
FDI into an Islamic legal system. In this light, the Saudi Arabian government has been forced 
to balance its need to amend its legal environment with the need to protect traditional values 
whilst ensuring that foreign investors are not deterred from initially investing or further 
investing in the country. Nonetheless, all these reasons can deter new investors or further 
investment of existing investors.  
 
Consequently, on the 10th of April 2000, the Saudi government enacted a new Foreign 
Investment Law in order to encourage FDI within its territory. This sought to usher in a new 
era that reduced the country’s excessive dependence on oil. This need to ease the country’s 
economic dependence on oil was further fostered by the global search for alternative energy 
sources, especially in the context of the Paris Climate Change Summit in December 2015.39  
However, the Saudi government’s desire to control its natural resources and its concern for 
ensuring that the Islamic heritage of the country is protected led to the amendment of existing 
investment law that did not affect the traditional values of the nation while it sought to 
encourage foreign investors at the same time. Nonetheless, the unfettered benefits of FDI (i.e. 
creation of jobs, enhancing technological developments, and stimulating funds for new 
enterprises) emphasises the need to reconcile such differences for Saudi Arabia to benefit 
fully from FDI.   
 
This study investigates the environment of FDI in Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the 
enactment of the Foreign Investment Law 2000 and the enactment of the new arbitration 
regulation in 2012.  Reference to the background of the enactment of foreign investment law 
is made in analysing the law’s effectiveness. Also, the study critically analyses whether the 
environment of FDI in Saudi Arabia is attracting foreign investment. This study contains an 
analysis of the legal framework in Saudi Arabia and determines whether the administrative 
prospect facilitates foreign investment or there are still barriers deterring foreign investors. 
Furthermore, this study addresses the nature of early Islamic law towards foreign investment 
                                                
39 See Ashok Swain and Anders Jagerskog, Emerging Security Threats in the Middle East: The Impact of 
Climate Change (Rowan and Littlefield 2016) 111-112. 
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and the potential conflicts between Shari’ah Law in Saudi Arabia and the modern Foreign 
Investment Law. Also, the recognition of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution 
method is addressed with its potential conflict with the Islamic nature of the legal system in 
the country.  
 
1.5 Literature Review 
The first reference to Shari’ah law in the opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
appeared in a case on the delineation of the continental shelf of the North Sea between 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark.40 After the ICJ’s decision was issued,41 Judge 
Fouad Ammoun wrote an opinion that agreed with the outcome but deplored the fact that the 
ICJ failed to refer to Islamic legal theory in discussing relevant equitable principles.42 He 
believed that this would have provided a stronger justification of the decision and enhanced 
its legitimacy. Given that Germany had not ratified the Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf of 1958, the ICJ turned to equitable principles to determine how boundaries 
should be drawn, and the ICJ applied the principles in a way “consistent with the legal 
philosophies of all the civilised nations of the world.”43 Judge Ammoun therefore took 
exception to the fact that Islamic legal philosophies were not considered among the ‘legal 
philosophies of all the civilised nations of the world.’ He pointed out that Islamic legal 
tradition is largely based on the principle of equity.44 
Clark Lombardi however argued that it was unclear why Judge Ammoun strongly believed 
that modern international legal norms are compatible with Islamic legal norms.45 He observed 
that the Judge’s command of traditional European legal sources was more reliable than his 
command of Islamic sources of law. Hence, the Judge analysed the Greco-Roman origins of 
the concept of equity and how the concept has evolved over the centuries in the West, but 
regarding Islamic law, he was only able to cite a Qur’anic verse that was very difficult to 
interpret.46 Lombardi noted further that Judge Ammoun failed to explain why the majority of 
Muslims do not follow the Hanafi interpretations of the Qur’an (which he preferred), and 
                                                
40 Clark B Lombardi, ‘Islamic Law in the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice: An Analysis’ 
(2007) 8(1) Journal of International Law 85, 96. 
41 North Sea Continental Shelf 1969 ICJ 3. 
42 Ibid, 131-143. 
43 Ibid, 40. 
44 Ibid, 141-143. 
45 Clark B Lombardi (n 37) 98-99. 
46 Ibid. 
 11 
overlooked the fact that many Muslims would have rejected the ICJ’s interpretation of the 
Shari’ah because the ICJ judges did not have a strong Islamic legal training.47 Lombardi then 
submitted that there is hardly any compelling evidence that Islamic legal norms have 
contributed towards the development of international legal norms or that both sets of norms 
are consistent.48 
Lombardi’s conclusion failed to take into account the evidence provided by Judge 
Weeramantry, despite the fact that the latter was cited by Lombardi.49 Before his appointment 
to the ICJ, Weeramantry had argued cogently that Islamic legal norms had a strong “potential 
for assisting towards a juster world in the future.”50 He noted that many international lawyers 
in the West were ignorant about the sophistication of the Islamic legal tradition and the ways 
in which the tradition might help enrich international law. He also pointed out that if 
international lawyers examined the Shari’ah closely, they would note the high degree of 
intercommunication between Western and Islamic legal cultures over the centuries, as well as 
the congruence of the two legal cultures on some key principles of international law such as 
fairness and justice.51 
In the same vein, Bulliet examined the common roots of Western and Islamic cultures and 
observed that “their confrontation today arises not from essential differences, but from a long 
and wilful determination to deny their kinship.”52 The analysis focused on the congruence of 
historical and political ideologies. Quraishi went even further and demonstrated high levels of 
similarity in the legal discourses.53 He argued that similar methods of legal interpretation 
have guided jurisprudential debates in Islamic and American law. These include historical 
understanding, literalism, and reference to ultimate goal or underlying purpose.54 He noted 
that in both legal cultures, the most difficult challenge was determining how human agents 
could consistently interpret and apply edicts without imposing their own personal opinions. 
                                                
47 Ibid, 118. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid, 103-105. 
50 Christopher Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective (St Martin 1988) xv. 
51 Ibid, 166-169. 
52 Richard W Bulliet, The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization (Columbia University Press 2004) vii. 
53 Asifa Quraishi, ‘Interpreting the Qur’an and the Constitution: Similarities in the Use of Text, Tradition, and 
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Given the above similarities, it may be important to ask why foreign lawyers and investors 
continue to eschew the Shari’ah as the relevant law to settle investment disputes.55 Powella 
and Rickar note that investors are frequently advised to avoid dispute settlement under 
Islamic law and increasingly, contracts provide that disputes will be deferred to neutral 
international arbitration bodies such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), and London Court of International 
Arbitration.56 It is only logical because these international bodies seek to minimise the 
uncertainties related to dispute settlement in domestic courts. However, investors from the 
West are more likely to avoid domestic courts in Islamic countries because contract 
enforcement in the latter is much weaker than in non-Islamic Western countries.57 Is it simply 
a question of perception due to the fact that the Shari’ah as law was marginalised during the 
colonial period?58 Or it is simply because Islamic and Western legal cultures are yet to 
interface and learn and negotiate differences in a manner removed from ignorant and hateful 
rhetoric.59  
It has been established that “economic success will depend on whether the parties can create 
a constructive working relationship and manage the conflicts that are certain to arise.”60 It has 
also been established that in the first Millennium, the economy in the Middle East in general 
and the Arab peninsula as a part of the Middle East was graced by prosperity as the 
contractual parties from the region with other commercial parties from other regions were 
familiar with the contractual agreements due to same level of  organisational development in 
commercial and legal institutions.61 However, after the first Millennium, the economies of the 
regional countries, of which one of them is what is now Saudi Arabia, fell behind those of the 
                                                
55 See George Khoukaz, ‘Shari’ah Law and International Commercial Arbitration: The Need for An Intra-
Islamic Arbitral Institution’ (2017) Journal of Dispute Resolution 181, 189-191. 
56 Emilia Justyna Powella and Stephanie J Rickar, ‘International Trade and Domestic Legal Systems: Examining 
the Impact of Islamic Law’ (2010) 36 International Interactions 335, 352. 
57 Ibid, 348. 
58 Muhammad Khalid Masud, ‘Teaching of Islamic Law and Shari’ah: A Critical Evaluation of the Present and 
Prospects for the Future’ (2005) 44(2) Islamic Studies 165, 165. See also, Edward Said who argued that all 
knowledge about what is understood in the West as the Orient was blemished with colonial aspirations. Edward 
Said, Orientalism (Pantheon Books 1978) 29-110. 
59 Carlo A Pedrioli, ‘Constructing the Other: US Muslims, Anti-Shari’ah Law, and the Constitutional 
Consequences of Volatile Intercultural Rhetoric’ (2012) 22 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 
65, 108. 
60 Christian Buhring-Uhle, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business (Kluwer Law International, 
London 2006) 5. 
61 Timur Kuran, The Long Divergence, How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East. (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton and Oxford 2011) 4. 
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developed countries because of the lack of modern economic institutions, specifically social 
services.62  
However, it is argued here that the root of the problem is the interpretation of the Shari’ah by 
Islamic scholars and authorities. It is clear that the prophet Muhammed (PBUH), as a very 
successful trader,63 would not have favoured doctrine or arbitrary textualism,64 as well as 
policies that stagnate the economy if he was alive. Younes noted that Islamic legal theorists 
have over the centuries adopted a textual mode of interpretation that reduced the sacred texts 
of the Qur’an to ‘unit-based’ edicts that are then unilaterally described and applied.65 He 
argued that this “hermeneutical innovation has made ‘medieval Islamic pragmatics’ not 
completely free from the fetters of rigidity that characterise parts of the Islamic legal 
theory.”66 He then stated that the flexibility of the Islamic legal system has been adversely 
affected to the extent that Islamic legal texts are misconstrued in the modern context. Hence, 
the methods of interpretation used by contemporary religious scholars simply “perpetuate an 
unmitigated version of fiqh, ignoring wittingly or otherwise – some legal doctrines such as al-
maslahah al-murslah (public interest), al-urf (custom), and al-istihsan (juristic preference) 
which have contributed to investing Islamic law with universality.”67 
In the same vein, Emon argued that the contention that the Shari’ah is fundamentally rigid 
and different from the law in Western countries reflects the findings of Orientalist legal 
scholars of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.68 These scholars advised governments of 
Western empires that to understand Muslims, Islam had to be reduced to what was expressly 
stated in specific authoritative texts.69 This is supported by Said’s depiction of the internal 
inconsistency of Orientalism’s ideas about the Orient.70 The reliance on Orientalist scholars 
                                                
62 Ibid 
63 Yusuf Islam, The Life of The Last Prophet (Darussalam Publishers & Distributors 1995) 3. 
64 The term ‘textualism’ was first used by Mark Pattison in the middle of the 19th century to criticise what he 
saw as the “arbitrary textualism of Puritan divines.” See Mark Pattison, ‘Learning in the Church of England’ in 
Henry Nettleship (ed), Essays by the Late Mark Pattison (Clarendon Press 1889) 236. The term was later on 
adopted in the United States especially and used interchangeably with intentionalism to describe the facets of 
originalism in the interpretation of the Constitution. See Caleb Nelson, ‘What is Textualism?’ (2005) 91(2) 
Virginia Law Review 347, 347-348. 
65 Soualhi Younes, ‘Islamic Legal Hermeneutics: The Context and Adequacy of Interpretation in Modern 
Islamic Discourse’ (2002) 41(4) Islamic Studies 585, 585-586. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Anver M Emon, ‘Conceiving Islamic Law in a Pluralist Society: History, Politics and Multicultural 
Jurisprudence’ (2006) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 331, 339-340. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Orientalism in this context implies the Western cultural investment in the East, while Orient is a constituted 
entity in the Western mind that may be contrasted from the empirical Orient. See Edward Said (n 79) 29-110.  
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therefore led to the phenomenon of textual experts who interpret the Qur’an and the Hadith 
according to the ordinary meaning of the language used. However, the description of the 
interpretation by Islamic scholars as textualism differs from Younes’ description of the 
method of interpretation as “hermeneutical innovation.”71 Nonetheless, it is argued here that 
both descriptions are justified given that the rigid interpretation of the Shari’ah involves 
ascertaining the meaning of text on the grounds that the semantic context is fixed but then 
allowing the interpreter’s personal views, pre-suppositions and preunderstandings 
(hermeneutics) to fill in the gaps. This is due to the fact that the bulk of the legal rulings in 
the Qur’an and Hadith is not definitive and requires legal reasoning in order to be applied.72 
1.6 Hypothesis 
In light of the above, the hypothesis that was tested in this study is that the Shari’ah is 
fundamentally flexible, and the rigid interpretation subsequently imposed by doctrinaire 
conservatives explains why the use of the Shari’ah to settle disputes constitutes an obstacle to 
FDI in Saudi Arabia.  
The argument that the Shari’ah is fundamentally flexible is largely based on the findings of 
three commentators: 
Younes who argued that the hermeneutical innovation of Islamic legal theory has 
made medieval Islamic pragmatics not completely free from the fetters of rigidity that 
characterise parts of the Islamic legal theory.73 
Weeramantry who demonstrated that if international lawyers examine the Shari’ah 
closely, they would note the high degree of intercommunication between Western and 
Islamic legal cultures over the centuries, as well as the congruence of the two legal 
cultures on some key principles of international law such as fairness and justice.74 
Alwazna who argued that the importance of the interpretation of the Shari’ah lies in 
the way in which the scholar or judge interprets the law.75 Thus, a Quarnic verse 
                                                
71 Soualhi Younes (n 62) 585. 
72 Rafat Y Alwazna, ‘Islamic Law: Its Sources, Interpretation and the Translation of It into Laws Written in 
English’ (2016) 29(2) International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 251, 253. 
73 Soualhi Younes (n 83) 585. 
74 Christopher Weeramantry (n 70) 160. 
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cannot be interpreted in insolation. The scholar or judge must take into account the 
legal and linguistic contexts, as well as the events that occurred around the revelation. 
The contention that the rigid interpretation of the Shari’ah was subsequently imposed by 
doctrinaire conservatives is largely based on the findings of three commentators: 
Malik who demonstrated that after the 13th century, there was a growing influential 
movement, led by conservative thinkers such as Al-Ghazali, that promoted Muslim 
insularity and shunned the rationalism of the Islamic Golden Age.76 
Rubin who demonstrated that the conservative jurists in the Ottoman Empire and 
Mecca who legitimised the power of the elite became powerful to the extent that 
many rulers were reluctant to challenge their rulings, even when the rulings 
negatively impacted on trade.77 
Zaman who argued that the growing conservatism and rigidity of Islamic jurists may 
be explained by the rise of the Ulama or scholars who believed God’s will had been 
completely revealed in the Qur’an, but only the Ulama had the capacity of its 
interpretation.78 Also, the Ulama did no use a codified system and often interpreted 
the Qur’an and the Hadith by filling the gaps with their personal views, pre-
suppositions and preunderstandings.  
In light of the above, the Researcher tested the idea that the legal uncertainty caused by the 
wide discretion enjoyed by adjudicators deters FDI in Saudi Arabia, and FDI may realise its 
full potential if the modernisation of the laws is combined with what the Prophet 
recommended or Islamic practices before the 14th century. The Researcher’s inquiry was 
guided by five main studies. They were conducted by Sayen, Khoukaz, Alqudah, Gemmell 
and Rizwan and depict the challenges faced by both Islamic and non-Islamic societies when 
using international commercial arbitration as a cross border mechanism to apply Shari’ah 
principles to resolve disputes involving non-Islamic entities or nations.  
Sayen generally argued that a more constructive approach was to develop the Saudi legal 
system by using procedures drawn from the rich legacy of Shari’ah scholarship rather than 
                                                
76 Ken Malik, The Quest for a Moral Compass: A Global History of Ethics (Atlantic 2014) 56. Some key 
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77 Jared Rubin, Rulers, Religion and Riches: Why the West Got Rich (Cambridge University Press 2009) 13. 
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exert pressure on the Saudi government to adopt modern or Western models.79 Khoukaz 
analysed the international arbitration system from a Shari’ah perspective and concluded that 
the “dark and pessimistic depiction” of the conflict between both mechanisms is unwarranted 
because the concept of dispute resolution has been recognised in the Middle East for more 
than a millennium, and the Shari’ah allows for the evolution of legal rules in light of the 
changing circumstances.80 He argues further that the Prophet resisted the idea of codifying 
Islamic law because he wanted to preserve the system’s fundamental character as an 
assemblage of flexible principles.81 It follows that the Shari’ah ought to be suitable for all 
times because it has the requisite degree of flexibility. 
In the same vein, Alqudah demonstrates that the Shari’ah is sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate Western or modern international arbitration practices.82 He places emphasis on 
the UNCITRAL Model Law and five pillars of arbitration, namely the agreement, choice of 
arbitrators, conduct of the proceeding, applicable substantive law, and the recognition and 
enforcement of the arbitral award. He then concludes that the reluctance of many Muslim 
countries to adopt international practices may be explained by the negative depiction of the 
Shari’ah in Western societies as an impediment to free trade and arbitration, as well as the 
bad experience some Muslim countries have had with arbitral tribunals.83 He believes 
arbitration in Muslim countries may realise its full potential if the modernisation of the laws 
is combined with a better understanding of the Shari’ah by the Western legal community.84 
Given that Alqudah did not develop this contention further, I believed it was a hypothesis that 
needed to be tested. 
Gemmell raises a pertinent point which may also explain in part the negative depiction of the 
Shari’ah as an archaic system. He notes that “it is anomalous that modern commercial 
arbitration in the Islamic Middle East stands in stark contrast to the endorsements given to 
arbitration by both the Prophet and the Shari’ah.”85 Thus, what is presented as the current 
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Shari’ah stance is at variance with what the Prophet recommended. For instance, the Saudi 
Hanbali approach which has been adapted by the Saudi Judicial system forbids settle disputes 
by non-sharia law in any Islamic countries, also, some arbitrary conditions must be applied 
appointing judges and arbitrators to settle the disputes. However, Gemmell fails to justify the 
contention or even develop it further since he later on notes that “while the traditions of the 
past provide comfort to believers, it is imperative to be cognizant of the present state of the 
world. In the ever-shrinking commercial world, religious-civil bifurcation would be an 
attractive starting point to provide comfort to the commercial business world that there was 
legal determinacy in the Islamic Middle Eastern arbitral process.”86 The religious-civil 
bifurcation implies using private international law or international standards to fill in 
doctrinal gaps in the Shari’ah. Nonetheless, the fact that Gemmell recognises that there are 
dissimilarities between what is presented as the current Shari’ah stance and what the Prophet 
recommended, contradicts the conclusion that the Shari’ah simply represents “traditions of 
the past.” It is such negative depiction of the Shari’ah that prevents many scholars from 
taking note of the fact that the Shari’ah is suitable for all times because it has the requisite 
degree of flexibility. 
It is also the negative depiction of the Shari’ah that in part motivates Rizwan’s conclusion 
that where an arbitration agreement requires the arbitral tribunal to apply Islamic law, the 
tribunal faces serious challenges because there are multiple schools of Islamic law with 
diverse interpretations, the concept of binding precedent is not recognised, and there is no 
choice-of-law rule.87 As such, it was also important to demonstrate that the negative 
perception of the Shari’ah as an impediment to free trade and international commercial 
arbitration is largely due to a misunderstanding of the law. This perception may be changed if 
it is recognised that commercial arbitration as understood by some scholars of the Islamic 
Middle East, such as the Hanbali scholars in Saudi Arabia, stands in stark contrast to the 
endorsements given to arbitration by the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and the Shari’ah allows for 
the evolution of legal rules in light of changing circumstances. It is in light of the above 
findings that the Researcher formulated the hypothesis that was tested in this research.  
                                                
86 Ibid. 
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The hypothesis was further tested in the field. Twenty-five participants were asked questions 
related to the hypothesis and the Researcher explored all the meanings that the participants 
developed. The results were triangulated with the data derived from the primary research. 
1.1 1.7 Aim and Research Questions  
 
This study seeks to determine whether the government of Saudi Arabia has not been able to 
attract more FDI is because of applying Sharia law and the Sharia law is strict by its nature or 
that the Sharia is flexible but the rigidity of the interpretation of Sharia due to different 
factors such as: social, economic and political factors is the reason. That will lead also to the 
question that whether the government of Saudi Arabia can strike a balance between 
protecting the Kingdom’s Islamic heritage and protecting the interests of foreign investors. 
The study analyses trade and the role of arbitration as a viable method of dispute resolution 
under the rule of Sharia law to examine its flexibility, and then assesses foreign investment 
environment in Saudi Arabia and demonstrates how the Saudi government might encourage 
more foreign investors to trust the legal system in Saudi Arabia. Also, it examines Saudi 
history, secular and theological laws, in the context of foreign investment and dispute 
resolution. Emphasis is placed on the extent to which the principles of the Shari’ah allow 
foreign investments and the recognition of arbitration as an alternative dispute settlement 
mechanism to litigation in Shari’ah courts. This study therefore assesses the legal framework 
for resolving disputes and shows how this framework may be enhanced to develop, foster and 
protect FDI in Saudi Arabia.  
 
In order to test the above hypothesis and achieve the above aim, this study addresses the 
following questions: 
1) To what extent are foreign investors in Saudi law protected through relevant 
principles of Islamic law, international conventions and bilateral and multilateral 
investment treaties? 
2) What are the legal factors deterring foreign investment in Saudi Arabia? What 
mechanisms can Saudi Arabia implement to eliminate the factors or mitigate their 
effects in order to encourage foreign investment? 
3) How can arbitration in Saudi Arabia be rendered into a more favourable model for 
the settlement of disputes in the Kingdom?  
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4) Is the Shari’ah (as applied in Saudi Arabia) sufficiently flexible to accommodate 
modern international investment and arbitration practices? 
The first question related to the protection foreign investors in Saudi Arabia is important 
because of the pressure exerted on Saudi authorities to adhere closely to traditional Islamic 
values while applying conventional legislative standards for the protection of foreign 
investors. This dauting challenge that the Saudi government must confront was described by 
Sayen more than three decades ago: 
Give the Western business community confidence that claims can be settled 
(reasonably quickly and fairly, impartially and predictably) under rules at least 
somewhat familiar to this community, while not straying too far from the rules that 
historically governed arbitration, or tahkim under the Shari’a.88 
This challenge is yet to be met. Thus, it is important to determine the extent to which Saudi 
authorities may enact investment and arbitration rules that are Shari’ah-compliant and meet 
the requirements of the international business community. This is achieved in chapters 5, 6, 7 
and 8. These chapters also assess how foreign investors in Saudi Arabia may settle disputes 
with the State and local private entities. Emphasis is placed on the safeguards in the Foreign 
Investment Law of 2000, the Arbitration Law of 2012, and the Vision 2030 programme. With 
regard to the latter, it is important to determine whether its objectives are achievable under 
the Shari’ah.  
The second question related to the factors deterring FDI in Saudi Arabia is important because 
although the government of Saudi Arabia has adopted a free trade policy and reformed its 
investment regime, the flow of FDI has been below expectation.89 Beyond economic factors, 
there are specific legal impediments that must be addressed. It is argued here that the most 
important of these impediments is the misrepresentation of Islam as antithetical to free trade 
due to the rigid interpretation by conservative doctrinaires as well as the absence of 
precedents and codes. 
The third question related to arbitration in Saudi Arabia is important because the local social 
norms that influenced the development of rules governing free trade and arbitration in Saudi 
Arabia may enhance the understanding and acceptance of Islam in non-Islamic legal and 
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investment communities. Achieving this objective involves determining how different 
communities in Saudi Arabia perceive arbitration and whether they prefer this form of 
dispute settlement to litigation in Saudi courts. In chapter 4, emphasis is placed on the 
different perceptions of Sunni schools of thought in order to show the internal inconsistencies 
and paradoxes within the Muslim society. Also, in chapter 8, the opinions of adjudicators, 
scholars, investors and reporters in Saudi Arabia are captured in order to determine whether 
there is a disconnect between locals and foreigners regarding the appreciation of the 
relationship between investment and arbitration laws and the Shari’ah in Saudi Arabia.  
The fourth question related to the flexibility of the Shari’ah is important because the Shari’ah 
is commonly misrepresented as a system that is directly opposed to free trade. It is important 
to show that in the early Islamic period, there was a relatively unrestricted operation of 
markets for goods, labour, and capital, and the Prophet had in part developed Islam to 
promote trade. Thus, foreign investors are more likely to be motivated when shown that not 
only does the Shari’ah favour free trade, but also economic efficiency and private property 
have always been very important in Islam. The analysis of the historical context in chapter 2 
also helps to explain why the Shari’ah principles conducive to business concerns and 
Shari’ah-based arbitration subsequently diverted from what may be described as the Western 
conception of arbitration. 
 
 
 
1.2 1.8 Research Methodology 
 
Research can be regarded as a form of science in that it enables problems of data collection to 
be resolved by adopting systematic techniques and steps.90 In this sense, legal research in the 
academic domain is a newer phenomenon, but its methodological outputs can nevertheless be 
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considered as providing “credible research contributions.”91 In very broad terms, this research 
required the collection of primary and secondary data, thus, it was both empirical and 
doctrinal. In order to test the hypothesis, answer the research questions and achieve the aim 
of the study, the research methodology for this study relies initially on primary sources (the 
Sharia sources, Saudi legislation and regulations), and secondary data sources obtained from 
journal articles, textbooks and relevant international bodies and government publications 
pertaining to FDI and Islamic law in Saudi Arabia. It also analyses previous studies on the 
history and philosophy of the Shari’ah. In the second stage, a mixed methods approach was 
used to collect empirical data from some important stakeholders affected by and those 
affecting the direction of FDI in Saudi Arabia. Each method is discussed below, providing 
reasons that motivated their use for this research. 
1.8.1 Doctrinal Research 
The doctrinal research mainly took place in law libraries.92  This involved locating, reading, 
and analysing legal materials comprising municipal law and Islamic law documents; 
legislation, court reports, historical and philosophical records; and secondary legal sources 
(books and articles) in relation to investment and dispute resolution laws of Saudi Arabia and, 
perhaps, even of the capital exporting States of Britain, the USA and Canada. It required the 
study of the sources of Sharia and its development through history and elaborating the Sharia 
sources such as: Qur’an, Sunnah and Ijma’a and Qiyas.93Also, the it is crucial to study the 
Islamic law principles and foundation such as Usual Al Figh and Qawaed Al Islam which 
provide the rulers and jurists the norms how to seek for the adequate legal rules for any 
problem or fatwa94.  
It also required the study of international materials such as the texts of conventions and 
treaties that Saudi Arabia has ratified.95 These resources were found in several libraries and 
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on official websites such as: Saudi Digital Library, King Fahad National Library,  and the 
Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers,96 Ministry of Justice (Judgment records),97 
Ministry of Commerce,98 and Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority.99 An analytical 
approach to the doctrinal research allowed the analysis of the FDI environment and a deep 
historical analysis of Shari’ah law, and Arab history and philosophy in regard to foreigners, 
investment, and dispute resolution. 
 
Difficulties were encountered in the doctrinal phase of the research because of the 
unavailability and poor quality of primary sources such as ancient Arab history and Arabic 
philosophy documents; the shortage of reliable secondary sources (especially publications by 
Saudi Arabian commentators); and the unavailability of some relevant case reports such as 
the decisions of arbitral tribunals. 
1.8.2 Empirical Research 
 
The empirical approach is a way of gathering data by direct and non-direct observation.  
Direct observation was appropriate to this research because it was necessary to obtain the 
opinions of individuals who might be able to influence the Shari’ah is interpreted in Saudi 
Arabia in regard to the protection of flexibility nature of Sharia rules (Ahkam) of arbitration 
to be compatible with the international standered in order to encourage more foreign 
investment to the coutry as the foreign investors may feel protected (particularly from non-
Muslim States) and the enforcement arbitration awards. So, this is the reason of choosing the 
participants to this research very carefully, as the participants mainly were from the 
legislative power such as Shura councils members, the council of Experts Authority members 
and the Coucil of Senior Ulema and Judges. The in Direct observation took the form of 
interviews based on pre-planned sessions in which open questions were asked to twenty-five 
participants. 
 
Semi-structured interviews were also carried out with the following participants: senior 
executives of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority, Shari’ah scholars, Dean of a 
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local faculty of law, investors, retired and current judges and journalists. Impediments to the 
empirical study included the difficulty in locating persons with a thorough knowledge of the 
investment and arbitration laws of Saudi Arabia who were willing to be interviewed. The 
Researcher devised a plan to locate potential participants in multinational companies that 
have invested in the Kingdom, lawyers in private practices, and friends of the Researcher’s 
former lecturers in schools in Saudi Arabia. The opinions of the interviewees were captured 
with the objective of determining the perception of Saudi adjudicators and pundits on the 
rigid interpretation of the Shari’ah in Saudi Arabia. Given that the Shari’ah is not codified 
and courts are not required to comply with any precedent, a prophecy of how investment and 
arbitration laws will be applied in court or an arbitral tribunal may only have made by 
analysing the relevant statutes and commentaries, as well as the opinions of persons who are 
likely to apply these laws or analyse court decisions. The Researcher conducted face-to-face 
semi-structured interviews with the latter so that additional questions could be asked where 
the interviewees did not provide satisfactory answers. The interviewees provided meanings to 
key concepts relating to the interpretation and application of investment and arbitration laws 
in the Saudi Arabia. The meanings were decoded and conveyed in terms of categories and 
themes and then analysed as shown in chapter 8. The questions and the responses (translated 
from Arabic) are attached as Appendix I and Appendix II.  
 
1.8.3 Research Design 
 
The research mainly focussed on the collection and analysis of data relating to the impact of 
the rigid interpretation of the Shari’ah on the flow of FDI into Saudi Arabia. A hermeneutic 
phenomenological approach was taken to the empirical research so as to reveal the individual 
and shared opinions and experiences of the interviewees.100 This approach was also used for 
analysing the data collected through interviews. The data collected was applied to the thesis 
through quotations of significant statements and sentences,101 and then those statements were 
used to describe the participants’ opinions and experiences in a “textural description.”102  The 
researcher was careful to mitigate any biases of his own in analysing the results. This was 
very important given that the interviews were conducted after the doctrinal research, and the 
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Researcher had already formed an opinion on the link between the interpretation of the 
Shari’ah and the protection of foreign investors and adjudication or settlement of commercial 
disputes in Saudi Arabia. 
 
An interpretive (constructivist) approach was taken to documentary sources. This approach 
revealed and illuminated the main issues associated with FDI into Saudi Arabia and enabled 
the Researcher to identify the flaws of current system and proposed ways in which they may 
be rectified without damaging the cultural and religious heritage of the Kingdom. As noted in 
chapter 8, the Researcher encountered many challenges in the process including the time and 
costs of travelling, hesitation of some interviewees to participate, and the difficult access to 
primary data in libraries in Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, it was anticipated that enough data 
would be collected from other sources. An application was made for Ethics Approval, and it 
is relevant to note here that the research design was coordinated with the requirements of that 
application and Approval. 
 
1.9 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. Following the introduction provided in this chapter, 
the thesis is structured as follows:  
Chapter 2: The Role of Islam and Islamic Thought in Arabia and its Impact on Trade 
This chapter is the first step towards answering the research question of whether investors in 
Saudi Arabia are protected by the principles of the Shari’ah. It examines the history of 
Islamic legal thought as shaped by a plurality of cultural influences as well as a plurality of 
religious opinions, both at odds with orientalist conceptions of Islamic history as endlessly 
defined by stagnation and intellectual sterility. It therefore shows that the Western view of 
Islamic legal and social histories tends to oversimply the complexities of Islamic legal 
thought. Early Islamic legal thought was accommodating of plurality of thought. This 
plurality of thought arguably enabled the Islamic world to emerge as one of the powerhouses 
of the global economy and Muslim merchants at the time operated on an international scale. 
Two factors played a crucial role in the subsequent opposition to innovation and free trade in 
the Islamic world. These include first, the rise of the West and increased competition from 
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Western businesses, and second, the increased marginalisation of Arabia as world trade 
routes shifted and the West began to dominate world trade.  
Chapter 3: The Commercial Aspects of International Trade: How the Shari’ah 
Principles of Contract Law Have Shaped Islamic Trade and its Application in Saudi 
Arabia 
This chapter is a first step towards answering the question of whether the Shari’ah is 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate modern practices. It explains how historical factors led 
to the renewed scholarship of the Shari’ah which has helped Islamic law to adapt to the 
modern economics, commercial law and globalisation. It also shows that many principles of 
the Shari’ah stem from pre-Islamic and early Islamic practices of Arab tribes. It notes that 
despite these pro-trade origins, elements of the Shari’ah became rigid and inflexible resulting 
in jurisprudential stagnation that lasted for many centuries. However, there are some 
indications that this may be changing in order to attract foreign investors. Thus, Saudi Arabia 
continues to embrace globalisation due to the increased interconnectedness of the global 
economy. It concludes that the history of Islam provides two paths, the path of innovation 
and the path of stagnation, and Saudi Arabia can utilise the wisdom of Allah, Muhammad and 
early Islamic scholars to create an innovative and diversified economy without sacrificing its 
Islamic privilege. 
Chapter 4:  Modernising the Legal System: Reconciling the Shari’ah and Modernity 
This chapter also addresses the research question of whether the Shari’ah is sufficiently 
flexible to accommodate modern practices. It attempts to determine the extent to which the 
modernisation aims of the Saudi leadership are reconcilable with Islamic legal traditions in 
contemporary Saudi Arabia. The analysis of legal reforms also helps towards addressing the 
research question of what mechanisms can be implemented to attract foreign investors. It 
examines the development of the legal system, with emphasis on how Saudi authorities have 
imported foreign concepts and values to modernise the laws while protecting the Kingdom’s 
Islamic heritage. It then analyses the current dual legal system and determines the extent to 
which the delicate balance is achieved. It notes that looking in, a foreign investor may 
struggle to grasp the most basic aspects of Saudi law and, this may be an impediment to the 
prospects of the Kingdom as a place to do business and settle investment disputes. This is 
because we are left with a paradox. On the one hand, without codification or a system of 
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judicial precedent, there is little certainty and transparency on how particular courts arrive to 
their decision. On the other hand, an attempt to codify general principles of the Shari’ah 
might further entrench certain religious legal traditions that have been historically dominant 
in Saudi Arabia, at the expense of creativity, innovation and adaptability in Islamic legal 
thought and practice. Thus, the key to adaptation may be to take the best of the Hanbali 
tradition while drawing from other sources and schools of thought from within and outside 
the Islamic legal tradition. 
Chapter 5: The Investment Environment and Law in Saudi Arabia: A Step Forward 
and a Step Back? 
This chapter also attempts to answer the research question of how foreign investors are 
protected in Saudi Arabia. It reviews the history of FDI in Saudi Arabia in order to establish 
why certain legal, political and religious barriers resulted in negative perceptions amongst 
foreign investors about the Kingdom. It considers why the perceptions are changing and 
illustrates how Saudi Arabia is amending its legal structures to encourage FDI. These changes 
form part of a broader spectrum which can be seen throughout Saudi society, including the 
legal, political, social and economic systems. It shows that historically, the Saudi government 
has failed to tackle the fundamental issues that are holding back the proposed economic 
progress. It also demonstrates that the Shari’ah is not an obstacle to the protection of foreign 
investments. The relevant pointer is the foreign investor’s nationality rather than religion, 
given that the MITs and BITs ratified by Saudi Arabia require investors from other signatory 
states to be afforded certain rights and privileges. However, a major obstacle to all foreign 
investment in Saudi Arabia is dispute resolution in general, and arbitration in particular. 
Chapter 6: The History of Arbitration in Saudi Arabia 
This chapter continues from chapter 3 by showing that there are some indications that the 
rigid and inflexible approach to the interpretation of the Shari’ah may be changing in order to 
attract foreign investors. However, it focuses on the laws governing arbitration. It 
demonstrates that the apparent rejection by Saudi courts of international commercial 
arbitration had more to do with the perceived unfairness that resulted from the application of 
‘Western’ arbitration models that highlighted the inherent differences between the Western 
model and the Shari’ah model. In addition, there was a perception in Saudi Arabia that 
international arbitrators were dismissive in respect of the use of Shari’ah law in international 
arbitration, which made it more difficult for the Kingdom to protect its Islamic heritage. The 
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chapter traces the history of arbitration in the Arabian Peninsula from the pre-Islamic period 
through to the enactment of the New Arbitration Law in 2012. It shows that far from being 
anti-arbitration, Shari’ah law, and the region that now makes up the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, both have a rich history of encouraging arbitration stretching back for well over a 
millennium. It attempts to answer the research questions of whether the Shari’ah is 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate modern international arbitration practices; and how the 
Saudi Arabian model can be rendered into a more favourable model for the settlement of 
disputes in Saudi Arabia. 
Chapter 7: The New Arbitration Law and its Effects on International Arbitration in 
Saudi Arabia  
This chapter expands upon the previous chapters to provide more context of how Saudi 
Arabia, a country founded in a region that was steeped in the history of international trade 
and practising a religion that expressly promoted the principles of arbitration, has since 
struggled to incorporate international arbitration standards into its domestic law. It seeks to 
determine whether the New Arbitration Law may be said to mark the beginning of the final 
phase of the Saudi regulatory attitude towards arbitration. 
It argues that the willingness of the drafters of the New Arbitration Law to adopt and enforce 
UNCITRAL standards suggests a change of approach by the Saudi authorities when 
considering international standards. The courts are taking into account the Kingdom’s 
obligations under international treaties ratified by Saudi Arabia, such as the New York 
Convention and the Riyadh Convention. Furthermore, the willingness to appoint (or at least 
not reject the appointment of) female arbitrators is another example to support the contention 
that the Kingdom’s often rigid adherence to a traditional interpretation of the Hanbali school 
is being reconsidered. However, it points out that there is still some uncertainty about when 
Saudi courts may consider it appropriate to invoke their powers to intervene or to refuse to 
enforce an international arbitral award. 
Chapter 8: Fieldwork  
This chapter reports the findings of the qualitative survey that was conducted by the 
Researcher. It was motivated by the fact that although the Shari’ah remains the highest law of 
the land, it is not codified, and courts are not required to follow precedents. Thus, it may be 
difficult for a foreign investor or arbitrator to determine with certainty whether any provision 
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or clause in a contract or any arbitral award will be enforceable in Saudi Arabia. In this light, 
the Researcher attempted to ascertain the perception of members of the Saudi legal 
community towards the Shari’ah. Emphasis was placed on the relationship between the 
Shari’ah and free trade and its appeal to foreign investors, the importance of codification, the 
use of the Shari’ah to settle investment disputes, the training and knowledge of judges in 
Shari’ah courts, and the importance of establishing precedent. The study was based on the 
contention that the perception of participants in the Saudi legal community may help to 
provide a better understanding of the flexibility of the Shari’ah. All the participants had in 
their respective capacities faced the dilemma of applying the law of the Saudi Arabia based 
on the strict interpretation of the Shari’ah or the law of another State that is more suitable for 
investment or arbitration. The Researcher identified causal relationships by showing that the 
independent variable, respondents’ belief that free trade and enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards are compatible with the principles of the Shari’ah, has a marked impact on the 
dependent variable, the progressive interpretation of the Shari’ah.  
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
This chapter concludes this thesis by showing how the hypothesis was tested and the research 
questions answered in order to achieve the aim. Also, it shows how the results of the study 
may be integrated with the findings of key studies and provide support to and differ from the 
theoretical positions of the studies. It submits that although the rigid interpretation of the 
Shari’ah is an obstacle to FDI, the Hanbali fiqh is flexible in regard to commercial matters. 
Moreover, other schools such as the Hanafi are much more flexible. As such, it is important 
to determine whether adjudicators in Saudi Arabia may refer to another school of 
Jurisprudence other than the Hanbali school in order to invoke another interpretation of the 
Shari’ah that is more advantageous to trade and commerce. This in line with the istihsan 
principle that enables Islamic judges to choose more equitable solutions where a literal 
application of the verses may not promote the public good or cause a detriment to the general 
public. The chapter concludes with recommendations for further studies. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
The Role of Islam and Islamic Thought in Arabia and its Impact on Trade 
2.1 Introduction 
There is a general recognition that much of the Muslim world, and specifically the Arab 
world, has fallen behind other regions of the world economically.1 There has been much 
debate about the reasons for this. Some claim it is the result of the interplay of cultural and 
religious factors in the region.2 Others have argued that it is a common misunderstanding of 
Islam to believe that it discourages trade and economic progress.3 On the other hand, some 
commentators have contended that Islam actually encourages trade.4 This chapter verifies this 
last contention through a historical analysis. It examines the relationship between Islamic 
thought and trade. This is the first step towards answering the first research question of 
whether investors in Saudi Arabia are protected by the principles of the Shari’ah. It is shown 
here that the Golden Age of Islam was possible because of merchant capitalism, and until the 
1500s, the Muslim world was per capita richer than the West. However, this was to change, 
because of the growing influence of the jurists who interpreted the Qur’an in inflexible ways 
and discouraged5 risk-taking and innovation, which were essential for trade.  
This change in the legal culture was to create an environment where traders and entrepreneurs 
were no longer able to take risks or rely even on the legality of the contracts that they formed. 
                                                
1 See for example, Wasim Maziak, ‘Science, Modernity, and the Muslim World’ (2017) EMBO Reports 194, 
194-195; Nir Kshetri and Ajami Riad, ‘Institutional Reforms in the Gulf Cooperation Council Economies: A 
Conceptual Framework’ (2008) 14(3) Journal of International Management 300, 300-302; Timur Kuran, ‘Why 
the Middle East is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation’ (2004) 
18(3) Journal of Economic Perspectives 71, 71-90; Ahmad S Moussalli, ‘Globalization and the Nation State in 
the Arab World’ (1998) 32(1) Middle East Studies Association Bulletin 11, 11-12. 
2 See for example, Filipe Campante and David Yanagizawa-Drott, ‘Does Religion Affect Economic Growth and 
Happiness? Evidence from Ramadan’ (2013) Harvard Kennedy School, Faculty Research Working Paper Series 
RWP 13-052, 1, 5-6, 26. See also, David Bryan S Turner, Weber and Islam: A Critical Study (Routledge and 
Kegan Paul 1974). However, Weber also argued that China’s failure to develop rational institutions was due to 
the absence of a universalist ethical religion such as Christianity, Islam and Judaism. See Max Weber, The 
Religion of China (The Free Press 1964) 237. 
3 Carlo A Pedrioli, ‘Constructing the Other: US Muslims, Anti-Sharia Law, and the Constitutional 
Consequences of Volatile Intercultural Rhetoric’ (2012) 22 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 
65, 108; Richard W Bulliet, The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization (Columbia University Press 2004) vii; 
Christopher Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective (St Martin 1988) xv. 
4 See Timur Kuran, The Long Divergence, How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East. (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton and Oxford 2011) 4; Ajaz Ahmed Khan and Laura Thaut, ‘Islamic Perspective on Free Trade’ 
(2008) Secours Islamique 3, 5-11. 
. 
5 Ibid P. 17 
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This contributed to undermining trade and economic growth in the Muslim world. This is not 
just of historical interest given that the impact of a conservative legal culture, which is 
committed to the literal interpretation of the scripture, is a significant factor in the relative 
failure of Saudi Arabia to develop a diversified economy. The rigid legal culture means that 
Saudi entrepreneurs have been unable to create top-class companies and reduce the 
Kingdom’s dependency on the energy sector.  
However, it is arguable that this rigid legal culture stands in contrast with the pluralism of 
early Islamic thought, elements of which find their influences in non-Islamic intellectual 
traditions. Given its unique geographical location, Arabia has drawn influences from great 
civilizations and empires throughout history. Greece, Rome and the Egyptian empire lay to 
the west, the Persian and Babylonian empires to the north and the Indian and Chinese 
empires, the east. All these civilizations traded with and brought their unique ideas, 
philosophies and knowledge to Arabia.6 These traditions have shaped, and continue to 
influence, legal and cultural practices in the Middle East, and in Saudi Arabia more 
particularly.7  
For these reasons, this chapter considers the dynamic relation between Islamic societies and 
other civilisations in antiquity through to the modern era, stretching from Greek philosophy 
to its modern influence on commercial law. However, the chapter also cautions against a 
‘Western’ or orientalist conception of the identity and origins of Islamic history. This 
approach to history tends to depict Arab (and early Islamic) history as excessively influenced 
by foreign cultures, often in ways that exclude or marginalise alternative histories developed 
from ‘within’ the Islamic world.8 Orientalist developmental histories of Islamic civilisation, 
moreover, will frequently identify the 10th and 12th Centuries as a turning point in the 
evolution of Islamic thought and practice, whereby a once enlightened civilisation would 
                                                
6 See Siran Liu et al, ‘Copper Processing in the Oases of Northwest Arabia: Technology, Alloys and 
Provenance’ (2015) 53 Journal of Archaeological Science 492, 492; Christopher Edens and Garth Bawden, 
‘History of Tayma and Hejazi Trade during the First Millennium BC’ (1989) 32 Journal of Economic and Social 
History of the Orient 48, 48-103; Patricia Cone, Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam (Princeton University Press 
1987) 214-230; Frederick S Paxton, ‘The Review of Patricia Cone “Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam”’ 
(1989) 48 The Journal of Asian Studies 574, 574-575. 
7 On the influence of English and French legal cultures, see Mohammed AM Ismail, International Investment 
Arbitration: Lessons from Developments in the MENA Region (Routledge 2016) 1-2; Maren Hanson, ‘The 
Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia’ (1987) 2(3) Arab Law Quarterly 272, 272-
291. 
8 Lena Salaymeh, ‘The Beginnings of Islamic Law: Late Antique Islamicate Legal Traditions (Cambridge 
University Press, 2016) 137-138; Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993) 2.  
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come to reject reason and innovation as ‘un-Islamic’.9 In an attempt to challenge, or qualify, 
these reductive and paternalistic accounts of Islamic intellectual and social histories, the 
second part of the chapter shifts the focus from an exterior view of Islamic civilisation to an 
interior view of Islamic knowledge as that which is derived from God’s law. Here, the 
chapter will reflect on the dynamic beginnings of Islamic philosophy, focusing on the 
relationship between legal thought and social change. This will prepare the ground for a 
careful assessment of the historical relation between Islamic thought and practice, on the one 
hand, and the modern economic stagnation of Muslim societies from the 10th Century to 
Modernity, on the other. 10 From the above premises, the third part of the chapter will 
conclude by considering ‘what went wrong’, examining the disjuncture between the diverse 
intellectual influences on Islam and the historical factors that adversely affected the economic 
development of the Islamic world, focusing on Saudi Arabia.  
2.2 Development of Islamic Knowledge 
Saudi Arabia is not only the birthplace of Islam, but also has the holiest sites in Islam revered 
by over a billion Muslims. Saudi Arabia itself strives to hold itself up as an example of 
following Islam and implements the Shari’ah (Islamic Law) as prescribed by the Qur’an and 
the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (Hadith).11 Islam emerged in Saudi Arabia which is 
a gateway to the three continents of Europe, Asia and Africa.12  
Islam is the world’s second largest religion13 adhered to by approximately 25% of the world’s 
population.14 Its followers, the Muslims, believe in one God Allah and Muhammad (PBUH) 
as the messenger of God who brought forth the message of Allah in the Holy book called the 
Qur’an. Emerging in Mecca as a new religion and socio-political order based on divine 
revelations in the early 7th century, the Islamic community led by the Holy prophet of Islam 
quickly established the city state of Medina to be the first ever modern sovereign nation state 
of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula. At that time, Mecca and Medina were located in the 
                                                
9 For a discussion see Aziz Al-Azmeh, Islamic Law (RLE Politics of Islam): Social and Historical Contexts 
(Routledge, 2013) 78 
10 Wael Hallaq, ‘Was the Gate of Ijtihâd Closed’?, (1984) International Journal of Middle East Studies 3, 28,. 
11 Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Islamic Jurisprudence (UsulAI-Fiqh). (Islamic Research Institute Press 2000) 50-
80. 
12 Sir Thomas Walker Arnold, The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith 
(Constable 1913) 212. 
13 Pew Research Center, ‘The Global Religious Landscape’(Pew Forum, 18 December 2012) 
<http://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/global-religious-landscape-exec/> 
14 Michael Lipka and Conrad Hackett, ‘Why Muslims are the World’s Fastest-growing Religious Group’. (2015) 
Pew Research Center 1, 2. 
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middle of the Byzantine, Sassanid and Greco-Egyptian empires of East Europe, the Middle 
East and the West Asia which then included the territories now known as Cyprus, Egypt, 
Yemen, Oman, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Jordan and 
Palestine.15 From just these two cities within a hundred years of the beginning of Islam, the 
religion had spread to China in the East and Spain in the West making it the most rapidly 
spreading mass religion in human history.16 The success of this new religion can be attributed 
more to its reverence of knowledge than anything else. 
The Arabic word for knowledge is ‘ilm’ and this word is considerably broader in nature than 
the word knowledge.17 Islam inspires its believers to acquire knowledge not only in the 
pursuit of spiritual uplift and scholastic enrichment but also as an act of worship which is 
superior even to Ibbadat (worship).18 The Prophet declared that learning is the duty of every 
Muslim and he himself was a great educator,19 as said of his creator, Allah: 
My Lord! Increase me in Knowledge (as revealed in the Qur’an)20.  
After the beginning of Islam, several streams of religious knowledge and inquiry came into 
existence, such as Tafseer (Qur’anic Commentary), Hadith (words said and acts done by the 
Prophet), Maghazi (battles of the Prophet), Fiqh (Jurisprudence), Usul-Al-Fiqh (Methodology 
of reading jurisprudence), Usul Al Din (Theology) and Ilm Ul Qirat (Linguistic Science). 21 
The concept of unity of knowledge i.e. the common goal of religion and knowledge also 
came into existence which encouraged followers of Islam to acquire knowledge, whether 
religious or relating to philosophy or science.22 
The Prophet corroborates this duty and is narrated as saying: 
                                                
15 Ibid. 
16 Arnold (n 8) 212. 
17 Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam (Vol 2, Brill 1970) 
10-40. 
18 Husam Muhi El Din Al-Alousi, The Problem of Creation in Islamic Thought, Qurʹan, Hadith, Commentaries, 
and Kalam (National Print. and Publishing Company 1965) 209. 
19 ibid 
20 Qur’an Chapter 20, verse 114. 
21Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Islamic Jurisprudence (UsulAI-Fiqh) (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute Press 
2000) 50-80. 
22 Husam Muhi El Din Al-Alousi, The Problem of Creation in Islamic Thought, Qurʹan, Hadith, Commentaries, 
and Kalam (National Print. and Publishing Company 1965) 58. 
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Seek knowledge even if you have to go as far as China, for seeking knowledge is 
a duty on every Muslim. 23 
In a further contemplation of the centrality of knowledge to the development of Islamic 
thought, the Hanafi jurist Al-Zarnūjī produced several volumes of writing dedicated to 
understanding the nature of Islamic knowledge, which he delineated into two main 
categories.24The first branch of knowledge is known as fardh al ayn.25 This mode of 
knowledge refers to the mode of spiritual awakening to which all believers must strive and 
without with Muslims cannot acquire the necessary knowledge to correctly discharge their 
duties to Allah (God) The second branch is known as fard al-kifaya and is more 
communitarian in ethic. Fard al-kifaya requires all Muslims, individuals and institutions, to 
enter into cooperative forms of learning towards the achievement of mutually beneficial 
outcomes.26Applying these two principles, Al-Zarnūjī conceived of ilm as the endeavour to 
attain and perfect the social and spiritual wellbeing of individuals and communities, since one 
could not exist without the other. 27  
Viewed through the lens of Al-Zarnūjī’s concept of knowledge, in Islam, religion and reason 
are neither opposing nor distinct realms of enquiry but should be viewed, instead, as two 
sides of the same coin. Islam Huda et al elaborate on the ‘dialectical’ (reflexive and 
responsive) character of Islamic conceptions of knowledge.28 
The Islamization of knowledge is not simply about an intellectual attempt to 
‘Islamicize’ the ‘un-Islamic’ fields of knowledge but to integrate the Islamic 
ethical or tawhidic principles into such fields of modern thought. It means that 
                                                
23 Al-Albaani, Silsalah Al-aHaadeeth Al-Da'eefah wa Al-MawDoo'ah, vol. 1, pg. 600 - 609, hadeeth # 416 
24 Burhan l-Zarnuji, Ta‘lim al-muta‘allim: Tariq al-ta‘allum (Indonesia Al Miftah, 2008) 
25 Jibrail Huda et al, ‘Al-Zarnūjī’s Concept of Knowledge (‘Ilm)’, (2014) Sage Open 1, available at 
< http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2158244016666885> 
26 ibid 
27 id 
28 On responsive law, see the classical treatise of Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick, Law and Society in 
Transition: Toward Responsive Law (ed. (1978) 1. On responsive law, see the seminal work of Gunther ‘ 
‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements In Modern Law,’ (1986) Law and Society Review 17. What the researcher 
is trying to communicate here is the idea of an objective form of knowledge that is self-referential. Islamic law, 
in other words, is an autonomous branch of law with its own independent validity criteria. On the other hand, 
Islamic models of knowledge allow for a plurality of opinion and, by “responding” to its social environment, 
can evolve to integrate other forms of knowledge, from within and outside Islamic intellectual discourses. For 
an interesting take, see Sai Bhatawadekar, ‘Islam in Hegel's Triadic Philosophy of Religion’, (2014) 25(2/3) 
Journal of World History 397. See also Safdar Ahmad, ‘ProgressiveIslam and Qur’anic Hermeneutics: The 
Reification of Religion and Theories of Religious Experience,’ Muslim Secular Democracy 76,77. 
However, it should be noted that deviation from epistemic principles of Islamic law and knowledge is 
considered to be illegitimate (bid’a). In the strict Salafist tradition, those who reject the literal word of God are 
believed to have excommunicated themselves from the religion (tafsir).  
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the outcome will be a sort of hybrid knowledge formed from a blend of the 
Islamic norms and rational knowledge.29 
2.2.1 The Islamic Idea of Legal Knowledge 
For Muslims, all knowledge has a divine root and ‘grammar’.30 In the above regard, the 
Qur’an and Sunnah constitute ‘the highest primary sources of the Shari’ah and therefore 
possess supreme character and authority.’31 The laws derived from the Shari’ah are both 
divine and temporal and, in this latter character, are constitutive of the ‘moral scheme’ that 
regulates the conduct of all Muslims in their daily lives.32  
Given that the Shari’ah regulates matters of morality as well as legal doctrine, it might 
appear, as Reinhart suggests, that the Islamic legal ethics are indistinguishable from Islamic 
law and legal theory.33 Turning this assumption on its head, Hallaq posits that Islamic legal 
theory is fundamentally concerned with the ‘epistemic’ foundations of legal authority, and 
not with the religious or ethical content of a particular rule of the Shari’ah, per se.34 Put 
differently, legal scholars from within the Islamic world, historically and in the present era, 
are endlessly preoccupied the essential nature, sources and structure of authority of Islamic 
law. In order to understand this concept of epistemic authority, it is important to recognise 
that Shari’ah is an ‘archetype’. For Muslims, in other words, Shari’ah is the highest 
embodiment of a legal system and, therefore, the authoritative standard by which all other 
rules and norms of Islamic law (fiqh) are derived.35 The rules of Islamic law therefore prevail 
over all other forms of secular and civil authority.36 All expressions of knowledge are, 
moreover, to be viewed as the human effort to perfect the will of God.37 
                                                
29 id at 4. On Islam’s capacity for legal pluralism see Wael B Hallaq Authority, Continuity and Change in the 
History of Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press, 4ed 2004) preface, 125-127 
30 Mohammad Hashim Kamali Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Islamic Legal Text society, 1989) 13 
31 Mahdi Zahraa, ‘Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of Modern Legal and Social Science 
Research Methods for Islamic Research’, (2003) 18(3/4) Arab Law Quarterly 215, 218 
32 Kevin Reinhart, ‘Islamic Law as Ethics’, (1983) 11(2) Journal of Religious Ethics 186 [describing the 
Shari’ah as an “independent scheme of moral categorization”].id 196. See also David A. Westbrook, ‘Islamic 
International Law and Public International Law: Separate Expressions of World Order’ (1993) 33 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 819, 842 
33 Reinhart [n31] 186-187 
34 Wael B Hallaq Authority, Continuity and Change in the History of Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press, 
4ed 2004) preface, 127-128 
35 Usul al-Bazdawi, Al-Mahsul, and the Mukhtasar al-Muntaha of the Maliki jurist. Abu Umar Uthman b. al-
Hajib (d. 646). See also Mahdi Zahraa, Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of Modern Legal and 
Social Science Research Methods for Islamic Research’, (2003) 18(3/4) Arab Law Quarterly 215,218-219 
36 The textual authority for this principle derives from the Qur’an 3: 191 “Those who remember Allah standing, 
sitting, and lying down on their sides, and think deeply about the creation of the heavens and the earth, (saying): 
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There is, however, another aspect of Islamic philosophy which speaks to its capacity for 
innovation and adaptability to social change.38 Islamic discourses, religious and legal, are in 
one sense conservative and literal, in so far as no ruler or juristic authority may derive fiqh 
(the substantive rules of Islamic law) from sources outside of the Qur’an and Sunnah.39 In 
most practical aspects, however, Islam is no different from any other legal system in its 
capacity to accommodate ‘processes of continuity and change.’40 This continuity is expressed 
not as the ‘blind or mindless acquiescence to the opinions of others, but rather as the reasoned 
and highly calculated insistence on abiding by a particular authoritative legal doctrine.’ 41The 
task of regulating the boundaries between processes of continuity and change was first taken 
up by the classical jurists of Islam’s presumed Golden age of Reason.42 This era, widely 
assumed to have spanned the 8th to 12th Centuries, is regarded as a ‘formative’ period and 
resulted in the articulation and elaboration of Islamic concepts of legal authority and general 
principles of law.43 Guided by the first principles of classic Islamic legal thought – faith and 
reason – the jurists of the age produced an unprecedented body of norms and legal 
methodologies.44 The principles produced from these practices of juristic interpretation 
continue to shape normative and legal discourses in the Islamic world even today.45  
                                                                                                                                                  
"Our Lord! You have not created this without purpose, glory to You! Give us salvation from the torment of the 
Fire”. For an interesting discussion see Azizah Al-Hibri ‘Islam, Law And Custom: Redefining Muslim Women 
'S Rights’, 1997 12 American University International Law Review 1, 19 
37 Zahraa, (n30) 215, 218, 220-221 
38 Hallaq (n33) ix 
39 Reinhart (n31) 193 
40 Wael B (n33) preface, x 
41 ibid 
42 In as much as this era was characterised by intense intellectual debate, innovation and creativity, there is some 
dispute as to when this ‘Golden Age’ ended. Wael espouses the view that the classical jurisprudence spans the 
8th century, which was then followed by a counter reformation in the 9th and 11th and 13th Century, fostered 
through the revival of strict literalism in the work of Ibn Hanbal (9th Century) and his student Ibn Tamiyyah (the 
13th Century); the founder of the Hanbali school of thought popularised in Arabia. See Wael Hallaq, ‘The Quest 
for Origins and Doctrines - Islamic Legal Studies as Colonialist Discourse,’(2002-2003) 2 UCLA Journal of 
Islamic & Near Eastern Law 1, 3. However, El Shamsy contends that the 14th Century was equally fruitful. See 
Ahmed Shamsy, The Canonisation of Islamic law (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 2. The idea that Islamic 
jurisprudence and methods of reasoning ‘closed’ down, that is became less creative and more rigid, in the 12th 
century is pervasive in the literature. In fact, the conventional periodisation of Islam’s Golden age may represent 
an orientalist ‘historiciation’ of Islamic legal history, rendering it a legal and cultural monolith which 
‘solidified’ in the 12th Century, after which Islamic discourse either stagnated or took on a regressive character 
based on strict literalism. This began an era defined as the end of independent juristic reasoning, or the ‘closing 
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2.2.2 European Criticism of Islamic Knowledge  
The centrality of reason to Islamic knowledge and related intellectual discourses arguably 
disproves the ‘European criticism of Islam as an inherently backward and superstitious faith,’ 
and therefore to be regarded as the antithesis of Western-centric 18th century Enlightenment 
values of reason, rationality, historical progress and plurality of thought.46 The noted cultural 
critic Edward Said has explored these ideas in his work.47 Said suggests that European 
literature tends to portray the East, specifically the Arab world, as weak and irrational and 
therefore as the opposite of the rational and energetic West.48 This has resulted in a ‘cultural 
hierarchy’ wherein western culture, tradition and law are portrayed as inherently superior to 
their Eastern equivalents.49 
Moreover, Said contends that these ‘hegemonic’ representations of the Eastern world by the 
West have been internalised by the ruling elite of the Muslim world and that this has 
contributed to the failure of the Middle East to democratise and to develop, economically.50 
The Arab and Muslim worlds’ continuing influence on global knowledge in fields such as 
law, the sciences and economics is consequently trivialised, or otherwise styled as a ‘Grand 
Narrative’. This narrative tells a story of how the Arab world, once enriched by the earlier 
influence of Western ideas and the traditions of the neighbouring East, abandoned its 
rationalist heritage in favour of cultural insularity and religious conservativism.51 This 
account of the Islamic world’s intellectual and social history will be dealt with below. 
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2.2.3 A European View of Islamic History 
In the conventional ‘metanarrative’ of Arab social histories, the 4th to 8th Centuries52 are 
generally regarded as the highpoint of scientific enlightenment in the Islamic world, which is 
the period directly following the death of Prophet Mohammed, the Messenger of Allah.53 
Before the Prophet Mohammed transmitted the message of the Qur’an to the people of 
Medina, the Islamic world was a tribal one, with a largely oral culture.54 The last of the 
monotheistic religions, Islam promised to deliver the people of Medina from ignorance, the 
age of darkness, and through its teachings, fundamentally altered and ‘civilised’ the primitive 
practices of these tribal communities.55  
However, even before the message of the Qur’an was revealed to the earliest followers of the 
faith, many great empires has already invaded parts of Arabia and extended commercial links 
with the Arabs.56 The influence of the Babylonian law code on Arab law has also been 
established, as seen in the parallels between the Babylonian Code and Islamic tribal law.57 
Ancient Egyptian civilisation is also argued to have a formative influence on the cultural 
knowledge of pre-Islamic societies and there is some evidence to suggest that scientific 
methods in fields such as medicine were transmitted to Arabia, where it was handed down by 
the elders.58 Roman culture was also important in the development of Arab culture, possibly 
seen in some of the Pre-Islamic law code, especially the law on contracts.59  
2.2.4 Foreign Influences on the Islamic World  
Through Islamic expansionism and conquest, the Muslim Caliphates of Iraq, Syria and Hejaz 
would gain access to, and imbibe, cultural and technological influences from the Egyptian, 
Greek, Persian-Turkish form of Roman civilisation, as well as from Christian-Judaeo 
                                                
52 This may seem an odd statement to make as Islam was only founded in the 7th Century with the transmission 
of Qur’anic scripture by the Prophet Mohammed (s.a.w). However, it is not uncommon to speak of the Islamic 
world’s cultural enrichment through its proximity to Judaeo-Christian ideas and other influences from the non-
Islamic world which would influence thought and practice in centuries to come 
53 Eric Chaney, ‘Religion and the Rise and Fall of Islamic Science’, Occasional Paper, Harvard University, 
Word Press (2016) at 5 available at < https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/chaney/files/paper.pdf>  
54 Paul Lunde, Islam a Brief History (Dorling Kindersley 2003) 74181 
55 Henry Corbin, History of Islamic philosophy (Routledge, 2014), 19 
56 Ibid, 22 
57 Carol Bakhos and Michael Cook (eds) Islam and Its Past: Jahiliyya, Late Antiquity, and the Qur'an. (Oxford 
University Press 2017) 10-50 
58 Majid Fakhry, ‘Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism a Short Introduction (2000) 67 
59 Lunde (53) 74. 
 38 
traditions in the Near East.60 The Arab conquests in the 7th century meant that the Muslims 
ruled over sophisticated populations in Persian and the former Byzantine eastern provinces. 61 
Here, as told through an orientalist periodisation of Islamic history, the Muslims encountered 
societies that enjoyed long and illustrious intellectual traditions, in particular, the vast corpus 
of Greek philosophy. To this point, some have suggested that Muslims began to use Greek 
philosophy for the systematic investigation of legal methods, the universe, morality, and 
socially desirable or utilitarian outcomes.62 This became known as Falsifia, from the Greek 
word for philosophy. Islamic philosophers became known as ‘Hakims’ (philosophers)63 and 
held a higher status than ‘ulema’ (theocrats) and ‘fuqaha’ (scholars).64 It is noteworthy that 
Muslim philosophers used their knowledge and skill to defend the faith (Kalam) but also 
speculated on secular and scientific matters.65 These rationality based traditions were, as told 
through conventional ‘histories’ of the era, soon to be challenged with the rise of religious 
conservativism in the 11th Century, discussed below. 
2.2.5 From Rationality to Religious Revivalism 
By late Antiquity, the Islamic empire stretched from India to Spain. Schacht describes as this as 
‘a period of incubation’ resulting in the ‘integration’ of methods, concepts and principles 
originating in the traditions of antique civilisations, including the Aramaic Jewish Talmudic 
traditions and the shared cultures of neighbouring Christian and pagan societies in the Near 
East. 66 During this period, Islamic territories were administered under the control of the 
Abbasid Caliphate, the epicentre of the Islamic empire. The historical rulers of the Abbasid 
Caliphate introduced several reforms that were seen as vital to the developmental ‘progress’ of 
the Islamic world, since Arabia was the chief beneficiary of the wealth accumulated from the 
region’s exposure to foreign cultures through trading partnerships.67 These commercial 
connections, viewed through the lens of Orientalist literature, enriched the knowledge of 
Arabian rulers who blended and borrowed techniques from the earlier Greek, Egyptian and 
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Roman civilisations to improve their administrative systems and promote technological 
innovation in city infrastructure.68 The Abbasid Caliphs in Baghdad translated all major 
scientific works into Arabic and sponsored scientific research in the fields of astronomy, 
mathematics, medicine and optics. 69 Viewed in the above light, the intellectual heritage of 
medieval Islamic Arabia was both built on, and vastly enriched, by previous civilisations.70  
In these ‘exterior’ histories of the Arabian world in late Antiquity, the 11th Century represented 
the first departure point from the pluralistic influences that had earlier shaped Arabian culture 
and the resulting ‘identity’ of the Arab world. Chaney, for example, contends that the earlier 
system of Caliphate patronage in the arts, sciences and administrative would come under threat 
as ‘intellectual pursuits shifted to religious institutions such as madrasas’.71 In conventional 
(Western) histories of Islamic civilisation, therefore, the 11th Century began the struggle to 
define the ‘identity’ of the Arab world. In this historical account, secular (scientific-rationalist) 
and traditional (religious) forces within the Baghdad Caliphate each vied for political 
supremacy and interpretative authority.72  
In these traditional accounts, the institutional and intellectual shifts that occurred in the early 
11th Century through to the 12th Century (ending with the Mongolian invasion of the Abbasid 
empire) brought about an uncoupling of faith from reason.73 As Maksidi noted: ‘[t]he 
traditionalists rel[ied] on faith and shun[ned] reason; the rationalists glorif[ied] reason and 
ha[d] little use for faith.74 Viewed through the lens of Eurocentric histories, this impasse was 
finally overcome with the triumph of Sunni revivalism, a movement that fused political and 
religious authority through the state’s submission to an ultra-literalist or traditional approach to 
Islamic rules and rule-interpretation, discussed in section 2.3.75 As religious dogma prevailed, 
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the great achievements of Arab societies, in the fields of administration, science and 
technology, began to come undone under the imposing glare of religious fundamentalism. As a 
result of these developments Islamic societies, and their legal systems, are assumed to have 
entered into a period of relative economic decline.76 This period of decline is presumed to have 
spanned several centuries, moving from the 12th to the 19th Centuries through to the modern 
history of statehood and the decolonisation of Arab states (section 2.4).77  
2.2.6 The Limitations of the Orientalist View of Islamic History 
If the prevailing ‘metanarrative’ of Islamic history is to be accepted, the 12th Century also laid 
waste to the tradition of juristic creativity, legal pluralism and plurality of opinion that had 
once characterised Islamic legal discourses in the 8th and 10th Centuries.78 The Sunni revival, it 
is conventionally argued, brought an end to the tradition of independent juristic opinion, 
resulting in the reification and ‘canonisation’ of general principles of Islamic law in the 12th 
Century.79 Put differently, the normative contours of Islamic legal thought are implied to have, 
acquired a fixed identity.80 In the Orientalist imaginary at least, these developments stood in 
sharp contrast to the ‘Golden Age’ of reason-led religious interpretation in the classical era 
(section 2.3). 
The above discussed ethnocentric or cultural (orientalist) representations of Islamic legal and 
social histories tend to suffer from two basic problems.81 The first is that modern cultural 
criticisms of Islam tend to be a-historical, or otherwise offer a ‘hegemonic’ view of European 
influences on the development on Arab identity, in a way that marginalises the influence of 
Islamic thought, its role in ‘civilising’ tribal societies and its contribution to current forms of 
global knowledge.82 A more pertinent criticism is that these accounts fail to fully grasp the 
complexities of Islamic law and theory.83 In this regard, modern critics84 of the religion tend to 
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disregard the dialectical mode of legal reasoning applied to religious interpretation and 
exegesis as it was practiced by medieval era Islamic jurists.85 Ahmed suggests, for instance, 
that classical jurists practiced a, 
[m]ethod of interpretation that places emphasis on the ‘subjective nature of 
religious understanding ……[and] subject-centred notion of truth that is brought 
to the interpretation of the Qur’an or subsidiary texts…[thereby] resisting 
rationalization (and subsequent instrumentalization) of religion’. 86  
According to Ahmed, it is this ‘subjective’ mode of interpretation and reasoning that has 
fallen into disuse following long periods of religious revivalism, traditionalism and 
fundamentalism throughout various phases of Islamic legal history.87 This account of the 
nature and development of Islamic methods of textual interpretation (hermeneutics) is, 
however, subject to criticism for, at once, overstating the role of ‘subjective’ reasoning in the 
development of Islamic law and custom, whilst also (unwittingly) privileging a ‘regressionist’ 
narrative of the developmental histories of Islamic legal thought from late Antiquity to 
Modernity.88 In the above regard, Western and other non-Islamic scholars tend to portray 
legal and political developments in the Islamic world in linear and monolithic terms, often at 
some distance from how Muslims scholars understand their own history, identity and 
traditions. There is no such as thing as single or unitary conception of Islamic civilisation, 
identity or history, and a Muslim’s appreciation of their legal traditions is invariably shaped 
by the contingencies of local culture, history and context.89  
At the same, as discussed in the remaining sections of this chapter, Islamic society and 
thought has not remained static, but has instead experienced periods of relative innovation 
and relative stagnation. Nevertheless, regardless of how paternalistic or flawed European 
assessments of Islamic history may appear to be from those who practice and study it, there is 
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nonetheless some evidence to suggest that the character of Islamic law and method did 
acquire a certain kind of fixity in the 13th Century, at odds with the dynamic nature of Islamic 
legal thought two centuries before. 90 By grounding its analysis in cultural criticisms of the 
‘Western’ or Orientalist histories of Islamic thought and practice as it is viewed ‘from the 
outside’, the next section offers a (highly stylised) version of early Islamic legal history from 
within its ranks. This will prepare the ground for an assessment of how leading intellectual 
figures in the Islamic world came to shape, and potentially fossilise, legal developments in 
the Muslim world for centuries to come. 
2.3 Islamic Religious Histories: A View from ‘The Inside’  
Islamic scholars and jurists, unsurprisingly, perceive Islamic intellectual histories from a very 
different lens than their European (and now Anglo-American) cousins. Some accept that the 
intellectual history of the field was dynamic and ‘open-textured’ in the era of Islamic 
conquest and expansionism, 91  though others will argue that if, indeed, Islamic legal custom 
and method had solidified in the 12th Century, it had done so for good reason. 92  In other 
words, Islamic jurisprudence had no need to evolve as rapidly as had done in the ‘formative’ 
period of its development because most jurists had already achieved an acceptable level of 
consensus on principles of Islamic law and its methods of rule-interpretation. The above 
notwithstanding, even at the peak of Islamic theoretical and doctrinal innovation, key areas of 
disagreement remained. The most important of these disagreements developed around the 
manner, and degree to which, a jurist could exercise independent juristic reasoning (ijtihad) 
when faced with a problem not explicitly regulated by the Qur’an and Sunnah. 93 These 
debates were, in a deeper sense, intimately connected to broader juristic controversies on the 
role of fairness and equity in rule-reinterpretation, or the balance to be struck between legal 
tradition and social reform.94 At the core of these disputes, however, lay a more fundamental 
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set of ‘epistemic’ questions around the nature and sources of legal authority underpinning the 
system of the Shari’ah. 95 
2.3.1 The Emergence of Islamic Legal Theory  
The root of Islamic law derives from the concept of Fiqh. 96 Fiqh describes the laws of an 
Islamic legal system that are derived from the supreme sources of Islamic law (the Qur’an 
and Sunnah).97 In this regard, a detailed set of legal practices, rulings, norms and customs 
have evolved across the Muslim world on matters ranging from religious ritual, personal 
status law (family law) and contract regulation; the latter of which is considered the ‘root’ of 
all Shari’ah governed commercial laws and practices.98 There is second branch of Islamic 
law, known as Usul al-fiqh, which includes within its scope various ‘experimental’ research 
methods of juristic deduction and inference which are used to interpret and derive rules from 
textual sources.99 Conceptually, these two domains of knowledge are distinct.100 
To those scholars immersed in Western theories of law and jurisprudence, these aspects of 
Islamic law and method may appear unfamiliar and obscure. Part of this confusion arises 
from the fact that the Qur’an and Sunnah constitute both the ‘source and subject matter’ of 
Islamic law or fiqh,101 as Kamali elaborates: 
Fiqh, in other words, is the law itself whereas usul al-fiqh is the methodology of 
the law. The relationship between the two disciplines resembles that of the rules 
of grammar to a language, or of logic (mantiq) to philosophy. Usul al-fiqh in this 
sense provides standard criteria for the correct deduction of the rules of fiqh from 
the sources of Shari’ah. An adequate knowledge of fiqh necessitates close 
familiarity with its sources.102  
In practice, most legal methodologies that have been developed under the rubric of usul al-
fiqh emanate from human enquiry rather than the Qur’an and Sunnah, since both provide 
little guidance on how to resolve interpretative conflicts (between conflicting verses of the 
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Qur’an); the manner in which the authenticity of Hadith (the narration of the Prophet’s 
rulings and practices) is discerned; or the method by which rules not expressly regulated by 
textual sources can be modified or applied to new circumstances.103  
2.3.2 Jurisprudence in the First and Second Islamic Century  
Formally speaking, the concept of fiqh developed by the relevant schools of jurisprudence 
(fiqh) emerged only in the first century of Islam, after Prophet Mohammed’s death in 632 
CE.104In the first Islamic century, there was no theological need for the development of 
secondary rules of deduction i.e. Usul al-fiqh. This is because any legal question or dispute 
could be referred to the Prophet himself.105 This was a logical step because, as Kamali notes, 
the first principles of Islamic law and method are themselves derived from primary sources, 
in other words from Qur’anic revelation and the Prophet’s corroborating legal judgments and 
customs.106 The Prophet’s teachings were then passed down through oral transmission to his 
companions and their descendants after the Prophet’s death, still in the First Islamic century 
(622 CE – 719 CE).107 Since the Prophet’s companions had living memory of his rulings and 
practices, and therefore had direct experience of the Sunnah and knowledge of the scriptural 
revelations, there was little impetus to articulate general principle and methods from which to 
derive Islamic rules of law. 108 In fact, it is something of a misnomer to suggest that Islamic 
law came into existence only after Islamic jurists and scholars had put a name to it, since the 
Prophet himself issued several rulings, opinions and decisions, and did so by developing 
methods of rule-deduction. 
By the next Islamic Century (the 8th Century), the jurists of the age had no direct proximity to 
sources of fiqh; in other words, the Prophet’s rulings or the oral testimony of his companions. 
Faced with legal issues on which there was no clear solution, jurists in the classical period of 
Islamic thought began to rely on ever more innovative interpretative techniques and 
secondary legal methods.109 These methods were systematised in a treaty (Kutub al-Usul) in 
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788 CE/150 A.H.110 It was during this era that religious scholars and ulama (the collective 
noun for religious experts trained in Islamic law and methods) would emerge as powerful 
figures of authority. Through this authority, the ulama was not only able to critique and shape 
the prevailing socio-religious norms of the regions, but also influenced the more positivistic 
aspects of state-building, administered under the 2nd Umayyad Caliphate. 111Three centres of 
Islamic learning would become dominant during this era: Hijaz, Iraq and Syria. Makah and 
Medina emerged as the intellectual powerhouses of the Hijaz region (Arabia).112  
In the early 8th Century, the Medina ulama and the ruling authorities in Baghdad began to 
diverge on the fundamental purposes of Islamic legal method.113 The nature of the dispute 
rested on the distinction between legal precepts (Hukm) and local customs that had developed 
through need and necessity (Zaman). 114 One area of controversy concerned the degree to 
which Islamic legal precepts could be reinterpreted or modified in light of social (or political) 
necessity, for instance to meet the welfare needs of local regions and communities 
administered under the historical rulers of each region.115  
The Hizaj regions came to be associated with a strict and more literal fiqh (Kutub al-Usul) 
and in this regard the Medina jurists were the natural intellectual predecessors of the Hanbali 
School of jurisprudence discussed below.116 For followers of this tradition, legal precepts 
deduced from the sources of Shari’ah and the consensus of Prophet’s Companions should 
prevail over custom or necessity, except in certain narrow circumstances.117The historical 
rulers of the Umayyad and later Abbasid Caliphates, by opposition, came to favour the 
teachings of jurists who applied a more socially-orientated (purposive) mode of legal 
reasoning which aimed to ‘bridge the gap’ between the Shari’ah and the more positivistic 
aspects of rule-administration.118 These jurists, influenced by the teachings of what would 
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later become the Hanafi School, would develop local customs that were more reflective of the 
processes of economic and legal change unfolding within societies of the time.119 
In the midst of these clashes between political and religious authority, the visionary founder 
and eponym of the Shaf’i school of jurisprudence devoted his writings to resolving the 
juristic conflicts of the age.120 Al Shafi, viewed by some as the architect of classical (and 
modern) Islamic jurisprudence, began the process of formulating general principles of Islamic 
law and methods of reasoning.121 Paralleling these developments, the Ulama (the community 
of religious scholars) had also begun the long process of recording and compiling the Hadith, 
(the oral testimony of the Prophet and his Companions).122 This, in turn, spurred the 
development of usul al-fiqh (the methods and science of Islamic law) as jurists came to rely 
more heavily on the Sunnah to substantiate their legal orientations and methodologies.123 
Through these and other developments, the 8th Century ushered in a new era of Islamic legal 
thought which culminated in the formation of the four orthodox schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence; Shafi, Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali.  
In pursuit of a coherent corpus juris, and in an attempt to mediate conflicts between the 
Medina ulama and state-sponsored madrassas in Baghdad, al-Shafi formulated evaluative 
criteria by which to assess the authoritativeness of a particular rule or method.124 The eponym 
of the Hanafi School, Abu Hanifah, was equally creative and generated a substantial body of 
opinions on secondary methods of rule-deduction and inference such as analogy, consensus 
and juristic preference.125 lmam Malik, founder of the Maliki school, developed a novel 
doctrine known as Madinese consensus – Ijma' ahl.126 While this school espoused (a 
relatively) strict adherence to religious texts and tradition, the consensus of the people of 
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Medina, in other words the Prophet’s companions, were used to substantiate a ruling or 
opinion not expressly addressed by the sources of the Shari’ah.127  
In their combined writings, the four orthodox schools articulated a typology of sources and 
general principles from which positivistic rules could be deduced or derived. These sources 
were the Qur’an, Sunnah, analogy (qiyas), and consensus (ijma). In the broadest sense, the 
four founding schools of jurisprudence (known as madhabs) were engaged in the process of 
constructing and reconstructing the boundaries between authority, continuity and change 
from within the prescriptive framework of the Shari’ah. These jurists went on to develop a 
sophisticated system for determining the rank and order of jurists with authority to provide 
direct rulings on points of law (fatwas) or render judgements in respect of individual cases. 128 
A variety of secondary methods and rules of re-interpretation were also formulated in this 
period, including inter alia: doctrine of juristic preference; (istihsan); the presumption of 
continuity (istishab); urf (custom); istidlal (referring) and masaliah al-mursalah (the law of 
suitability) and related principles such as maslahah (public interest).129The jurisprudence on 
usul al-fiqh is breath-taking in its scope and has given rise to complex schemes of 
argumentation, hermeneutics and evidence based rules. Many elements of rule deduction 
practiced by Islamic jurist appear to have their lineage in Greek philosophy namely the 
Aristotelian method of rule deduction, though modern Islamic lawyers have generally resisted 
this philosophical connection.130 Above all, the articulation of these methods was broadly 
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construed to give ‘fresh sanctions and definitions to a variety of socio-legal contents not 
reflected in the earlier phase of the Islamic history’. 131 
2.3.3 The Concept of Ijtihad 
As outlined above, many Islamic legal principles applied today can be traced to the writings 
of leading authorities of the four orthodox schools. Writing in the 8th Century and 9th Century, 
these jurists constructed innovative methods and secondary rules for dealing with Qur’anic 
exegesis; the authenticity of the Hadith; the theory of abrogation; the interpretation of 
language; in addition to formulate criteria used to evaluate the administrative laws and 
decisions of political authorities.132 Crucially, these processes of rule-deduction and 
interpretation developed under the auspices of the doctrine of ijtihad. 
The concept of ijtihad is defined as follows: 
[T[he exertion of the utmost effort by a trained jurist, taking into account all the 
relevant texts of the Qur‘an and Sunna as well as principles of jurisprudence, to 
discover, for a particular human situation, a rule or law. Ijtihad is the mechanism 
by which Islamic law, as revealed in the Qur’an and the Sunna, may be 
interpreted, developed and kept alive in line with the intellectual, political, 
economic, legal, technological and moral developments of a society.133 
When unable to find unequivocal answers to legal questions in the texts of the Qur’an or 
narration of the Sunnah, Hanafi and Shafi scholars in the classical jurisprudential canon 
would rely on the legal methodologies of the consensus and analogy.134 To the above point, 
El Fadl suggests that many Islamic jurists understood that the true objectives of the Shari’ah 
could not be derived from the explicit wording of religious texts alone. He noted:  
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Shari’ah was never a simple amalgamation of positive prescriptions and rules and 
was not simply based on textual commands claiming to be rooted with varying 
degrees of credibility to divine revelation.135 
At the same time, all four schools of Islamic jurisprudence acknowledged that the use of 
human reasoning did not permit a jurist or scholar to flagrantly flout the explicit meaning of a 
religious text.136 The science of usul al-fiqh was, accordingly, developed to ‘regulate ijtihad 
and to guide the jurist in his effort at deducing the law from its source and to [prevent] 
unqualified persons attempted to carry out ijtihad.’137 Religious authorities of the highest 
rank (the founders of the four schools, or madhab) were responsible for articulating legal 
standards with which to approve legal methodologies or to otherwise reject them.138 
Traditional courts and religious jurists would then apply these methodologies in their 
judgments. 139 
In the above light, a practice emerged whereby scholars of appropriate authority were 
required to base their rulings on evidence or ‘proofs’ derived from the explicit text of the 
Qur’an and authentic narrations of the Sunnah. 140 A magistrate (qadi) or jurisconsult (mufti) 
could not, for instance, derive a ruling or opinion from a general principle of law: such as 
‘theft is forbidden’ or that a contract containing elements of impurity (interest or gambling) 
should not be enforced. 141 The scholars of the age went on to delineate a sophisticated theory 
of textual interpretation based on the nature and sequence of the Qur’anic verses (e.g. a 
method for distinguishing literal verses (haqiqi) from those with a metaphorical meaning 
(majazi)).142  
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The above should not be taken to suggest that there were not significant differences between 
the four orthodox schools, Hanbali, Shaf’i, Hanafi and Maliki.143 The classical jurists adopted 
different opinions on a whole range of issues, include the authoritativeness and juristic limits 
of applying different proofs (consensus, analogy, custom, principle of continuity, juristic 
preference, public interest etc.). The point of departure between these schools boiled down to 
the degree to which jurists could, or should, depart from a legal text in order to achieve the 
higher moral and regulatory purposes of the Shari’ah.144  
The Qur’an is authoritative in the hierarchy of sources but the leading jurists of the classical 
era would invoke independent reasoning in certain circumstances to develop methods and 
precepts not strongly based in religious text or tradition. For instance, the Maliki jurist Ibn 
Rashad posited that a rule based in consensus may prevail over a rule of law sourced in 
ambiguous verse of the Qur’an or weak Hadith. 145The justification for the use of these 
consensus-based methods stemmed from the need to reduce interpretative variation which 
might otherwise expose Qur’anic exegesis and Hadith interpretation to an unreasonable 
degree of uncertainty.146  
Among the most dynamic interpretative (hermeneutical) methods developed in the formative 
age of classical Islamic jurisprudence is the doctrine of juristic preference, or istihsan.147 This 
rationalist doctrine requires the jurist to apply their intellect, experience and reason for the 
purposes of determining the appropriate rule-recognition criteria on an issue left unregulated 
by the Qur’an and Sunnah.148 The value of istihsan lies in the relative freedom it affords the 
jurist to exercise his own preference when deciding among one of many possible legal 
solutions to a given problem and also allows some scope for rule-reinterpretation in light of 
considerations of fairness and equity.149 Itishan is recognised as a permitted ‘proof’ but 
students of the more literalist fiqh schools, the Hanbali school prime among them, have 
construed it narrowly.150 This takes us to the crucial point. Jurists within each school of 
                                                
143 The differences between these schools are too vast to accurately reflect here. However see Zahraa (n30) 230-
242.  
144 El Fadl (n134) 88-89 
145 Hallaq (n33) 3. For a discussion on the Maliki school and the key tenants of its jurisprudence see Hallaq, 
infra, pp 11-12. On the Hanafi school approach to these juristic controversies and the role of independent 
reasoning in the construction of Islamic rules see 46-47, 5 and 91-92. On the Shafi school see 52-54 and 96-98 
146 Hallaq (n33) 127 
147 Kamali (n28) 13 
148 Hallaq (n33) 13-15 
149 Zuraidah & Wan Zailan (n132) 40 
150 See John Makdisi,, ‘Legal Logic and Equity in Islamic Law’, (1985) 33 American Journal of Comparative 
Law, 63 
 51 
thought or madhab will approach ‘hard cases’ from within their own interpretative 
traditions.151 
In the above regard, Islamic legal theory has undoubtedly played a formative role in the 
evolution (and stagnation) of Islamic legal thought and practice. 152 The classical scholars 
developed a vast body of case law that allowed for general principles to be applied to new 
circumstances. This process of legal reasoning was dynamic and pluralistic, meaning that 
while weaker opinions or cases were often supplanted by new rulings from other fiqh schools, 
the principles underpinning case law and opinion remained relatively constant.153 While this 
provided a safeguard against the perils of interpretative overreach, the mechanistic (and 
localised) application of Ijtihad can be argued to have generated problems of a different kind. 
Particular schools or madhabs would emerge as dominant in particular regions or 
communities. This meant that later generations of jurists were inclined to imitate the rulings 
and opinions of the school (mudhab) most closely aligned to the local culture and customs in 
which they operated.154  
At the same time, while the founding schools had achieved a degree of consensus over the 
character of general principles of law, it was equally clear that each fiqh School expressed 
different views on how flexibly, or inflexibly, these general principles of law should be 
applied or adapted in the face of social change or need. In this regard, Ibn Hanbal, the 
founder of the fourth school of Hanbali school of Jurisprudence is assumed to have departed 
from the other Schools of jurisprudence in significant ways. 155 
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A noted theologian, Ibn Hanbal launched a theological critique of ‘itjihad’ and was more 
generally critical of innovation in Islamic law and method. 156The fulcrum of his critique 
rested on the fallacy of questioning God’s law (shirk). From these premises, Ibn Hanbal 
appeared to refute Judeo-Christian conceptions of reason and logic on the basis that neither 
provided answers to the strictly theological enterprise of establishing what is permitted by 
scriptural revelation and what it is not.157 The writings of Ibn Hanbal represented the first 
repudiation of juristic innovation (bid’a), giving rise to the second wave of Sunni revivalism 
as manifested in the writings of Ibn Taymiyya; a scholar noted for his firm rejection of rules 
derived from juristic consensus and for his narrow interpretation of secondary rules of 
interpretation.158 By the 13th Century, the most influential Hanbali jurists preached near 
complete fidelity to the text of the Qur’an and the prophetic revelations of the Sunnah.  
To what extent, then, is to true suggest, therefore, the 13th Century ‘closed the door to 
ijtihad’.159 The next sections will reflect on the veracity of these claims, before going on to 
assess the developmental histories of the Islamic world, specifically its respect of the 
Muslim’s world’s attitudes to, and relationship with, trade from the 10th to 19th Century. 
2.3.4 The Closing of the Gate of Ijtihad? 
In the Orientalist imaginary, though perhaps bearing some truth, the door to ijtihad was 
closed in 13th Century. One perceived example of this ‘closure’ to ijtihad is best represented 
to the strict constructivism of Ibn Taymiyya, a follower of the founder of the Hanbali School, 
Ibn Hanbal. This jurist rose to prominence after the Mongolian invasion of Baghdad, setting 
into a motion a series of seismic political events that would result in the virtual collapse of 
the Abbasid Caliphate.160 In these shifting landscapes, a new religious polemics shaped 
intellectual discourses, this time in the form of a dispute between Sufi rationalists and the 
                                                
156 See note above (n155). Authority for this reading of Ibn Hanbal’s work is found in the oral transmission of 
his conversations with another jurist. See Saud Saleh AlSarhan, Early Muslim Traditionalism: Early Muslim 
Traditionalism: A Critical Study of the Works and Political Theology of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (Doctoral Thesis, 
University of Exeter,2011) 28 
157 See Holtzman [n154] [arguing against Orientalist representations of Ibn Hanbal work as inherently opposed 
to the use of logic and reasoning in scriptural interpretation, noting that ‘Ibn Hanbal allow[ed] himself a certain 
degree of reasoning.] id. 
158 See Caterina Bori, “Ibn Taymiyya wa-Jamā‘atuhu: Authority, Conflict and Consensus in Ibn Taymiyya’s 
Circle,” in (ed. Yossef Rapoport) Ibn Taymiyya and his Times (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 25 
159 See Schacht (n41) 71-72. For a critical perspective, see Hallaq, ‘Was the Gate of Ijtihâd Closed’?, (n79) 28-
33 
160 See generally, Ismail Abdullah, ‘Tawhid and Trinity: A Study of Ibn Taymiyyah’s al-Jawab al Sahih’, (2006) 
(4) Intellectual Discourse 191, 192. Also discussed extensively in Al Ahmad, Faris, ‘Corruptions, Imitations, 
and Innovations: Tropes of Ibn Taymiyya's Polemics’, (Masters Dissertation, submitted to the City University of 
New York, awarded in 2015) 9. Available at. <https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/831> 
 53 
leaders of a second Sunni revivalist movement, now resurgent in Cairo, Damascus and the 
Hijaz region. Lapidus, a student of Islamic history, notes that: 
Hanbalism fused the tradition of autonomous religious activity with the heritage 
of political activism and rebellion… a fusion with explosive implications for the 
religious authority of the Caliphate and for the relations between state and 
religion.161 
The above events provide important historical insight into the reasons why religious 
literalism emerged resurgent in the 13th and 14th Century, as well as the challenge it presented 
to political authority. On the matter of Islamic legal doctrine, however, it is arguable that the 
era of unconstrained ijtihad (independent reasoning) had already begun to ‘wither’ by the 10th 
Century. This is because successive generations of legal jurists were bound to follow the 
standards of the founding schools. These customs, in other words, had already begun to 
crystalise before the later waves of Sunni revivalism.162 If, indeed, the gates of ijtihad had 
closed by the 10th Century, then the Islamic duty of all Muslims to enrich their ilm may also 
be said to have been abandoned during this period. In other words, by failing to evolve the 
jurisprudence, later generations could be said to have based their opinions on blind faith or 
imitation (taqlid).163  
On the other hand, it is arguable that the demise of ijtihad has been somewhat overstated.164 
There have always been voices within the Islamic faith that have urged greater adaptation and 
reinterpretation of existing rules and methods. The Hanbali School is no exception. Whatever 
one might make of the static or fluid nature of Islamic jurisprudence in the Arab world, Saudi 
Arabia included, the Hanbali School is regarded as having ‘produced some of the most 
analytically and normatively dynamic legal scholars’.165These include the writings of al-Tufi 
writing in the 14th Century who wrote extensively on the general permissibility of adapting 
and reinterpreting rules for the purposes of advancing the social and economic welfare of 
Islamic societies.166 Legal innovation has, after the 10th Century, however been framed in less 
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authoritative terms through the use of doctrines such as ifta which allows for the adaptation 
of an existing rule in certain narrow circumstances.167 Some secondary rules, however, afford 
scholars a relatively broad scope of reinterpretation. For instance, the Islamic concept of 
public interest (maslahah) has been applied liberally to further legal reform on the grounds of 
social need, local custom and necessity.168 
Some have argued of the need to renew the tradition of ijtihad be renewed in the contexts of a 
globalising world, given that many modern Islamic countries do not appear to have kept pace 
with modern commercial and economic realities.169While there have been important attempts 
at legal innovation, the conditions under which such secondary rules may or may not be 
applied remains contentious. The above account underscores just how integral and 
problematic the concepts of reason and rationality are to the development of Islamic law and 
custom. Drawing on Islamic criticism of the limits of juristic innovation, Hallaq notes that 
fundamental aspects of substantive Islamic law have crystallised as ‘universal’ form of 
Islamic custom.170 Masud takes a different view of the field and argues that, far from being 
the engine of social reform, ijtihad was further purged of its creative potential from the 15th 
Century onwards, thereby rendering it a ‘mechanical principle that led Islamic society to 
fossilization and prevented it from progress.’171 
To what extent, therefore, can it be argued that Islamic societies have historically failed to 
attain relatively high levels economic development because of the doctrinal ‘closure’ of 
ijtihad and its mechanistic application from the 10th Century onwards? As discussed in the 
next section other factors, such as colonial rule, have also contributed to the stagnation of 
Muslim societies. As a result, any historical analyses that lays the blame for the Muslim 
world’s limited economic ‘progress’ on religious factors alone appears dubious when 
considering the West’s involvement in the Islamic world.172 Colonial critiques are also 
instructive in a theological as well as political sense. For instance, any exercise of ijtihad that 
                                                
167 Hallaq, ‘Ifta' And Ijtihad In Sunni Legal Theory’, (n131) 33-43 
168 See Opwis (n166) 184. 
169Frank Vogel and Samuel Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk and Return (Kluwer Law 
International, 2008) 4, 9.  
170 Ibid. Hallaq [n45] 227-228. Hallaq notes :[Although the notion of necessity has been used to justify a number 
of departures from the stringent demands of the law, it is, like custom, restricted to those areas upon which the 
explicit texts of revelation are silent. Abe Yesuf, for instance, was criticized when he held the opinion – which 
ran against the dictates of Prophetic Sunna]. Id at 227 
171 Muhammad Khalid Masud,  ‘Iqbal's Reconstruction of ljtihad,’ ( Islamic Research Institute, 1995) 7 
172 Ismael Hossein-Zadeh , ‘The Muslim World And The West: The Roots Of Conflict,’ (2005) 27(3) Arab 
Studies Quarterly 1 
 55 
is solely concerned with adapting Islamic rules of law to contemporary legal norms and 
practices might be viewed as the Muslim world’s capitulation to a Western legal paradigm.173 
In light of the above considerations, the next section turns its attention to broader historical 
factors thought to have affected economic progress in the Islamic world in the post classical 
era of Islamic jurisprudence, focusing finally on the birth of the modern state of Saudi 
Arabia. 
2.4 Bridging the Gap between Islamic and Western Histories: The Muslim World 
and Trade from the 10th To 19th Century 
The next section will focus on the religious, social and factors that have shaped trade and 
commerce in the Islamic world, and finally Saudi Arabia, as viewed through the lens of 
Islamic and orientalist histories. In doing so, it will consider the relationship between law and 
economy in the Muslim world after the 10th Century; in other words, after the ‘gates of 
ijtihad’ were, according to conventional histories, already beginning to close.  
Before the 10th Century, Arabia was considered a Golden Age of trade, and established 
Arabia as a hub of trade and commerce. The flourishing of trade was facilitated by Islamic 
principles of contract law (as detailed in chapter 2). Subsequent to this period, the main 
development of trade in the Islamic World is divided into two main periods: the 10th to the 
15th century, when Islamic trade remained strong and the period from 1500 to 1900 when it is 
assumed to have entered into a period of stagnation and decline.174After the 10th century, the 
Islamic world underwent a series of crises. The Abbasid Caliphate continued to rule in 
Baghdad, but as Lewis suggests, these rulers were little more than the puppets of their 
Turkish guards (Ghulam).175 The fragmentation of the Abbasid Caliphate did not, however, 
lead to the complete collapse of Muslim society.176 A series of successor Empires arose in the 
lands that were formerly held by the Abbasids such as the Fatimids.177These were Muslims 
societies and it is estimated that these Muslim majority states were becoming increasingly 
Arabized. By the early 12th century, however, Turkish nomads dominated much of the 
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Muslim World and various Turkic dynasties would rule much of the Muslim World until the 
20th century.178 
However, trade continued and proved to be remarkably resilient.179 This was in part because 
of the high status that was accorded to traders and merchants, who often formed alliances 
with the new Turkish elites. The various communities in the Muslim world had become 
interdependent and they needed to exchange goods and products. Caravan routes that had 
crossed much of the Muslim world continued to be used. These and other routes of trading in 
intra-city commerce allowed for the free flow of merchandise across territories.180  
The importance of these caravan routes was recognised by the Great Seljuk Empire and they 
established caravanserais to support the trade conducted by caravans. These were retained 
and expanded by later rulers such as the Ottomans.181 Indeed, the Arab world continued to be 
the crossroad of world trade, for example, the Silk Road traversed the Muslim world.182The 
Arabs continued to act as the intermediaries for trade and they traded extensively with the 
Byzantium Empire, at least in times of peace.183 This also spurred the development of new 
trade routes in the Mediterranean where Muslim merchants traded mainly with Italian 
merchants. Many of the trading practices developed in the Islamic world, primarily in the 
area of trusts and banking, were adopted by European merchants at this time and this helped 
to boost the European economy.184 According to Banaj, ‘Islam shaped the tradition of early 
capitalism both by preserving monetary economy and through its own precocious 
development of the partnership form’.185 
North African merchants also expanded into Sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian Ocean trade 
remained in Muslim hands and this helped to spread Islam.186 Trade and Islam were 
interconnected; merchants supported the growth of Islam and the faith continued to facilitate 
the growth of commerce as discussed further in chapter 2. The Muslim world was estimated 
to be wealthier than Europe until 1500.187 This was because many of the practices that 
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emerged during the Golden Age were maintained until this period, such as secure contracts 
and fair arbitration.188 
The area that is currently contained within the Saudi Kingdom was not yet united and its 
economic fortunes varied. From the 10th to the 20th century, the Hejaz was dominated by the 
Sharif of Mecca.189The merchant class remained very influential in both Mecca and Medina. 
Many of the new Islamic Empires gave donations and gifts to the Holy Cities and an 
elaborate welfare state was developed in the Hejaz as a result.190 The East of Arabia 
continued to play a very important role in the Indian Ocean trade. However, the East Arabian 
ports came under the influence of the Kingdom of Ormuz from the 11 century to the 16th 
Century since Arabian merchants would reap the benefits of trading with the wealth of 
Hormuz.191 The interior of Arabia, such as Najd remained poor but trade was conducted to 
ensure the regular supply of important resources.192 
2.4.1 A Departure Point: The Islamic World and Trade from 1500-1900  
The appearance of Europeans in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean around 1500 was a 
decisive turning point for global trade. Their superior ships meant that they captured much of 
the Indian Ocean trade and disrupted the trade on the old Silk Road.193 The Portuguese 
captured the Kingdom of Ormuz and therefore secured much of the Spice Trade. As a result 
of these developments, the East Arabian ports began a long period of decline though they 
continued long-distance trade.  
In 1506, the Turkish Ottoman Empire invaded the Hejaz in 1506 in part to save the Holy 
Sites from the Christians. The Ottoman Caliphs would later dominate the West and the east of 
the Arabian Peninsula in the following centuries. They closed the ports of Eastern Arabia to 
Safavid Persia and pilgrims by-passed the east to the detriment of trade and commerce.194 
The Hejaz continued to prosper because of the Haj and benefited from its central location on 
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trade routes.195 During this era, the Ottomans granted the Hejaz a great deal of autonomy and 
imposed low taxes.196 In the Muslim world, trade continued to grow but not at the relatively 
dramatic rate as in Europe. 197New products stimulated commerce such as the discovery of 
coffee from Ethiopia and tobacco from the New World. The benefits of trade were usually 
invested in farming and agriculture. However, the Ottomans while supportive of trade 
generally regulated it more tightly than previous Empires.198This was done to secure the 
welfare of the Islamic community. For example, Ottoman Sultans established as system of 
Islamic guilds to protect and govern trade. The trade in guilds spread to the urban centres of 
the Arabian Peninsula from the 16th century. 199 
The Ottoman Empire was the largest Muslim state since the Abbasids, but it was not a free 
trade area. The Ottomans veered between state involvement in trade and free trade policies. 
Locals were expected to buy from local agents and the guild system ensured that most trade 
was local, and this tended to restrict the development of international trade networks.200 The 
expansion in trade began to slow from the 18th century as the Ottoman and the Safavid 
Empire declined. For these reasons, the Ottomans had no real control over the interior of the 
Arabian Peninsula. In the mid-eighteenth century the first Saudi state of Saudi Arabia was 
established.201 This was later destroyed by the Ottomans, but a second Saudi state emerged in 
the nineteenth century. Commins suggests that the first Saudi and second State’s ‘distinctive 
character stems from its affiliation with the ‘conservative’ or ‘strict’ Hanbali legal school’.202. 
This was to lead to some divergence between the Saudi state and the rest of the Middle East 
in the nineteenth century, a state of affairs which arguably persists to this day.  
The stagnation of the economy in the Muslim world became very apparent by the start of the 
nineteenth century.203Throughout the nineteenth century, Muslim powers, such as the 
Ottoman Empire and the Egyptian Khedivate attempted to modernise their societies by 
reforming the economy and commercial laws. These rulers, for instance, made a conscious 
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effort to introduce western ‘legal norms on economic regulation and private property’.204 At 
first, these laws were not designed to supersede Shari’ah. However, by the late 19th century 
especially in Ottoman territories, the adoption of quasi-secular legal code by the Ottoman 
rulers had virtually replaced Islamic law’s former influence over the empire (see Chapter 5). 
Minorities such as Christians were legally emancipated, and this was in part designed to 
boost trade and economic activity.205 These developments were followed by a deliberate 
attempt in both Egypt and the Egyptian lands to industrialize. However, the efforts at 
modernising the Muslim economies were not successful. Increasingly minorities such as 
Christians and Jews dominated trade and western imports dominated local trade.206  
Many of the Ottoman reforms were not extended to the Hejaz because of the opposition of 
the religious establishment.207This and the fragmented nature of Arabia meant that the region 
stagnated in terms of trade. Trade was still very important, but the region had not developed, 
and its trade system was much the same as it had been before. The Haj remained of crucial 
importance to the Hejaz. The Ottoman development of the Hejaz railways was designed to 
bring pilgrims to Mecca and Medina and did boost somewhat the local economy of the 
region. However, the rest of Arabia languished in poverty and underdevelopment.208 External 
trade was dominated by Europeans and many pilgrims were carried to the Holy Shrines by 
British and French steamers209.  
2.4.2 Economic Factors Contributing to the Decline and Stagnation of Trade in the Islamic 
World 
In 1000 AD the Muslim world was still preeminent in international trade210. However, by 
1900 the Muslim world was poor and underdeveloped compared to Western nations. There 
were several long-term factors for the decline and the stagnation of trade in the Islamic 
World. 
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The discovery of America changed the dynamics in the World Economy.211 The opportunities 
created for Europeans by the discovery of the Americas allowed trade to grow rapidly. 
Spanish, Dutch, French and English colonies were established in the 16th and 17th century. 
The Europeans soon established trade networks around the world and this with the superior 
naval technologies allowed them to dominate global trade by 1700.212 This has important 
consequences for the Islamic world. Arab traders were no longer the middlemen in 
international trade.213 The old Silk Road became irrelevant and Western nations traded 
directly with China. The Arab maritime trade also declined because it could not compete with 
the Europeans.214 
With these developments, Arabia became increasingly cut off from international maritime 
trade and commerce was much reduced.215 However, the Muslim world remained quite 
affluent because of internal trade. By the 19th century, economic decline in the Ottoman 
Empire would provide the impetus for Europeans to become more influential in the internal 
trade of the Islamic World.216 As the West industrialised, the Ottomans continued to 
outcompete products made in the Muslim world where workshops were often controlled by 
guild members.217 This led to an increasing trade deficit and to pronounced economic decline. 
In this regard, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson have suggested that European interference 
and competition were responsible for the divergence in the ‘comparative development of the 
West and the Middle East’.218. 
The Ottoman Empires and Egypt did not greatly benefit from the growth in international 
trade and both nations became indebted to European banks resulting in them becoming de-
facto economic colonies of the West. 219Western powers, especially Britain and France used 
their considerable military and political power to impose unfair trade agreements on Muslim 
rulers such as the Khedive of Egypt.220 Local rulers’ efforts to modernise their economies 
such as the economic plans Muhammad Ali in Egypt were unable to ‘really succeed in the 
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context of colonialism’.221 One reason for this is that Western nations benefited from any 
improvements in the local economy, for example the construction of the Suez Canal.222 This 
ensured that local traders were increasingly disadvantaged in external trade and in internal 
trade. The increasing western control of the economy of the Ottoman Empire meant that 
Muslim trade began to further stagnate.223 By the eighteenth-century Arabia was no longer at 
the crossroads of various trade networks nor was it connected to new trade networks.224 
The Hejaz and the other regions were forced to rely on trade with Muslim states, many of 
which economically underdeveloped by the 19th century.225 By this time, Islamic societies 
were, according to Cogel, increasingly hostile to western commercial practices which were 
perceived as ‘Western’ and therefore Christian.226 Unlike the Golden Age of Islam, it is 
arguable that the Muslim community saw outsiders as a threat and became less pluralistic and 
more inward looking, possibly to protect their identity when they felt challenged by the 
power of the West. This insularity was especially evident in the adoption of western 
technologies. The flexibility and practicality that had been a feature of Islamic society were 
lost and Arabian society rejected many western innovations.227 
Despite these trends, Cogel argues that the conservatism of Muslim societies is overstated 
and that ‘there is mixed evidence on whether Islamic societies have been open or 
conservative against modern ideas, technological advancements, and legal developments’.228 
However, Cogel admits that the apparent inability of many Muslim societies to fully 
capitalise on technologies, with the exception of military technologies, was to have a negative 
impact on the Muslim world.229 This was especially true with regard to ‘how the legal 
community reacted to new developments’.230  
One reason that may be used to explain the Muslim world’s ambivalent approach to 
technological and economic innovations was that Islamic societies valued unity over 
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competition. This meant that the Arab world was reluctant to adopt practices that could be 
disruptive.231 This can be seen in the persistence of the guild system in Mecca and elsewhere, 
which was designed to regulate trade and to provide all guild members with a living, but 
which also had the effect of restricting the development of a dynamic free market.232 
Furthermore, the lack of Ottoman control meant that the Tanzimat reform policies were not 
extended to the Hejaz and other areas.233 This was to have a negative impact on trade as seen 
in the inability to take advantage of opportunities offered by the Hejaz railway, for 
example.234 There were not the institutions or modern rules that would have allowed local 
traders to develop new trade routes and to exploit the domestic market.235  
2.4.3 The Great Divergence: An Orientalist View of Islamic History or the ‘Closing of the 
Gate to Ijtihad’? 
One of the most influential reasons offered for the relative decline and the stagnation of the 
economies of the Muslim world is the ‘Great Divergence’ theory espoused by Timur Kuran. 
Kuran claims that the rise of the West was not responsible for the stagnation of the Arab 
world, but that it was in large part the consequence of the growing inflexibility of Islamic 
fiqh.236 On this issue, Kuran argues that Islamic legal schools which had contributed to the 
growth of trade and commerce in earlier periods became impediments to change. According 
to Kuran, ‘the explanation for the Middle East historical trajectory must include reasons why 
the decline in the efficacy of the traditional institutions took so long to reform.’237One 
possible explanation is that religious authorities within these countries were able to resist 
reform for centuries. Over the centuries, jurists began to slow or block any innovations which 
were deemed contrary to the Shari’ah.238 
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Kuran identifies key areas in which the law prevented economic growth.239 The main areas of 
Islamic law that harmed trade and economic development were the laws on partnerships, 
inheritance, credit (riba) and trusts (waqf). These prevented the development of corporations, 
investment and large-scale transactions.240 Kuran’s argument would seem to have some 
relevance to the situation in Arabia. The increasingly conservative jurists tended to become 
inflexible.241 This according to Raheem was not based on the original legal culture of Islam 
which was very pragmatic and flexible.242 The Ottomans sponsored Hanafi legal scholars, 
who unlike their predecessors became more literal in their interpretation of Islam. In the first 
and second Saudi States, the Hanbali interpretation of the Qur’an meant that commercial laws 
prevented the accumulation of capital and its efficient application.243 For example, much of 
the arable land around Mecca was owned by Waqfs and this meant that funds were tied up in 
land and could not be invested in trade.244  
It should be noted that the Great Divergence argument has been widely criticised. 
Shatzmiller, for instance, warns against Kuran’s ‘sweeping generalisations about the negative 
roles of the Islamic state and legal institution’.245 In the Golden Age of Islam, as outlined 
above, Shari’ah was able to support the development of trade by merchants. However, 
Kuran’s contention that jurists became more conservative after the 13th Century is supported 
by scholars such as Davis and Samuels. 246 A key development in the early modern period 
and later was that jurists no longer passed neutral judgments on trade disputes and contracts 
and were more likely to reject contractual forms containing elements of uncertainty (gharar) 
or interest (riba) were involved, since both were prohibited under Shari’ah’.247. While the 
Hanafi School remained influential in Ottoman lands, the Hanbali School became very 
influential in much of Arabia.248 The influence of the strict Hanbali schools, supported by the 
literalist ideas of Ibn Tamiyyah, became prominent in areas of Arabia, especially in the First 
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and Second Saudi state, and this was arguably a factor in them falling behind other areas of 
the Islamic World. 249  
All the legal schools became conservative, from the Middle Ages onward. Starting from the 
13th century there was evidence to suggest a movement away from the presumed or quasi 
rationalism of the Golden Age.250 One possible reason for the growing conservatism and 
rigidity of the Islamic jurists was the rise of the ulama. The jurists were essential as they 
helped to legitimise the authority of ruling elites, argues Rubin, who refers to them as 
‘legitimizing agents’.251 This was very true in the Ottoman Empire and with the Sharif of 
Mecca. The jurists became increasingly powerful and many rulers were reluctant to challenge 
their authority even if their rulings negatively impacted on trade.252 This was a departure 
from the Golden era of Islamic civilisation as the religious establishment’s power was to have 
a detrimental impact on Muslim society.253This is best seen in the Ottoman jurists’ rejection 
of the printing press.254 
In Arabia the ulama became very influential in the Hejaz and especially the first two Saudi 
states.255.As the madhab sought to preserve their ‘intellectual monopoly’, the ‘gate to ijtihad’ 
did in fact appear now to have been resolutely closed.256 These developments arguably 
deterred Arabian merchants from risk-taking because they feared the strict rules and opinions 
of a now powerful religious establishment.257 In turn, entrepreneurship and innovation and 
the region now within the borders of Saudi Arabia stagnated in the period from the mid-
eighteenth century.  
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2.5 The Role of Colonialism in Impeding Trade and Commerce in the Modern 
Muslim World  
From the late nineteenth century, Europeans increasingly dominated the Islamic World.258 By 
1900 a majority of the Muslim world was colonised by French, British and other European 
powers.259 The Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran were the only significant Muslim states that 
were not controlled by the Europeans, but even they were heavily influenced by powers such 
as Britain.260 World War one proved to be a disaster for the Islamic world. The Ottoman 
Empire joined the Central Powers and was to pay a heavy price.261 It survived repeated allied 
attacks but collapsed in 1918. By the end of the war the Europeans directly and indirectly 
dominated the Arab and the broader Muslim world. At the Sykes-Picot Agreement the Allies 
partitioned the Ottoman Empire and divided its Middle Eastern territories into spheres of 
influence.262The British and the French established a number of colonies, dependencies and 
protectorates that ensured that they retained influence and power over the Middle East.263 
This resulted in a social and economic revolution in many areas of the Middle East which had 
stagnated under Ottoman rule in recent centuries.264  
The traditional view is that colonialism greatly harmed the local Muslim economies but the 
impact of the West on economic development was much more nuanced and complex.265The 
colonial administrators were authoritarian, but they were eager to develop the infrastructure 
of local economies and this benefitted trade. This was to generate tax and other revenues for 
the colonial power and to consolidate their power in the region.266 However, as part of their 
efforts to control their colonies through a policy of divide and rule, they favoured minorities 
such as the Jews and Christians that were given special privileges in the commercial sector.267 
This is seen as one of the main reasons why the Syrian economy contracted during the years 
of French rule.268 It has often been claimed that the colonisation of the Middle East was 
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driven in part because of the discovery of oil, which was essential to the economies of the 
West. 269.  The colonial Empires granted concessions to Western oil companies and they 
effectively dominated the nascent oil industry. The discovery of oil did not benefit the local 
people. Most of the Middle East remained impoverished by colonialism.  
The hold of the Europeans on the Middle East was, however, never firm and after 1945 they 
began a period of decolonisation.270 This is not to suggest that the granted freedom to their 
former colonies, but rather that they applied a form of neo-colonialism whereby the West 
used its economic, financial and cultural influence to indirectly control the Muslim World. 
This resulted in the oil industry being effectively dominated by western companies and its 
revenues did not benefit the ordinary Muslim and economies stagnated.271 America became 
the dominant power in the Middle East after 1945. One distinctive feature of the Middle East 
was that authoritarian leaders continued to dominate the region.272 Unelected leaders could 
still count on the support of America or the Soviet Union (until 1989) to remain in power, 
especially during the Cold War.273 
Increasingly after the 1950s, many countries such as Egypt and Syria, in reaction to neo-
colonialism, adopted socialist models.274 Several Muslim majority nations sought to become 
more secular and believed that nationalisation of the economy was essential for 
development.275 However, the adoption of socialist policies in many countries failed to 
improve the situation in many economies.276 These policies lead to increasing inefficiencies 
and corruption and many nations built up significant foreign debts. Government intervention 
in the economy became the norm in Muslim countries, even in those countries that choose not 
to adopt the Socialist model. The state-controlled large areas of the economy formed massive 
state-owned conglomerates.277 Those states that had significant reserves of oil and used the 
revenues to create massive welfare states and these became a drain on the economy, raising 
debt and suppressing trade.278 Despite the adoption of western models and the vast reserves 
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of oil, the economy of the Middle East and the wider Muslim world did not greatly 
improve.279 While the Western world entered a dynamic period of growth from 1945 until 
1973 and later between 1983 and 2008, this was not the case in the Middle East. Indeed, 
many Muslim nations fell further behind the Western world and even many areas of Asia.280  
2.5.1 A Hybrid View of Factors causing lack of development in Muslim countries (1900-
2010) 
Recently, as we have seen, the Muslim world has been falling behind the West and the new 
Asian economic powers. While most of the world has progressed economically, the Muslim 
world has not been as successful.281 The relative decline in much of the Muslim world can be 
attributed to several factors. Colonialism was an important factor in the decline of many 
Muslim countries such as Syria. The western powers created new states that were not related 
to traditional ethnic borders and this led to the establishment of fundamentally unstable 
countries such as Lebanon.282These and other factors have caused instability and this has 
done much to prevent the development of commerce.283 As a result, entrepreneurs have been 
dissuaded from investing in new ideas and innovations and this has meant that many national 
economies have stagnated. Instead, companies have focused on safe investments such as the 
import and export business and have not developed new business models.284 Moreover, these 
fundamental unstable entities have led to authoritarian regimes and this has meant that the 
business actor have not enjoyed a high level of certainty or trust in the government.285 
By the same token, the impact of Islamic law has often been stated as a factor in the failure of 
entrepreneurs to develop businesses and the private sector in the Middle East and the wider 
Muslim world. This is the essence of Kuran’s ‘Great Divergence’ thesis.286 Some suggest that 
the Shari’ah is not always a primary consideration in how Muslim countries regulate 
domestic markets, many aspects of which are based conventional banking and finance 
practices.287 There are, however, some who argue that the strict interpretation of rules of 
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Shari’ah had dissuaded risk-taking and that this has thwarted the commercial development of 
many Islamic societies, especially in relation to contract law (discussed in chapter 3).288  
Since the 2000s, even the most conservative Gulf regions such as Bahrain have become more 
progressive and have increasingly side-lined those who promote a conservative interpretation 
of business law and related practices.289 This suggests that Kuran’s theory is no longer as 
relevant.290The persistent control of the oil industry by Western interests has harmed the 
development of many national economies. The revenues that could have been used to develop 
the infrastructure and economies of societies were often diverted to western companies. 291 
The neo-colonial economic relationship that was established especially by America in the 
1950s and continues to this day means that the region is not able to fully capitalise on its 
energy resources.292 Then there has been the extensive role of the state in the economy and 
this has meant that resources have been diverted from the private to the public sector. 293 The 
best example of this is the ubiquity of food subsidies and other subsidies. Based on the above 
observations, there is evidence to suggest that many Islamic societies are not free markets and 
there are only restricted opportunities for entrepreneurs and those engaged in commerce. 294 
2.5.2 Saudi Arabia in the Modern World:  
This final section will reflect on the possible implications of the above analysis on the 
contemporary pathways to economic development in Saudi Arabia. Arabia had a unique 
history in the twentieth century and was dissimilar to other areas of the Muslim world.295 The 
collapse of Ottoman control after 400 years revolutionised the situation in the region.296 
Many Arabs had participated in the Arab Revolt and had hoped to establish an independent 
Caliphate.297 The second Saudi state was able to capitalise on the disorders that followed the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire.298 The West, however, appeared to show little interest in 
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Arabia and this allowed Abdul-Aziz Al Saud to unify the area and he declared the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia. 299 
The Saudi Kingdom is a relatively new political entity. At first the country was impoverished 
and much of the population were nomadic Bedouin.300 Abdul Aziz encouraged the Bedouin 
to settle in agricultural communities and encouraged development.301 In the 1930s the Saudi 
government adopted a free trade policy and believed that this was the best way to develop the 
economy. 302 To develop trade Ibn Saud privileged the sedentary tribes engaged in agriculture 
and sought to create a stable environment for trade.303 As a result of these developments, Ibn 
Saud established commercial courts based on the Ottoman model (chapter 5).  
However, the country remained desperately poor and much of the population remained 
herders or subsistence farmers. 304The economy of the new Kingdom was desperately poor 
and it remained so until the discovery of oil in the east in 1938. However, it was only in 1949 
that the oil was exploited and sold on the international market. At this time an informal 
strategic arrangement was reached by Saudi Arabia and the United States. This meant that the 
Americans agreed to guarantee the security and sovereignty of the Kingdom in return for a 
role in the Saudi oil industry.305 
Oil transformed the economy of Saudi Arabia. The revenues from oil exports allowed the 
creation of a vast social welfare state. As a result, many Saudis were able to secure jobs in the 
bureaucracy and in the state.306 The living standards of Saudis increased exponentially, and 
they began to consume imported goods, especially luxury goods. 307 The oil revenues were 
used to develop the country and its infrastructure. The Saudi economy was, by the 1960s, 
completely dependent on oil and its only other meaningful industry was the tourism sector 
and this was based on pilgrims in the Haj.308 The rapid increase in wealth created problems 
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for the Saudi economy and society. Increasingly the economy was dependent on foreign 
workers to maintain the oil fields and in areas such as healthcare.309  
By the 1970s, the state of Saudi Arabia has increased its wealth as a result of the rising price 
of crude oil and this increased the spending power of the government.310 However, the 
growing population remained a concern and it was believed that over the longer-term 
government spending could not keep pace with population growth.311 The Saudis began in the 
1970s to publish five-year developmental plans, which sought to develop the economy of the 
kingdom.312 One of the key aims of these development plans was that the expansion of the 
private sector. 313Another policy that the kingdom had developed to create a more effective 
economy was that of ‘Saudization’314. While this period led to an increase in the number of 
Saudis that were working in the economy, the numbers employed in the public sector 
remained very high.315 
Bringing us up to date, the Kingdom remains very dependent on oil, although it has 
diversified to an extent and as of 2015, 70% of its national wealth is not based on oil.316 The 
Saudi economy needs to diversify further if it is to develop into a trading nation and reduce 
its dependency on its status as an ‘energy superpower’.317 This is particularly so as there is 
evidence to suggest that the living standards of the average Saudi are lower than those of an 
average person in the US. 318Moreover, the national debt is rising and the growth rate, as 
measured by the GDP figures indicate that growth had slowed and this is a problem that has 
been identified by successive administrations since the 1990s.319 The failure to diversify the 
economy and to develop a commercial sector is now a pressing issue and one that is being 
addressed in a series of bold measures in recent years.  
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In the broader legal practice, there is, however, some variation between Saudi legal norms 
and international commercial norms and usages.320 This means that it can be difficult to form 
a contract and to secure agreement on issues as to arbitration. Consequently, traders do not 
have the certainty they need to develop a commercial undertaking. Al-Azmeh argues that 
these factors, above all others, have discouraged enterprise in Saudi Arabia.321Others argue 
that Saudi Arabia’s system integrates the legal opinions of all schools of jurisprudence and 
including ‘western’ legal principles.322 This thesis will aim to demonstrate that there many 
aspects of Hanbali jurisprudence and Shari’ah more generally that are entirely compatible 
with free trade and freedom of contract. The task of the legal scholar is to revive the best of 
what is associated with the Islamic tradition of ijtihad, thereby closing the gap between 
Islamic precepts and modern economic realities in Saudi Arabia. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the Western view of Islamic legal and social histories 
tends to oversimply the complexities of Islamic legal thought. The chapter has shown that 
early Islamic legal thought was accommodating of plurality of thought. This plurality of 
thought arguably enabled the Islamic world to emerge as one of powerhouses of the global 
economy and Muslim merchants at the time operated on an international scale. Thus, the 
Islamic world prospered despite war and unrest until the 1500s. This was because Islam 
valued trade and the free market. Its legal system was flexible where jurists had discretion 
with regard to what was acceptable. This meant that the legal system was supportive of trade. 
As such, the analysis of the historical context demonstrates that the Shari’ah is fundamentally 
conducive to business concerns.  
Two factors played a crucial role in the subsequent opposition to innovation and free trade in 
the Islamic world. These include first, the rise of the West and increased competition from 
western businesses, which were rapidly modernising, and second, the changing of trade 
routes. Arabia was increasingly marginalised as world trade routes shifted and the West 
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began to dominate world trade. It is noted that by the 19th century, the Islamic world’s 
economy was dominated by Western interests and minorities such as Jews and Christians.323 
The analysis in this chapter therefore emphasises some degree of mutual causality between 
the increased poverty in the Islamic world and the increasingly conservative worldview of 
Islamic scholars and authorities. The literal interpretation of the Qur’an’s economic principles 
by the latter impeded trade as they prevented merchants from innovating and having the 
flexibility needed to engage in risk-taking.324 In Arabia especially, during the Ottoman period 
the region was marginalised and became insular and conservative.325 This led to a rigid and 
inflexible legal system, thereby impeding the development of a modern commercial legal 
code, the absence of which intensified uncertainty over property law and contracts.326  
The particular historical evolution of the Saudi state, has suggested inflexibility around 
certain aspects of trade and commerce.327 This could be addressed by codification but this 
needs to be counterbalanced by a need for flexibility, especially in the area of contract law 
and arbitration.328 This is needed to give business the certainty and flexibility that they need 
to achieve key objectives. Given that this chapter has shown that Islam was fundamentally 
flexible in the earliest phases of its development, the next chapter examines the development 
of the Islamic legal system and culture in the lands that now constitute the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, with emphasis on how the Prophet’s early practices were supportive of trade and 
protected entrepreneurs.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
The Commercial Aspects of International Trade: How the Shari’ah 
Principles of Contract Law Have Shaped Islamic Trade and its Application 
in Saudi Arabia	
3.1 Introduction 
It is widely accepted that a legal framework that is supportive of commerce needs to be in 
place if trade is to thrive.1 Without a supportive legal system, investment and trade volumes 
tend to decline.2 In order to develop a strong trading economy, a country’s legal system needs 
a number of basic principles. Firstly, it needs a legal system that provides security to parties 
to a contract that their agreement will be enforced. Secondly, it needs an effective dispute 
resolution mechanism in the event of an agreement being questioned or becoming a source of 
dispute.3 Commercial law needs to provide certainty and protection for traders and foreign 
investors. When it does, it creates the conditions within which trade can grow and expand.4 
These principles are fundamental not just for domestic trade, but perhaps even more to 
develop a strong international trading economy and attract FDI.5  
As the prophet Mohammed Hadith says: “I have been sent to uphold and complement ethical 
values”6 the Sharia has confirmed the good deeds of the Arab traditions in ignorance period 
before the Islam message. This chapter will show how the pre-Islam people in Arabia were 
supportive of pro trade principles and the principle of Sharia confirmed those principles, this   
lay the way to answer this research question whether the government of Saudi Arabia has not 
been able to attract more FDI is because of applying Sharia law and the Sharia law is strict by 
its nature or that the Sharia is flexible but the rigidity of the interpretation of Sharia due to 
different factors such as: social, economic and political factors is the reason7.  
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Although some Western commentators assume that Islam is antithetical to enlightenment 
ideals of the West that encourage free trade, these assumptions do not take into account the 
fact that Shari’ah facilitated international trade for many centuries.8 Rather, they can often 
appear to be orientalist stereotypes or as a result of unfair comparisons between two entirely 
different legal systems which developed in vastly different circumstances.9 Therefore, this 
chapter equally demonstrates that the Shari’ah is sufficiently flexible and can accommodate 
modern practices. It also addresses the research question of what are the legal factors that 
deter foreign investment in Saudi Arabia. Emphasis is placed on the factors that have shaped 
Islamic contract law since the pre-Islamic era.  
This chapter also discusses the re-emergence of the Shari’ah in the financial sector. It 
explains how historical factors led to the renewed scholarship of the Shari’ah which has 
helped Islamic law to adapt to the modern economics, commercial law and globalisation. It 
also shows that many principles of the Shari’ah stem from pre-Islamic and early Islamic 
practices of Arab tribes. It equally demonstrates how these practices have influenced the 
modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and determines whether they have had a negative impact 
on the development of the law and the creation of an environment that is conducive to foreign 
investment and trade.  
3.2 Principles Of Islamic Contract Law 
Under the Shari’ah, the meaning of the term ‘contract’ is given a much wider definition than 
its equivalent in common law.10 However, it shares many characteristics with the contract 
under common law. For example, the principles of offer and acceptance are central to Islamic 
law contracts.11 However, the Shari’ah differentiates in respect of other fundamental 
characteristics of Western contract law. For example, although the Shari’ah recognises that 
contracts entered into by mutual agreement may be enforceable, there is an inherent 
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presumption that the mutual agreement will be fair on both parties.12 In other words, the fact 
that the parties have mutually agreed to enter into a contract is one of the initial steps of the 
contract procedure. A more important step under Islamic law is considered to be the 
negotiation of the terms of the contract to ensure that the exchange of goods is carried out 
fairly.13 This is based on the Islamic principles of equality and fairness within the community 
and is intended to ensure that any party that enters into a contract respects the intentions of 
the other parties.14 Furthermore, it is explicitly affirmed in the Qur’an that all Muslims have a 
religious duty to fulfil their contractual obligations in good faith.15 Several passages of the 
holy text make explicit reference to these duties, including passages proclaiming ‘O ye who 
believe fulfil the contractual obligations’,16 ‘And fulfil your covenant with me and as I fulfil 
my covenant with you’,17 and ‘[T]hey keep their promises whenever they promise’.18  
For this reason, some Western scholars have suggested that a contract under the Shari’ah is 
simply a legal undertaking to perform a religious obligation.19 For example, Coulson suggests 
that: 
a contract in Islamic law is in no sense the precise equivalent of the technical 
term contract in Western jurisprudence, which involves, certainly at the common 
law, the two basic essentials of agreement and consideration.20 
However, Jalil and Rahman note that consideration must be offered by both parties before a 
contract can be valid and enforceable under Islamic law.21 They also note that there are 
exceptions such as where one party is under a legal duty to perform or in cases of gifts.22 
Thanwi also states that riba is prohibited because it is an increase without any corresponding 
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consideration in a contract of exchange.23 Burns then points out that consideration is an 
essential ingredient of contracts under Islamic law, although it must be lawful and have value 
under the large umbrella of Islam.24 As such, consideration operates in similar ways under 
Islamic law and English law. It is a necessity for simple contracts and is not required in 
exceptional cases such as special contracts by deed under English law.25 Coulson’s oversight 
may be due to the fact that continental European civil law had a strong influence on the 
development of many legal systems in the Middle East, and an exchange of consideration is 
generally not required by civil law tradition.26  
Although, most scholars agree that although the definition of a contract under the Shari’ah 
may not be precisely equivalent to the common law contract, the notion of a contract under 
the Shari’ah should be sufficiently broad to encompass the internationally accepted norms of 
European-influenced contracts. For example, Ibn Taymiyya found that: 
…all contracts entered into, or conditions attached thereto, are permissible unless 
specifically prohibited by either the Qur’an or the Sunnah.27 
As a result of this flexibility, the Hanbali school permits contracting parties to agree to any 
provisions within a contract: 
…unless it is either contrary to the legal nature and purpose of the contract or 
implies the combining of two transactions in one, which the Prophet warned was 
suspect as usury.28  
According to Shimizu, this inherent flexibility is due to the fact the Islamic contract law is 
intended to promote efficient economic activity. He states that: 
Islam has a basic idea that private ownership should be effectively used and that 
exchange is a sort of productive activity. For example, the abolition of riba, 
which is perceived to hinder economic activity, is said to aim at greater economic 
efficiency, because one of the main reasons for it is to prevent hoarding by the 
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rich and circulate currency efficiently in a community … Moreover, the easy 
formation or cancellation of a contract is also a contribution to efficiency, since 
there is then a natural increase in the number of those people who are willing to 
enter into contracts if restrictions on them are decreased. The law encourages to 
enter into a contract by omitting formalities in the formation of a contract, or 
freeing contractors from the binding-force as they want.29 
It follows that foreign investors may enter into agreements in other parts of the world and 
execute or enforce these agreements in Saudi Arabia, provided that they are not inconsistent 
with the Shari’ah. In this regard, classic Islamic jurisprudence has set certain conditions on 
the permitted form or subject matter of a contract. A contract, for instance, cannot lead to 
Muhrram (an act forbidden under the Shari’ah). Examples of Muhrram include riba (usury)30 
and gharar (speculation, deception or excessive risk).31 Contracts that contain facid or fayed 
(unequal or unfair contractual) clauses may also render the entire contract invalid, unlawful, 
or voidable.32 These provisions are applied at every stage of the contract: formation, 
performance to dispute resolution, the latter extending to the arbitration of a dispute and 
resulting award.33  
However, despite these restrictions (and the fact that Islamic banking law has developed 
Shari’ah-compliant structures that avoid certain restrictions, as will be discussed), it would 
appear that, in theory at least, the Shari’ah (and in particular the Hanbali principles) is 
sufficiently flexible to allow for commercial agreements to be structured in any way that the 
parties to the agreement deem necessary. This inherent flexibility of Shari’ah is evidenced by 
the fact that in recent decades many Muslim-majority nations have adapted their Shari’ah-
based laws in order to embrace European-influenced international commercial law and 
practices.34  
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However, despite this the Saudi legal system has struggled somewhat with the harmonisation 
of common law principles and those of the Shari’ah.35 Nonetheless, this has been achieved to 
a certain extent in the banking sector in Malaysia, a country with both Islamic and common 
law traditions.36 The harmonisation (or tawfiq) has largely been limited to the application of 
common law principles that are not inconsistent with the Shari’ah. Hence, financial 
institutions may offer Islamic products under the Islamic Banking Act 1983 such as Uqud 
Ishtirak (contract of partnership), Uqud Hifz (contract of deposit) and Uqud Tawthiqat 
(contract of guarantee), but they must comply with statutes that have largely codified 
common law principles such as the Contracts Act 1950, the Companies Act 1965, and the 
Sale of Goods Act 1957.37 What this shows is that the Shari’ah is sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate modern commercial practices and is generally not an obstacle to the freedom 
of association and operation of financial schemes. In this light, the next section shows that 
there are many contractual principles and concepts originally developed in the Arabian 
Peninsula that were subsequently harmonised with early Islamic teachings. 
3.3 Trade In The Pre-Islamic Period 
3.3.1 Trade Routes in the Arabian Peninsula 
As the Arabian Peninsula is situated at the meeting point of three continents, it was part of 
important trade routes between Africa, Asia and Europe for many centuries.38 According to 
Michalopolous, Naghavi and Prarolo, this resulted in Arab merchants being able to profit 
from the overland trade routes: 
First, by selling to the [foreign] merchants they could take advantage of markets 
outside Arabia, and second, the increased caravan traffic was equivalent to higher 
demand for local produce.39 
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The importance of trade routes through the Arabian Peninsula therefore resulted in 
opportunities for Arabian commerce to thrive, but also resulted in considerable risk for Arab 
and foreign merchants who used the trade routes that crossed the Arabian desert. The absence 
of unified leadership meant that merchants had to pass through numerous territories 
belonging to unfriendly tribes, and merchants (both Arabian and foreign) were constantly at 
risk of raids by the Bedouin nomads who lived in the desert.40 Thus, these merchants sought 
to avoid conflict by entering into treaties with the tribes in order to ensure safe passage 
through their territories.41 As a result of these early treaties, Arab tribes began to develop 
rudimentary commercial codes that were to become influential in the Islamic period, partly 
because of their success in fostering trade.42  
3.3.2 Trade Agreements in the pre-Islamic period  
Ilaf was an arrangement between merchants and tribes whereby merchants purchased the 
right to move caravans through neighbouring territories for the purpose of engaging in 
trade.43 Under an ilaf arrangement, the merchants would provide the tribes with either a 
certain percentage of profits or would purchase commodities produced by the tribes to be sold 
in the markets and fairs that they would later on visit.44 In exchange, the tribes whose lands 
the merchants were passing through would ensure the merchants were granted safe passage 
through their territories (khafara).45 This meant that they were not harassed or robbed and 
could safely complete trade expeditions.  
Ilaf was first utilised by Quraysh traders to pass through other territories to trade in markets 
in the Levant, allowing them to return to Mecca with their profit without fear of robbery.46 
The success of ilaf treaties was one of the factors that led to Mecca becoming a regional 
trading hub.47 Some translations of the Qur’an suggest that the following passage directly 
                                                
40 Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arab: From the Earliest Times to the Present (St. Martin’s Press 2002) 105. 
41 Michalopolous et al (n 39) 4. 
42 Hitti (n 40) 107. 
43 Stelios Michalopolous, Alizera Naghavi and Giovanni Prarolo, ‘Trade and Geography in the Economic 
Origins and Spread of Islam: Theory and Evidence’ (2011) Brown University Working Paper 096, Institute for 
Advanced Study, School of Social Science, revised May 2011), 5 < http://amsacta.unibo.it/4541/1/700.pdf> 
accessed on 19 January 2018. 
44 Ibid 
45 Ibid. 
46 Salamah Salih Sulayman Aladieh, ‘Mecca Trade Prior to the Rise of Islam’ (1991) The University of Durham 
1, 44-46 < https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/108374.pdf>, accessed on 22 January 2018.  
47 Ibid. 
 80 
refers to ilaf (although it should also be stated that other interpretations suggests that ilaf in 
this context refers to being habituated and accustomed to be reunited): 
For the security arrangements (ilaf) of the Quraysh, their agreements of the 
journey of winter and summer.48  
Along with entering into ilaf agreements with other Arab tribes, there is evidence that 
Arabian tribes entered into various treaties and agreements with the major powers in the 
region. For example, in the peace treaty entered into by the Byzantines and the Persians in 
561 AD, the fifth clause provides that: 
It is agreed that Saracen and all other barbarian merchants of either state shall not 
travel by strange roads but shall go by Nisibis and Daras, and shall not cross into 
foreign territory without official permission. But if they dare anything contrary to 
the agreement (that is to say, if they engage in tax-dodging, so called) they shall 
be hunted down by the officers of the frontier and handed over for punishment 
together with the merchandise which they are carrying, whether Assyrian or 
Roman.49 
According to Simon, this clause is evidence that the Arabian tribes ‘actively pursued their 
commerce and without doubt controlled the Syrian part of the incense route’.50 Al-Roubi 
suggests further that this clause was intended to organise trade between two Arab tribes (the 
Lakhmids and the Ghassanids) who acted as agents and buffer-states in respect of 
commercial activities between Persia and Byzantine respectively. He stated: 
This is evidence of [the Arabs] in the world eastern trade, and proves their major 
role in it. This led the two great powers to be in agreement to bind their agents, as 
they were incapable of handling the necessary affairs of the trade routes to 
facilitate the commercial caravans from the east and west of Arabia51 
Following the decline of the Lakhmid and Ghassanid tribes in the 6th century A.D, the 
Quraysh, under the leadership of an ancestor of Muhammed, Hashim, were able to enter into 
Ilaf treaties (that they had previously utilised with other Arabian tribes) with kingdoms 
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including Persia, Yemen and Syria.52 These Ilafs further entrenched the Quraysh as the 
dominant tribe in the Arabian Peninsula and further enhanced Mecca’s position as an regional 
trading hub.53 The Ilafs also helped to create a legal framework that allowed the Arab tribes 
to flourish. It is a prime example of how laws can be made and developed to enhance the 
flow of trade. The development of Ilafs demonstrate that Arabia had a legal tradition, even 
before the foundation of any defined state within the territory, that facilitated and protected 
trade and understood the relationship between laws and trade.54 
3.4 Islamic Legal Culture And Free Trade 
3.4.1 Mohammad and Free Market Principles 
As a direct descendent of Hashim, Muhammad was born into a prominent Meccan merchant 
family and was involved in trade from an early age.55 He became a merchant trader himself 
and was active between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea.56 Muhammad 
developed a strong reputation as a just and honest man and merchant, whose reputation was 
such that he was invited to act as an arbitrator (Hakam) in a number of tribal disputes, both 
before and after ascending to Prophethood.57  
The wealth achieved by the rich merchant families of Mecca troubled Muhammad. As a 
merchant himself he was able to witness first-hand the corruption in Mecca.58 He saw that it 
exacerbated tension between tribes as well as resulted in class-conflict, as majority of the 
population failed to benefit from Mecca’s role in trade.59 As a result, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that Islam focuses so heavily on trade practices and economic equality.60 The 
Qur’an includes many verses and traditions emphasising the need for just dealing between 
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traders.61 However, the Qur’an also emphasises that free trade and commerce is vital to the 
overall interests of society. For example, it states that: 
O, you who believe, squander not your wealth among yourselves in vanity, but let 
there be trade and traffic amongst you by mutual goodwill.62 
The Qur’an condemns hoarding, cheating, bribing or monopolising of trade or any other 
unethical practices.63 Furthermore, the Hadith states that Muhammad encouraged his 
companions to trade, noting that ‘You should trade because nine tenths of provisions come 
from it’.64 He is also quoted in the Hadith as saying that ‘An honest trader will be raised up in 
the Hereafter with the truthful and the martyred’.65 
It is therefore clear that Muhammad was of the belief that fair trade was vitally important to 
the religion of Islam. Many of Muhammad’s early followers were also merchants and it was 
important for the success of the religion that the new Islamic doctrine was able to appeal to 
the merchant class.66 As noted by Michalopous et al: 
To reach out to the heterogeneous Arabian tribes, a doctrine with a political base 
appealing to the divergent interest groups was necessary. The Islamic economic 
principles were forged to align the clashing interests nurtured by the underlying 
unequal geography effectively acting as a state-building force. It offered a means 
by which tribes could be unified through a common identity under one god that 
transcended clan and class divisions.67 
Islam was intended to transcend tribal loyalties, which were and are social groups based and 
clans which are groups of families related by a common bloodline.68 Muhammad encouraged 
the population of the Arabian Peninsula to see themselves as Muslims rather than as members 
of a tribe or clan. This helped to unify the previously competing and divided clans and 
tribes.69 Dost points out that early Islam effectively operated a form of ‘free market’ in the 
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region, which encouraged private entrepreneurship and the supervision and regulation of the 
market on morality grounds.70 Muhammad himself took a personal interest in ensuring that 
trade was carried out on a free and equal basis, with Dost noting that: 
He was involved in the inspection of the marketplace to check the accuracy of the 
measures, he assigned particular places for different mongers in the market and 
he was fiercely opposed to merchants who try to tempt the producer-farmer at the 
entrance of the city before arriving to the marketplace lest they buy at a lower 
price. Indeed, the post of Muhtasib that one sees in later Islamic states was 
inspired both by his personal conduct in the market and by his appointment of 
Umar b. Hattab to Medinah marketplace.71 
The role of the Muhtasib in this free market was that of a market supervisor who acted as a 
protector of free trade and ensured that merchants refrained from fixing market prices, 
confiscating private property, or investing in the market at the expense of the private sector.72 
Initially, the wealthy merchant elite, mainly members of the Quraysh, were resistant to the 
Islamic principles due to the fear that it would undermine their monopoly of pan-Arabian 
trade.73 However, Muhammad was able to influence the Quraysh by providing them with 
assurances with regard to their continued pre-eminence in Mecca and the new Islamic state.74 
In addition, the free market principles espoused by Islam meant that the new religion 
appealed to the Quraysh as merchants because it legitimised trading activity more than rival 
belief systems at that time75. According to Michalopous et al, the advantages of Islam to Arab 
merchants included that the rules governing commercial activities favoured Muslims over 
non-Muslims and, as a consequence, the spread of Islam resulted in extensive cooperation 
across the largest trading network in existence at that period in history.76 Furthermore, the 
rise of Islam brought the first efforts at state-building to the Arabian Peninsula and this 
assisted in stabilizing the region and uniting the tribes.77 It also helped to create a single 
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market in the Arabian Peninsula through the establishment of both a common trade area and a 
unified commercial legal system, as outlined in the Shari’ah.78 These factors (as well as the 
more obvious fact that the region also shared a religious outlook) meant that the Arabian 
tribes were united under a single system, resulting in a more stable society than that which 
preceded it, a factor that was also conducive in encouraging trade.  
The effect of the Islamic free market principles can be seen in the spread of Islam in the 
centuries following the death of Muhammad. Prior to the Islamic conquests, Arabian traders 
generally acted as intermediaries in surrounding trading routes, such as the role played by the 
Lakhmids and Ghassanids between Persia and Byzantium (as explained above).79 Arab trade 
began to flourish because of the free market principles set out in the Qur’an as well as the 
opportunities offered to merchants as a result of Muslim conquests and the protection 
provided by the newly dominant Islamic rulers.80 They could trade with foreigners and were 
generally welcomed throughout the world because of their reputation for principled and fair 
trading which, in turn, allowed them to spread the Islamic religion, as the respect given to 
them included permission to freely convert people to Islam and obtain a monopoly of import 
and export trade.81 As a result, wherever Arab merchants went, Islamic communities tended 
to form in their aftermath.82 Indeed, studies carried out by Michalopous et al illustrate clear 
links between the foundation of new Islamic communities and traditional trading routes used 
by Islamic merchants.83 As a result of the rapid spread of Islam in the century after the 
prophet Muhammad’s death, Muslims were in control of the western half of the Silk Road, 
resulting in the spread of both Islam and Arab trade into Europe and Africa.84 
The free flow of trade was therefore inextricably linked to the growth of Islam and the 
promotion of trade within Islamic states was not just a practical issue but also a religious one. 
It also led to the development of a legal system that was supportive of free trade. In particular 
it meant that once a trader or merchant acted in the common interest and complied with the 
divine laws, they were free to trade and were protected by the law.85  
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3.4.2 Emergence of the Islamic Commercial Legal Culture 
The law governing Islamic economic activities was developed from the Shari’ah branch of 
mu'amalat (transaction).86 The mu’amalat is the standard to which all commercial 
transactions are held. Among the key principles of mu’amalat are free consent in any 
transaction,87 prohibition of speculative transactions and profit from chance or luck 
(Qimar).88 Any profits have to be earned by honest work and any profits from trade have to 
be accrued involving some liability on the part of the merchant.89  
As noted above, Islamic contract law seeks to ensure that all parties meet their obligations 
and that any contract is fair and voluntarily entered into by all the contracting parties.90 
However, Islamic law also provides for one of the most important aspects of any legal 
system, namely that that it needs to function effectively as a dispute resolution mechanism. 
As will be considered in more detail in chapter 4, pre-Islamic Arabia had many dispute 
resolution mechanisms. Islam, which sought unity among the faithful, relied heavily on forms 
of mediation and arbitration that were adapted from the pre-Islamic period. For example, the 
Qur’an instructs Muslims:  
If you fear a breach between them (husband and wife) appoint two arbiters, one 
from his family, and the other from hers. If they wish for peace, Allah will cause 
their conciliation. For Allah hath full knowledge and is acquainted with all 
things.91  
According to Al-Ramahi, the ‘the duty to reconcile’ is imposed on all Muslims.92 As noted in 
chapter 4, sulh and arbitration are both legal instruments and moral injunctions in Islam and 
were conducive to business concerns as they provided a fair and predictable way to resolve 
disputes.  
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3.4.3 Development of the Shari’ah 
Defined as ‘the path to the water’, the Shari’ah is deemed to set down the total code of 
conduct in Islam.93 As discussed in chapter 2, the Shari’ah is based on four sources in Islam; 
the Qur’an and the Sunnah as primary sources and ijma (consensus) and qiyas (analogical 
deduction) as secondary sources.94  
The principle source is the Qur’an, which has approximately 500 verses that contain 
principles and regulations, and references to contract law.95 However, as discussed in chapter 
2, these verses, together with the Sunnah, are not broad enough to provide solutions to all 
commercial issues that emerged after the death of the Prophet in the expanding Islamic 
Empire. As a result, a series of secondary sources of the Shari’ah emerged to address the 
matters that were not addressed within the Qur’an and the Sunnah.  
Ijma is considered to be the third source of Islamic law. It is defined as a unanimous 
agreement of Muslim scholars on any legal principle or rule that seeks to resolve some 
issue.96 Ijma is considered to be somewhat different from the concept of ijtihad on the basis 
that ijtihad only needs the agreement of some scholars whereas ijma needs unanimity.97 As a 
result of this difficult hurdle, there has been no new ijma that has been accepted throughout 
the Islamic world since the companions of Muhammad. This has made it difficult for Islamic 
industries such as finance to standardize across the Muslim world, as will be discussed in 
more detail later.  
Qiyas is the fourth primary source of the Shari’ah. Since the primary sources usually do not 
make reference to specific issues but instead state that identical causes and identical 
occurrences should be judged equally, Islamic scholars use qiyas to draw analogies between 
their decisions and those made by the Prophet in the Sunnah or some command in the 
Qur’an.98 An example of qiyas in practice would be how modern Islamic scholars refer to the 
Qur’an or the Sunnah in order to find whether or not any analogical sources exist in these 
texts that would legitimise modern financial instruments.  
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The rigorous interpretation of the Sunnah, as well as the fact that the secondary sources 
resulted in a highly interpretative legal system, gave rise to the concept of ijtihad. The use of 
qiyas, for example, was very important in the development of ijtihad because it allowed that 
if a judgment could not be based on a scriptural source or some preference then reason or 
interpretation could be employed.99 The need for reason to be employed resulted in a high 
level of judicial discretion and the development of Islamic legal theory and practice.100 This 
judicial discretion, or istihsan, enabled the Islamic judge to choose a more equitable solution 
which he believed promoted the public good better than its alternatives, including a strict 
interpretation of the Shari’ah.101 According to Baamir and Bantekas: 
Istihsan allows judges and scholars some flexibility when interpreting the law to 
allow for the infusion of elements deemed useful. In other words, istihsan 
constitutes a permit for the spirit of the law to prevail over its letter.102 
The development of concepts such as ijtihad and istihsan paved the way for the development 
of four schools of Islamic jurisprudence (or fiqh), each of which claimed to give the most 
authentic narration of the Prophet’s teachings, namely the Hanbali, Shafi'i, Maliki, and 
Hanafi schools.103 The Hanbali school, for example, promoted a literal interpretation of the 
Qur’an and Sunnah, rejecting ijtihad, qiwas and ijma.104 
Although the development of these four schools clarified much in respect of the interpretation 
of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, their prominence meant that the Islamic legal culture became 
less interpretive. As explained by De Jonge, the four legal schools developed ‘authoritative 
medieval manuals’ that: 
…remain the principal repository of Shari’ahh. The process by which they 
gained this status is usually explained by reference to the phenomenon known in 
Islamic legal history as 'the closing of the door of itjihad’. At the risk of 
oversimplification, this can be described as a stage where respect for the legal 
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jurists of the past reached such a height that their ability to discern the correct 
expression of the divine law was considered insurpassable … The four Islamic 
schools have been hugely influential and ‘Future jurists became bound to respect, 
and to imitate without restatement or reformation, the rules laid down by their 
classical predecessors.105  
In practice, the fact that Islamic culture became less interpretive and more reliant on the four 
fiqh schools meant that scholars were increasingly reluctant to outlaw anything that was not 
expressly prohibited in the primary sources and judges were not prepared to use istihsan if 
the Qur’an and Sunnah were not clear about an issue. Although these developments are at 
least partly the reason why there was and remains a great deal of flexibility in Islamic legal 
culture (anything that fell outside the Qur’an and Sunnah were not focused on by scholars 
nor judges), the decline in the use of Itjihad had important consequences for the development 
of Islamic law, which did not really develop theoretical models of law but was restricted to 
interpreting the holy texts.106 As a result, Islamic jurisprudence stagnated for centuries as the 
teachings of the four fiqh schools were strictly followed.107 This had important implications 
for Islamic commercial regulation as it ‘denied to Islamic law the opportunity to develop a 
general theory of contract, and caused it instead to remain crystallised as a law of 
contracts’.108 
3.5 The Role Of The Shari’ah In Fostering Trade 
As the previous section illustrates, the use of ijtihad to allow for a contemporary 
interpretation of the Shari’ah has allowed it to be adapted for modern circumstances and 
economics. However, it remains true that Islamic commercial law is not as progressive as the 
laws in Western countries. As noted by Ahmed: 
Given the principle of permissibility, Islamic commercial law can evolve within 
the boundaries set by Shari’ah. The development of Islamic law in response to 
changing environment can take place in couple of ways. The first way is to 
expand the already existing body of law by analogy and ijtihad. The second 
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alternative is to open the law itself to transform according to changed conditions. 
While arriving at solutions under the first alternative using ijtihad based on 
previous fiqh (taqlid) is not a problem and is being practised widely, it is the 
second alternative that is more challenging. Under this latter option, some of the 
fiqhi rules may be modified, given the changed environment and new knowledge 
about the implications of these rules in the contemporary times. As a result, new 
rulings may be formed that were not sanctioned in fiqh literature of the past. This 
calls for not adhering strongly to taqlid.109 
As noted in section 3.3, the rise of the fiqh schools led to a decline in the influence of ijtihad. 
According to Millar: 
Historically, the influence of ijtihad lessened in the 15th century110, and it has 
been noted that this coincides with the time when Islam ceased to be the leading 
innovator of modern ideas and practices and the European renaissance began.111 
Ijtihad was considered to be one of the fundamental reasons for the success of Islam and the 
spread of the religion across the known world.112 However, as noted above, the increased 
acceptance of the principles of the four schools of jurisprudence led to a culture where the 
notion of questioning or re-interpreting the Qur’an or the Sunnah became less common. This 
stagnation lasted until the early 20th century before scholars began once again to encourage 
the use of ijtihad in order to address issues that are left unanswered in the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah.113 Elshurafa notes that: 
In the field of Islamic finance, financial instruments are relatively novel and 
scholars have not considered their applicability or indeed legitimacy to the extent 
that they could be rendered established instruments. It is for this reason that the 
role of scholars and their ijthihad is paramount to advancing the field of Islamic 
finance.114  
However, Elshurafa further notes that: 
                                                
109 Ahmed (n 107) 90. 
110 Note: some scholars suggest that the “Gate of Ijtihad’ closed as early as the 9th century AD. 
111 Roderick Millar, ‘Religious Foundations of Islamic Law’ in Roderick Millar and Habiba Anwar (eds.) 
Islamic Finance: A Guide for International Business and Development (GMB Publishing, 2008) 5. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Javed and Javed (n 100) 218.  
114 Elshurafa, (n 137) 349. 
 90 
The traditionalists, who wish to exercise their limited interference policy with 
Islamic principles, fail to acknowledge that no religion, ideology or indeed idea 
can survive through the centuries without a degree of adaptability and 
pragmatism.115 
The founder of the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence was an early traditionalist who 
rejected the concept of ijtihad and relied on a literal interpretation of the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah.116 This explains why literalism became a principle of Hanbali jurisprudence.117 
However, when Saudi Arabia adopted the Hanbali school upon the foundation of the 
Kingdom as the source of Saudi Shari’ah, it accepted the validity of the concept of ijtihad.118 
Notwithstanding, according to Roberts, despite the recognition of ijtihad as a concept under 
Saudi law, it is regularly ignored by the ulama which, he suggests, is one of the primary 
reasons for Saudi law being one of the most literalist in Islamic countries.119 Vogel, writing in 
1975, came to a similar conclusion, noting that for the Saudi ulama: 
…the virtue of the scholar seems to lie less in intellectual and technical 
attainments or virtuosity than in pious immersion in Qur'an and Hadith texts and 
the knowing and sincere application of these texts in all concrete rulings. Novelty 
in itself is not then the full measure of ijtihad or of status as a mujtahid. To pass 
to modern Saudi Arabia, the usul al-fiqh positions [of the Saudi ulema] ... remain 
valid, as is confirmed on every hand.120 
From a more modern perspective, Elshurafa notes that ‘purist’ scholars continue to reject the 
wide use of ijtihad as a tool for the development of Islamic finance and this has the potential 
to have a negative effect on how Islamic finance develops. Hence, she stated that: 
Modernists on their own cannot pioneer the use of ijtihad, as they do not possess 
the requisite religious knowledge that Shari’ahh scholars do. The literal 
interpretation of the Qur’an and Shari’ahh is no longer satisfactory for many and 
the ulema are challenged to a new ‘itjihad’: rather than be content with the 
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imitation of existing models, they are asked to adopt a more innovative approach, 
exploring the wide array of Shari’ahh concepts that have not yet been tested. 121 
Elshurafa proposes a system whereby modern financial experts and Shari’ah scholars 
collaborate in order to advance the field of Islamic finance while remaining in compliance 
with the Shari’ah. This type of collaboration could, in theory, further assist in the 
standardisation of Islamic finance throughout the Muslim world.122 
This internal debate within Islam about the relationship of Islamic finance and the Shari’ah is 
illustrated by the relationship between the Islamic banking system and the international 
banking system, particularly with respect to regulations that are primarily based on Western 
banking systems. In respect of certain international regulations, such as Basel III, Islamic 
banks find it easy to remain in compliance with capital requirements due to the Islamic 
finance principles being strictly applied. However, in respect of other regulations, such as 
those imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), Islamic banking systems often struggle with compliance due to the fact that the 
regulations of these institutions do not always comply with the Shari’ah. For example, these 
regulations are often based on principles that favour debt over equity, which is at odds with 
Islamic finance principles.123 Elshurafa suggests that the solution to these fundamental 
differences may not require the Islamic banking system to comply with the Western 
dominated system (which is often the case at present) but instead to try to establish a rival 
banking network based on Islamic principles. She notes that: 
convergence for many [Islamic] countries seems to be the path of least resistance 
in order for their products to be marketable in the world economy.124 
However, the failure to establish a banking network based on the Shari’ah is not just as a 
direct result of the attraction of the international banking network but also due to national 
interests within the Islamic world. For example, the fact that countries such as the UAE have 
applied the Shari’ah in a different manner (such as the permitting of simple interest) has 
resulted in an inability of the Islamic banking system to accept and adopt a set of standard 
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regulations that would be applicable across all Muslim-majority countries.125 Furthermore, 
the traditionalist countries that were less willing to adopt Western standards such as Saudi 
Arabia were, as noted by Elshurafa ‘left behind when it came to being integrated alongside 
western economies’.126 However, despite this, she notes that those Muslim-majority countries 
that found it in their best interests to adopt Western standards may have been victims of 
short-termism, given that a rival banking system based on Islamic principles may have 
resulted in the effects of the 2008 global recession being much less severe.127 
3.6 The Position of Saudi Arabia  
As has been illustrated above, international trade and finance is continuing to evolve across 
Muslim-majority countries, including Saudi Arabia, as contemporary scholars attempt to 
reconcile the traditional principles set out in the Shari’ah with the modern concepts necessary 
to operate a successful globalised economy. In Saudi Arabia, successive Saudi kings have 
sought to promote a liberal trade and banking policy. For example, despite the inherent 
differences between Islamic law and the WTO set out in the previous section, the Kingdom 
still decided to join the WTO in 1999, with an agreement being reached in 2005.128 
The desire of Saudi Arabia to accede to the WTO is indicative of the fact that the Kingdom, 
unlike many other resource rich countries, decided to adopt an open trade system and did not 
become a closed economy.129 This was undoubtedly influenced in part by the Islamic 
teachings on the benefits of a free market. However, the influence of the ulama has meant 
that the Saudi government has not been able to fully open its economy or embrace concepts 
that are not derived from literal or traditionalist teachings.130 This has negatively affected the 
Kingdom’s ability to diversify its economy outside of its natural resources. As an example, 
the conservative and inflexible interpretation of the Shari’ah with regard to riba means that 
foreign lenders are not active in the Kingdom. This can be contrasted with the flexible 
position taken by the UAE set out above, which resulted in the formation of a large 
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international banking sector in that country.131 The lack of a relatively developed banking 
sector within Saudi Arabia has also had a further knock-on effect on the domestic industry as 
it has limited the ability of Saudi entrepreneurs to secure capital especially during times of 
low growth when oil prices are low.132  
Furthermore, the legal system in Saudi Arabia may also be considered to be a barrier to trade. 
The legal culture of the Saudi ulama is one that has been deeply influenced by the Hanbali 
School, despite recognition that other schools are also important.133 As noted above, the 
Hanbali legal school is noted for its literal interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunnah and it 
privileges the text above the concepts of ijtihad and istihsan.134 When it comes to commercial 
law cases, Saudi judges are less likely to be guided by consensus and deliver neutral 
judgments.135 The result of this is that Saudi courts often deliver rigid decisions which do not 
allow businesses any flexibility and this is something that frustrates many in the commercial 
sector and government and stymies the functioning of a free market.136This rigidity further 
results in contracts that are incompatible with the legal systems of other nations, even in the 
Muslim world. Saudi traders and entrepreneurs as a result have been typically dissuaded from 
foreign trade and this created a business sector that was insular and inclined only to look to 
its home market.137  
3.6.1 Interpretative Rigidity  
Despite the fact that the Hanbali school is so rigidly bound to the text of the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah, it may be argued that any commercial activity that is not explicitly prohibited within 
these texts is permitted in accordance with their interpretation. It is therefore arguable that 
Hanbali scholars apply the most liberal approach to issues of contracts, affirming the sacred 
duty of all Muslims to honour their obligations under contract, as well as the court or 
arbitrator’s duty to execute all agreements made in good faith.138  
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For a contract to be valid under the Shari’ah, which according to the Hanbali fiqh, 
encompasses arbitration agreements, it must adhere to certain conditions. On the whole, 
consequently, arbitration clauses tend to fall within two categories: those which are necessary 
and appropriate to the contract in addition to being commonly applied in commercial 
transactions, so called lex mercatoria, and invalid arbitration clauses that contain usury or 
payment of interest.139  
Hanafi scholars differentiate between three categories of contract: valid, invalid (fasid) and 
void (batil). However, this categorization, according to Alqudah, finds no basis in the 
Shari’ah or in Islamic custom.140 Under the classical Hanafi fiqh an invalid contract is any 
contract considered prejudicial to one party or which allows the possessory party to gain an 
advantage without fair consideration. A contract for the sale of property including a 
contractual stipulation preventing the buyer from reselling it would for instance be deemed to 
conflict with the essence of that contract.141 Similarly, a stipulation that the property can only 
be used for a specified period of time, without provision for the transfer of that property to 
the buyer upon payment would, according to the Hanafi jurist be invalid ab initio because it 
is usurious and harmful to the buyer.142 
The inclusion of fasid clauses that are in conflict with the spirit of the contract, or otherwise 
give one party an unfair advantage, would render the contract void, with profound 
implications for commercial arbitrations. A void clause, in other words, would not be 
separable from the main contract.143 A local court would therefore have grounds to reopen an 
a Saudi award on the merits and determine the arbitration or underlying agreement null and 
void (though the same would not apply to an award rendered in a foreign jurisdiction, 
discussed in chapter 7). It should therefore be of some comfort to foreign actors entering into 
a contract with a Saudi element that Hanbali scholars diverge from Hanafi fiqh on these 
issues and take a more liberal perspective.  
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The Prophet himself abhorred monopolies, stating: ‘He who hoards (monopolizes) is a 
sinner’.144 Indeed, it is precisely because Hanbali teachings adhere closely to the Prophet’s 
own practices that in classical Hanbali fiqh, a clause found contrary to the object of the 
contract is nonetheless considered valid, for example, a contractual stipulation which 
prevents the resale of any goods which are essentially resaleable (and thus in conflict with the 
essence of a sale contract as per classical Hanafi jurisprudence).145 A contract is invalid only 
in respect of any such clauses with the subject matter expressly prohibited by the Shari’ah.146 
We return to the question of how Islamic law and opinion inform Saudi investment strategy 
and underpinning legal architecture. Take the example of contracts with future clauses. The 
Prophet himself allowed Muslims to conclude contracts with speculative clauses under 
certain circumstances, thereby permitting an exception to the general rule.147 
However, this interpretation has not generally been the one applied by the Saudi ulama.148 As 
a result, the Saudi legal system has, to a certain extent, become a modern victim of the 
stagnation that resulted in Islamic jurisprudence following the ‘closing of the gate of 
ijtihad’.149 By only considering ijtihad at a last resort (and even then only utilising it in 
reference to the past rather than the present or the future), the ulama have helped to create an 
economy that has often struggled to diversify its economy away from its natural resources. 
3.6.2 Legal Uncertainty  
Another legal issue is that of transparency. Islamic law is not codified, and this has led to 
uncertainty because of the . The Hanbali school is resistant to any efforts to codify Islamic 
law as this is contrary to the principle of ijtihad, despite the fact that, as mentioned above, 
ijtihad only plays a relatively limited part in Saudi jurisprudence.150 The failure to codify the 
law has resulted in a situation where there is no clarity on the contractual rights of parties, 
which has been shown to deter entrepreneurs from engaging in risk-taking which is essential 
for a dynamic commercial system.151  
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The relative failure of the Saudi economy to develop a vibrant commercial sector would seem 
to conform to Kuran’s theory that Islamic law had prevented the development of modern 
trade systems.152 However, it is argued by this researcher that it is not Islamic law per se that 
has prevented the development of trade within Saudi Arabia, but instead the rigid 
interpretation of the conservative Islamic scholars who have embraced an inflexible approach 
to the development of commercial law in spite of historical evidence indicating that such 
actions in fact go against the very spirit of the Hanbali, namely that everything that is not 
forbidden is allowed.  
3.6.3 A Dual System of Commercial law and Dispute Settlement 
Esmaelli argues that the dual nature of the Saudi legal system is an anomaly in the new 
globalized world and even raises issues about the rule of law in the Kingdom.153.As noted 
previously, dispute resolution mechanisms are very important to an international legal system 
and the risk of a refusal of the Saudi courts to enforce an arbitral award is a great concern for 
international companies. This may be the reason why many are reluctant to invest in the 
kingdom. However, the laws on investment and arbitration passed in 2007 and 2012 may 
reassure foreign investors on the arbitral process as shown in chapters 6 and 7.  
The nature of the Saudi economy is one that has also militated against the development of a 
dynamic economy. Saudi Arabia may be considered a ‘rentier state’ (i.e. one that is content to 
live off the revenue of its natural resources) to the extent that the Kingdom is often referred to 
as suffering from the ‘resource curse’.154 This curse is the paradox that countries with an 
abundance of natural resources such as oil usually have less economic growth and less 
development than countries with fewer natural resources. While oil helped the Saudi 
governments to create a modern economy with world-class infrastructure, it has also led to a 
host of problems that hinder the development of the nation.155 One of these is the inherent 
volatility of the revenues that are derived from oil. The oil price collapsed in 1986.156 This led 
to severe downturns in the Saudi economy and had negative implications for many 
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businesses.157 The severe downturns have often led many businesses to fail and dissuaded 
investment.  
In respect of the development of financial and banking law specifically in Saudi Arabia, as 
noted above Saudi Arabia has acceded to the WTO, which includes regulations on banking. 
Furthermore, in 2015 the Saudi Arabian stock exchange was opened up to foreign investors. 
However, the banking industry is heavily regulated by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA), which ensures that the general principles of Islamic finance set out above are 
upheld.158 In respect of disputes, the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes 
(CSBD) is a dispute settlement forum that is targeted towards contemporary commercial 
banking matters that is intended to be more pragmatic than the regular courts (although this 
suggestion has been open to debate as shown in chapter ).159  
Unlike many of its neighbouring countries, Saudi Arabia does not distinguish between its 
financial institutions (for example, in the UAE there are legislative distinctions between 
Islamic financial institutions and conventional ‘Western’ institutions).160 According to Al 
Homoud, this is likely because SAMA does not wish to suggest that there is any bank 
operating within the Kingdom that is not bound by the Shari’ah. Financial products offered 
by Saudi banks must be approved by the supervisory committee to ensure that they are 
compliant with the Shari’ah.161 Similar to the situation with the ulama discussed above, there 
is a risk that such supervisory overview from a Shari’ah perspective could result in the failure 
to advance innovation in the commercial arenas. 
The prohibition of riba continues to apply under Saudi law, and any terms in a contract 
relating to the charging of interest will make the contract voidable under Saudi law. However, 
as noted above, such prohibitions are often bypassed through various other charges that play 
the same role as interest (although they are fixed rather than speculative).162 
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One of the primary targets of the Vision 2030 programme is to develop a robust financial 
sector, including the introduction of sophisticated capital market products such as derivatives. 
However, although the programme sets out a number of mechanisms by which the financial 
sector can develop further, there is little indication that this involves any radical re-evaluation 
of the financial sector from a Shari’ah-compliance perspective.163 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that many trading laws that were first developed by tribes in 
the Arabian Peninsula evolved from their pre-Islamic origins to become commonplace across 
the world. The tribes of the Arabian Peninsula were for example early advocates of the 
concept of free trade and this concept was given further authority by the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah. However, it also noted that despite these pro-trade origins, elements of the Shari’ah 
became rigid and inflexible resulting in jurisprudential stagnation that lasted for many 
centuries. The Shari’ah then staged a remarkable revival in the past two centuries. With so 
much to catch up on, Islamic scholars have been very busy in their attempts to apply 
traditional concepts to the contemporary world, especially in respect of banking and financial 
law. This has resulted in the rise of a financial system that could have the potential to 
challenge the traditional Westernised structures that have dominated the global economy for 
over half a millennium.  
Despite the huge advances that have taken place even within the past 50 years, Islamic 
finance still lags behind its Western rival in terms of freedom. This is an important factor that 
deters foreign investment. Although the financial crash of 2008 starkly illustrated the risks 
when a banking system is given too much free rein, certain elements of the Islamic trade and 
financial systems continue to promote insularity because of the Hanbali approach of looking 
to the past to derive legitimacy and authority from the Qur’an and the Sunnah. 
As one of the most conservative Muslim countries, Saudi Arabia prides itself on the fact that 
its laws are based on the Shari’ah. However, this does not come without some negatives, as 
Saudi Arabia’s rigid interpretation by the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence leads to a 
suggestion that the jurisprudential stagnation that began with the ‘closing of the gate of 
ijtihad’ could once again occur within the Kingdom, where the ulama continue to review 
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ancient texts for inspiration instead of looking to the future and laying down their own 
contemporary interpretations of the Shari’ah using discretion and reaching consensus.  
However, there are some indications that this may be changing in order to attract foreign 
investors. Politically, Saudi Arabia continues to embrace globalisation to a greater extent and 
with the increased interconnectedness of the global economy, the economic and legal systems 
of Saudi Arabia may be unable to revert or stagnate in the way that it did in the 13th century. 
Furthermore, the Kingdom continues to take steps to diversify its economy away from its 
natural resources and in order to do so, the development of free trade is fundamental to the 
process. The Saudi government has introduced large volumes of landmark legislation in 
recent years (such as for example, the Arbitration Law 2012) that is intended to facilitate 
trade and promote FDI within the Kingdom.  
The history of Islam provides two paths, the path of innovation and the path of stagnation. By 
considering its history, Saudi Arabia can utilise the wisdom of Allah, Muhammad and early 
Islamic scholars to create an innovative and diversified economy without sacrificing its 
Islamic privilege. If interpreted with a contemporary mind-set, the Shari’ah provides an 
excellent legal framework within which trade can flourish. Furthermore, if Muslim-majority 
countries cooperate to ensure that their financial structures provide for a free and fair system 
that is consistent with the principles of the Shari’ah, there is every possibility that the system 
will attract more foreign investors. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
Modernising the Saudi Legal System: Reconciling the Shari'ah and 
Modernity.  
4.1 Introduction: Saudi Arabia in the Modern World 
This chapter brings us squarely to the modern era of the Saudi legal system. The nature of 
Saudi Arabia’s constitutional order is somewhat distinct in that the Shari’ah is recognised not 
merely as a primary source of law but as the ultimate source of all law and authority and, 
hence, the constitutional embodiment of its legal system.1 In this regard, Article 7 of the 
Basic System of Governance instructs that ‘[g]overnment in Saudi Arabia derives power from 
the Holy Qur’an and the Prophet's tradition’.2 Sources of Saudi law consist of an assemblage 
of laws issued by Royal Decree, some of which partly codify aspects of the Shari’ah;3 
traditional (customary) law4 and civil codes and procedures borrowed from ‘foreign’ legal 
systems.5 In the hierarchy of sources, however, the Shari’ah is preeminent.6 The first source 
of primary law derives from the literal text of the Qur’an. The Sunnah is also considered a 
primary source of Saudi law and consists of the oral testimony of the life and teachings of the 
Prophet Mohammad known as Hadiths.7  
One distinction should, however, be made clear from the outset. Saudi law is not reducible to 
the Shari’ah. The former derives from the authority of the other. As Reinhart suggested, the 
Shari’ah embodies the highest ideal of a legal system and moral scheme that governs all 
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aspects of the manner in which Muslims ought to practice faith and conduct dealings in 
private and public life.8 As such, the Shari’ah provides its own ‘moral’ scheme and 
evaluative criteria, rooted in Godly values of morality, truth, beauty, knowledge and justice 
through law, which exists independently of the legal methodologies and methods through 
which these moral objectives are interpreted and given concrete expression in the positive 
laws of any given Islamic legal system (i.e. through its formal incorporation into state law).9 
This was in part a reflection of the fact that each school of Islamic jurisprudence emerged in a 
different part of the Islamic empire.10 In Saudi Arabia, opinions of the scholars who follow 
the strict constructivism of Ibn Hanbal, the founder of the Hanbali School, carry great 
weight. This is because the Hanbali school of jurisprudence is the official school in Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar, although aspects of its jurisprudence can also be found in Palestine, Syria, 
and Iraq.11  
In light of the above, this chapter addresses the research question of whether the Shari’ah is 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate modern practices. It attempts to determine the extent to 
which the modernisation aims of the Saudi leadership are reconcilable with Islamic legal 
traditions in contemporary Saudi Arabia. The analysis of legal reforms in this chapter also 
helps towards addressing the research question of what mechanisms Saudi Arabia can 
implement to attract foreign investors. In the past decades, the influx of foreign investment in 
the Saudi oil industry was a precipitant of modernisation and, its opposite, resistance; the 
latter a response to an international arbitration system that was deemed to have encroached 
upon the sovereign laws of the Kingdom’s legal order and displaced the Shari’ah’s rightful 
place within it.12 However, economic factors, notably the drop in oil revenues, are once again 
providing the impetus for a shift in the public consciousness of Saudi society which, in 
reciprocal relation, appear to have led to a change in political and, possibly to a lesser extent, 
judicial attitudes.13 Of course, policies aimed at fostering higher levels of investment in Saudi 
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Arabia cannot be achieved through policy alone; they rely on sound laws, procedures and 
enforcement mechanisms.14 Furthermore, governmental policies can hinder as well as help 
processes of modernisation,15 holding back the articulation of common Islamic standards that 
can be mobilised in favour of political and economic development aims.16  
This chapter begins with a brief analysis of the development of the legal system, with 
emphasis on how Saudi authorities have imported foreign concepts and values to modernise 
the laws while protecting the Kingdom’s Islamic heritage. It then examines the current dual 
legal system and determines the extent to which the delicate balance is achieved. It concludes 
by considering whether the modernisation project has been effective, and whether one may 
talk of duality or harmony. 
4.2 The History of the Saudi Legal System 
During his reign, King Abdul-Aziz Ibn Abdulrahman Al Saud presided over a series of 
modernising reforms that comprehensively overhauled the economic and governance 
architecture of Saudi Arabia.17 Through investments in science, education and technology, 
King Abdul-Aziz fulfilled the needs of the administratively organised area of Al-Hejaz., 
whilst fostering social cohesion among the people of different regions.18 A visionary leader, 
the founder of the modern state of Saudi Arabia, King Abdul-Aziz recognised that social 
bonds that held the Saudi policy were rooted not only in a common notions of nationhood, 
but in a shared legal heritage founded on Islamic law and custom.19 Seeking to reconcile the 
civil law orientation of Saudi Arabia’s administrative structure with the Islamic heritage of its 
people, the King passed an order obliging all judicial authorities ‘to conform to the Qur’an, 
the Sunna of its Prophet, and to the guidance of its Companions and the first pious 
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generations’.20 Moreover, under the King’s regency, all aspects of decision-making found 
inspiration in Islamic customs of conciliation, power-sharing and deliberation.21 These 
Islamic conceptions of ‘good governance’ endure in the Kingdom’s governance structure 
even today.22  
By the time of his death in 1953, the visionary King he had established a ministerial system 
with centralised policy making powers.23 Above all, the King fostered growth and 
development in the country, bringing order and stability to a formerly tribal and divided 
society, and did so by crafting a ‘method of ruling in the name of Islam and modernization’.24 
It follows that the King also faced the challenge of applying modern standards while adhering 
closely to Islamic values. Nonetheless, all Saudi people, ruler and ruled, were governed by a 
common legal framework derived from the Shari’ah and Hanbali fiqh.25 The law of 
procedure before the courts in Saudi Arabia stipulates: 
Courts shall apply to cases before them provisions of Shari'ah laws, in accordance 
with the Qur'an and Sunnah of the Prophet (peace be upon him), and laws 
promulgated by the State that do not conflict with the Qur'an and Sunnah, and their 
proceedings shall comply with the provisions of this Law.26 
4.2.1 Civil Law Influences on the Early Formation of the State 
Despite the primacy of Shari’ah law, the form and structure of Saudi Arabia’s institutions, 
both political and judicial, are strongly influenced by earlier civil law influences.27 According 
to Hanson, one reason that civil law, as opposed to common law, could be incorporated into 
countries that practice the Shari’ah is the similarities between the separation of public and 
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private law in civil law systems, on one hand, and the separation of administrative functions 
in Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia. She noted that: 
Although the Shari’ah permeates all aspects of life, it shares principles found in 
French jurisprudence for the rationale behind the establishment of a separate 
system of administrative law. It may seem surprising at first glance to discover 
that Saudi Arabia, a country never under the influence of European occupation 
and with a strong orthodox Islamic tradition, has been influenced by French 
jurisprudence. However, the flexibility and pragmatism of Shari’ah has enabled 
Saudi Arabia to take advantage of the legal expertise of its neighbours and fill in 
any voids left by Islamic law while always conforming to the Shari’ah.28 
To understand the continuing influence of civil law on the current structure of the Saudi legal 
system, it is necessary to look back in time before the creation of the modern state of Saudi 
Arabia in 1932. At the beginning of the 19th century, the French legal system was going 
through extensive changes following the rise of Napoleon, who promoted the codification of 
law in France and its conquered territories.29 This new fervour for codification spread into 
other areas of the world, including the Ottoman Empire, which based an array of new 
administrative laws on the French civil law system, including legislation based on the French 
Commercial Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. These codes were imported directly into the administrative structure of the 
Ottoman Empire with few changes to account for Shari’ah law.30  
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However, when it came to compiling a code of contractual obligations, the Ottoman 
reformers decided against accepting the French models and instead produced a code based on 
principles derived from the Hanafi school of Shari’ah law.31 This code is referred to as the 
Majalla and it was enacted in 1876.32 The Majalla was the first attempt of the codification of 
principles derived from the Shari’ah that were enacted as law by the authority of the State, 
which was a complete reversal from the classical Islamic position that the Shari’ah was 
divine law and should therefore remain uncodified.33 
The Majalla was based on principles derived from the Hanafi school of Islamic law but it 
also allowed for sufficient flexibility in interpretation, with the Ottoman legal scholars being 
encouraged to consider other schools of thought, both in Islam and elsewhere, thus 
establishing the basis for a legal code that was suitable and appropriate for the contemporary 
world.34 As a result of the dominance and popularity of the French civil law procedures at 
that time, the Majalla is considered to be ‘Islamic in content but European in form’.35 
However, as noted by Hanson:  
…it was not a code in the strictest European sense because it was not a complete 
and exclusive statement of the law as it existed at the time of codification, but 
rather a non-exclusive digest of existing rules of Islamic law which, because of 
its religious nature, could hardly have an exclusive character.36 
The Majalla remained influential after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th 
century and was the basis on which many of the former Ottoman territories based their civil 
codes upon their foundation.37 Although the Majalla was not directly transposed into Saudi 
Arabian law with the creation of the Kingdom, the concept of incorporating foreign laws and 
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Region (Routledge 2013) 1-4. See also, Abdul Basir Mohamad, ‘The Influence of Turkey on the State of Johore: 
A Study on Majallat al-Ahkam al-Adliyyah (2013) 8(3) Journal of Applied Sciences Research 1, 1-8; Lawrence 
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practices was influential in the formation of Saudi Arabian law, including its arbitration 
law.38 The Majalla also largely influenced the Egyptian Civil Code which was based on an 
attempt to harmonise Shari’ah law and European practices.39 Ismail argues that the Egyptian 
Code that had a greater influence on the substance of Saudi Arabian law than the laws of the 
Ottoman Empire.40 However, the Egyptian system was largely based on the French.41 Egypt 
was occupied by the French under Napoleon for only three years, but this brief occupation 
left a lasting impact on Islamic law, as civil law permeated throughout its administration.42 
As a result of the influence that first the French and then the British had in Egypt during the 
course of the 19th century, numerous reforms were introduced in order to regularise legal 
relations with these European powers and provide a more unified system for commercial 
transactions.43 These reforms included the development of European-derived civil codes that 
were applied by European-style civil courts, including the Egyptian Commercial Law Code 
that was broadly based on the French Commercial Code.44 Due to these influences, for 
instance, the Saudi ruling regime established the Board of Grievances (Diwan al Mazalim) 
that was one of the departments of the Council of Ministers in 1954, and by 1955 functioned 
as an independent ministerial body.45  
The Grievances Board, established under the reign of Khalid bin Abdul-Aziz, was directly 
influenced by the Egyptian version of the Diwan al Mazalim, which itself was based on the 
French Conseil d’Etat, established by Napoleon for the purpose of providing advice on the 
drafting of laws and regulations and other matters.46 The practice of the Board was, however, 
also based on principles similar to the classical Islamic Courts of Complaints (Qada al 
Mazalim) which dealt with administrative matters.47 The authority for the establishment of 
the Qada al Mazalim in classical Islam was based on a fundamental right of the sovereign 
under Shari’ah law to rule on all litigation matters and rectify any abuse of justice.48 The 
                                                
38 Ismail, ibid, 4. See also Baamir (n 33) 120. 
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40 Ismail (n 37) 4-8. 
41 See Brown (n 39) 155; Edge (n 27) 131-132. 
42 Hanson (n 10) 279-280. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid, 286; Edge (n 27) 131-132. 
45 Royal Decree No. 2/13/8759 dated 17 Ramadhan 1374 (10 May 1955). See Abd El-Mahdi Massadeh, ‘An 
Analysis of the Civil Service Disciplinary System of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait: An Islamic Perspective and A 
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Qada acted both as an appeal court and was intended to rectify any cases involving a 
miscarriage of justice.49  
The Egyptian Diwan al Mazalim evolved into an independent judiciary that was competent to 
render decisions in administrative disputes, and a similar evolution occurred with the Saudi 
Diwan. Although initially the latter’s role was consultative rather than judicial, the powers of 
the Diwan were increased by Royal Decree in 1976 and later in 1982, 50 with the Diwan being 
transformed from an advisory board into an independent judiciary with the responsibility of 
dispensing justice, and the stated intention of reducing the workload of the Shar’iah courts.51 
The new powers provided to the Diwan under the 1982 Royal Decree included the power of 
adjudication on arbitration matters, as well as the power to settle any other commercial and 
investment disputes and consider applications for the execution of foreign judgments.52  
This historical context is illuminating. It shows that each successive regent and ruling regime 
of Saudi Arabia has confronted the challenge of adopting modern or contemporary standards 
while adhering closely to Islamic law. In the process, each regime has found itself 
accommodating, absorbing and adapting (directly or indirectly) – perhaps capitulating – to 
Western standards, legal norms, practices and discourses originating from the secular legal 
system in order to meet the administrative and development needs of its society.53 
4.3 Saudi Arabia As A Dual Legal System 
Saudi laws fall into one of two categories: fiqh and siyasa.54 As established in previous 
chapters, fiqh consists of juristic opinions on matters of Islamic law and jurisprudence. Given 
the totalising nature of Islamic law, the fiqh covers a sweep of legal issues, covering personal 
law, religious ritual to contemporary rules and principles falling under the umbrella of 
Islamic commercial law (based on the Islamic ‘law of contracts’) and dispute resolution.55 It 
is also worth noting that Saudi Arabia adopts the same classification of Islamic jurisprudence 
in respect of the five categories of Islamic law. Subject to this classification, specific juristic 
                                                
49 Ibid. 
50 Royal Decree No. M/51 of 1402 H (1982) 
51 Hanson (n 10). 
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opinions derived from the text of the Qur’an or narration of the Sunnah are classed as 
mandatory, recommended, permissible, morally repugnant or prohibited activities.56 
Siyasa, by contrast, concerns the domain of human and temporal laws and policies enacted by 
the Saudi government for the benefit of the national interest.57 Thus, Siyasa addresses any 
civil acts which are not expressly regulated in the Qur’an or the Sunnah.58 Deeply embedded 
in the Islamic legal tradition, this doctrine had an ‘enormous impact on the political 
philosophy of the Ottoman state’.59 Arguably an iteration of an Islamic conception of the 
‘rule of law’ principle, Siyasa imposes a duty on ruling authorities to enact law only after 
they have deliberated with religious authorities in the land, thereby ensuring that Muslims 
comport their lives and transactions in abidance with higher principles of the Shari’ah.60  
Ordinary acts of law-making and administration in Saudi Arabia are classified therefore as a 
form of Siyasa. Following the establishment of the Diwan al Mazalim in Saudi Arabia, the 
Council of Ministers enacted several regulations including regulations governing companies 
and commercial agencies.61 In the decade after the establishment of the Council of Ministers 
in 1958, more than 200 regulations and codes in the areas of public and private law have been 
issued,62 extending to the establishment of labour and procurement law codes; banking, 
investment and company law.63  
The majority of these codes and regulations were inspired by the French system and involved 
collaboration with legal scholars in other jurisdictions, particularly ones that were influenced 
by the French law model such as Egypt, Lebanon and Syria.64 These legal codes, whether of 
Ottoman or European origin, were required to conform to the Shari’ah but were adopted 
through the doctrine of public interest (al massalih al mursala) which allows the Council to 
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draft legislation which, although not provided for in the Shari’ah, is for the public good.65 
This is emphasised in the principle of the Hanbali school that ‘all things not specifically 
prohibited are allowed’ in respect to commercial transactions with its corresponding 
justification in the issuance of regulations.66 This example emphasises the profound influence 
of French law on the development of all areas of Saudi law (with the exception of personal 
family law which remains strictly Shari’ah).67 
Thus while Saudi civil authorities have competence to propose legislation and adopt policies, 
the substance of those laws and policies must fall within the range of activities permitted 
under the Shari’ah.68 Likewise, while Royal Decrees issued by the state sovereign prevail 
over ministerial regulations, civil codes and other non-Shari’ah related sources, they are 
considered subordinate to Islamic law and juristic opinion.69 
It is in this sense that the Saudi system might be described as a dual legal system. Vogel 
noted as follows: 
[I]n most Islamic states other than Saudi Arabia, the legal system is bifurcated: 
one part is based on man-made, positive (wadi) law; the other part on Islamic 
law. The first part usually exists in the form of comprehensive codes similar to 
those of the European civil law systems, and the second in the form of Islamic 
law, usually codified as well. The positive legal system provides the basic or 
residual law, while the Islamic law is exceptional, supplementary and relatively 
narrow in scope. There is a similar bifurcation in the institutions that apply the 
law, for example, between positive law tribunals and religious law courts. Saudi 
Arabia also has a dual legal system, but the relative roles of the two sides are 
reversed. The Islamic component of the legal system is fundamental and 
dominant. The positive law, on the other hand, is subordinate, constitutionally 
and in scope.70 
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As such, the system in which regents and ruling regimes have sought to adopt modern 
standards is one in which the Shari’ah provides for the basic or residual law, while positive 
law is supplementary and narrow in scope. Nonetheless, it does not follow that this is a major 
obstacle to modernisation. It is crucial to note that Saudi Arabia has not adopted a 
comprehensive code on, for instance, commercial law, albeit many of its commercial laws 
and regulations derive from legal codes adapted from French and Egyptian systems.71 
Moreover, the Shari’ah remains the primary source of law. Notwithstanding, this reinforces 
the dual aspects of the Kingdom whereby civil law influences coexist with Islamic 
‘supremacy clauses’.72 Saudi Arabia is not the only country to recognise and apply Islamic 
sources of law within the relevant legislative, administrative and judicial processes.73 Saudi 
Arabia is distinct, however, in so far as it establishes the Shari’ah as the constitutive basis of 
all its law.74 As mentioned earlier, a further distinctive feature of the Kingdom’s 
constitutional order is the primacy afforded to the Hanbali school which requires its 
followers to emulate the practices of the Prophet.75 The next section identifies and briefly 
examines the main institutions and features of the contemporary Saudi legal system in order 
to assess the role of the Hanbali Shari’ah within the Kingdom’s broader legal order. 
4.4 Constitutional Aspects of the Saudi Legal System 
4.4.1 Formal Elements of Saudi Arabia’s Constitutional Order 
The political structure of Saudi Arabia’s constitution is overall, fairly ordinary. It is 
composed of three branches of government, (a sui generis) legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary.76 Regulations and laws may be adopted through Royal Decree, i.e. through 
sovereign acts of the King; by means of legislation implemented through Ministerial 
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resolution in consultation with the Shura Council and through secondary law making i.e. 
regional laws, bylaws and administrative circulars.77 Law produced from these sources may 
be considered part of Saudi law.  
A constitution, as commonly understood, is a document that defines, regulates, governs and 
constitutes the organs of government.78 The founders of Saudi Arabia do not provide for a 
written constitution, in part because of hostility to any attempts to codify God’s law as 
discussed below.79 In 1993, however, Saudi Arabia introduced three regulations that codified 
historic aspects of the Kingdom’s constitutional framework. The three regulations encompass 
the Basic System of Governance,80 the Consultative Council (Shura Council) Law,81 and 
Regional Law. 82  
Collectively referred to as the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia, these instruments define, 
constitute, delineate and regulate the powers and functions of each organ of government. In 
this regard, the Basic Law is functionally equivalent to a constitutional document.83 One 
additional legal instrument of note is the Council of Minister’s Law, which defines the 
functions and responsibilities of the executive branch of government.84 The Council of 
Ministers is composed of the heads of ministerial departments, each responsible for 
formulating policy on various subject matters.85 As noted above, the creation of the Council 
of Minister predates the adoption of the Basic Rule of Governance. Moreover, the Basic Law 
codifies aspects of existing legal practice and does not establish new institutions, some of 
which, including the judiciary, have long been existing since the inception of the Kingdom.86  
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In order to better understand the dynamics between judicial and legislative processes in Saudi 
Arabia, it is necessary to first explain the main organs of government. 
4.4.2 Institutions of Government  
4.4.2.1 Executive Branch of Government 
Formally a monarch, the executive branch of Saudi government is composed of the Prime 
Minister (and the King) and Council of Ministers, both of whom are endowed with authority 
to enact laws.87 Royal orders issued by the King and Prime Minister are self-executing and 
become effective upon being published in the Saudi gazette.88 The Council of Ministers is 
also vested with authority to promulgate ministerial resolutions with binding legal effect.89 
Under the political structure of Saudi Arabia, the King may issue Royal Orders which 
supplant or abrogate existing laws,90 or resolutions passed by the Council of Ministers.91 As a 
political sovereign, the Prime Minister also has the final say over the decision to ratify 
international treaties.92 
The Council of Ministers consists of numerous ministerial offices which perform governance 
functions under the supervisory authority of the King and his deputies.93 As to the functions, 
the Council of Ministers is chiefly responsible for developing and implementing 
administrative laws and policies which aid the development and stable functioning of the 
Kingdom, encompassing the sphere of education, economy and finance, and administrative 
matters.94 The Council may also establish committees charged with the task of implementing 
policies and reviewing the work of governmental authorities.95 
The political structure of the Saudi government is highly centralised and the executive 
branches of government and royal authorities have sweeping powers. The Prime Minister 
exercises broad power, and therefore the concept of republicanism cannot conceivably 
coexist with Saudi interpretation of Islamic conceptions of the source and divine nature of 
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law and authority.96 However, ruling authorities in Saudi Arabia are bound by the limits of 
the Shari’ah. One may ask why Saudi Arabian authorities believed that empowering the 
executive branches withsweeping powers to direct general policy would ensure 
modernisation and the protection of the Kingdom’s Islamic heritage. Although there is no 
uncomplicated answer to this question and, also, it does not fall within the Researcher’s 
remit, it may be important to very briefly discuss some attempts at justifying this stance.  
Ayoob has noted that the ijtihad was incorporated within the Saudi legal system by King 
Abdul-Aziz despite stiff resistance from the Ulama, and this expanded and modernised the 
legal system.97 Vietor and Forrest also noted that King Abdullah was able to use his broad 
powers to balance the interests of divergent constituents:98 the clergy (Ulama), on whom the 
the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers depend for social legitimacy,99 who are 
generally opposed to progressive social reforms; the growing youth population who 
increasingly demand justice for all and the respect of human rights; and many Muslims 
around the world who look towards Saudi Arabia as leader of the Muslim world to uphold 
Islamic principles rigorously.100 Also, Wurm pointed to the setting up of the Shura Council 
by King Fahd as a major component of the basic system of government that facilitated 
dialogue between Islamic scholars and society; and the setting up of the Forum of National 
Dialogue that channelled social pressure including pressure to enhance the rights of women, 
youth, non-Muslims and foreigners, and organise municipal elections.101 Nonetheless, it is 
logical to ask whether the best way of protecting Saudi Arabia’s Islamic heritage while 
adopting modern standards was through a centralised system with an empowered executive. 
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4.4.2.2 Legislature 
Viewed through the lens of modern constitutional theory,102 the legislature has three primary 
functions. It is responsible for enacting laws in accordance with the prescribed legislative (i.e. 
parliamentary) process; it acts as a ‘check’ on executive power and, finally, enacts laws on 
behalf of the will of ‘the people’.103 In common with other Muslim countries, the Saudi 
Arabian concept of the role and function of the legislature is markedly different from Western 
liberal democracies.104 Under social contract theories of law, the legislature traces its 
authority back to ‘the people’, the ultimate sovereign, through periodic elections and 
plebiscites.105 By way of contrast, the Saudi legislature derive their power and authority from 
religious legitimacy, whereby all human laws are understood to be subordinate to, or derive 
directly from, God’s law as the ultimate source of all law and authority.106 
It is commonly assumed Saudi Arabia lacks an independent legislature with authority to enact 
laws and policies. Even the use of the word ‘law’ is considered a secular construct.107 As a 
result, the word ‘Nizam’ which means regulation is used instead.108 In reality, Saudi Arabia 
has a unicameral legislature, which consists of two authorities, collectively referred to as the 
Malik al Shura. The first of these authorities is the Council of Ministers which functions in 
the dual capacity of a legislative and executive organ of state, 109 while the second takes the 
form of the Council of Senior Scholars (the Shura).110 Created in 1992, the Shura Council is 
composed of members of civil society, including professionals and Hanbali jurists. The 
composition of the Council reflects the vaguely democratic ideal that that any person who 
claims to represent Saudi citizens should be fully acquainted with the country’s legal 
traditions and be an active participant of Islamic society.111 As part of its consultative 
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functions, the Council advises the government on any proposed regulations and Islamic 
aspects of government policy, thereby ensuring that all ‘regulations and motions meet the 
interests of the state or remove what is bad’.112 
The sui generis nature of Saudi Arabia’s political organs is the best expression of its mixed 
legal traditions. On the one hand, the Council is empowered to enact policies or siyasa in the 
interest of furthering the social and economic welfare of its citizenry. On the other hand, the 
Shura is charged with the task of recommending laws or regulations aimed at bringing Saudi 
Arabia’s law, and society, into greater abidance with Shari’ah. 113  
4.4.2.3 The Judiciary 
Many instruments establishing the basic structure of the Saudi judiciary precede its formation 
as a unified state. King Abdul-Aziz adopted the first regulation establishing Shari’ah 
courts114 as the King of the al-Hejaz and Sultan of Najed,115 in 1926, before the Kingdom was 
consolidated in 1932. In the following year, a subsequent royal order was issued to expand 
the number of courts by establishing two additional summary courts in both Jeddah and Al 
Medina alongside Shari’ah courts, and brought under the supervisory authority of the 
Supreme court in Mecca, known as the Almahkamah Alshriyah Alkobra.116 The Hay’at 
Altadqeqat Alshar’iyah was established for the purposes of supervising all court decisions as 
a court of appeal.117 Further amendments to the Court of Appeal’s powers were adopted in 
1962.118 These new judicial provisions were later codified by Royal Decree.119 
Bringing us up to date with the modern structure of the Saudi judiciary, the country’s court 
system is divided into general courts of jurisdiction, the administrative courts, and specialised 
tribunals. The first are the Shari’ah courts, which are in effect courts of general jurisdiction. 
These courts have been comprehensively restructured under a new judicial hierarchy 
following recent judicial reforms, discussed below.120 The second judicial branch is the Saudi 
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Administrative court known as the Board of Grievances or Diwan.121 Thirdly, and operating 
in parallel to the administrative and Shari’ah courts are a number of ad hoc and quasi-judicial 
committees with subject matter jurisdiction over labour and banking disputes such as the 
Settlement of Labour Disputes and the Committee for Settlement of Banking Disputes.122 The 
independence of the courts from political authorities is affirmed in Article 46 of the Basic 
Law, and further articles of the same law endow all citizens with the right to pursue justice 
through the courts.123 The Prime Minister and King retain final authority to overturn the 
decisions of the highest courts of the land under Article 50 of the Basic Law.124 
All courts in Saudi Arabia are required to render judgments, both penal and administrative, in 
accordance with the requirements of the Shari’ah.125 A noteworthy feature of the Shari’ah 
rules of judicial procedure is their apparent informality and emphasis on oral testimony.126 
Many aspects of Islamic judicial procedure remain touched under the Saudi legal system. For 
instance, Saudi courts do observe pre-trial procedures and the country’s civil and criminal 
procedure laws do not stipulate a time bar for bringing actions, though parties may provide 
stipulations in contractual arrangements.127 In an important development, the New Arbitration 
law of 2012 prescribes timelines within which a jurisdictional challenge must be made, 
although an arbitral tribunal may accept a late plea if satisfied with the reasons for the 
delay.128 Saudi citizens may also avail of other ADR procedures and, in this regard, refer any 
disputes for mediation before a religious judge known as a mufti.129 A mufti or qualified 
expert in religious law brokers disputes by relying on Islamic principles and may provide his 
ruling on a given dispute, most commonly in the area of family law.130 While these 
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procedures operate outside formal court procedures, any decision may be binding on both 
parties with their consent.131 
Prior to the 2007 reforms to the judicial system, general courts exercised jurisdiction over 
civil and commercial matters, leading to potential conflicts of jurisdiction and a court system 
over-burdened by cases.132 In the broader sense, the overall structure of the judiciary was 
highly fragmented, disorganised and inefficient.133 These dysfunctions were further 
underscored by the absence of a system of a judicial precedent.134 Cases were, furthermore, 
only published 5 years after decisions had been rendered. 
Following recommendations by the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), the main body with 
supervisory authority over the entire court structure, the judicial system of Saudi Arabia was 
comprehensively overhauled.135 The New Judiciary Law was adopted by Royal Order in 
2007.136 Implementing proposals put forth by the SJC, the new law aimed to improve the 
general order, transparency and efficiency of Saudi Arabia’s sluggish court structure and 
system. The newly reorganised Saudi court system consists of: higher courts, appeal courts, 
and lower district courts known as first instance courts. The latter are further divided into 
summary courts137 and general courts.138 These reforms are to be celebrated, given that they 
streamline and unify courts under a logically ordered court hierarchy.139 Under the newly 
restructured court system, separate Courts of Appeal have also been established in each 
region and province.140 These Appellate Courts are entrusted with the task of reviewing 
petitions in accordance with the Shari’ah procedure.141 The Board of Grievances retains its 
jurisdiction as the highest administrative court of the land.142 
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4.4.2.4 Review of Foreign Judgments 
Created by ministerial decree,143 the Board of Grievances (Diwan al-Mazalem) is best 
described as an administrative court and performs similar functions to the Supreme Court of 
Administrative Justice in France known as the Conseil d’Etat.144 In the past, the Board lacked 
authority to issue binding judgments and could only issue recommendations for approval by 
the ministers.145 Following the adoption of the 2007 Judiciary law, the Board was 
reconstituted as a central judicial authority and afforded jurisdiction to render binding 
judgments on matters relating to state or administrative acts.146 A further Royal Order known 
as the Procedural Law of the Grievances Board affirms that that the Court will apply ‘rules of 
the Islamic Shari’ah in accordance with the Qur’an, the Sunnah and laws not conflicting with 
the present Law’.147 The power to settle commercial matters was vested in the Board until 
2007, at which time it was transferred to the new courts of first instance. With regard to 
arbitration proceedings, the Board remained the competent authority for the supervision of 
such proceedings until the enactment of the New Enforcement Law in 2012, which 
transferred the competence to the specially constituted enforcement (execution) court.148 
The new Enforcement (execution) Law adopted in 2012 has coverage over the execution of 
all local and foreign court judgements, including any requests to enforce arbitral awards 
rendered outside the Kingdom.149 Since this law has coverage over the execution of all 
judgements in Saudi Arabia, it will directly affect all individuals or companies operating in 
the Kingdom or conducting business with a Saudi company.150 Under the new law, the 
execution judge is empowered with jurisdiction to enforce all local and foreign judgments or 
awards issued in the form of an execution deed.151 If a claimant seeks to execute an 
agreement not on the list, or arbitral that is not final, the competent Execution Judge will 
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refuse enforcement. Subject to Article 11, the Execution Judge may only enforce a foreign 
arbitral award on the basis of reciprocity as discussed in chapter 7. The new enforcement law 
significantly improves on the previous law, subject to which enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards remained within the jurisdiction of the Board of Grievances.152 This resulted in 
lengthy and expensive procedures.153 Parties seeking speedy enforcement met with delays in 
the execution of judgements and the absence of sophisticated administrative support.154 More 
problematic still, the Board of Grievance would on occasion reopen the dispute on the merits 
on grounds of public policy or Shari’ah compliance.155 As discussed in chapter 7, the new 
arbitration law requires the awards to comply with the Shari’ah and public policy but the 
Board of Grievance (and the enforcement court and Court of Appeal) is no more empowered 
to review the merits of awards.  
The SJC exercises supervisory authority over the restructured court system. In conjunction 
with the High Court, the SJC assumes new powers to develop general principles of law and 
precedent which may bind the lower courts,156 though some doubt remains as to how, given 
religious resistance, these reforms will be implemented in practice. The Council also has the 
responsibility of appointing judges, establishing ad hoc tribunals and creating any other 
specialised courts for the purposes of implementing the recommendations of the Prime 
Minster, King and Council of Ministers.157  
While a step in the right direction, the new judiciary law has not entirely addressed the 
dysfunctions of the previous system. Key provisions of existing law create potential for 
conflicts of jurisdiction.158 Moreover, a restructured judiciary does not deal with the problem 
of unruly jurisprudence of local courts given the absence of a developed body of general 
principles of law and the Shari’ah. There is another dimension to judicial competences under 
the current court system that may be said to present something of a constitutional dilemma, as 
discussed below. 
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The new judiciary law transfers jurisdiction on specialised subject matters from the first 
instance courts to tribunals with particular expertise on these issues.159 Accordingly, the 
Committee for the Settlement of Banking and the Insurance Dispute Committees have 
jurisdiction on the preponderance of commercial cases.160  
Article A of the Royal Decree establishing the Committee for the Settlement of Banking 
Disputes provides for the creation of a specialised sub-committee with exceptional powers 
and functions.161 The Committee has exclusive competence to resolve banking disputes in 
accordance with the contract signed by the parties.162 The effect of this provision is to remove 
jurisdiction from the Shari’ah courts (and the Commission for the Settlement of Commercial 
Disputes) which are no longer able to hear disputes on the subject matters listed in the Decree 
establishing the Committee. The Decree itself vests the Committee with broad discretionary 
powers to determine its competence and laws applicable to the dispute and recommend 
remedies such as asset freezing.163 Given its wide powers, it is notable that the Committee’s 
power is obstructed by the absence of clarity on which body has final authority to enforce its 
decisions.164 A more contentious issue concerns the Committee’s authority to enforce any 
contractual terms which might otherwise be prescribed under the Shari’ah or Hanbali fiqh as 
it has traditionally been applied in Saudi Arabia. The Committee may for instance elect to 
enforce contractual terms with elements of riba or gharar and apply general (Western) 
principles of contract law.165 
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As suggested above, the Saudi religious jurists have some latitude to favour a purposive 
interpretation of a particular legal issue against more technically (formally) correct 
alternatives. By invoking the doctrine of al-slyasa alifdi'ivva, for instance, religious 
authorities can render an opinion or ruling on how law should be applied in the best interests 
of the public.166 This doctrine allows for the spirit of law to prevail over the letter of the law, 
whereby a given ruling (fatwa) can be adjusted in accordance with the ‘ruler’s expectations of 
rendering religious legitimacy to political decisions in order to maintain political stability and 
acceptability by the society’.167A fine example of this is the recent relaxation of the 
guardianship of women law in 2017.168 The ruling authorities in Saudi Arabia relied on the 
supporting fatwas before introducing policy changes on matters of personal status law, which 
are primarily governed by the Hanbali fiqh.169  
More broadly, however, interpretative challenges remain. The concept of stare decisis is not 
an accepted part of the classic Islamic legal tradition, in part because of the flexibility built 
into Islamic methods of interpretation.170 This presents significant difficulties since jurists 
will often disagree on points of law, and these different opinions may, in certain situations, 
affect legal outcomes quite dramatically.  
One might very well argue that there is no unified body of law called the ‘the Shari’ah’, but 
that in fact different versions of the Shari’ah apply variously from school to school, 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, one social context to another.171 This brings us back to the critical 
distinction between Islamic law and jurisprudence. As an expression of divine law, the 
Shari’ah cannot, by its nature, be the sole preserve of one country, nor does there exists a 
global authoritative body or supreme court of law that can develop unified standards on the 
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Shar’iah.172 In principle, this may lead, perversely, to a kind of fatwa-shopping, as has been 
the case in some Islamic finance disputes, whereby disputing parties seek rulings that are 
more flexible on issues prohibited under the Shari’ah.173 
As noted above, King Abdul-Aziz issued the first Royal order establishing regional courts in 
1926.174 In this order, the King instructed that no court or jurist is bound by any one school of 
Islamic jurisprudence.175 In principle, this would have enabled jurists and other religious 
authorities in the Kingdom to ‘shop’ among different fiqhs. However, in doing so, the King 
had sought to revive the pluralistic ethic of early Islam, ensuring that fidelity to one particular 
interpretation would not abrogate the usefulness of another’s school fiqh on a separate legal 
question.176 Other than custom, therefore, which undoubtedly carries significant weight, there 
are no clear rules within the secular dimensions of Saudi law that would prevent Saudi judges 
from exercising their judicial autonomy including invoking the doctrine of istihaan or juristic 
preference.177 Historically, Saudi judges have almost exclusively relied on the legal 
commentaries and narrow set of rulings, inspired by the teachings of the late Scholar Ibn 
Taymiyyah who wrote in the 13th Century.178 Reflecting on the historical practice of the 
judiciary in Najd, it is noted that: 
One of the most prominent features of that period was the reliance on the Hanbali 
School, ease of judicial procedure and simplicity. The judges were to meet people at 
home and in the market and might invite them to meetings in Riyadh to discuss 
some of the general affairs when presented to them. Nomination of a person to hold 
a judicial office would take place when they attended lessons in mosques and 
studying the books of Al-Hanbali fiqh [i.e. jurisprudence]. At the same time there 
was a need for judges even if they could not finish that study.179 
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Resistance to codification reflected a suspicion widely held among religious groups and 
authorities that governments have no place in legislating on delicate matters of religious 
law.180 This reflected the consensus of jurists that the meaning of the Qur’an’s textual verses 
and narration of the Sunnah can only be fully comprehended by jurists trained in the Islamic 
sciences, known as mujtahid.181 Others feared the ‘closing of the gate of ijtihad’, thereby 
preventing the articulation of new norms and principles more responsive to modern realities, 
particular in the sphere of commercial law.182 In this sense too, codification is anathema to 
the notion of a ‘living law’ or ‘law of the body politic’.183 This reasoning is persuasive on its 
own terms where it not for the fact that, as Foster suggests, in historical context, Islamic law 
that emerged was ‘almost entirely managed and interpreted, by jurists working within 
madhahib (singular madhhab, rendered in English as ‘school’)’.184  
4.5 Reconciling Shari’ah And Modernity  
Islamic governments appear to be caught in an endless struggle; striving on one hand to 
modernize their laws through ‘legal transplants’ whilst courts and religious authorities stand 
guard, armed with Islamic ‘supremacy’ clauses that compel the former to select policy 
options consistent with mandatory aspects of the Shari’ah. Notably, it is political authorities 
who are leading the modernisation agenda, specifically by transposing ever more Western 
style rules and provisions into commercial laws.185 
On occasion, governments express unbridled optimism. Gemmell for example notes that the 
Yemen’s Minister of Justice agreed to the country’s new arbitration law as a reflection of 
future Islamic legislation.186 Reflecting on the need to reconcile Islamic fiqh with modern 
commercial norms and practices, the Minister described the newly modernized arbitration 
law as, ‘an avant-garde experience [that] cast the provisions of the Shari’ah in a modern 
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mould . . . and taking the doctrinal treasure of the ‘Fiqh’ . . . [created] a model of codification 
and the nucleus of a unified Moslem legislation which can be applied throughout the entire 
Moslem world’.187 Can Saudi Arabia also achieve the same aims with respect to its legal and 
economic modernisation agenda? 
Commercial codes in Islamic countries in the Gulf are being modified to accommodate 
Western principles of commercial law, and contracts concluded between private parties will 
frequently incorporate foreign-choice of law arbitration clauses.188 Should these attempts be 
regarded as encouraging signs of the Islamic world’s willingness to open up lines of dialogue 
with the non-Islamic world, whether through reciprocity in the enforcement of foreign 
judgments and awards or through greater receptiveness to Western legal influences and 
comparative jurisprudence more generally?189 If this is the case, this would suggest a turning 
point in the attitude of many Middle Eastern countries who might have turned away from 
what they perceived as the cultural chauvinism of courts and tribunals who depicted Islamic 
law as a primitive creation of the ‘orient’ and consequently vastly inferior to international 
commercial norms and practices.190 
If the above is true, international commercial law, to the extent that such a thing exists, is 
only nominally international. It may be argued that what is called ‘international’ is revealed 
as a historically and culturally contingent expression of European legal traditions (and now 
Anglo-American) ‘made universal’.191 The regime and institutions of international 
investment, trade and arbitration law are, according to Anghie, inescapably bound up with a 
colonial past. 192 To what extent then are ongoing attempts to integrate Western elements into 
‘Moslem legislation’ the latest iteration of the legal form by which the ‘orient’s is made to 
submit to Western economic powers? If this logic is to be accepted, Muslim countries have 
little choice to ‘accommodate’ Western legal influences or to rebuild their laws around them 
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as a condition of their participation in the modern international economic order. Law 
becomes the mere instrument of a new empire built on commerce, fuelled by the flow of 
investment from developed capital exporting economies to developing resource-producer 
countries.193 Then economic hegemony allegedly maintained through international law and 
its institutions may transform into a mode of cultural hegemony. On this view, the 
sovereignty of Islamic states and legitimate diversity of their inherited traditions are casually 
set aside or ‘civilised’ by an international ‘juristocracy’ masquerading as a ‘neutral’ 
mechanism of international arbitration.194  
The ideas of Edward Said are once again thrown into relief, who described the manifold ways 
in which subaltern non-Western societies have been denied legitimate autonomy not merely 
through colonial-era direct rule but through subversion of traditional (legal) practices by 
means of hegemonic European discourses on law and culture. On this Said says: 
The Orient is an integral part of the European material civilization and culture. 
Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically 
as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, 
imagery, doctrines even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles.195 
Shifting the focus away from influences, malign or otherwise, that have shaped the 
contemporary Arab world, Gemmell considers the motivations of ruling authorities from 
within Islamic countries in the Gulf, asking the question of whether current efforts to reform 
and revise aspects of the Shari’ah to ‘fit’ modern economic realities ought be treated as 
evidence of ‘pragmatism or sophistry’ on the part of the framers of new legislation?196 
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Many Islamic nations have erred on the side of those aspects of Islamic jurisprudence which 
may be likened to the Western tradition of legal pragmatism.197 Through the device of ijtihad 
(dialectical reasoning), maslahah (public interest exceptions to the general rule) and itishaan 
(juristic preferences), ruling authorities in Islamic nations appear to apply a mode of 
contextual reasoning that allows for innovations in classic jurisprudence if they can be 
defended as necessary tools for the social and economic advancement of their people.198 But 
how far should the pendulum swing before modernisation becomes an agent of 
transformation, fundamentally altering the identity of Islamic society, for bad as well as good. 
In this regard, Ballantyne199 and Gemmell200 remark on growing aspects of commercial 
practice in Islamic countries that appear to directly contravene the text and spirit of the 
Shari’ah. Some banks in nominally Muslim countries apply interest or devise ever more 
innovative ways by which to charge or receive interest.201 A debate now flourishes on the 
permissibility of debt-based instruments or insurance contracts based on speculative losses, 
each highly contentious from the standpoint of classic Islamic jurisprudence.202 The next 
section will close the discussion by considering the extent to which the above discussed 
cultural and legal criticisms hold water in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a historically 
conservative nation and torchbearer of the Islamic faith. 
4.6 Shari’ah and Modernisation in Saudi Arabia: Harmony or Duality? 
As will be seen in chapters 5 and 7, Saudi Arabia has introduced significant reforms to its 
investment policy and arbitration laws. Many of these reforms are designed to encourage 
foreign companies to do business in Saudi Arabia or enter into commercial agreements with 
Saudi entities, encouraged by the prospect that, contracts with a Saudi element may not 
constitute a deterrent, and Saudi Arabia may yet emerge as a desirable place in which to settle 
disputes and enforce foreign awards. It is certainly the case in regard to Saudi Arbitration 
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laws and investment related reforms as shown in chapters 6 and 7. Contractual and arbitration 
agreements drafted in the Islamic Middle East are increasingly peppered with references to 
standard contractual terms and usages, suggesting that the business actors established in the 
region are increasingly looking outside their legal system to the contractual regimes of others 
countries that can offer them more certainty around aspects of contract construction and 
dispute settlement outcomes.203 
As noted in chapter 2, the experience of Saudi Arabia has been one of ebbs and flows, 
oscillating between earlier periods of commercial (and religious) openness to periods of 
‘closure’ to the non-Islamic world.204 And yet, this closure to the outside world was evidence 
of the strong social, religious and cultural ties that bind Saudi people as a nation, long before 
being formally recognised as state in 1932.205 In this regard, the Basic Law states in its 
preamble as follows: 
The reform mission, upon which the Saudi state was founded, represents the main 
core of the government. This mission is based on the realization of Islamic rules, 
implementation of Shari'ah, and enjoining good and forbidding evil, as well as to 
reform the Islamic creed and purify it from heterodoxies. Therefore, it adopts its 
doctrine from the true Islamic principles that were prevailing at the very 
beginning of Islam.206 
In Saudi Arabia, religious authorities continue to resist proposals that call for the codification 
of the Shari’ah.207 As noted above, for the legal pragmatist, codification quashes creativity in 
development of rules and opinions, while others express theological concerns of a more 
profound nature. Thus, it has been argued that only God has authority to legislate on aspects 
of the Shari’ah, and it is not for any man or country to make authoritative pronouncements on 
God’s will or law: God alone is sovereign, the final arbitrator of justice, and only He may 
rule over his creations.208 Erring on the side of pragmatism, attitudes of Saudi institutions 
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appear to be shifting on this issue. Following recommendations issued by the King, the SJC 
has established an official website to publish Islamic legal rulings, or fatwas in the hopes of 
creating more transparency around judicial decisions so that similar facts may yield similar 
and more predictable outcomes.209  
Saudi society, however, may look dimly on attempts to model Islamic legal orders on 
Western legal concepts,210 such as judicial precedent or Anglo-American conceptions of 
separated powers. Some of these fears are well founded because of the need to first and 
foremost comply with the principles of the Shari’ah. Saudi Arabia is taking on more and 
more features of a dual legal system, whereby Saudi traditional law shares an (uneasy) 
coexistence with pieces of legislation based on secular legal regimes, such as UNICTRAL 
model legislation on arbitral procedure. As noted above, these influences have been present 
from the moment the Kingdom was founded, through the influence of Ottoman civil codes, 
French administrative law and the Egyptian constitutional experience. In recent eras, the 
separation between civil and religious aspects of the Saudi legal order appear to be widening 
ever further. In this light, it may be important to once again consider Vogel’s description of 
Saudi Law: 
Saudi Arabia [also] has a dual legal system, but the relative roles of the two sides 
are reversed. The Islamic component of the legal system is fundamental and 
dominant. The positive law, on the other hand, is subordinate, constitutionally 
and in scope.211 
The task of the Saudi lawyer is therefore to consider whether the hierarchy in which Islamic 
law stands to Saudi law is beginning to disintegrate or is at the very at least being profoundly 
undermined in some areas, while being rigidly clung to in other areas – in rhetoric as well as 
in practice. Take for example the Banking Control Law which regulates some financial 
activities, including interest-based banking – a practice incontrovertibly prohibited by the 
Shari’ah.212 The financial authorities in Saudi Arabia have turned a blind eye to various 
foreign banks that offer conventional banking (non-Shari’ah) products to Saudi consumers. 
On this the Muhammed Al-Jasser, Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
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(SAMA) notes as follows:  
We have richness in diversity . . . Everything is permissible unless it is shown to 
contravene Islamic tenets. Someone has to tell me if and how it contravenes 
explicitly. In fact, most conventional financial products are fine . . . Regulators 
and supervisors are not religious scholars. They are in charge of financial 
stability. The safety of the institution is paramount.213  
In this practical and yet unprincipled way, the Shari’ah is preserved as the official ‘law on the 
books’, even if regulatory authorities do not always observe riba and other Islamic principles 
in practice.214 Yet, it is also possible to argue that the banking settlement dispute committee 
and other non-Shari’ah compliant practices are the inevitable consequences of a legal culture 
that has ossified over time; in which certain doctrinal orthodoxies remain fixed and inflexible, 
and where ruling authorities have, in recent history, turned inwards, unwilling to recognise or 
learn from other legal systems and traditions. In other words, if the government is not able to 
legislate on commercial law issues for fear that the laws will be met with popular or religious 
resistance, it is likely that informal, non-Shari’ah compliant practices and procedures will 
continue to evolve through the back door.  
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has reflected on the relationship between legal and political authority in Saudi 
Arabia, and at a conceptual level, the flexible relationship between secular and Islamic law 
within the Kingdom’s modern constitutional order. It shows that there are many reasons to be 
positive. King Abdullah’s initiative to reform the judicial system in the country was a step 
forward. The court has been reorganized in new commercial and enforcement courts, 
removing some of the jurisdictional powers of the Board of Grievance.  
However, many Islamic practices, encompassing fatwas of the Ulama and legal 
commentaries of Mudhahib - on which local courts rely - have yet to be formally codified 
under Saudi law.215 Though key pieces of regulation on banking, capital markets, investment 
and arbitration have been adopted, clarifying aspects of Saudi law which had until then 
remained opaque, a preponderance of legal issues, including those impacting on investment 
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or arbitration, appear to be regulated by the Shari’ah and supplementary opinions of Islamic 
jurists. Looking in, a foreign investor may struggle to grasp the most basic aspects of Saudi 
law and this can only be an impediment to the future economic prospects of the Kingdom as a 
place to do business and settle investment disputes. 
We are left with a paradox. On the one hand, without codification or a system of judicial 
precedent, there is little certainty and transparency on how particular courts arrive to their 
decision. Without a system widely adhered to in the Saudi legal system, it might appear to the 
Western lawyer that judges decide individual cases based on their own interpretation of the 
Shari’ah and the circumstances surrounding each case.216 This defeats any concept of 
legitimate expectations of a party subject to legal proceedings since there is no reliable way 
of predicting whether one court will follow the decision of another.  
On the other hand, one might argue that interpretative openness is in fact the subtle secret of 
success behind Islamic economic modernisation. For instance, were there to be an attempt to 
codify general principles of the Shari’ah, the result might be to further entrench certain 
religious legal traditions that have been historically dominant in Saudi Arabia, at the expense 
of creativity, innovation and adaptability in Islamic legal thought and practice. The 
prevalence of the Hanbali fiqh has, arguably, made Saudi judges less likely to draw from fiqh 
that is better adapted to modern legal realities, particularly in the sphere of investment law 
and dispute resolution. The key to adaptation may therefore to be to take the best of the 
Hanbali tradition while drawing from other sources and schools of thought from within and 
outside the Islamic legal tradition. 
This can be done without sacrificing Islamic legal traditions on the altar of legal and 
economic reform, nor does it require that a Western notion of progress be accepted as the 
only baseline of development. These ideals can be balanced. The analysis of legal influences 
and interpretative practices that have shaped the Saudi Arabia’s legal system shows that the 
Shari’ah is sufficiently flexible and does not pose an obstacle in the process of 
accommodating modern practices. The next chapter will apply theoretical and historical 
insights gleaned from the foregoing analysis to a discussion of the concrete aspects of the 
Kingdom’s investment environment. This will prepare the ground for an analysis of how the 
country’s FDI prospects may be hindered or encouraged by changes in Saudi investment and 
related to the Shari’ah.  
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One step forward may be to develop a loose system of judicial precedent, based on the 
recommendations of the SJC discussed above. Furthermore, there should be some movement 
towards the codification of legal commentaries relied upon by judges. As well as publishing 
the reasons motivating dicta, the Saudi government should train commercial law judges to 
strengthen their understanding of Islamic and Western commercial law. This may eliminate 
some of the uncertainty in the legal system, and thereby encourage the right forms of 
investment into the country in line with the Saudi vision 2030.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
The Investment Environment and Law in Saudi Arabia: A Step Forward 
and a Step Back? 
5.1 Introduction  
Much of Saudi Arabia’s prosperity is based on the oil industry, which began in the 1930s, not 
long after the Kingdom was founded.1 The success of the commercial production of oil in 
Saudi Arabia has resulted in an increasingly prosperous nation and has contributed to rapid 
economic development in the Kingdom, especially since the 1970s.2 Today, Saudi Arabia has 
the largest economy in the Middle East and is the world’s largest exporter of petroleum.3 This 
sector accounts for 87% of Saudi budget revenues, 90% of its export earnings and 42% of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP).4 
However, in recent years the unsteady price of oil has illustrated the need for Saudi Arabia to 
diversify its economy.5 In 2016, the Kingdom had a budget deficit of an estimated 12.3% of 
GDP, much of which can be accounted for as being the result of lower oil prices.6 In 2017, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted that although non-oil GDP would grow in 
the Kingdom, oil GDP would decline resulting in a real GDP growth rate of close to zero.7 
This budget deficit and lack of growth in GDP has resulted in cuts to capital spending and the 
introduction of VAT and reduced subsidies on certain products, including electricity and 
water.8  
Despite the importance of the public sector elements of the petroleum industry to the Saudi9 
economy, the private sector in Saudi Arabia (including the oil private sector) makes an 
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estimated contribution of 48% to the state’s GDP.10 The Saudi government’s Vision 2030 
plan aims to increase this contribution to 65%.11 However, State funded investment accounts 
for 47.4% of all capital investment in Saudi Arabia,12 with the private sector continuing to be 
heavily dependent on government contracts.13 To counteract this domination of the state, the 
Vision 2030 programme also intends to promote foreign direct investment (FDI), with an 
expected increase in FDI from 3.8% to 5.7%, as the State also attempts to increase non-oil 
exports from 16% to 50% of the export economy.14 The Vision 2030 programme also 
promotes the concept of Saudization, which is an attempt to reduce the unemployment rate 
within the Kingdom (as well as promote more employment among female Saudis) by offering 
incentives to companies that employ a certain percentage of Saudi employees.15 These 
incentives include lower processing fees and a number of other administrative benefits, such 
as sponsorship and immigration benefits.16  
There is an understanding in Saudi Arabia that the natural resources upon which its economy 
is built will not last forever.17 Furthermore, the increased globalisation of the world economy 
as a result of technology has resulted in an increased level of interdependence among 
different countries in the world.18 In order to compete globally, it has been recognised that the 
Saudi Arabian economy needed to reform.19 As a result, over the past two decades, the 
Kingdom’s government has focused on economic reforms that are intended to achieve 
sustainable growth.20 In order to do so, the government has been attempting to lay down the 
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foundations of a market economy based on private ownership.21 These foundations are 
intended to ensure that the Saudi economy is comparable to other global economies. In order 
to achieve these goals, the Saudi government has proposed privatising much of the public 
sector.22 As far back as 1997, the Council of Ministers in Decision No. 60 stated that it was 
expected that privatisation would: 
Improve the efficiency of the national economy and enhance its competitive 
ability to meet the challenges of regional and international competition.23 
Pertinently, the Resolution also sought to encourage private investment from both Saudi 
Arabia and abroad while retaining some state oversight to avoid unregulated industries.24 The 
privatisation of Saudi public companies is considered to have been relatively successful in 
several industries, such as electricity, communications, mineral resources, air transportation 
and insurance.25 One of the objectives of this Decision was also to encourage foreign capital 
to invest locally.26 However, these measures did not bring about the anticipated levels of FDI 
as a result of limitations on the rights of foreign entities to buy or own shares in a privatised 
Saudi company.27 As a result, foreign entities could only contribute in the as a partner in a 
privatised company.28 Despite these restrictions, other reforms have resulted in a steady 
increase in FDI in Saudi Arabia in the past two decades.29 These reforms include the Foreign 
Investment Law 2000, allowing foreign investors access to the same incentives that are 
available to local investors, including the right to own property directly.30 The Vision 2030 
plan includes further incentives for foreign entities, for example the creation of a new 
transnational city called Neom, which would aim to compete for multinational technology 
companies by providing incentives through preferential regulation.31 
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This chapter will review the history of FDI in Saudi Arabia in order to establish why certain 
legal, political and religious barriers resulted in some negative perceptions amongst foreign 
investors about the Kingdom. This chapter will consider why that perception is changing and 
illustrate how Saudi Arabia is amending its legal structures in order to encourage FDI. These 
changes form part of a broader spectrum which can be seen throughout Saudi society, 
including the legal, political, social and economic systems. This chapter will also consider 
where further improvements can be made and where there remain certain limitations which 
discourage foreign entities from investing in Saudi Arabia. It will analyse where further 
liberalisation and privatisation is necessary if Saudi Arabia is to realise the aims of the Vision 
2030 plan. 
5.2 Historical Issues Preventing Or Restraining FDI In Saudi Arabia 
The history of foreign investment in Saudi Arabia is closely linked to the oil and gas industry. 
As noted previously, oil was first found in Saudi Arabia shortly after the Kingdom was 
founded and, once it had been established that there were significant reserves of oil in the 
Kingdom, the Saudi government required the expertise of foreign companies to begin 
extraction and to train locals in the industry.32 As a result, early FDI in Saudi Arabia took the 
form of concession agreements between the Saudi government and international oil 
companies, which eventually resulted in the foundation of ARAMCO, a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Standard Oil of California.33 Although the concession agreements entered into 
by Saudi Arabia were considered to be mutually beneficial at that time as it provided Saudi 
Arabia with industry expertise that it did not have domestically at that time, once the oil 
industry had been established successfully in the Kingdom there was widespread opinion that 
the concession agreements entered into by Saudi Arabia were entered into on an unequal 
basis.34 The ARAMCO case, which has been considered in depth in Chapter 7 of this Thesis, 
may be considered to be one of the catalysts of this opinion as it resulted in a perception 
within Saudi Arabia that the concession agreements were a form of colonisation by American 
and British oil companies.35 
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This perception, as well as an increased demand by OPEC countries for government 
participation in resource exploitation in the aftermath of Libya’s nationalisation of its oil 
industry, the fall of oil prices and the Arab-Israeli war and the oil embargo that followed it, 
led to a reassessment of the concession agreements. The Saudi government began a program 
of renegotiating concession agreements and gaining control of state assets from private 
foreign companies, starting with ARAMCO.36 As noted by Anderson, in the aftermath of the 
nationalisation of the Libyan and Mexican oil industries, foreign companies were willing to 
renegotiate these concession agreements as they feared that the entire industry would be 
nationalised without any compensation being paid to the companies.37 In 1974, the Saudi 
Arabian agreement with ARAMCO was revised to raise the government’s participatory 
interest to 60%.38 By 1980, the Saudi government had acquired 100% ownership of 
ARAMCO, and in 1988 ARAMCO was converted into the national oil company of Saudi 
Arabia and renamed Saudi ARAMCO.39 
Notwithstanding the nationalisation of the Saudi oil industry in the 1980s, that same period 
saw the introduction of legislation to regulate foreign investment in Saudi Arabia for the first 
time.40 In 1974, the Saudi government first introduced legislation intended to encourage 
foreign investment through the Basic Principles of Industrial Policy.41 This policy was 
intended to allow for the transfer of technical know-how from foreign partners, with an 
incentive to foreign partners exempting them from any restrictions on entry and repatriation 
of foreign capital.42 Furthermore, in 1979 the Foreign Capital Investment Code (the Code) 
was introduced with the aim of providing a set of guarantees and incentives for foreign 
investors that wished to invest in Saudi Arabia.43 According to Zerfas: 
The benefits [of the FCIC] are being given with the expectation that the foreign 
firm will conduct itself with its Saudi partners so as to enhance their experience 
and their capabilities, and with the expectation that ultimately, the joint venture 
company will create a genuine, independent, self-reliant, economic enterprise. ... 
That is the real result which the existing legal requirements are attempting to 
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achieve. To the extent these results are not achieved, [it can be expected] that 
further regulations will follow designed to more effectively guarantee that 
result…44 
The Code established the Foreign Capital Investment Committee (the Committee) to oversee 
all FDI in Saudi Arabia.45 According to Weber: 
This Committee [had] the powers to recommend projects it deem[ed] to be 
economically developmental, to review applications for foreign capital 
investment, to consider both complaints made by foreign investors and disputes 
arising from application of the code, to make recommendations for penalties to be 
imposed on those who violate the code and to provide for implementation of the 
[Code]. Through such discretionary authority, the Committee wield[ed] immense 
power over foreign capital investment policy and over the choice of companies 
permitted to operate in the Kingdom.46 
The Committee could determine the desirability of a project based on the number of Saudi 
nationals employed, what type of, and how much technology would be imparted into the 
Kingdom, and the potential for expansion of manufacturing capabilities within the 
Kingdom.47 The Committee’s power of discretion to determine whether a joint venture was 
appropriate meant that foreign investors entering into joint ventures with Saudi companies 
could not look to a definite set of rules to decide whether or not it could validly enter into 
such arrangements.48 
However, despite the Code having been introduced to encourage FDI, research has suggested 
that it had the opposite effect.49 According to Khyeda, the Committee gave priority to Saudi 
Arabian firms and to joint ventures with Saudi participation.50 Article 3 of the Code also 
prohibited foreign investment in a wide range of sectors (including publishing, education, 
health, insurance, electric power generation and more) as well as preventing foreign investors 
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from obtaining a licence unless it was accompanied by appropriate technical expertise.51 
Further criticisms directed at the Code and the Committee included arguments that they failed 
to: (i) protect foreign investors from potential arbitrary measures taken by the government; 
(ii) assure foreign investors that they could freely transfer their investment capital to their 
home countries; and (iii) define a standard of treatment of foreign investments and a means of 
resolving investment -related disputes.52 Furthermore, as Weber goes on to suggest, the 
increase in joint ventures between Saudi companies and foreign companies in the aftermath 
of the implementation of the Code was in spite of the Code, and not because of it.53 For 
example, one challenge faced by foreign companies to establish themselves in Saudi Arabia 
under the Code appeared to be governmental attempts to curtail foreign investment. Weber 
expanded on this point: 
It [was] not clear exactly why the Saudi government appear[ed] to be stepping 
back from its policy of encouraging foreign investment as embodied in the 
Foreign Capital Investment Code of 1979. Perhaps the Saudi markets [had] 
become overcrowded and the government [was] attempting to protect Saudi local 
business. More importantly though, perhaps the Saudis [had] gained the 
technological and economic development the foreign capital was designed to 
stimulate, and the Saudis … now want[ed] to become major [] investors 
themselves.54 
The Code was replaced in 2000 by the Foreign Investment Act which was implemented at the 
same time as the establishment of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 
(SAGIA).55 The purpose of SAGIA was to replace the Committee and to establish a ‘one-stop 
shop’ authorised to issue licences and incorporate foreign and joint venture companies.56 This 
Act is considered to be a turning point in Saudi Arabia in respect of FDI and will be 
considered in the next section. 
Other challenges faced by foreign companies seeking to conduct business in Saudi Arabia 
involve barriers to ownership of companies. Although the 2000 Act allows for foreign 
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investors to own Saudi companies there are some limitations to this, especially in respect of 
companies that are considered to relate to national sovereignty values, Islamic traditions or 
other customary traditions.57 As a result, Article 3 of the Basic Law of Governance states that 
the Shari’ah Council ‘has the authority to issue a list of activities excluded from foreign 
investment’.58 This so-called ‘Negative List’ includes companies involved in 10 different 
industries, including the oil industry59 or other natural resources or the ownership of real 
estate in Mecca or Medina.60 Furthermore, because of the particular nature of the financial 
sector in Saudi Arabia as a result of Shari’ah restrictions on lending and riba, there are 
relatively few foreign banking institutions operating in the Kingdom, with most of those that 
are operating there being joint ventures between the foreign bank and the Saudi 
government.61 The Saudi Arabian government has stated that it is intending to continue to 
reduce the industries on the Negative List and eventually abolish the list entirely.62 
This section has provided some background on the history of FDI in Saudi Arabia, including 
legal and practical issues that have arisen. Some of these issues have resulted in a perception 
amongst foreign companies that it is difficult to invest in and own property in Saudi Arabia or 
to obtain shares in Saudi Arabian companies. In this researcher’s opinion, this perception 
may stem from the high-profile nationalisations of Saudi industries such as ARAMCO in the 
70s and 80s. However, as noted at the outset of this Chapter 6 there has been increased focus 
in Saudi Arabia on establishing a sustainable private sector, and there is a realisation among 
Saudi Government Ministers that foreign direct investment will be required to do so. 
Changing this perception will involve the changing of legal structures, providing certainty to 
foreign investors that their assets will be protected and that there is no risk of the loss of an 
investment as a result of issues that are outside of their control (such as nationalisation or 
Shari’ah-based policies). The next section will consider the changes that the Saudi Arabian 
government has implemented in the last two decades and whether or not they should be seen 
to be a turning point for foreign direct investment in Saudi Arabia. 
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5.3 Recent Reforms And Remaining Challenges In Respect Of Attracting FDI  
5.3.1 Foreign Investment Law 2000 
The Foreign Investment Act 2000 marked a new dawn in Saudi Arabian FDI law. According 
to El Sheikh, the 2000 Act is considered to be a genuine attempt by the Saudi government to 
encourage foreign investment into Saudi Arabia by removing much of the red tape that 
existed under the FCIC.63 According to the OECD, the 2000 Act is also considered to be an 
attempt to make the process of investing in Saudi Arabian companies more transparent to 
foreign investors.64 
The changes made by the Foreign Investment Law include enhanced rights for foreign 
investors to broadly be entitled to the same rights as are available to Saudi nationals. In 
addition, foreign companies no longer need to enter into joint venture agreements with local 
companies nor, as discussed above, are there any restrictions on property ownership or 
investment other than those that appear on the Negative List.65 Indeed, the number of 
industries that have been restricted through the Negative List has also decreased in recent 
years. In September 2015, the Saudi government stated that 100% foreign ownership of 
companies in the wholesale and retail trade sectors was permitted (effective from July 2016), 
while in August 2017 foreign ownership of engineering companies was also removed from 
the Negative List.66 Furthermore, greater incentives are available to foreign companies that 
invest in certain sectors that are not on the Negative List, such as in the energy, education, 
transportation, health, life sciences and knowledge-based industries.67 In addition, there has 
been significant reform in other areas of Saudi law, including Company Law68, Insurance 
Law69 and, as discussed in the later chapter from this Thesis, Arbitration Law.70 
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In practice, the Foreign Investment Law and the related changes create a more transparent 
and open legal structure that encourages FDI by providing clarity to foreign companies that 
wish to invest in the Kingdom.71 For example, Article 2 of the Foreign Investment Law 
makes it clear how foreign companies may obtain a licence for capital investment in the 
Kingdom. It states that: 
The authority shall act on the investor’s application within thirty days of the 
submission of all the documents required by the regulations. If the specified 
period lapses without the authority acting on the application, it shall issue the 
required licence to the investor. If the authority rejects the application within the 
prescribed period, the decision must be justified, and the party whose application 
has been rejected shall have the right to appeal such decision according to laws.72 
The speed at which an application is processed is at odds with many government agencies in 
Saudi Arabia and elsewhere where delays are common. Furthermore, as noted by Alkhaldi: 
To enhance transparency and create a willingness to invest, SAGIA must provide 
all interested investors with required information, clarifications and statistics, as 
well as all services and procedures needed to facilitate and complete all 
investment transactions.73 
Once an application for a licence has been accepted, Article 5 of the Foreign Investment Law 
provides that foreign companies will be eligible for one of two categories of licence: firstly, 
companies owned jointly by a Saudi and foreign investor and, secondly, companies wholly-
owned by a foreign investor, thereby confirming that foreign investors may own 100% of 
companies in Saudi Arabia.74 Furthermore the Foreign Investment Law provides that foreign 
investors can obtain more than one licence for different activities and may apply for more 
than one licence at any given time.75 
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Article 9 of the Foreign Investment Law provides that all foreign investors need a local legal 
sponsor in order to work in country.76 However, once a licence application has been accepted, 
the investor and its employees shall be entitled to apply for sponsorship through the licenced 
investment company (provided that Saudization quotas are met.77 
Article 14 of the Foreign Investment Law provides that foreign investors are subject to 
corporate income tax which is 20% of net profit.78 According to the World Bank, this level of 
corporation tax is among the lowest in the world (although it should be noted that the zakat 
tax rate for Saudi investors is much lower79). Furthermore, the procedural rules of the Foreign 
Investment Law state that foreign investors can benefit from any Double Taxation 
agreements to which the Kingdom is a signatory.80  
The implementation of the Foreign Investment Law helped to create a legal infrastructure that 
was more transparent to foreign companies considering investing in Saudi Arabia. However, 
by itself it was unable to encourage investment and other reforms were necessary, as will be 
considered in the next section. 
5.3.2 Further Reforms 
As noted previously there was a certain level of reluctance among foreign investors to work 
in Saudi Arabia due to the lack of transparency, and the introduction of new legislation 
(including the Foreign Investment Law and new Company Law, Insurance Law and 
Arbitration Law) alone was not sufficient to promote Saudi Arabia as a Kingdom open to 
FDI. Instead, in order to do so, subsequent to the implementation of the Foreign Investment 
Law the Saudi government began to sign a wide range of bilateral and multilateral investment 
(and investment related) treaties with other countries, especially other Middle Eastern and 
Arab League nations.81  
Once such agreements were in force, the King, by Royal Decree, requested that government 
agencies revise their existing laws in order to be able to successfully implement the changes 
set out in these bilateral and multilateral agreements in order ‘to enhance the ease of access to 
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investment opportunities for both Saudi and non-Saudi investors…’82 The government also 
created a number of new state agencies following the implementation of the Foreign 
Investment Kaw. Along with SAGIA, other important state agencies that have been 
instrumental in improving the level of FDI in Saudi Arabia include the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA), the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu83, the Saudi 
Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), the Saudi Industrial Development Fund 
(SIDF), and the Capital Markets Authority (CMA). According to Cityscape Intelligence, the 
foundation of these agencies resulted in: 
…rapid and sustainable economic growth by creating a pro-business 
environment, providing comprehensive services to investors and fostering 
investment opportunities in key sectors of the economy, including energy, 
transportation, information and communication technology (ICT) and 
knowledge-based industries.84 
This pro-business environment provided reassurance to foreign investors that the Saudi 
authorities were putting in place the necessary infrastructure to create an economic 
environment that appealed to foreign investors. However, outside of the economic sphere 
there were other areas where reform was needed to encourage FDI. 
5.3.3 Social Liberalisation 
Another factor encouraging FDI in Saudi Arabia has been the increased social liberalisation 
within the Kingdom in recent decades. The Vision 2030 programme is not just an economic 
programme, but also includes a degree of social liberalisation and education reform.85 The 
social liberalisation reforms suggested in the Vision 2030 programme included expansion of 
the entertainment industry, increased focus on the tourist sector (outside of religious 
pilgrimage) and related social reforms such as permitting women to drive and encouraging 
more women to enter the workforce.86 These reforms are reflective of a nation where younger 
people are becoming more significant, both in politics (such as the inspiration behind the 
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Vision 2030 programme). Approximately half of the population, including Prince 
Mohammed bin Salman and much of the workforce, are under the age of 30.87 The reforms 
are indicative that young Saudis are willing to embrace a more liberal and modern society 
compared to their forebears.88 However, in order to achieve such a society, young Saudis will 
inevitably clash with the clerical establishment and the older generation, as opinions suggest 
that the younger generation are less content with central government and that they want 
increased input in government decision-making.89 The Vision 2030 programme can therefore 
be seen as a challenge to the status of the Ulema, as many of the policies proposed in this 
programme (such as educational reform, expansion of the entertainment industry and 
encouraging women to enter the workplace) have been traditionally opposed by religious 
clerics.90 However, it has been noted that, thus far, the opposition to the social liberalisation 
plans set out in the Vision 2030 programme has been less than expected.91  
5.3.4 Educational Reform 
Educational reform also forms part of the Vision 2030 programme. In order to achieve its 
economic goals, the Saudi government has recognised the importance of education, 
especially in respect of the education and employment of women.92 According to Pennington, 
the education system in Saudi Arabia has consistently ranked near the bottom of international 
assessment rankings.93 According to the Saudi Minister of Education, the Vision 2030 
programme is an attempt to ‘rethink education from preschool through graduate schools’.94 
According to some commentators such as Courington and Alyami, there has been a failure of 
the education system (despite considerable investment by the government) as a result of a 
curriculum that is focused on rote-learning and religious education as opposed to preparing 
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individuals for the labour market.95 Furthermore, the promise of jobs in the public sector has 
done little to encourage students to focus on their education. Again, such reforms may result 
in confrontations with the religious establishment. As noted by Wrey: 
Therein lies the dilemma facing Prince Mohammed. He knows that only a change 
in the ethos and structure of the education system, with much improved provision 
of science- and technology-based curricula, can prepare young Saudis for jobs in 
the new industries he envisages. But he is well aware that this will inevitably lead 
to tensions with the clerics whose support for the House of Saud is predicated on 
their control of the judiciary and education.96 
These tensions have led to some other commentators suggesting that the educational reforms 
contained in the Vision 2030 programme are nowhere near as ambitious as the economic 
reforms, with Tuvey suggesting that the Vision 2030 program ‘has shied away from a much-
needed overhaul’.97 
5.3.5 Stopping corruption 
A further issue that has been dealt with in recent years by the Saudi government is that of 
corruption. According to the Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perception 
Index, Saudi Arabia ranks as the 57th least corrupt country in the world, with a rating of 49 
out of 100 (for comparison, the least corrupt country on the index was New Zealand, which 
finished on 89 points out of 100. The highest ranking Middle Eastern country was the UAE, 
which was 21st in the ranking with a score of 71. The global average was 43 out of 100).98  
In 2011, King Abdullah established a National Anti-Corruption Commission by Royal 
Decree which was aimed at ‘fighting administrative and financial corruption’ in the 
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Kingdom.99 According to the Commission, it aims to achieve these goals in order to 
‘maintain integrity, promote transparency and combat financial and administrative corruption 
in all forms, manifestations and means’.100 In order to achieve its goals, the Commission has, 
amongst other things, the powers to create orders and directives relating to matters of public 
concern, detect financial administrative corruption in public works, refer violations and 
irregularities relating to financial administrative corruption to the relevant agencies and to 
propose laws and policies necessary to prevent and combat corruption.101 
In 2017, the National Anti-Corruption Commission carried out a number of high-profile 
investigations into corruption in Saudi Arabia which led to the removal of two prominent 
ministers from their posts, along with the detention of dozens of Saudi government officials 
who had been alleged to have been involved in corrupt practices.102 The detentions were 
based on a Royal Decree, which stated that the decision to carry out these detentions: 
…was made in view of what we have noticed of exploitation by some of the 
weak souls who have put their own interests above the public interest, in order to, 
illicitly, accrue money.103 
Although these detentions may suggest that the anti-corruption methods in Saudi Arabia are 
being effectively implemented, some commentators have questioned the reasoning for, and 
the methods used in, the crackdown.104 Furthermore, some commentators have suggested that 
the detentions may in fact destabilise the economy and may, in the short term, actually reduce 
FDI in Saudi Arabia due to the perception of instability and potentially arbitrary risks of 
detention.105 The fact that such perceptions exist does not, in this researcher’s opinion, mean 
that the crackdown was not a genuine attempt by the Saudi government to tackle corruption 
in the Kingdom. However, in this researcher’s opinion, these perceptions have been allowed 
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to flourish as a result of another issue - a lack of transparency. This takes us to the next major 
factor encouraging investment. 
5.3.6 Encouraging transparency and legal certainty 
As has been noted in other chapters of this Thesis, issues relating to a lack of transparency 
and lack of certainty in the legal system in Saudi Arabia are commonplace. According to the 
Heritage Foundation’s 2018 index of economic freedom, Saudi Arabia obtained a score of 
50% on the ‘government integrity’ sub-indicator, which is the indicator considered to be of 
the utmost important to foreign investors.106 According to the Foundation’s 2018 report: 
Corruption remains a significant problem, and there is both low transparency in 
the functioning of government and opacity with respect to state budgets and 
financial practices.107 
When unveiling Vision 2030, Prince Mohammed acknowledged the importance of improving 
the transparency of the government in order to ensure that the Saudi economy becomes more 
competitive.108 According to Spitler, corruption is allowed to infiltrate Saudi governance as a 
result of this lack of transparency, which means that government agencies are not in regular 
and efficient contact with each other, allowing for fraud and corruption to occur without 
being detected.109 According to the IMF, since the announcement of the Vision 2030 plan, the 
Saudi authorities have made considerable progress in initiating the reform agenda, including 
the implementation of a framework to increase transparency and accountability within the 
government.110 
This lack of transparency and inter-governmental communication could be dealt with 
throughout the public sector by implementing certain measures without resorting to 
widespread prosecution. For example, the privatisation of many of the State’s institutions 
means that the operations of companies such as ARAMCO are open to scrutiny by private 
shareholders, meaning that the improvement of political, economic and social conditions may 
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in fact be a by-product of the Vision 2030 programme.111 However, in other sections, 
transparency may require a more fundamental change of approach by the Saudi government. 
For example, although there are a number of reforms aimed at promoting transparency under 
the Vision 2030 program, there are still significant legal reforms necessary to ensure a level 
of transparency comparable to many Western nations or other GCC countries such as the 
UAE.112 According to the Heritage Foundation’s 2018 report: 
The slow and non-transparent judiciary is not independent, and there is 
significant collusion between the executive branch and judges.113 
Traditionally, the judicial system has been quite reticent in relation to transparency, with few 
judicial decisions being published and with legislation being issued without warning or 
consultation. As noted in previous chapters, there has been an increase in the publication of 
court proceedings.114 However, such publications are intermittent events, whereas there must 
be a wider programme to ensure that justice is carried out in public in order to provide 
foreign investors with the requisite degree of comfort. Until precedents are available and 
international investors can observe how they are being applied to cases coming before the 
Saudi courts, there will remain some scepticism about any attempts to claim transparency 
within the Saudi legal system. However, as this Thesis will explain in the next chapter, the 
implementation of the Arbitration Law has resulted in a decrease in the level of court 
interference in the arbitration process, suggesting that the ongoing reforms are having a 
positive effect on reforming the legal system. 
5.3.7 Corporate Governance Regulations 
Another part of the continued effort to attract foreign investment by promoting transparency 
and tackle corruption has been the development of corporate governance standards in Saudi 
Arabia.115 According to the World Bank in 2009, it was reported that the Saudi Arabian 
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corporate governance practices were largely in line with international standards.116 However, 
the World Bank’s report also noted that there was a relatively low level of compliance with 
the corporate governance rules in Saudi Arabia at that time, with more recent studies 
suggesting that no more than 12.5% of the companies listed on the Saudi stock exchange 
recognise self-regulatory corporate governance.117 
Legislation relating to corporate governance in Saudi Arabia began in 2003 with the creation 
of the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) (a government authority that holds considerable 
financial and administrative autonomy) and culminating in the implementation of the new 
Corporate Governance Regulations in respect of listed companies in 2017.118 In the 
introduction to the draft Regulations, the Ministry of Commerce of Investment and the CMA 
stated that reform to the corporate governance system: 
…not only benefits the companies, but it does affect the national economy 
directly, taking into consideration the continuity and growth of the companies.119 
The purpose of these Regulations was to consolidate the rules of the CMA and the new 
Companies Law that came into effect in May 2016. The Regulations provide shareholders 
and board members with improved rights, and provide greater clarity and transparency to the 
responsibilities of shareholders and board members.120  
According to practitioners, it is expected that the 2017 Regulations will have a significant 
impact on the corporate governance regime in Saudi Arabia. Sioufi et al state that the 2017 
Regulations: 
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…should serve, in equal parts, to give comfort to international investors and to 
encourage sponsors to support the local listings regime, both of which will be 
equally necessary in order for the domestic market to grow as intended.121 
However, it is suggested that the most significant level of comfort that could be made 
available to foreign investors would be to make such corporate governance rules compulsory 
for Saudi companies, thereby ensuring that any failure to comply is actionable in the Saudi 
courts. 
5.3.8 Shift from protectionism to state-controlled liberalisation  
The shift of Saudi (and Arab) society from the protectionist state to a liberalised state is an 
issue that goes beyond the matter of FDI. In this researcher’s opinion, it is a matter that is at 
the very root of many of the problems associated with transitioning a traditionally rural and 
community-based collection of tribes into a thriving economic powerhouse in less than a 
century. Economically, Saudi Arabia has proven that this is possible up to a point, with the 
government being assisted in this transition by the vast amount of natural resource available 
in the Kingdom. However, as is illustrated by the transitions in the arbitral procedure outlined 
in other chapter, a similar shift in tribal, cultural, religious and political norms in the same 
timeframe has proven be more difficult, with many recent economic reforms directly 
confronting the traditional religious and societal structure of Saudi Arabia. This view finds 
support in the work of Biygautane et al, who note that for hundreds of years before the 
foundation of the Kingdom, the tribal structure in the region was ruled by Sheikhs who acted 
as both the political and moral leaders of the tribes, as well as the ‘figurative’ father (or 
patriarch) of the tribe. They contend that: 
To fulfil their ‘paternal’ obligations, the sheikhs were expected to achieve justice 
and provide safety, unity, and protection against external threats in return for the 
financial tributes and political submission of their subjects.122 
This researcher would suggest that this form of ‘paternal’ state protectionism is therefore 
instilled in the very fabric of Saudi society and is at odds with many of the social 
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liberalisation measures that have been introduced in Western economies since the beginning 
of the twentieth century and which are being adapted for Saudi Arabia for the twenty-first 
century and beyond. However, the discovery of oil resulted in vast amounts of wealth that 
belonged, in effect, exclusively to the ruling Saudi Royal Family. At least partly in order to 
ensure that their legitimacy was not questioned, their ‘parental’ obligations were reversed and 
instead of requiring financial tributes they were instead required to share their wealth with the 
merchant classes and citizens through government contracts.123 This ‘rentier state’ model, 
whereby unearned wealth is distributed to citizens lies in contrast to the Western model and 
requires citizens to contribute to society through entrepreneurship, employment and the 
resulting taxes applied to these endeavours.124 The protection against external threats 
included the threat of foreign investment, such as the American oil companies in the 1930s to 
1950s.125 The transformation of Saudi Arabia into a capitalist economy was therefore led by 
the monarchy itself rather than the citizens. 
In order to change this tribal structure, the Kingdom has, as noted earlier in this chapter, 
begun to roll out a range of privatisations of public sector enterprises in order to encourage a 
form of economic liberalism that enhances the role of the private sector, thereby reducing the 
requirement of the King to act as ‘parent’ of the Kingdom.126 The goal of this is to create a 
free economy and a free market for all goods and services within the Kingdom, thereby 
encouraging FDI.127 However, it should be noted that it remains to be seen what effect such 
privatisation will have on the relationship between the monarchy and its citizens. If a ‘parent’ 
is no longer necessary, what becomes of the role of the monarchy? 
The importance of privatisation is illustrated by the role of the public sector in Saudi Arabia. 
As noted, the ‘rentier state’ model employed by Saudi Arabia in recent decades has resulted 
in a bloated and ineffective public service where employees are underutilised and 
underperforming and generally operate without any clear objectives.128 As a result of the 
rentier state model, the public sector companies received large amounts of government 
money but returned little to the economy, with heavy financial losses common within state-
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run companies and a lack of expertise resulting in an inability of public sector companies to 
compete with foreign competitors.129 As a result, privatisation became increasingly common 
from the 1970s. However, economic freedom comes with a risk, especially in a feudal 
Kingdom such as Saudi Arabia.130 As noted by Muchlinski: 
Given that publicly owned enterprises have predominated in strategic industries 
such as transport, public utilities, natural resources, energy, financial services, 
and defence, the unregulated sale of such enterprises to the private sector raises 
the possibility of their falling under foreign ownership and control, thereby 
threatening existing national control over vital economic interests. Consequently, 
privatizations of publicly owned companies have often involved restrictions on 
foreign ownership.131 
The advent of the Vision 2030 programme can be considered to be a leap forward in 
economic liberalisation. With a focus being placed on the development of the private sector, 
the ambitious reforms set out in the plan will, if successful, have the potential to complete the 
transition from protectionism to free market economy.132  
However, there are suggestions that the Saudi government has not fully embraced the fact 
that privatisation means losing control of assets, with reports indicating that the government 
itself has purchased shares in institutions targeted for privatisation, suggesting that the State 
wishes to retain a certain level of control.133 How much this form of privatisation appeals to 
foreign investors remains to be seen. 
Many of the factors set out above including legal, economic and social reforms resulted in a 
rapid increase in the level of FDI in Saudi Arabia in the 1990’s and 2000’s, with the World 
Bank reporting in 2009 that the Kingdom was the 13th most competitive economy in the 
world.134 However, a more recent report from the World Bank illustrates that there is still 
much work to do in Saudi Arabia to encourage FDI, with a 2017 report stating that Saudi 
Arabia ranks only 94th on a list of countries ranked by the ease with which investors can do 
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business there, including a ranking of 147th when it came to starting a business in the 
Kingdom and 169th when it came to resolving insolvency issues.135 In addition, the level of 
foreign investment has stagnated somewhat in recent years, starting with the global recession 
of 2008. Market indicators point to a consistent decrease in FDI flows between 2012 and 
2017 – resulting in estimated future revenues of around USD$7.45 billion in 2018 - that 
investment in Saudi Arabia is becoming increasingly risky for foreign investors, at least 
partly because the drop in sovereign reserves has made the Saudi government less willing to 
guarantee against losses resulting from failed investments.136 Furthermore, in the short term, 
the Vision 2030 programme may have had a negative effect on FDI in Saudi Arabia due to 
uncertainty about the direction which the reforms will take. As noted by Kinninmont, the 
Vision 2030 programme: 
…represents a profound disruption to the status quo in Saudi Arabia which may 
well be necessary as the business and economic status quo was unsustainable, but 
there is now significant uncertainty. The risk-reward ratio isn’t attractive to many 
foreign companies just now.137 
The above quote illustrates that although the Vision 2030 programme includes much that is to 
be admired, the scope of the changes may be so ambitious that it could result in significant 
upheaval which could negatively affect FDI.  
This chapter will now consider some of the remaining prevalent issues (other than those dealt 
with within the Vision 2030 programme) within Saudi Arabia that discourages FDI. 
5.4 Remaining Limitations - What Saudi Arabia Is Doing to Discourage Investment 
Although the Foreign Investment Law only distinguishes between Saudi and non-Saudi 
investors, the reality is that different categories of foreign investors are also treated 
differently, with special provisions and preferential treatment available to investors from 
countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League (although it should be noted 
that this preferential treatment is based on nationality as opposed to religion i.e. non-Muslims 
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in GCC or Arab League countries will also be eligible for this preferential treatment).138 As a 
result of this preferential treatment, individuals from GCC and Arab League countries are 
treated the same as Saudi citizens under the Foreign Investment Law.139 Preferential 
treatment for these categories of individuals includes the right to invest in opportunities listed 
in the Negative List.140 Furthermore, investors from these countries are exempted from 
paying income tax. For investors from other countries, Article 14 of the Foreign Investment 
Law states that: 
All foreign investments licensed under this Law shall be treated in accordance 
with applicable tax provisions and amendments thereto in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia.141 
Other differences between Saudi (and deemed Saudi) investors and all other investors include 
the amount of capital required to invest in certain sectors and industries. For example, to 
incorporate and operate a limited liability company, foreign investors from non-GCC / Arab 
League countries require a minimum capital of USD 140,000 (this minimum may increase for 
certain industries such as agriculture or may be reduced for other industries, such as the 
technology industry), whereas limited liability companies operated by GCC / Arab League 
investors does not set any minimum amount of capital.142 As a result of the preferential 
treatment accorded to investors from these countries, a common method of GCC / Arab 
League investors to invest in Saudi Arabia is to establish offshore business entities in GCC / 
Arab League countries such as Bahrain, which are then used to acquire investments in Saudi 
Arabia without any minimum level of capital.143 
In respect of foreign ownership, as noted previously, provided that capitalisation 
requirements are complied with, the Foreign Investment Law provides that foreign investors 
can own 100% of Saudi limited liability companies or joint-stock entities, provided that such 
companies / investments do not fall within the Negative List. Further examples include 
investment restrictions in the financial industry, where Saudi law requires that no more than 
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40% of the shares/capital in a banking institution may be owned by non-GCC / Arab League 
foreign investors.144 
As noted earlier, the World Bank stated that Saudi Arabia was only 147th in a list of countries 
ranked on how easy it was to open a business. Since June 2016, full foreign ownership by 
foreigners of Saudi businesses has been allowed, thereby removing the previous requirement 
that local partners must own at least 25% of the business.145 However, most practitioners 
recommend that foreign investors setting up companies in Saudi Arabia appoint local partners 
or professionals to assist them with navigating the local laws and regulations; and they also 
note that 100% foreign-owned companies do not have the same tax treatment, funding and 
other incentives available to joint venture companies.146 
Furthermore, many of the difficulties experienced by foreign investors opening a business in 
Saudi Arabia are not related to any shortfalls in the legislation but instead are the result of 
obstacles arising from administrative procedures and technicalities.147 Although there has 
been an increase in efficiency in recent years, there is still a high level of bureaucracy which 
can result in unanticipated delays and requests for additional documentation.148 However, as 
recently as April 2018, SAGIA has attempted to cut the processing time for business licenses 
from 53 hours to 4 hours, as well as reducing the number of documents that are required for 
submission.149 Although this is a promising step towards improving efficiency, once a licence 
is obtained from SAGIA there are still further registration steps which must be completed by 
licensed foreign investors.150 This procedure can be even more complex than the licensing 
procedure as this involves dealing with a number of different government ministries, 
including the Ministry of Commerce and any other Ministry whose approval may be required 
(such as, depending on the nature of the investment, the Ministries for Agriculture and Higher 
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Education).151 This can involve requiring foreign investors to provide extensive notarised 
documentation.152 
In respect of real estate investment in Saudi Arabia, foreign investors are entitled to own land 
in the Kingdom under the Foreign Investment Law. However, there remains certain limitation 
on foreign ownership of real estate. For example, foreign investors / companies may only 
own real estates in Saudi Arabia where they have a legal presence within the Kingdom (for an 
individual, this requires them to have legal residency status, for a foreign company they 
require the requisite licence from SAGIA).153 Furthermore, the ownership of real estate by 
foreign companies is only permitted to the extent that it is linked to a particular project (and 
that the project is not related to an industry on the Negative List). It is therefore not a general 
right to property ownership. Such projects have to be above a certain threshold in terms of 
value and duration, with the total cost of the project required to be greater than USD 8 
million; and the projects must commence within five years of the purchase of the real 
estate.154 This means that foreign companies are not entitled to own real estate in Saudi 
Arabia purely for real estate investment purposes (other than property development).155 
5.5 Limitations of The Vision 2030 Programme And What Needs To Be Done In Order 
For It To Succeed  
Unsurprisingly, efforts to make great economic changes in a short space of time can have 
unintended effects as the relevant parties begin to understand and apply new provisions in 
practice. Although the Vision 2030 programme has ambitious targets, these targets may 
require reassessment as the Kingdom’s businesses adopt the wide-ranging legal reforms (such 
as the Companies Law 2016, Bankruptcy Law 2018, and Arbitration Law 2016) into its 
business operations. An example of an area of the Vision 2030 programme which may 
require reassessment is illustrated by the plans for the Neom mega-city, a planned semi-
autonomous transnational city that would operate independently from the existing 
governmental and administrative framework, offering its own tax and labour laws as well as 
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an independent judicial system.156 The plans for the city are central to the vision set out by 
Prince Mohammed to encourage FDI and diversify the economy.157 However, doubt remains 
amongst commentators about whether the Neom project can ever be realised.158 Although the 
project stands as a testament to the ambition of Prince Mohammed, this researcher suggests 
that the project’s success or failure illustrates the contrast between, on the one hand, the 
ambitions of the government of Saudi Arabia in the Vision 2030 programme and, on the other 
hand, the practical reality of implementing such dramatic change in such a short space of 
time. From an FDI perspective the stated ambition is not as important as the practical reality 
(such as whether financial resources or the labour force is available to make the vision a 
reality), a fact that is not necessarily acknowledged with the Vision 2030 programme. 
A similar argument can be made about some of the other targeted reforms under the Vision 
2030 programme. Many of them are considered by commentators to be excessively 
ambitious, with Freer noting that previous reform programmes have consistently failed to 
reach their targets as they have failed to amend the rentier-driven social contract.159 She notes 
that: 
Progress has been hindered … [by] the fact that almost everything in the Saudi 
economy has been directly or indirectly fed by state spending.160 
Freer notes that the Vision 2030 programme ‘enforces and even expands the rentier bargain, 
rather than undermining it’ on the grounds that it would result in the Saudi government 
playing an even greater role in the lives of its citizens.161 Kinninmont acknowledges the 
potential effect of the Vision 2030 programme on the implicit social contract between the 
Saudi government and other key constituencies including influential clerics and the general 
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public.162 She notes that the delicate nature of the balance between these constituencies often 
means that reform efforts ‘are often diluted or deferred, or reversed when oil prices rise’.163 
This delicate balance is illustrated in the attempts by the Saudi government to balance Saudi 
economic nationalism with the requirements to liberalise the economy (and the wider society) 
and the attempts at privatisation. As noted previously, the Foreign Investment Law 2000 
applies a rate of income tax on non GCC / Arab League investors and companies that is 
considerably higher than the zakat164 payable by Saudi companies. Furthermore, the Saudi 
government has introduced the Saudization scheme, which is an attempt to increase the 
number of Saudi nationals in the workforce and to reduce the reliance on foreign workers.165 
However, it is suggested that this scheme is dependent on the Saudi workforce having the 
skills necessary to replace their foreign equivalents which, as noted above, is not currently 
happening as a result of failures in the education system to prepare graduates for the demands 
of roles in the private sector.166  
As noted previously, rumours about the proposed introduction of various taxes on foreign 
investors and employees have continued to swirl, with the suggestion being that the foreign 
workers are an easier target for taxes than Saudi nationals as they do not have any political 
capital. In July 2017, foreign workers were required to start paying taxes for any of their 
dependents living in Saudi Arabia while Saudi companies whose foreign workers exceed the 
number of local workers are required to pay levies to the government.167 This has resulted in 
significant job cuts of foreign nationals in the private sector, with reports suggesting that the 
Bin Laden Group were required to lay off 70,000 foreign workers as a result of imposed 
levies.168 According to Abdullah Al-Maghlouth a member of the Riyadh Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (RCCI), these taxes will have the effect of driving out foreigners 
who pay a significant amount into the Saudi economy.169 Furthermore, Al-Maghlouth stated 
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that it would likely have an adverse impact on private sector firms.170 These taxes can be 
contrasted with austerity measures that were introduced by the government from 2014, 
including pay cuts for public sector employees.171 These pay cuts were later revoked in April 
2017 and the original pay conditions were not only restored, but were also backdated to the 
date of the pay cuts, meaning that there were effectively no cuts.172 According to 
Kinninmont: 
The reversal of cuts follows a classic pattern of pro-cyclical fiscal policy in Saudi 
Arabia whereby apparently ‘structural’ fiscal reforms are introduced when money 
is tight, but are then often cancelled when government revenues go up again. 
However, the episode underlined the need, in the interest of avoiding the old 
pattern of public pushback and policy reversal, for economic and fiscal reforms to 
be devised with an awareness of social and political impact built in from the very 
beginning.173 
Furthermore, as noted by Feteha & Nereim, the increased spending on wages exceeded the 
income accrued from the higher taxes placed on foreign workers and companies employing 
them, with the suggestion also being made that the governmental reform was not as 
aggressive as it had been predicted.174  
Another example of the balancing act between the ambitions of the Vision 2030 plan and the 
social realities can be found within the existing Saudi legal framework. As noted above, there 
have been significant amounts of legislation introduced within the Kingdom that are intended 
to establish a market based monetary policy. However, in this researcher’s view, much of 
these new legislative provisions have been introduced without a backdrop of laws that define 
the scope of financial activities nor clear precedents or actions on how they will operate in 
practice. In the absence of such laws, much of the economic reform falls under the remit of 
the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA), which has been tasked with filling this 
legislative gap with non-binding regulations and circulars containing rules or instructions.175 
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The lack of fundamental legislation therefore undermines attempts to promote investor 
confidence and to reach the Vision 2030 targets of FDI. Furthermore, there is some 
uncertainty about the interpretation of Shari’ah law by the Saudi judiciary, with judges and 
arbitrators entitled to decide in accordance with a particular doctrine of Islamic jurisprudence. 
According to Alshamrani: 
…[this] leads to the justification that the legal environment for foreign 
investment in Saudi Arabia needs to be codified, especially in matters of 
commercial transactions … in order to avoid judgments that are issued by judges 
and arbitrators according to their personal readings of Muslim texts.176  
Again, in this case, it is suggested by this researcher that what is necessary is not a high-level 
introduction of legislation that sets out the ambitions of the government, but rather a 
fundamental root-and-branch review of the Saudi legal system and the functions of the 
judiciary and the legislature within that system. By creating a strong legal system, it will 
become much easier for Saudi reform plans, such as the Vision 2030 programme, to achieve 
their targets and ambitions. It is suggested that this may be achieved through codification by 
the legislature or through the establishment of precedents by the judiciary that sets out certain 
legal standards and norms that are universally applicable.  
The effect of the taxes and levies imposed on foreign workers and their employers, and issues 
surrounding legal reforms, illustrate a major internal conflict with the Vision 2030 plan. On 
the one hand, the programme is intended to promote privatisation and diversify the economy 
and encourage FDI. However, on the other hand, the programme wishes to deal with the high 
unemployment rates among young Saudis by imposing levies that force companies to employ 
local workers without providing the requisite education to young Saudis that is necessary to 
become part of the workforce. The programme also wants to introduce legal reforms that, 
although broadly intended to provide comfort to foreign investors, will only be effective if 
combined with more fundamental reforms to the Saudi legal system. This researcher suggests 
that the Vision 2030 plan does not ensure that the social and political reforms needed to fully 
implement the programme are built in from the very beginning. 
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 The Vision 2030 plan could be, in some instances, considered to be an advertisement or 
propaganda material being used to promote FDI in Saudi Arabia. However, without a 
substantial change of attitude (or alternatively a push-through of reform by the government 
without regard to the other key constituents, which would likely be unstable) then many of 
the targets set out in the programme are destined to be missed. This was recognised to a 
certain extent by Prince Mohammed when, in September 2017, some features of the Vision 
2030 plan were scaled back, with Gardner noting that the implementation of certain projects 
was given an extended timeline or removed entirely.177 However, the Vision 2030 
programme still fails fully to appreciate the internal conflict outlined above and it remains 
unclear how Saudi Arabia intends to diversify an economy and promote FDI while 
simultaneously requiring companies to hire untrained Saudi workers and attempt to 
discourage appropriately qualified foreign workers from migrating to the Kingdom. It is this 
dilemma that the Saudi government will be required to solve in order to ensure that the 
Vision 2030 plan succeeds in its aims of diversifying its economy and encouraging FDI. 
It is noted above that the change in the ethos and structure of the education system to better 
prepare young Saudis for jobs may inevitably lead to tensions with the clerics. Kinninmont is 
also cited above as observing that the attempt to balance the interests and expectations of 
different constituencies including influential clerics and the general public often results in the 
deferral or dilution of reform efforts.178  
It is suggested here that reforms aimed at liberalising the economy and adopting new 
technology may be fully implemented with the support of constituencies such as influential 
clerics where they are convinced that science and technology are ultimately religious 
subjects.179 Professor Nasr argued that ‘In the same way that in mathematics the central 
Islamic doctrine of unity (al-tawhid) and its application accorded with the Pythagorean 
philosophy of numbers and made the integration of Greek mathematics into the Islamic 
perspective possible, another basic Islamic doctrine, namely that of harmony and balance, 
made the philosophy underlying the Hippocratic and Galenic traditions easily digestible by 
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Muslims’.180 The latter statement is even more reflective of the contemporary Islamic society, 
where there is a disconnect between the ideas of religious leaders/scholars and secular 
scholars, each drawing different conclusions about what is required under the Shari’ah. It is 
noted in chapters 2 and 3 that the Prophet declared that learning is the duty of every Muslim, 
and he himself was a great educator. Moreover, it is shown that the methodology of rational 
reasoning and logic played an important role in the development of the Fiqh and, the latter 
can foster compatibility between Islamic law and the current revolution in knowledge and 
technology around the world.  
As such, the fact that secular scholarship is committed to liberal thinking does not imply that 
it is antithetical to Islam. In the same vein, the fact that social and educational reform will 
result in a more educated and liberal society does not imply that the society will abandon 
Islamic principles. This misconception is borne out of the description of Islam as a religion 
anchored in traditionalism and isolationism. Blame may also be laid on the government 
which has failed to educate the international community on the Shari’ah and the common 
principles it shares with the lex mercatoria.181 Thus, potential foreign investors do not have a 
good grasp of the extent to which their investments will be protected in Saudi Arabia. The 
most reliable pointer is the treaty establishing the terms and conditions for investments by 
certain nationals. 
5.6 Protection under Investment Treaties 
It is noted above that the Foreign Investment Law allows existing persons of other 
nationalities (‘foreign investors’ as per Article 1(e)) to invest in all sectors of the economy, 
except those contained in the ‘negative list’. It is also noted that SAGIA maintains and 
reviews the list at regularly occurring intervals. It is however uncertain whether a joint 
venture with foreign minority ownership may be allowed to invest in sectors on the negative 
list given that Article 1(f) of the Foreign Investment Law further defines foreign investment 
as any form of capital investment owned by foreign nationals, jointly or wholly.  
Notwithstanding, it must be noted that foreign investment restriction is neither unique to 
Saudi Arabia nor Muslim countries. International law principles generally recognise the 
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sovereign powers of states to exclude foreign persons and property.182 States often restrict 
foreign investment because of the fear that the unrestricted invitation of alien investors may 
increase the amount of capital in the economy but lead to forms of unbalanced 
development.183 However, the treaty-based investment regime has in turn limited the powers 
of states to restrict foreign investment and reallocated powers of adjudication from domestic 
courts to the private arbitration industry. In this light, foreign investors may receive more 
protection in states that have ratified more investment treaties. Van Harten demonstrates that 
despite sustained pressure for reform, the investment treaty system generally encourages 
foreign investment because it minimises the bias and unreliability of domestic courts, 
advances fairness and the rule of law in the settlement of disputes, affirms the sovereignty 
and bargaining strategies of states and foreign investors, and the treaties are endorsed by the 
democratic process.184 
Many international treaties therefore contain elements that guarantee the protection of 
investors’ rights by authorising investors to initiate proceedings against states in relation to 
any aspect of the treaties, and without exhausting local remedies in the host state.185 Some 
treaties may also enable international investors to forum-shop and establish holding 
companies in states that have ratified the treaties in order to acquire the status of foreign 
investor.186 The latter privilege is important because not all foreign investors may enforce 
rights protected under an investment treaty. Only nationals of the state that has ratified that 
treaty may be entitled to the rights and privileges provided by the treaty. As such, it is 
surprising that the Foreign Investment Law does not distinguish between different categories 
of foreign investors in Saudi Arabia. Given the large number of bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) and multilateral investment treaties (MITs) that has been ratified by Saudi Arabia, 
different categories of foreign investors receive different treatments depending on their 
nationalities.  
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Foreign investors from states that have ratified the Unified Agreement for the Investment of 
Arab Capital in Arab States of 1980 (as amended) are granted distinct privileges.187 Article 1 
of the Agreement for example guarantees these investors freedom of personal and capital 
mobility in Saudi Arabia, freedom of residence, work, and exercise of economic activities, 
right of possession and inheritance, and freedom of the use of transport, ports and civil 
airports. Also, Article 2(5) provides that the contracting state should streamline all ‘policies 
related to agriculture, industry, and internal trade; and unification of economic legislation in a 
manner that would guarantee equivalent conditions for all nationals of the contracting 
countries working in agriculture, industry and other professions’. This implies that nationals 
of contracting states are afforded the same protections as Saudi nationals as regards 
agriculture, industry, and internal trade. It is interesting that the rights and privileges enjoyed 
by foreign investors under the Agreement are based on their nationality rather than religion. 
Thus, a Muslim from a country that has not ratified the treaty will not be offered the same 
protection as a Christian from a country that is a contracting state. 
Saudi Arabia is also a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) which comprises five 
other states (all members of the Arab League). Article 31 of the Economic Agreement signed 
by all GCC member provides that ‘No Member State may grant to a non-Member State any 
preferential treatment exceeding that granted herein to Member States … [or] conclude any 
agreement that violates provisions of this agreement’. Furthermore, Article 3 requires all 
GCC member states to grant the same privileges to investors from the signatory states as 
those granted to local investors. In other words, they are required to treat investors from other 
GCC states like they were Saudi investors. It follows that foreign investors from GCC states 
are not required to comply with the provisions of the Foreign Investment Law. Also, they are 
not restricted by the negative list. Thus, they may own real estate in the two Holy Cities, 
carry out oil exploration, drilling and production, manufacture military equipment and 
devices, and provide tourist orientation and guidance services, amongst other services.  
However, neither the GCC Agreement nor the Foreign Investment Law addresses the 
question whether a joint venture between a (non-Saudi) GCC national and a non-GCC 
national may be considered a foreign investor. Also, the rights and privileges enjoyed by 
foreign investors under the Agreement are based on their nationality rather than religion. 
Thus, all investors from outside of the GCC are treated the same (depending on whether there 
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are other relevant treaties) regardless of their religion. Nonetheless, it is uncertain whether a 
investor from a non-GCC state would have opportunities to forum-shop, for instance by 
establishing a holding company in a GCC state in order to acquire the status of GCC foreign 
investor. 
Saudi Arabia has also ratified the Agreement on the Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of 
Investments amongst the Member States of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC 
Agreement). Article 1(6) of the Agreement defines the ‘investor’ as ‘the Government of any 
contracting party or natural or corporate person, who is a national of a contracting party and 
who owns capital and invests it in the territory of another contracting party’. This minimises 
the possibility of forum-shopping since the fact of establishing a holding company in a 
contracting state is not sufficient to qualify as an investor. The latter must have invested 
capital in the contracting state.  
However, the Agreement places fewer restrictions on the powers of contracting states to limit 
foreign investment. Article 3 states that ‘The contracting parties shall endeavour to open up 
various fields and investment opportunities to the capital on the widest possible scale, in such 
a way that may suit their economic conditions’. This implies that Saudi Arabia may open up 
various sectors to investors from other contracting states only in regard to its economic 
conditions and whether this will foster its economic and social development. Nonetheless, the 
Agreement contains a Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) clause in Article 8(1) that requires the 
contracting state to grant investors of other contracting states ‘a treatment not less favourable 
than the treatment accorded to investors belonging to another State not party to this 
Agreement’. However, this must be within the context the investors’ economic activity. 
Hence, since Saudi Arabia may restrict foreign participation in sectors on the negative list by 
invoking Article 3, it may grant favourable treatment to investors from GCC states in these 
sectors without violating the OIC Agreement. Moreover, Article 8(2) states that the 
provisions of Article 8(1) shall not apply to rights and privileges granted under an 
international agreement or any special preferential agreement. Thus, they do not apply to 
rights and privileges granted under the GGC Economic Agreement. 
Also, foreign investors receive less protection under the OIC Agreement given that Article 
10(2) recognises the right of the host state to expropriate investment ‘in the public interest, 
without discrimination and on prompt payment of adequate and effective compensation to the 
investor in accordance with the laws of the host state’. Thus, although the rights and 
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privileges enjoyed by foreign investors under the Agreement are based on their nationality 
rather than religion, foreign investors relying on the Agreement must be well-versed in the 
Shari’ah. This is because the Shari’ah will determine whether their investment in Saudi 
Arabia can be expropriated in the ‘public interest’ and what constitutes ‘adequate and 
effective compensation’. The importance of the Shari’ah is even more accentuated where 
none of the available MITs, as well as no relevant BIT is available to an investor. Such an 
investor may rely on the Shari’ah. As noted in chapter three, Article 81 of the Basic Law of 
Saudi Arabia requires all decrees, legislation and regulations to reflect the principles of the 
Shari’ah. As such, the decrees, legislation and regulations governing foreign investment in 
Saudi Arabia must promote free trade and liberalisation given that the Shari’ah, as shown in 
chapter 2 and 3, developed on the basis that Islamic societies were open to free trade.  
However, reliance on the Shari’ah may require the foreign investor to go through several 
tribunals. Aspects of the disputes related to bills of exchange, cheques and promissory are 
decided by the Negotiate Instruments Committee; aspects related to banking and the use of 
financial instruments are decided by the SAMA Committee; aspects related to the change of 
commercial agents by foreign companies are resolved by the Conciliation Committee at the 
Chamber of Commerce; and aspects related to labour and employee relations are decided by 
the Preliminary Committee for the Settlement of Labour Disputes. Foreign investors may 
therefore be confused regarding the appropriate forum from which to seek local remedies.  
Furthermore, it is uncertain which specific areas of Islamic law have been developed by local 
courts to protect foreign investment. This is because of the absence of precedents. 
Nonetheless, governments are required to protect foreign nationals due to Dhimmi which is a 
duty imposed on all Muslims to protect and secure non-Muslims. Also, private property 
rights are sacred under the Shari’ah.188 However, the local remedies that foreign investors 
may seek are limited. Contracts containing the payment of riba will not be enforced under the 
Shari’ah. Also, foreign investors must exploit natural resources on behalf of the Islamic 
community that holds the ultimate right of property.189 It must be noted that this is the 
Hanbali interpretation of the Qur’an and it applies in Saudi Arabia. It may be distinguished 
from the interpretations of other schools such as the Hanafi and Shafi which hold that mineral 
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ownership depends on land ownership.190 The latter interpretation is more progressive and 
closer to what obtains in Western states. Thus, foreign investors are likely to receive better 
protection in Islamic societies that apply the opinions of all schools or those of the Hanafi and 
Shafi schools rather than those that apply only the opinions of the Hanbali school. 
The foreign investor may also rely on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. This Convention provides a means of 
settling investment disputes between signatory states such as Saudi Arabia and nationals of 
other signatory States: the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID). Saudi Arabia acceded the Convention in 1980.191 Article 25(1) requires the 
disputing parties to consent in writing to submit disputes to ICSID. This may be done in the 
investment contract between the foreign investor and signatory state or in the investment 
treaty under which the foreign investment is made. Also, Article 25(4) provides that the 
contracting state is entitled to notify ICSID of any categories of disputes that it may not 
submit to ICSID. Thus, at the time of ratification, Saudi Arabia notified ICSID that it will not 
submit disputes pertaining to oil exploration and production, and acts of sovereignty.192 It has 
been contended that Article 25(4) of the Convention is based on the ‘act of state’ doctrine 
which prevents the adjudication of claims or enforcement of awards that result from acts of a 
governmental nature carried out by a sovereign power within its territory.193 The doctrine 
requires acts of a governmental nature to be distinguished from acts of a commercial nature. 
In reality, such distinction may be difficult in instances where the sovereign power enacts 
legislation nationalising the property of a foreign investor. 
Nonetheless, there have been three claims submitted to ICSID against Saudi Arabia. The first 
claim was brought under the Germany and Saudi Arabia BIT of 1996.194 The BIT provided 
for the submission of disputes to ICSID. The dispute arose from disagreements on payment 
for the construction of university facilities in Saudi Arabia. The dispute was settled by the 
parties and the proceeding was discontinued at the claimant’s request. No information was 
provided on the terms agreed by the parties.  
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The second claim was based on the BIT between South Korea and Saudi Arabia of 2002.195 
The dispute arose from the termination of an electric power plant and seawater desalinisation 
plant construction contract between the claimant and the government of Saudi Arabia. The 
claimant states that it received notice of the termination of the contract while negotiating an 
increase in the construction cost and an extension of the contract following the respondent’s 
change of technical specifications. The decision is pending. 
The third claim was brought under the BIT between France and Saudi Arabia of 2002.196 The 
claim arose out of the alleged systematic harassment of the claimant by the government of 
Saudi Arabia and the destruction of the claimant’s fashion retail business in Saudi Arabia 
allegedly caused by the harassment. The decision is pending. 
What the above treaties and cases show is that the Shari’ah is neither an obstacle to free trade 
and liberalisation nor the protection of foreign investments in Saudi Arabia. Foreign investors 
are protected under the various MITs and BITs on the basis of their nationalities rather than 
religion. They are able to bring claims against the government of Saudi Arabia without regard 
to the Shari’ah. It is true that in the absence of a civil code in Saudi Arabia, the Shari’ah 
governs all transactions and foreign investors ought to have a good grasp of the relevant 
Shari’ah principles in order to gauge the extent to which their investments will be protected.  
Nonetheless, parties may submit disputes against the government of Saudi Arabia to 
international tribunals depending on whether the former’s investments are protected by a MIT 
or BIT. Also, foreign investors from GCC countries receive the same treatment as Saudi 
citizens, while investors from countries that have ratified the OIC Agreement and Arab 
Investment Agreement are afforded the same protections as Saudi nationals as regards 
agriculture, industry, and internal trade. Foreign investors from many other countries are also 
protected given that Saudi Arabia has signed 16 BITs and ratified 9 over the past two 
decades.197 Also, the GCC is currently working on free trade agreements with the European 
Union and eleven countries in Asia.198 
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5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has been intended to illustrate that, in order to prosper, the Saudi economy needs 
to diversify and encourage FDI. This has been clearly acknowledged by the Saudi 
government and, through the Vision 2030 plan, the government has attempted to tackle these 
issues. However, as this chapter also illustrates, historically (and debatably Vision 2030 
itself) the Saudi government has failed successfully to tackle the fundamental issues that are 
holding back the proposed economic progress.  
As far as FDI is concerned, the issues that the Saudi government is attempting to tackle in the 
short-term include privatisation of state-owned entities, social liberalization, stopping 
corruption, encouraging transparency and legal certainty and attempting to move away from 
state protectionism. However, all of these reform policies are subject to certain provisos. For 
example, the Kingdom is only willing to privatize certain industries and, although it is 
reduced in size, the Negative List continues to exclude certain industries from foreign 
investment. Another example can be an attempt to discourage state protectionism. The 
Monarchy’s duties to its citizens include a duty to protect and without that the King’s 
legitimacy is subject to debate. Protection includes a duty to provide gainful employment and 
to uphold individual rights, but this has to be balanced somewhat with the needs of the State. 
The example in the previous section is a perfect illustration of the failure of the Saudi 
government successfully to balance these two objectives, whereby austerity-based pay cuts to 
public sector employees was entirely revoked and backdated so that those employees were 
effectively not subject to any austerity measures. Although these measures are clearly 
beneficial to the public sector employee in the short-term, the fact that these high rates of 
wages are resulting in a budget deficit (not to mention that the output of the public sector is 
not in line with the investment, as evidenced by the failures within the highly-funded 
educational system) means that the Kingdom is not sufficiently protecting its citizens in the 
long-term as it is gambling on the price of oil and the success of the Vision 2030 plan in 
order to pay for these under-educated and under-skilled employees. 
Some of the other issues being dealt with by the Saudi government in implementing the 
Vision 2030 plan are similar to the problems seen in other areas of Saudi law. For example, 
many of the issues in implementing effective foreign investment legislation are similar to the 
issues surrounding the successful implementation of dispute resolution and arbitration 
legislation. In both cases, it is arguable that the current legislation in Saudi Arabia is, in and 
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of itself, effective and comparable to the legislation in other GCC nations such as the UAE. 
However, it is in the application, implementation and enforcement of the legislation where 
the two Kingdoms differ. The UAE ranks 21st in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
2018 report, including 12th in the world for the ease of enforcing contracts (Saudi Arabia 
ranks 83rd) and 10th for registering property (Saudi Arabia ranks 24th).199 As a result, the UAE 
is seen by foreign investors as a safer and easier destination within which to do business, as 
foreign investors have fewer reservations that excessive bureaucracy or a lack of 
administrative or legal transparency will limit their rights or prevent the foreign investors 
from enforcing them.  
It remains to be seen whether the Vision 2030 plan will succeed in transforming the Saudi 
Arabian economy into the diversified and FDI-driven economy foreseen by its drafters. 
However, if it does succeed, it will not be because of the ambitious targets or the proposed 
Neom mega-city that are set out in the programme, but rather it will be as a result of evidence 
that the Saudi government are willing to provide the same rights to foreign investors and 
workers as are applicable to Saudi citizens and that the application and enforcement of these 
rights are transparent and that all business actors are able to compete with equal rights and 
standing before the law. It will require the government to ensure that legislation is enforced 
and not diluted once it is subject to review by the courts and that a transparent court process 
that provides the rationale for judicial decisions is prevalent. It will require that government 
ministries are efficient and transparent when dealing with foreign investors and that the 
requirements for investors wishing to set up companies and employ staff (whether Saudi or 
foreign national) are clear and available to all investors before any such investment takes 
place. It will also require an acceptance that change is gradual and cannot be completed 
overnight (or even by 2030).  
The Saudi society of today is younger and more highly educated than its predecessors. It is 
consciously or unconsciously being shaped by the effects of globalisation and liberalisation. 
It is less likely to accept compromises. This youthful society has the power to shape Saudi 
society and its economy as it sees fit and it needs to be given the political, religious and 
economic freedom to do so without being subject to the mistakes of previous generations. It 
is important to note that the above reforms may be implemented within the Islamic legal 
framework. It is shown above that Shari’ah is not an obstacle to the protection of foreign 
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investments in Saudi Arabia. The relevant pointer is the foreign investor’s nationality rather 
than religion, given that the MITs and BITs ratified by Saudi Arabia require investors from 
other signatory states to be afforded certain rights and privileges. However, a major obstacle 
to the foreign investment in Saudi Arabia which concerns all foreign investors, is dispute 
resolution in general, and arbitration in particular. This will be discussed in more detail in the 
following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
History of Arbitration in Saudi Arabia 
6.1 Introduction 
The law in Saudi Arabia in respect of international commercial arbitration has been steadily 
evolving since the modern Kingdom was founded. The discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia and 
the subsequent expansion of the associated commercial elements of the oil industry meant 
that the concept of international arbitration became increasingly prevalent as foreign 
businesses began to operate in the Kingdom.1 Although early Muslims endorsed and 
practised arbitration, a number of high-profile arbitration decisions in the 1950s and 1960s 
that applied ‘Western’ arbitration principles in the Arab World resulted in international 
commercial arbitration becoming increasingly unpopular as a means of dispute resolution 
within the Kingdom.2 As a result of this distrust towards arbitration, Saudi courts increasingly 
began to intervene in the arbitral process to consider the merits of cases, or to consider 
awards on public policy grounds.3 
However, as this chapter sets out, the apparent rejection by the Saudi courts of international 
commercial arbitration had more to do with the perceived unfairness that resulted from the 
application of ‘Western’ arbitration models that highlighted the inherent differences between 
the Western model and the Shari’ah model. In addition, there was a perception in Saudi 
Arabia that international arbitrators were dismissive in respect of the use of Shari’ah law in 
international arbitration, which made it more difficult for the Kingdom to protect its rights. 
In fact, as this chapter illustrates, the concept of commercial arbitration has long been a part 
of the culture of the Arabian Peninsula, stretching back beyond the birth of Muhammed to the 
pre-Islamic period.4 This chapter traces the history of arbitration in the Arabian Peninsula 
from the pre-Islamic period through to the enactment of the New Arbitration Laws in 2012. It 
shows that far from being anti-arbitration, Shari’ah law, and the region that now makes up 
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the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, both have a rich history of encouraging arbitration stretching 
back for well over a millennium.  
This chapter then discusses the evolution of modern arbitration law in Saudi Arabia, by 
considering first the influence of civil law on the Saudi Arabian legal system and then the 
effects of international arbitration on Saudi Arabia, and especially the landmark ARAMCO 
case. This chapter discusses the fallout from the case and the restrictions it placed on the use 
of international commercial arbitration. This is followed by an analysis of the subsequent 
steps taken by Saudi Arabia to reintegrate commercial arbitration into domestic law as an 
effective dispute resolution mechanism through the enactment of legislation and the 
acceptance of some key international conventions. This allows the reader to have a greater 
background into the evolution of commercial arbitration in Saudi Arabia that has ultimately 
led to the passing of the New Arbitration Law in 2012. The provisions of this law are 
critically examined in chapter 7. 
This chapter therefore attempts to answer the research question of whether the Shari’ah is 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate modern international arbitration practices. It is also a 
first step towards addressing the question of how the Saudi Arabian model can be rendered 
into a more favourable model for the settlement of disputes between foreign investors and the 
government of Saudi Arabia. 
6.2 Arbitration In The Pre-Islamic Period (The Age Of Jahiliyya) 
Disputes in Arabia before Islam were predominantly resolved through revenge. Ja’far ibn Abi 
Talib, who was the head of the Muslim delegation sent by the Prophet Mohammed to the 
King of Abyssinia Negus, declared ‘O King! We were a people of ignorance…the strong 
among us would devour the weak’5. It is believed that the reason of this ignorance 
(Jahiliyyah) resulted from the lack of formal dispute settlement mechanisms.In the pre-
Islamic period, the Arabian Peninsula was predominantly made up of small communities and 
various tribal groups, each of whom had its own territory.6 The tribes were bound together by 
                                                
5 Attributed to the eponym of the Maliki school, Abd al-Malik b, cited in Hish┐m, Al-Srah al-Nabawiyyah, 1: 
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common interests and unwritten rules, with enforcement of the law typically at the behest of 
the injured party.7  
According to Al-Ramahi, tribal law was built on two basic principles: 
the principle of collective responsibility; and (2) the principle of retribution or 
compensation. The objective of tribal law is not merely to punish the offender but 
to restore the equilibrium between the offending and the offended families and 
tribes.8 
Collective responsibility in this context means that the tribe was responsible for the actions of 
the individual, and contrastingly, any attack on an individual was an attack on the tribe.9 As a 
result, disagreements between individuals could quickly escalate into an inter-tribal war if a 
dispute was not resolved quickly, and in a manner acceptable to both parties.10 
6.2.1 Tahkim 
The preferred method of resolving disputes between individuals and between tribes in the 
pre-Islamic period was through the use of a form of arbitration known as tahkim, illustrating 
that arbitration was already a concept that was familiar to Arabs before the emergence of 
Islam.11 In pre-Islamic Arabic culture, tradition provided that societies should try and resolve 
disputes internally before having to turn to litigation as a last resort.12 As a result, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that arbitration became a fundamental mechanism of pre-Islamic society 
as it allowed disputes to be resolved privately within the collective nature of the society.13 
Although the structures are different, the pre-Islamic concept of tahkim shares many of the 
same qualities as modern international arbitration practices, including the following: 
a) Freedom to submit disputes to arbitration; 
b) Requirement to identify the issue at the time the dispute arises; 
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c) Freedom to agree on the time and location of the arbitration; and 
d) Freedom to nominate an arbitrator of their choice.14 
However, there were also a number of fundamental differences between tahkim and Western 
arbitration practices. For example, tahkim was considered to be a conciliatory practice and 
therefore encouraged free will between the parties in order to enforce the award, which 
contrasts with the Western practice of arbitrators being permitted to issue and enforce binding 
awards on parties.15  
6.2.2 The Concept of Hakam 
Each tribe had its own ruler (the sheikh) who was responsible for matters relating to his own 
tribe, including arbitrating in the event of internal disputes within his tribe.16 However, the 
sheikh did not always enforce his powers of arbitration and, in the event of a dispute, the 
parties could also mutually agree to the appointment of an individual to settle a dispute, who 
would be a member of the tribe who was considered to be worthy of arbitrating based on his 
favourable reputation and high personal qualities such as his tribal knowledge or reputation 
for impartiality.17 This individual, who was generally a volunteer and had no judicial 
authority per se, was referred to as the Hakam – a ruler or judge.18 Arab historian Al-
Ya’quobi described the concept as follows: 
As a result of not having religions or laws to govern their lives, pagan Arabs used 
to have arbitrators to settle their disputes. So when they have a conflict regarding 
blood, water, grazing or inheritance they used to appoint an arbitrator who carries 
the characters of honour, honest, older age and wisdom.19 
Often, a kahin (soothsayer) would be designated as the arbitrator within a tribe (which was as 
a result of a belief that the decisions of Hakams were based on divine relation, which was an 
important factor in ensuring enforcement),20 but it was also common that certain families 
would gain a reputation for impartiality, and the role of Hakam would pass down through 
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family members as a type of honorary title.21 Although generally male, there is evidence to 
suggest that a number of women also acted as arbitrators at the1 time.22 
The role of the Hakam was to administer justice through conciliation or peacemaking (known 
as sulh). Schact refers to a Hakam as ‘a lawmaker, an authoritative expounder of the 
normative legal custom or sunna’.23 The Hakam had the freedom to choose whether to 
arbitrate or not.24 However, as the Hakam was not a judge or an official appointee, he was not 
in a position to enforce his pronouncements. For that reason, if the Hakam agreed to arbitrate, 
the parties would be required to provide a type of security or guarantee to ensure that they 
would abide by the decision of the arbitrator (which often took the form of property or 
hostages).25 If they refused to abide by the decision of the arbitrator, the guarantee would be 
forfeited to the other party, who also may have been put under a ‘curse’ by the kahin for their 
failure to abide by the ruling.26 Al-Shubaiki suggests that: 
…there were several reasons for making the losing party accept judgment and 
carry it out. For example, the fact of not executing the award would affect his 
reputation which might lead, if it became known, to the refusal of other 
arbitrators from the settlement of any dispute to which he was party. 
Consequently, we can say that the losing party was subject to the ruling of 
arbitration under the authority of tribal influence and customs, or the authority of 
public opinion, or fear of fighting, which could take place if the judgment was 
not accepted.27 
There is evidence that some arbitrators would even agree to make the necessary payments 
themselves in order to ensure that disputants agreed to sulh.28 Arbitrators tended to attempt to 
convince the offender that he had wronged the other party, as well as ensuring that any 
awards made were easy to follow.29 
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As it was an informal and voluntary role, there were no specific rules or regulations 
applicable to tahkim at that time. In addition, there was no specific place or court in which 
arbitrations would take place; often the parties would be required to travel to the Hakam’s 
home to obtain his services. In addition, there is no evidence of whether a Hakam received 
any payment for his role, with the literature appearing to suggest that being appointed as a 
Hakam was considered to be an honour and, as Hakams tended to come from noble and 
wealthy families, there were no requirements to pay them for their services.30  
6.2.3 Procedure of arbitration 
Under the customs of tahkim, the claimant was required to prove his case, with the 
respondent basing any defence on his oath, which meant that if the claimant was unable to 
prove his case the respondent would be asked to swear an oath denying the claim.31 If the 
respondent successfully swore his oath the claim would fail.32 This practice continues to form 
a base of the arbitration procedure in all Muslim countries today.33 
As there was no specific legislation on the role of a Hakam, Al Afgani suggests that Hakams 
in pre-Islamic Arabia adjudicated on a wide array of matters, including ‘inheritance, 
possession, or criminal matters such as murder, robbery or adultery’.34 Furthermore, the 
arbitrators had powers beyond the traditional legal sphere, but extended to disputes about 
ranks of nobility within a tribe or family.35 
In terms of commercial arbitration, evidence would suggest that pre-Islamic Arabian society 
utilised the services of ‘souk judges’ or marketplace arbitrators, who would arbitrate on 
commercial matters.36 The Okaz market, the largest market in the pre-Islamic Arabian 
Peninsula, had Hakams that settled trade disputes as well as larger disputes between noble 
families who travelled to the market solely to obtain the services of the Hakam.37 
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Muhammed himself acted as a Hakam on a number of occasions before and after his ascent to 
Prophethood.38 Also, the Qur’an designated Muhammed as an adjudicator: 
We sent down to thee the book of truth, that thou mightiest judge between men, 
as guided by Allah: so be not used as an advocate by those who betray their trust. 
(Qur’an 4: 105). 
Tradition tells the story of a flood in Mecca that resulted in the Al-Kabh39 being destroyed 
and the revered Black Stone being displaced.40 Following this displacement, a dispute arose 
between the two tribes of Kuraesh, both of whom wished to have the honour of replacing the 
Black Stone to its original position.41 With no agreement forthcoming, there was a risk of a 
tribal war breaking out. However, before war could begin, it was suggested that tahkim could 
be utilised in order to resolve this dispute. As Muhammed already had a reputation for being 
a trustworthy individual, the two tribes agreed to appoint him as Hakam.42 Muhammed was 
able to successfully resolve the dispute by suggesting that a piece of fabric (some sources 
suggest that it was his own robe)43 be used to carry the Black Stone to the correct position, 
with each corner of the fabric being held by a member of each tribe meaning that both tribes 
were able to say that they had replaced the stone. Furthermore, Abu-Nimer provides 
examples of Muhammed submitting to tahkim when he himself was involved in a dispute 
with a Jewish tribe called Banu Qurayza.44 These examples, according to Schacht, suggest 
that Muhammed’s commitment to the arbitration procedure provided him with additional 
authority when he subsequently became a political and military leader.45 
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The concepts of arbitration from the pre-Islamic period, as set out above, were adopted by 
Muhammed based on the assimilation of local customs and practices through Urf and formed 
an integral part of Islamic law, which this chapter will consider next.46 
6.3 Arbitration Under Islamic Law 
6.3.1 Qur’anic Authority for Arbitration 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given its importance in pre-Islamic society, tahkim continued to be 
practised in the Arabian Peninsula in a manner similar to its tribal roots subsequent to the 
foundation of Islam. It is cited in the Qur’an on a number of occasions. Although the Qur’an 
does not provide for specific rules on arbitration, it does appear to guide and direct followers 
towards the use of it.47 For example, in respect of marriage the Qur’an provides: 
If ye fear a breach between them twain (i.e. husband and wife) then appoint (two) 
arbiters, one from his family, and the other from hers; if they wish for peace, God 
will cause their conciliations, for God hath full knowledge and is acquainted with 
all things.48 
The appointment of two arbitrators was common practice in early Islamic community (and is 
still encouraged by the Shafi school of interpretation), with the proviso that any such 
arbitrations would now be required to be based on the laws set out in the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah.49 Indeed, the schism between Shi’a and Sunni occurred only after attempts at 
arbitration which are said to have failed as a result of one of the Hakams not relying on the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah and therefore making their decision to depose Ali Ibn Abi Talib as 
Caliph invalid, which indirectly resulted in Ali’s assassination and the subsequent split 
between the followers of Sunni and the followers of Shi’a.50  
Another example from the Qur’an also cited as promoting arbitration is the following: 
You should always refer disputes to God and to his Prophet. And obey Allah and 
his messenger; And Fall into no disputes, lest you lose heart and your power to 
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depart; and be patient and persevering, for Allah is with those who patiently 
persevere.51  
This passage indicates that in the event of a dispute, it would be Allah, and Muhammed as his 
Prophet, that would act as arbitrators. In practicality, the Sunnah indicates that Muhammed 
continued to act as a Hakam himself after becoming the Prophet. The reasons for this were in 
some sense practical, as in order to create a unified nation, Muhammed required that there be 
only one recipient of divine revelation, who was Muhammed himself.52 By appointing 
himself as a Hakam, Muhammed was able to position himself as a decisive and honest 
leader.53 This positioning of himself as a Hakam suggests that there was no intent on behalf 
of Muhammed to develop a dispute resolution mechanism that was beyond political power.54 
Indeed, the traditional power of Hakams was a threat to Muhammed after he became the 
Prophet and began to administrate the Caliphate. The reason for this was that Hakams 
continued to rely on customary law which, despite being the source of much of the arbitration 
principles in classical Islam, was in many ways contrary to the Islamic reforms being set out 
by Muhammed.55 In addition, the Hakams, especially the soothsayers, relied on divine 
revelation as part of making their judgments, which was at odds with the teachings of 
Muhammed that Allah was the one true God.56 
Although Islam changed the nature of arbitration in Arab society, it still contained many 
concepts that would have been familiar to pre-Islamic Hakams.57 For example, under 
Shari’ah law, arbitration continued to be a voluntary process and Muhammed was reluctant 
to impose judgments when it came to disputes, preferring to first request that the parties 
mediate in order to resolve their disputes and, in the event that the mediation was 
unsuccessful, he would generally propose sulh, with a judgment only being imposed as a last 
resort.58 The concept of sulh is discussed in the next subsection. 
                                                
51 Qur’an 4:59. 
52 Sayen (n 1) 924. 
53 Khoukaz (n 15) 187. 
54 Sayen (n 1) 924. 
55 Khadduri and Liebesny (n 38) 
56 Ibid. 
57 Sayen (n 1) 924-925. 
58 Baamir (n 12) 53. 
 182 
6.3.2 The Concept of Sulh 
The concept of sulh under Islamic was also a remnant from pre-Islamic arbitration customs, 
and indeed is considered to be an important factor in all dispute resolution mechanisms 
within Islam, with the Qur’an encouraging parties to use sulh in dispute resolution.59 The 
Qur’an states that: 
If two parties among the Believers fall into a quarrel, make ye peace between 
them…make peace between them with justice, and be fair: For God loves those 
who are fair and just.60 
As previously noted, the Prophet implemented sulh when acting as a Hakam, on the basis that 
legal proceedings were not won by the party who was best able to state his claim, but the 
party who was the most honest. According to al-Ramahi, Muhammed believed that the trial 
process ‘can be tainted and subverted by the imperfect nature of man therefore, it should be 
avoided when possible’.61 This was expanded upon by Al-Shafi, who stated his preference for 
judges allowing parties to have a number of days to attempt to conciliate before making any 
judgments.62 
Although under Shari’ah law, sulh and tahkim are separate concepts, the Qur’anic authority 
for both stem from similar sources and they are generally quite similar, with the following 
differences: 
a) Sulh is a settlement between parties that does not necessarily require the 
intervention of third parties (although the parties have the option to do 
so), whereas tahkim requires the appointment of a third party; 
b) Sulh is an agreement reached before the court, whereas tahkim may bind 
the parties without any court intervention; 
c) Sulh can only be used in respect of existing disputes whereas tahkim can 
be used in respect of both existing and prospective disagreements.63 
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The Qur’an allows for both sulh and tahkim, with the parties being entitled to agree on their 
preferred approach. According to Al-Ramahi: 
This shows the flexible and evolutionary nature of Shari’ah which allows the 
parties to choose and adapt the process to suit them and their dispute.64 
Today, sulh continues to be influential in Saudi Arabia. The principle of amicable settlement 
was promoted by early Islamic scholars on the basis that it was more likely to produce a 
settlement of a dispute, rather than a judgment.65 According to Sayen: 
…the possibility of judgment, whether by the Hakam or a qadi, or both, was left 
open mainly to spur the parties to reach an agreed settlement. It may have been 
considered desirable for a Hakam's judgment to be difficult to enforce, because 
this would constitute added incentive for the parties to settle.66  
However, it is accepted that in certain instances sulh would not be appropriate, such as where 
the contract has not been performed by one party, or where one party has not acted in good 
faith.67 Similarly, sulh would not be appropriate where the two parties are entirely at odds 
with each other’s position, as there would unlikely be any common ground on which all the 
arbitrators can agree.68 
6.4 Four Schools Of Interpretation 
Despite Muhammed’s and the Qur’an’s approval of the dispute resolution mechanisms of 
tahkim and sulh, it did not result in the smooth transition of these concepts into Shari’ah 
law.69 Although the four major schools of fiqh all accepted the concept of tahkim, it was 
classified under the laws of agency rather than the laws of contract (an approach still 
accepted by the Hanafi school).70 The reason for this is that takhim began with attempts at 
sulh.71 As the arbitration procedure was conciliation rather than judgment, it was important 
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under Shari’ah law that the Hakam was considered to be an agent of the parties rather than as 
an individual that would impose judgment.72 As stated by Sayen, the Hakam’s role was: 
…to persuade rather that coerce the parties and generally to maintain a 
cooperative and friendly atmosphere conducive to an amicable settlement, the 
same atmosphere that ought to be maintained between principal and agent.73 
However, although the Hakam’s role was persuasive rather than coercive, the decision of a 
Hakam was still required to provide the same standards to their role as that of a judge.74 This 
resulted in an arbitration system which, from a Western point of view, may be interpreted as 
resembling conciliation up to a certain point, but also bearing a resemblance to litigation.75 
This interpretation of tahkim lies in stark contrast to the Western concept of arbitration in 
respect of enforceability, and is perhaps unsurprisingly an area that traditionally has led to 
conflict arising between the Eastern and Western schools of thought.76 This is largely because 
tahkim does not result in a binding award as it is the case with Western arbitral awards.77 
Tahkim diverged from the Western concept of arbitration when Muawiya, a long-time 
opponent of the Prophet’s, became Caliph of the Umayyad Dynasty.78 Muawiya required the 
approval of a judge (qadi) before an arbitrator’s decision could be enforced. However, the 
enforceability of the tahkim award often depended on the arbitrators’ credibility.79 Also, the 
process relies on the willingness of the parties to submit disputes when they arise rather than 
at the time of concluding the contract.80 It must be noted that the Prophet favoured tahkim 
(although a pre-Islamic concept), abided by the decision of an arbitrator and in some cases 
acted as a Hakam.81 
Nonetheless, each of the four schools of interpretation emphasised different aspects of the 
system, especially regarding the disputes that fall within the scope of arbitration and the 
binding nature of the arbitral award.82 As such, it is important to refer to each of the schools 
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in order to obtain a fuller understanding of tahkim.83 Although the interpretation of the 
Hanbali school is of the most relevance to this thesis, it is important to note that legislators 
and judges in Saudi Arabia are allow to apply legal principles or opinions of any of the other 
schools if it is deemed appropriate in contemporary circumstances (which is advantageous for 
parties being arbitrated under Shari’ah law as any opinion can be applied without violation of 
the law) and where the opinion of the Hanbali school would ‘cause strain and incompatibility 
with the public interest [maslahat al-umum]’.84 For these reasons, a brief overview of the 
approach taken by each of the four schools of interpretation is set out below. 
6.4.1 Hanafi School 
The Hanafi school legitimises arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism on the basis that 
it ‘serves an important social need and it simplifies disputes’.85 When considering arbitration, 
the Hanafi school tends to emphasise the importance of the contractual nature of arbitration, 
and promotes the view that arbitration should be considered to be conciliation between the 
parties as opposed to a judgment against one party.86 Hanafi scholars tend to promote reason 
and equitable principles, with decisions being enforced through the binding nature of a 
contractual agreement to accept the decision of the arbitrator.87 Thus, the arbitral award is 
similar to the parties reaching a compromise, implying that the enforcement of the award 
depends on the willingness of the parties to abide by the arbitrator’s decision.88 This is 
because they contend that the awards are ‘characterised by the use of subjective opinions (ra’ 
y)’.89 Recourse is made to ra’ y in the absence of direct guidance from the Qur’an.90 As such, 
it is logical that a decision that is based on ra’ y has lesser force than the decision of a judge 
who applies rules enshrined in the Qur’an. A party may only be bound by the arbitral 
decision in the same way as a party is required to fulfil a promise in a contract.91 This school 
also holds that the arbitrator should be known to the disputants to increase the likelihood of 
conciliation.92 It has been noted that they are the most likely of all the schools to recognise an 
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award granted by a non-Muslim arbitrator, since the Hanafi fiqh does not regard arbitration 
by non-Muslims as contrary to Divine law.93 
6.4.2 Maliki School 
The Maliki school suggests that arbitration is one of the highest forms of dispute resolution.94 
The Maliki school relies on the use of consensus (Ijma) between scholars, customs, the 
Qur’an, the Sunnah and Qiyas (i.e. reasoning by analogy).95 It also relies on the customary 
practices of the people of Medina as evidence of how the Shari’ah should be applied.96 The 
Maliki scholars also permit one party to the dispute to act as arbitrator on the basis that cases 
are decided by an arbitrator based on his conscience.97 Although this diverges from 
international ethical standards that require arbitrators to be independent and free from bias, it 
shows that the Maliki school prioritises the resumption of harmonious relations.98 However, 
they also diverge from international ethical standards by maintaining that an arbitrator may 
not be removed once arbitration proceedings have commenced.99 This implies that a disputant 
cannot apply to the court or institution vested with the appropriate authority to remove an 
arbitrator without waiting for the arbitral award, even where there are justifiable doubts as to 
the arbitrator’s impartiality or the arbitrator does not possess the requisite qualifications or is 
physically or mentally incapable of conducting the proceedings.100 However, arbitration 
awards under this school can be overturned by a judge if the latter considers the award to be 
‘flagrantly unjust’.101  
It must be noted that arbitration, for this school is the highest form of dispute resolution and 
thus preferable to court rulings. This is because it is seen as a more pragmatic way of 
establishing harmonious relations than litigation.102 Also, their faith in the integrity of the 
arbitrator, who is ruled by his conscience, is so strong that they recommend that even a party 
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to a dispute may be designated as an arbitrator.103 The school is also likely to recognise 
arbitral awards from non-Muslim courts unless they are contrary to Shari’ah law.104 
6.4.3 Shafi School 
Arbitration under the Shafi school is based on the methodology developed by Muhammad 
ash-Shafi.105 He stated that it was preferable for the judge to extricate himself from the case 
and order the parties to attempt sulh for one or two days in order to determine whether the 
dispute may be settled through negotiation or conciliation. Where the parties continue to 
disagree, the judge may then adjudicate between them.106 The school shares elements with 
both the Hanafi and Maliki schools, and provides for a balance between logic and tradition. 
Just like the Maliki school, they rely on traditional practices such as that of referring disputes 
to Caliphate Umar ibn al-Khatt’ab who arbitrated in many disputes.107 Hence, it is described 
as eclectic.108 Shafi scholars interpret principles from both the Qur’an and the Sunnah, but do 
not consider Qiyas when it comes to arbitration.109 In addition, the Shafi school allows the 
parties the freedom to choose any ordinary person to act as arbitrator, regardless of whether 
they have any experience.110 However, as a result of the view that an arbitrator is inferior to a 
judge, arbitrators under the Shafi school may be removed by the disputants at any time up to 
the point that the award is made.111 
Moreover, the arbitrator is not a conciliator as in the Hanafi School but an adjudicator who 
assesses the facts.112 The arbitrator must be an impartial judge of the evidence and how it 
relates to Shari’ah law. However, the fact that arbitrators are inferior to judges implies that 
their findings are liable to be overturned if they are found to be not compliant to Shari’ah 
law. In this school, the arbitration process is secondary to the legal process. The arbitrator 
must not substitute himself for the judge. Also, there is less emphasis on conciliation113 and 
there is no agreement on the scope arbitration. Some state that arbitration should not deal 
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with criminal matters.114 However, all members of the Shafi school agree that arbitration is 
important in commercial disputes.115 Despite the fact that the Hanbali school is the most 
conservative, the Shafi school is perhaps the most inflexible as regards the enforcement of 
contracts made in non-Muslim legal countries and awards granted by non-Muslim 
arbitrators.116  
6.4.4 Hanbali School 
The Hanbali school is generally the most conservative as regards the enforcement of the 
principles of the Shari’ah.117 Saudi Arabian law is based on the school’s exegesis of the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah. Thus, it is the most relevant in this study. The school accepts that the 
Sunnah is fully authentic, which is unique among the four schools.118 As it relies on the 
Qur’an in full, it does not require any references to reasoning or logic when reaching 
decisions.119 However, the Hanbali school is also considered to be very flexible in relation to 
commercial matters, with Hanbali scholars suggesting that contractual clauses are valid so 
long as they do not contradict the overall purpose of the contract.120 According to the 
influential classical Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyah, any contractual clause entered into does 
not even have to be relevant to the contract in order for it to be enforceable.121 Also, Al-
Sanhury contended that Ibn Taymiyah’s interpretation of contract law may be understood as 
follows: 
…the Hanbali doctrine has come quite close to the Western doctrines: any clause 
which accompanies the contract is valid unless it is impossible or contrary to 
public order or good morals. Said clause is then set aside but the contract remains 
valid unless this clause condition is the determining motive of the contract. In this 
case, the contract is also set aside.122 
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Under the Hanbali school, arbitration is considered to be litigation, meaning that an arbitrator 
must have the same qualifications as a judge and, as a result, any award granted by the 
arbitrator is binding upon both parties, and any award made by an arbitrator may not be 
appealed by either party (res judicata).123 In practice, prior to the enactment of the New 
Arbitration Laws in 2012, Saudi Arabia provided the parties to arbitration with a list of 
arbitrators, the use of which was encouraged but not required.124 Nonetheless, given that the 
parties are required to appoint as arbitrator a person that has the same qualifications as a 
judge, disputants could hardly find other qualified persons not mentioned in the list.125  
The Hanbali school is the strictest school with regard to compliance with the Shari’ah since 
it emphasises uncompromising literalism, requiring arbitrators to adhere to the wording of the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah and avoid analogies.126 Also, although the arbitration award is 
binding to the same extent as a judge’s decision, it still requires ratification by the court. As 
such, the court must investigate the validity of the arbitration process, since without judicial 
review, the arbitral award may be unenforceable.127 The court ensures that the arbitration 
proceedings were in compliance with the Shari’ah and the arbitrator is a Muslim man.128 It 
must be noted that the Hanbali school is not a monolith. This is especially the case with 
regard to the scope of arbitration.129 There are some who believe that arbitration should only 
be restricted to commercial and family matters. However, Ibn Taimyiah believed that it could 
be applied to all areas including criminal law.130 However, some scholars argue that an 
arbitrator should not be involved in commercial disputes.131  
The Hanbali school is flexible when it comes to arbitrating a dispute where one of the 
disputants is a non-Muslim.132 Also, awards granted in non-Islamic jurisdictions are 
recognised as long as they are not inconsistent with the Shari’ah.133 Recourse to a non-
Muslim court, in contractual disputes is allowed only as long as there are no non-Islamic 
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clauses such as riba.134 Furthermore, there are decisions of Hanbali judges that recognise the 
right of non-Muslims to arbitrate at least in commercial matters, outside Muslim territories.135 
It may therefore be argued that the Hanbali stance on the arbitration process is pragmatic.136 
Although the four schools of interpretation set out above illustrate the range of interpretation 
that Muslim scholars have had in respect of arbitration, there is uniform and unequivocal 
agreement that the principle of arbitration itself exists under Shari’ah law, whether it is to be 
viewed as a form of conciliation or as a form of judgment.137 This has implications for the 
role of the Hakam, with the modern interpretation of a Hakam having obtained different 
meanings, depending on the school being applied. In one sense, it refers to a person that is 
authorised to settle differences between parties by making suggestions and assisting parties in 
reconciling, while in another sense it can refer to an individual with authority to bind parties 
to a decision.138 Also, all four schools agree on the importance of arbitration and that it is 
necessary for the good of the community and the growth of individuals.139 Furthermore, they 
all believe that arbitration should be confined to practical matters and disputes involving 
humans and not God.140 As to the actual process of arbitration, they all regard it as a legal 
process that requires oath taking and verbal testimony.141 One of the contentious issues at the 
heart of the ongoing debate on Shari’ah-compliant arbitration is the appointment of female 
arbitrators.  
6.4.5 Female Arbitrators 
The issue of female arbitrators is very contentious in many Muslim-majority countries.142 
Traditionally, the participation of women in Islamic law has been very limited. The usual 
interpretation of Shari’ah law is that women cannot be appointed as judges or arbitrators.143 
Thus, if a woman is appointed as an arbitrator her judgements are not binding, even if her 
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ruling is in accordance with the Shari’ah. The prohibition of female judges is often based on 
the question whether women are eligible to be judges. The Shafi, Maliki and Hanbali schools 
hold that they are ineligible. This is largely based on verse 4:34 of the Qur’an which ordains 
that ‘men are qawwamuna (protectors) over women’. It is also based on the statement made 
by the Prophet, with regard to the coronation of a woman as Queen of Persia: ‘people will not 
prosper if they appoint a woman in charge of them’.144  
In light of the above, many scholars then contended that this meant that women could not be 
public officials.145 Only the Hanafi scholars argue that women can be appointed as judges 
given that any person who is qualified to be a witness could validly become a judge.146 Thus, 
since verse 2:282 of the Qur’an allows women to act as witnesses in commercial disputes, 
they ought to be eligible to act as judges in commercial cases. However, they could not be 
judges with regard to Hudud (sanctions for violating the rights of God) and Qisas 
(retaliation).147 Thus, women could not adjudicate criminal matters. It must however be noted 
that there is no express prohibition of women from becoming judges in the Qur’an or 
Sunnah. Thus, a woman was appointed bazaar-inspector of Medina by Caliph.148 This 
inspector arbitrated disputes of merchants.149 
Nonetheless, the Hanbali scholars maintain that women should not assume important roles, 
for the good of the wider community. They interpret the Hadith as prohibiting the 
appointment of female arbitrators because they are not suitable for such important public 
roles.150 This also explains their inferior legal standing in the Islamic legal system. As noted 
above, Hanbali scholars believe that rules should only be based on what is stated in the 
Qur’an. Therefore, since there is no statement excluding women from the position of a judge, 
then it may be argued that they should be allowed to become judges. More pertinently, the 
argument that their appointment would not benefit the community is no longer valid as 
female judges in several countries such as Egypt have proven to be as effective as their male 
counterparts.151 
                                                
144 Hadith, Albukhari, vol. 9, Chapter 88, 219. 
145 Alqudah (n 114) 10-11. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Rawya Al-Zahhar, ‘Women under Saudi Legal System’ in Abdulla Al-Khunain et al (eds), Judicial System in 
Saudi Arabia (Center for Global Thought on Saudi Arabia 2015) 339. 
148 Alqudah (n 114) 10. 
149 Baamir (n 12) 117. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Alqudah (n 114) 5. 
 192 
6.5 Differentiating Between Arbitration Under Islamic Law And Western Models 
Antaki suggests that there are two models of dispute resolution mechanisms in the world. The 
first is an informal and innate model, whereas the latter is a more formal model.152 According 
to Antaki, the Arab world subscribes to the former model while the West applies the latter.153 
Al-Ramahi suggests that, in addition, the Western model focuses on the individual whereas in 
the Middle East it remains the collective towards which the dispute resolution is aimed.154 
Islamic law is not solely concerned with business relations, but also with relations within 
their own social circle and society as a whole.155 According to Al-Ramahi, this diverging 
outlook has resulted in a fundamental difference in how the Middle East and the West 
approach business relations: 
The differences are not just in the general landscape but in the detail and 
perceptions in relation to specific matters…conflict from a western perspective is 
considered to have a positive dimension ‘acting as a catharsis to redefine 
relationships between individuals, groups and nations and makes it easier to find 
adequate settlement of possible solutions. Whereas conflict in the East is 
considered to be negative, threatening and destructive to the normative order and 
needs to be settled quickly or be avoided. These two views of conflict are 
sufficiently dissimilar to substantiate the argument that each side has a very 
different starting point when it comes to understanding conflict and consequently, 
conflict resolution.156 
However, despite contrasting views between the two models of arbitration, there is a positive 
outlook for the future. As will be set out in the next section, the innate flexibility of Shari’ah 
law allows it to incorporate elements of other legal systems without being in conflict with the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah. The next section will consider the influence that civil law, a 
predominantly European model of law, has had both on Shari’ah law in general, and more 
particularly on Saudi law.  
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6.6 Civil Law Influences On Arbitration 
The Ottoman Empire greatly influenced arbitral practices in the Middle East.157 The Ottoman 
Empire, moreover, produced a code based on principles derived from the Hanafi school of 
Shari’ah law.158 This code is referred to as the Majalla and it was enacted in 1876.159  
The Majalla dedicated a full section to arbitration, which emphasised the contractual nature 
of arbitration under the Hanafi principles.160 Accordingly, the Majalla set out the following 
conditions that would be required to be met in order for an arbitration clause or agreement to 
be valid: 
a) The dispute must already have arisen; 
b) The parties must agree to the arbitration through offer and acceptance; 
c) The arbitrator must be appointed by reference to their name; and 
d) The arbitrator must have the capacity to be a witness.161 
The requirement that the dispute must have already arisen has traditionally been one of the 
contentious issues between Western and Middle Eastern arbitration principles, as on its face it 
would appear to forbid the concept of entering arbitration clauses or agreements while 
concluding a contract.162 On the one hand, the very existence of an arbitration clause in the 
contract tends to refer to the potential for future disputes. However, as noted previously, the 
Shari’ah allows parties to include any term in a contract that does not conflict with the 
principles of the Shari’ah, such as in respect to the payment of interest.163 According to 
Baamir, this apparent conflict is solved by the fact that:  
…arbitration clauses are recognised as valid…as long as they are not contrary to 
public order and do not permit a prohibited action under Shari’ah. Risk and 
uncertainty make a transaction void and it is obvious that an arbitration clause 
does not involve any risk.164  
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The Majalla emphasised that an arbitral award was inferior to a court judgment and could 
therefore be appealed to court.165 However, parties were expected to accept any awards made 
under arbitration on the basis that, as it was a conciliatory process, any award was based on 
an agreement being reached between the parties.166 
The Majalla remained influential after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th 
century and was the basis on which many of the former Ottoman territories based their civil 
codes upon their foundation.167 Although the Majalla was not directly transposed into Saudi 
Arabian law upon the foundation of the Kingdom, the concept of incorporating foreign laws 
and practices has been influential in the formation of Saudi Arabian arbitration law.168 
6.7 Evolution Of Arbitration In The Saudi Legal System 
The evolution of arbitration law in Saudi Arabia may be divided into four phases. The 
regulatory attitude towards arbitration in Saudi Arabia entered its fourth phase with the 
passing of the Arbitration Law in 2012. The first phase began shortly after the foundation of 
Saudi Arabia whereby international commercial arbitration was allowed within the Kingdom, 
although in practice little commercial arbitration actually took place in Saudi Arabia during 
this phase.169 This phase was continued from the foundation of Saudi Arabia until the 
ARAMCO case in 1958, when the Saudi government began to view international arbitration 
as a threat to its national sovereignty. This marked the beginning of the second phase, under 
which commercial arbitration was greatly restricted in Saudi Arabia.170 The second phase 
lasted until the oil boom and the related Islamic revival period in the 1970s. This phase saw 
the implementation of significant new reforms as well as the membership of Saudi Arabia in 
a major international arbitration organisation.171 This phase lasted until the implementation of 
the New Arbitration Law in 2012 which will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 7.  
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6.7.1 Commercial Arbitration in its Early Phase: 1931-1958 
Commercial arbitration has been part of Saudi Arabian law since the foundation of Saudi 
Arabia, under the Code of Commercial Courts in 1931.172 Due to a lack of legal experience 
available to the new Kingdom on the matter of Shari’ah commercial law at that time, this 
Code was based on the Ottoman Code of Commercial Law of 1850 (which was in turn 
influenced by the French codification system).173 The 1931 Code provides a number of 
articles that regulate arbitration proceedings, which broadly followed the Hanbali school of 
interpretation as set out in section 2 above.174 Arbitration under the 1931 Code was 
institutional, with the proceedings held under the supervision of the Commercial Court.175 
The 1931 Code provided that an arbitral award was not enforceable unless it was reviewed by 
the Commercial Court, which would either approve it for enforcement or repudiate it.176 
Despite the arbitration provisions in the 1931 Code, in actual fact few arbitration proceedings 
followed the provisions.177 The reasons for this included the fact that the Commercial Court 
did not recognise arbitration agreements (due to the principle of Shari’ah law that arbitration 
could only occur in relation to existing disputes).178 Accordingly, the reference to arbitration 
was very limited, with the conflict between the civil-law inspired Commercial Court and the 
Shari’ah courts, leading arbitration to become ineffective, time consuming and in many cases 
harmful to some parties.179 This conflict grew and became one between the Shari’ah courts 
and international forums in the second phase. 
6.7.2 ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia’s Response: 1958-1980 
From early in the history of oil exploration in Saudi Arabia until the ARAMCO case in 1958 
arbitration clauses were generally included in agreements between Saudi and foreign 
companies.180 Despite some reservations about the Western model of arbitration that provides 
for the enforcement of awards on terms that are not acceptable to the parties, the Saudi 
Arabian government was willing to make such concessions when entering into agreements 
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with US oil companies not long after the foundation of the Kingdom in the 1930s. However, 
there was a feeling of distrust in the Middle East towards international commercial arbitration 
even before the ARAMCO decision. This may be attributed to the ruling in Petroleum 
Development Ltd. v The Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1952) the arbitrator. Lord Asquith described 
Abu Dhabi law as ‘primitive’, stating that: 
…it would be fanciful to suggest that in this very primitive region there is any 
settled body of legal principles applicable to the construction of modern 
commercial instruments.181 
Instead, he applied English law, which he described as being rooted in the ‘good sense and 
common practice of civilized nations’.182 
Unsurprisingly, sentiments such as these expressed by European arbitrators about the validity 
of Shari’ah commercial law reinforced an opinion in Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern 
countries that international commercial arbitration was solely a vehicle to allow Western 
companies to impose their own laws on contracts in Arab countries and as a vehicle to avoid 
Shari’ah law.183  
The ARAMCO case arose as a result of concessions given by Saudi Arabia to the Standard 
Oil Company in 1933. Standard Oil later sold a 50% stake in these concessions to the Texas 
Oil Company and together, these companies formed the Arabian American Oil Company (or 
ARAMCO).184 An arbitration clause was included in the concession agreement, which stated 
that any disputes would be settled by a three-person arbitration panel and would be based on 
the interpretation of arbitration applied by the Hanbali school.185 However, when a dispute 
arose between the parties, it was submitted to arbitration, but the arbitration tribunal refused 
to apply the Shari’ah on the basis that: 
…the regime of…concessions has remained embryonic in Muslim law and is not 
the same in different schools. The principles of one school cannot be introduced 
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from another, unless this is done by the act of authority. Hanbali law contains no 
precise rule about mining concession and a fortiori about oil concessions.186 
This passage was highlighted by Baamir as an illustration of the ignorance that the arbitrators 
had towards Shari’ah law.187 For instance, as previously noted, the arbitrators failed to 
understand that the Hanbali school of interpretation provided for sufficient flexibility to be 
able to incorporate any type of agreement and any type of clause that the parties agreed to 
enter into.188 In addition, the arbitrators were incorrect to state that the principles of other 
schools could not be incorporated into a ruling based on the Hanbali school. Reference to 
other schools can be made without any resort to official authority provided that the arbitrator 
had ‘adequate knowledge of the nature of both situations and an accurate reasoning’.189  
In addition, the arbitrators found that ARAMCO’s rights would be unable to be: 
…secured in an unquestionable manner by the law of force in Saudi 
Arabia…[and that Saudi laws] must be interpreted or supplemented by the 
general principles of law, by the custom and practice in the oil business and by 
notions of pure jurisprudence.190 
In his analysis of their decision, Baamir concluded that: 
…when the tribunal denied the application of the Saudi law and applied British 
and Swiss practices, it implied that Saudi Arabia is not a civilisation, which was a 
discrimination against not just Saudi Arabia alone, but an unfair judgment of the 
Islamic law as a whole.191 
As a result of their dissatisfaction with the ARAMCO decision, the Saudi government 
effectively restricted all international commercial arbitration from 1963 by forbidding all 
government agencies from resorting to arbitration without prior approval from the Council of 
                                                
186 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (1963) 27 LLR 117, 162-163. 
187 Baamir (n 12) 103. 
188 Ibid. See also Nicholas Foster, ‘Islamic Commercial Law: An Overview (I)’ School of Law and School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Working Paper 4/2006 ) 9-10. 
189 Baamir (n 12) 103. 
190 See Gemmell (n 4) 179. 
191 Baamir (n 12) 104. 
 198 
Ministers.192 This policy remained in effect despite the 1980 Saudi ratification of the ICSID 
Convention.193  
According to Gemmell, these cases unsurprisingly did not endear the Western model of 
arbitration to the governments of the Middle East. He states that: 
In these cases, the arbitrators concocted a unique arbitral stew consisting of one 
part cynicism for local law and one part disdain for the Islamic parties’ ability to 
enforce rights…The profound and lasting impact of these arbitrations on the 
region’s arbitral psyche should not be underestimated.194 
6.8 Commercial Arbitration In Saudi Arabia After ARAMCO 
Following the ARAMCO case, Saudi Arabia took a number of steps to protect their interests 
in oil, including the formation of OPEC.195 In the aftermath of the oil boom in the 1970s, 
Saudi Arabia accumulated enormous wealth and, as a result, began to seek additional foreign 
investment to diversify its economy from its dependence on oil. In order to attract such 
foreign investment, a fair and impartial dispute settlement mechanism was required.196 
As a result, Saudi Arabia entered the third phase, which resulted in comprehensive reform. 
As noted above, Saudi Arabia ratified the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) Convention in 1980. The ICSID Convention, which was enacted in 1966, 
aims to provide facilities for the conciliation and arbitration of disputes between member 
countries and investors who qualify as nationals of other member countries.197 The 
ratification of ICSID was seen at the time as the first positive step that Saudi Arabia had 
taken in respect of reconsidering its position on arbitration and was viewed domestically as 
an important means of attracting foreign investment by providing for investor confidence.198 
However, it was not until 1983 that a comprehensive set of rules to govern arbitration was 
introduced. The lack of clear procedures and judicial support, as well as the restrictions laid 
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down by the Council of Ministers, meant that arbitration between private parties in Saudi 
Arabia was infrequent.199 The Board of Grievances (Diwan) (chapter 5) was unwilling to 
enforce arbitration rules agreed by the parties and, therefore, there was much uncertainty 
about how awards were to be enforced, especially if they were rendered outside of Saudi 
Arabia.200 However, despite these obstacles, there was still great support for the concept of 
arbitration in the Saudi business community, with most companies voluntarily complying 
with any awards handed down against them in order to ensure that their international 
reputation was not damaged.201 Nonetheless, the uncertainty in the legal status under Saudi 
law led to much confusion and therefore many foreign companies preferred to rely on foreign 
arbitration rules when dealing with Saudi companies, a concept that was still viewed with 
distrust by the Saudi government.202 
The Arbitration Regulations of 1983 was the first measure taken by Saudi Arabia to 
implement comprehensive arbitration regulations and they governed the practice of 
commercial arbitration until the implementation of the New Arbitration Laws of 2012, as 
discussed in chapter 7.203 Based on the Hanbali school of thought, the 1983 Regulations 
constituted a set of rules that was accessible to foreign companies and ensured that there were 
provisions not only governing the arbitration procedure in general, but also the actual 
arbitration proceedings by requiring supervision by governmental agencies or courts.204 Most 
importantly, the Arbitration Act recognised the validity of an arbitration clause or 
agreement.205 The 1983 Act were later complemented by the Implementing Rules in 1985. 
However, the Arbitration Regulations also allowed the Saudi courts to intervene throughout 
the arbitration process, resulting in arbitration proceedings being obstructed on numerous 
occasions.206 The Arbitration Regulations also retained the restrictions on the use of 
arbitration by government entities without permission from the Council of Ministers.207 
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By the same token, foreign parties were concerned that Saudi Arabia arbitration law of 1983 
was simply the codification of the Hanbali fiqh.208 This had adverse implications on the 
attractiveness of the country as a place to do business and settle disputes. Some of the 
elements that motivated the fear by some foreign parties are outlined below. 
6.8.1 Arbitration Clauses and Formality Requirements 
Prior to adoption of the 1983 Arbitration law, competent authorities, in this case the Shari’ah 
courts, retained broad discretion to reject arbitration clauses on the grounds that these did not 
constitute valid contracts under Islamic law.209 Under previous judicial practice, and before 
the adoption of the arbitration laws of 1983, arbitration clauses were, deemed invalid ab intio. 
210Pursuant to Islamic rules governing the formal requirements of a valid contract, a binding 
covenant between two or more parties rests on some mutual undertaking between the parties. 
For example, the immediate transfer of possession of goods. Since an arbitration clause sets 
rules that apply to future, rather than actually-existing events, the consensus among scholars 
was that these clauses amount to a speculative condition and therefore violate the Shari’ah 
injunction on speculation and uncertainty.211  
A non-Muslim Western lawyer might, quite understandably, have regarded this feature of 
Saudi Arabian arbitration law as entirely anomalous with Western judicial practice. 212The 
widespread judicial rejection of arbitration clauses would strike a seemingly fatal blow to the 
autonomy and integrity of arbitration as an alternative to Shari’ah court-centered litigation.213 
Moreover, the silence of previous Saudi law on the form and degree of uncertainty 
disallowed in respect of a dispute under the Shari’ah had the effect of further emboldening 
the courts.214In the absence of an objective test, there was simply no way of determining 
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whether a particular clause violated Islamic Shari’ah’ related formality requirements or the 
injunction against contractual uncertainty and should be consequently rendered null and void 
before the relevant Saudi court.215 
This outcome would appear to be an affront to the spirit of the Shari’ah. The Qu’ran is 
explicit on the sacred nature of the covenant.216 All contractual undertakings entered into with 
good faith should be faithfully observed and enforced by the presiding judge, providing that 
elements of the contract do not contravene requirements of the Shari’ah. On the other hand, 
one could argue that judicial rejection of arbitration clauses is an entirely legitimate exercise 
of a court’s supervisory powers, since Saudi courts are constitutionally required to apply the 
Shari’ah as part of the mandatory law of its legal system, as discussed in chapter 5. 217 
On the question of contractual requirements, as discussed in chapter 3, the Hanbali school 
may, paradoxically, prove to be the flexible and most favourable to the parties involved, since 
it ‘has always considered arbitration clauses as possessing a valid contractual nature, insofar 
as they are not in conflict with the purpose of the contract and not prohibited under the 
Shari’a’.218 It follows that arbitration agreements should be treated as any contract would be 
under Islamic law, and its terms of reference applied in good faith. 219In this regard, it is 
arguable that Saudi Arabia’s competent authorities, in this case the general courts of 
jurisdiction or Shari’ah courts, fundamentally misunderstood the nature of an arbitration 
agreement as essentially contractual in nature. 220In other words, the previous practice of 
Saudi Shari’ah courts can be said to be based on custom, rather than a faithful application of 
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the Hanbali fiqh.221The result is a gap between religious text and judicial practice at the 
municipal level.  
6.8.2 Public Policy in Saudi Arabia  
In 1983 Saudi Arabia also signed the Riyadh Convention for Judicial Co-Operation, a 
Convention between Arab League states.222 The Riyadh Convention was enacted in an 
attempt to reconcile the differences between the New York Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Shari’ah law arbitration principles.223 It 
contained certain principles borrowed from the New York Convention, including a limitation 
on the power of the courts, when enforcing awards, to look beyond arbitration agreements to 
consider the merits of the dispute by preventing local courts from examining the substance of 
the dispute and by limiting the court’s role to either enforcing or rejecting the award’.224 The 
implementation of the Riyadh Convention in Saudi Arabia had the effect of extending the 
remit of the Board of Grievance (Diwan) to enforce both foreign and domestic arbitral 
awards.225 
However, despite the recognition of the Riyadh Convention, in 1994 Saudi Arabia eventually 
agreed to ratify the New York Convention. The New York Convention’s aim is ‘to provide 
common legislative standards for the recognition of arbitration agreements and court 
recognition and enforcement of foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards’.226 Although, the 
Convention came into place in 1958 and had been ratified by many Muslim nations since its 
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enactment, the inherent distrust that Saudi Arabia had towards international commercial 
arbitration resulted in the delay in ratification until 1994.227 
The New York Convention has provided some level of uniformity in the world of 
international commercial arbitration, although there remains a number of elements of it that 
conflict with Shari’ah law.228 The Convention provides for a number of means by which 
signatories may exempt themselves from its provisions, including for public policy 
reasons.229 However, the concept of ‘public policy’ is not defined in the Convention and 
therefore is subject to a wide range of interpretations.230 
All states exercise legitimate autonomy in this regard and national courts are entitled to 
uphold the sovereign laws of the state in the national and public interest. And yet, public 
policy is an exceedingly slippery term and one that eludes careful definition, not least in the 
case of the Saudi legal system where concepts such as public morals and customs are not 
clearly explicitly outlined or delineated. The Kingdom’s public policies takes on a 
heightened importance in arbitration, particularly in respect of the enforcement of an arbitral 
award, regardless of whether a domestic or a foreign award. Subject to Article V(2)(b) of the 
New York Convention’ safe harbor clause, an arbitral award is unenforceable if it violates 
the public policy of the country where enforcement is sought.231 Prior to the reform and 
restructuring of the judicial system, the Board of Grievance had final authority to review an 
award thereby ensuring it did not violate the Shari’ah or conflict with the public policies or 
municipal law of Saudi Arabia. 232 
                                                
227 Baamir (n 12) 147 
228 Khoukaz (n 15) 193. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Baamir (n 12) 183. 
231 New York Convention, art V(2)(b), (n 230). 
232 See decision 155/T/4 of 1415 H (1995), discussed infra note (n214). The Board reached its decision on public 
policy grounds. A similar decision was also reached in respect of case 143/T/4 of 1412 H (1992). The facts of 
this case concerned an arbitration clause which identified the ICC’s Rules of Procedure as the applicable curial 
law. The arbitration clause was deemed void on the basis that it constituted an attempt to ‘eliminate the 
jurisdiction of the Saudi judiciary over the dispute, which is against the public policy of Saudi Arabia’. (cited in 
Baamir and Bantekas (n209) 255-256). The main difficulty with the previous law has been the variable way in 
which public policy has been defined and applied as a ground for invalidating clauses or refusing recognition. 
For instance, the Board reached a different decision in 43/T/4 of 1416 H (1996). This case related to an 
arbitration agreement whose terms of reference allowed for the dispute to be referred to a US Court in Iowa. The 
Board recognised the jurisdiction of the US court and affirmed that foreign laws had applicability to the dispute, 
in addition to Saudi law and Shari’ah. The Board also held that the parties could also seek enforcement of 
remedies in their “chosen contractual forum,” (cited and discussed in Cited in cited in Baamir and Bantekas 
(n209) 255).  
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Thus, the public policy exemption has been frequently used by Saudi Arabia. According to 
Khoukaz, the lack of a definition of public policy in the Convention: 
…has resulted in a situation where Shari’ah-based countries were put at a 
disadvantage at the international stage. This disadvantage led to a widening gap 
between what will be called the ‘Shari’ah-based system’ and the ‘international 
system.233 
According to Mallet, this has resulted in a ‘duality between form and substance’ in terms of 
how Middle Eastern states apply the Convention.234 Mallet noted that since the ARAMCO 
decision, at least prior to the 2012 New Arbitration Law, the legislative position in Saudi 
Arabia: 
…tends to create all kinds of typically procedural problems to arbitration. This is 
done either for special contracts of some commercial significance, like those 
related to agency and distribution, or in a more general manner.235 
As a result, as noted by Ballantyne: 
…even where the Shari’ah is not applied in current practice, there could be a 
reversion to it in any particular case.236 
The reason for this is that the law was silent with regard to foreign arbitral awards, with 
Bakhashab noting that this silence indicated that ‘foreign arbitral awards or judgments are of 
no effect unless approved by the Diwan.237  
The state of the law in Saudi Arabia before the implementation of the New Arbitration Law 
in 2012 was summed up by Baamir as follows: 
…Saudi arbitration law does not seem to differ much from its western contemporaries. 
Why, then, is it deemed problematic? The primary reason is obvious; where a Saudi 
                                                
233 Khoukaz (n 15) 189. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Chibli Mallat , Introduction to Middle Eastern Law (Oxford Press, 2007) xcvii. See also Chibli Mallat, ‘A 
Comparative Critique of the Arbitration Process in the Arab World’ (1996) 1(3) Lebanese Review of Arab 
Arbitration 5, 5-7.  
236 M. Ballantyne, ‘Book Review of Commercial Arbitration in the Middle East: A Study in Shari’ah and Statute 
Law (1989) 4(3) Arbitration International 269, 269, cited in Al-Ramahi (n 7) 20-21.  
237 Omar Bakhashab, ‘The Concept of Extraterritoriality in the Saudi Arbitration Act’, (2000) 14(1) King Abdul-
Aziz University Journal 152, 152-164. 
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element is involved, the parties cannot escape being subjected to Saudi lex arbitri…As a 
result, arbitration remains a very speculative business since the parties and their lawyers 
navigate through legal uncertainty…the Hanbali corpus of law is in fact more flexible 
than Saudi law, particularly on the grounds of interpretative technique.238 
As such, local courts were provided with ample opportunity to refuse recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards on public policy grounds, and to do so under the 
pretext of religious duty. One could see how, for instance, a provision requiring interest on 
the principal amount of damages awarded would violate the Shari’ah and consequently 
breach acceptable public policy constraints. But what is the correct response to such a 
determination: should all portions of the award be treated as unenforceable? At the same 
time, the Shari’ah itself demands fairness in the resolution of disputes, as in the treatment of 
contracts. It may therefore incumbent on courts to apply the Islamic concept of istihsan 
which may is loosely described above as the process by which the judge selects the more 
normatively acceptable or desirable rule-interpretation in the wider public interest. In the 
context of enforcement proceedings, the ‘public interest’ may be broadly construed to include 
the interest of both parties, the stable functioning of dispute settlement mechanism or future 
social and economic development of the country. 
In chapter 7, an attempt is made to determine the extent to which the reforms implemented in 
the fourth phase (under the 2012 Arbitration Law) have resolved the above problems. It also 
determines whether they allow for greater reconciliation of the Shari’ah and modern 
international arbitral and judicial norms and practices, whilst also achieving greater certainty 
and transparency in respect of recognition and enforcement practices. These reforms are 
necessary if Saudi Arabia is to establish itself as desirable place to do business and settle 
disputes.  
6.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the history of arbitration in the Arabian Peninsula for over two 
millennia. It has illustrated that the practice of arbitration in this area existed long before the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and even before the advent of Islam. It has also shown that the 
concept of arbitration as set out under Shari’ah law was influenced by customs of the pre-
                                                
238 Baamir (n 12) 148. 
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Islamic era and that some of these customs such as the use of a Hakam have survived to this 
day.  
The Shari’ah allows for the evolution of law to deal with contemporary situations. It also 
allows for legal models to evolve and adapt to changing circumstances. In fact, one of the 
reasons that Muhammed resisted any attempts to codify the Shari’ah was as a result of a fear 
that it would prevent the system from evolving. Shari’ah law, and especially the Hanbali 
school practised in Saudi Arabia, provides for sufficient flexibility when it comes to applying 
dispute resolution mechanisms, including international commercial arbitration laws. Saudi 
Arabia has successfully incorporated the Hanbali exegesis of the Qur’an and the Sunnah into 
its domestic law, as well as elements of other legal systems, including the French civil law 
system. The civil law system has greatly influenced the modern law of Saudi Arabia, and 
such is the flexibility of the Shari’ah that the enactment such foreign-inspired regulations has 
not prevented from Saudi law complying with the Shari’ah. 
However, for most of its history, Saudi Arabia has failed to properly recognise and 
implement the principles of the Shari’ah that provide for arbitration. Much of this failure can 
be traced back to the founding of the Kingdom coinciding with international commercial 
arbitration models becoming more widespread, as globalisation continued its spread. The 
discovery of oil in the Kingdom was financially beneficial to the new Kingdom, but it also 
resulted in an increase in foreign investment which brought with it new legal practices. The 
lack of established principles for arbitration in the new Kingdom led to foreign companies 
attempting to use the arbitration laws of more ‘established’ states in order to enforce their 
laws, with such laws often being at odds with the purpose of conciliation which runs through 
the entirety of Islamic arbitration law. The ARAMCO case in particular led to mutual distrust 
between Saudi Arabia and foreign businesses: Saudi Arabia did not trust the foreign 
companies and lawyers to apply Shari’ah principles, while the foreign companies did not 
trust the Saudi Arabian courts to refrain from interfering with arbitration procedures and 
awards. 
As a result, something of an impasse arose between the parties, one which was not broken 
until the 1980s when attempts to diversify its economy began with Saudi Arabia taking steps 
to expand upon its arbitration laws. This has been a gradual process that is perhaps not yet 
finished, but it has resulted in the enactment of new arbitrations laws that align the Kingdom 
more closely with international arbitration practices. It is suggested that international 
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arbitration practices may also benefit in terms of legitimacy in different legal systems if they 
align with the flexibility provided by Shari’ah arbitration principles. Nonetheless, this 
chapter has demonstrated that the Shari’ah is sufficiently flexible to accommodate modern 
international arbitration practices. 
Furthermore, this chapter has shown that the Saudi Arabian model can be rendered into a 
more favourable model for the settlement of disputes by clarifying formality requirements, 
providing a concise definition to the public policy exemption, and clear guidelines on the 
standards for the recognition and enforcement of foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards. 
The New Arbitration Law of 2012 is an attempt by the Saudi government to further minimise 
legal uncertainty and adopt international standards in order to attract and protect foreign 
investors, amongst other goals239. Chapter 7 determines whether this objective has been 
achieved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
239 New legislation in Saudi Arabia to attract foreign investment (2019). Found at; 
https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/regulatory-updates-new-legislation-geared-towards-attracting-
foreign-investment-and-enhancing-job (Oxford Business Group) (accessed in; 31/07/2019) 
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CHAPTER 7: 
Analysis of the Arbitration Act 2012 & its Effects on International 
Arbitration in Saudi Arabia 
7.1 Introduction 
In a landmark piece of legislation, the government of Saudi Arabia introduced ground-
breaking reforms to the practice of international arbitration in Saudi Arabia. The Arbitration 
Law of 2012 (the ‘New Arbitration Law’ or ‘New Law’)1 replaced the Arbitration Regulation 
of 19832 and the parallel Rules for the Implementation of the Arbitration Regulation of 19853 
(together, the ‘Old Arbitration Law’ or ‘Old Law’). In addition to the New Arbitration Law, a 
supplementary law was also implemented in the form of the Enforcement Law 2012 (the 
‘Enforcement Law’).4 
The New Arbitration Law and the Enforcement Law together form one part of a larger reform 
of the Saudi judiciary that began in 2007 through a series of royal decrees issued to ensure 
that all decisions, judgment and arbitral awards rendered in Saudi Arabia are enforced in a 
timely and judicious fashion.5 The National Transformation Program (NTP) 2020 of the 
kingdom has provided a new impetus to judicial reform, with the initiatives of the Ministry of 
Justice envisioning key performance indicators such as reducing the average timeframe to 
conclude cases, increasing the percentage of concluded cases, increasing the percentage of 
those stakeholders in court cases who are satisfied with the process, reducing the average 
number of incoming cases per judge in the main courts; and improving Saudi Arabia's World 
Bank institution ranking.6 This is seen as important as making the kingdom more attractive to 
                                                
1 Saudi Arbitration Law (‘SAL 2012’) issued by Royal Decree No. (34/m) dated 24/05/1433 H. (corresponding 
to 16/04/2012), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers.  
2 Promulgated by Royal Decree No. (M/46) dated 12/7/1403H. 
3 Ministerial Resolution No. 7/2021/M. 
4 Issued through Royal Decree M/53/1433H corresponding to July 3, 2012. 
5 With King Abdullah’s issue of a number of royal decrees aimed at reorganizing the Saudi judicial system, the 
Law of the Judiciary issued by Royal Decree No. M/78 on 19 Ramadan 1428H (October 1st, 2007) established 
the Supreme Court as the highest judicial authority in the Kingdom. This law also established new Courts of 
Appeals in the Saudi Arabian provinces as well as courts of first instance for general, criminal, personal status 
(family), commercial and labour matters in each city. The Board of Grievances Law (also issued through Royal 
Decree No. M/78) established a Board of Grievances (BOG) to oversee the Administrative Court system. 
6 Rimi Bhati Assessment of the National transformation Program 2020 (London, 2016) chapter 1 < 
https://www.gib.com/sites/default/files/ntp_ebook_-_final_12_-_low-res_0_0_4.pdf>, accessed 14 May 2018. 
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investors through the development of a legal framework that supports business and 
entrepreneurship and reduces the country’s dependence on oil.7. 
As noted in chapter 6,8 the New Arbitration Law may be said to mark the beginning of the 
fourth phase of the Saudi regulatory attitude towards arbitration.9 The New Arbitration Law 
and the Enforcement Law are aimed at vastly improving the rights of the parties to 
international arbitration proceedings in respect of conduct of arbitral hearings (including 
before the commencement of and after the conclusion of the arbitration) and enforcement of 
arbitral awards in the Kingdom, providing evidence of the Kingdom’s broad, ongoing legal 
reform designed to improve the Saudi business environment.10  
This chapter expands upon the previous chapters to provide more context of how Saudi 
Arabia, a country founded in a region that was steeped in the history of international trade 
and practising a religion that expressly promoted the principles of arbitration, has since 
struggled to incorporate international arbitration standards into its domestic law.11 The 
chapter attempts to explain how the New Arbitration Law is a fundamental step on the road 
towards embracing international best practices and towards creating an arbitration-friendly 
culture within the Kingdom.  
This chapter then investigates a number of potential gaps that continue to persist between the 
New Arbitration Law and international arbitration standards despite the many positives of the 
New Law. Many of these gaps are demonstrative of a broader conflict between the 
traditionalists and the modernists within the Kingdom - where the traditionalist element of 
society preaches adherence to the pronouncements of the Hanbali school while the liberal or 
modern approach focuses on attracting investment to the Kingdom.12 However, this chapter 
broadly finds that the New Arbitration Law and the Enforcement Law have been relatively 
                                                
7 Ibid. See also section 6.1 of chapter 5.  
8 See concluding section, chapter 6 
9 See Abdulrahman Yahya Baamir, Saudi Law and Judicial Practice in Commercial and Banking Arbitration 
(Brunel University, 2008) 120. The author describes the first three phases as: (i) the Buraimi Oasis case in 1955, 
arguably the government’s one of the most formative attempts at arbitration, (ii) the ARAMCO award of 1958 
which caused the government to take a protectionist stance, seeing international arbitration as a threat to its 
national sovereignty, and (iii) triggered by the 1970 oil boom causing Saudi Arabia to relax its attitude towards 
international arbitration.  
10 Saud Al-Ammari and A Timothy Martin, ‘Arbitration in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ (2014) 30(2) The 
Journal of the London Court of International Arbitration 390, 390. 
11 For an overview of the history of Saudi Arbitration law chapter 4 and Abdulrahman Baamir and Ilias 
Bantekas, ‘Saudi Law as Lex Arbitri: Evaluation of Saudi Arbitration Law and Judicial Practice’ 20(2) 
Arbitration International (2009) 230, 251, 255. 
12 For an overview of these issues, see Yvonne Y Haddad and Barbara F Stowasser (eds), Islamic Law and the 
Challenges of Modernity (AltaMira Press 2004). 
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successful in closing the gap between Saudi arbitration law and international arbitration 
norms and provide a strong roadmap that can be used by the Saudi government to continue its 
drive to modernise domestic laws without having to derogate from the principles of Shari’ah. 
This chapter therefore addresses the research question of how arbitration in Saudi Arabia can 
be rendered into a more favourable model for the settlement of disputes involving foreign 
investors. Given that the New Law applies together with the principles of the Shari’ah, this 
chapter also addresses the research question of whether the Shari’ah is sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate modern international arbitration practices. 
7.2 Pre-Reform: The Perception of Arbitration In Saudi Arabia Before The New 
Arbitration Law 
As shown in chapter 2, since its foundation, Saudi Arabia has been precariously balanced 
between the traditional values and the modern, with conservative interpretations of Islamic 
law coming into conflict with the economic needs of a Kingdom. It became an important 
member of the global economy partly due to its natural resources. This required a change in 
both laws and well as the attitude of all stakeholders in order to modernise and diversify its 
economy and attract more foreign investors.13 The Government’s oscillating approach to 
modernity points towards an internal struggle at the administrative level. It has to embrace 
international standards of commercial law needed to compete in the global marketplace 
whilst maintaining a strict adherence to the Hanbali interpretation of Shari’ah.14 Tension also 
exists between legislative and the judicial approaches. On the one hand, the government has 
acceded to various international treaties, while on the other hand, an interventionist (rather 
than supportive) judiciary has limited the principles enshrined the country’s municipal 
arbitration laws by adopting an ambiguous stance on public policy.15  
However, it is shown in chapters 2 and 3 that the application of a flexible and pragmatic form 
of Shari’ah has existed since the earliest Islamic jurisprudence,16 where the eschatological 
                                                
13 See also, Killian Clarke, ‘A Modernization Paradox’ (Harvard International Review 2007) 
<http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=1676>, accessed 14 May 2018.  
14 See Felicitis Opwis, ‘Islamic Law and Legal Change: The Concept of Maslaha in Classical and Contemporary 
Islamic Legal Theory’, in Abbas Amanat and Frank Griffel (eds), Shari’a Islamic Law in the Contemporary 
Context(Stanford University Press, 2007) 62-82. 
15 Dina Elshufara, ‘The 2012 Saudi Arbitration Law and the Shar’ia Factor: A Friend or Foe in Construction’ 
(2012) 15 International Arbitration Law Review 138, 138-140. 
16 See chapter 2 and 3 but for an overview of the early history see Banaj Islam, The Mediterranean and the Rise 
of Capitalism, (2007) 15 Historical Materialism, 47–74 
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debate was not confined to the four recognised schools of jurisprudence.17 Outside the 
Muslim world, Islamic scholars influenced, and were influenced, by the theological, 
philosophical and economic insights of earlier or contemporaneous civilisations.18 These 
interactions provided fertile grounds for the development of trade relations between Muslim 
and non-Muslim merchants. As outlined in chapter 2, these relations were formalised through 
trade treaties, further strengthening the foundations of mercantile law in the region.19 Trust 
between trading partners was furnished through the customary law principles of reciprocity, 
freedom of contract and good faith.20  
Despite a history of embracing foreign legal and commercial concepts, it was not until 1983, 
and then 2012 that the Saudi government implemented a set of comprehensive rules to govern 
arbitration.21 After many years in the ‘wilderness’ of international arbitration, the New 
Arbitration Laws were drafted with the intention of providing a level of comfort to 
international companies from outside the Kingdom who were trading with or looking to trade 
with Saudi counterparts, and to ensure that there were provisions governing both the 
arbitration procedure and the actual proceedings themselves.22 However, the Old Arbitration 
Law was also based on Hanbali, thereby ensuring that international arbitration standards as 
perceived in Saudi Arabia would not inherently contradict the Shari’ah.23 However, 
incongruences between the Shari’ah and international law are not insurmountable obstacles, 
though there remain issues around public policy. By identifying common areas, it is possible 
to align Saudi courts with international norms. This has at least been partially successful 
when it comes to western construction companies seeking arbitration in Saudi courts.24  
                                                
17 Abdul Ghafoor Abdul Raheem, Text and the Immutability of Islamic Law: A Study of the Flexibility Evident 
in Dealing with Texts in Early Islam (University of Melbourne 2000) 7. 
18 Robert Haug and Michael Bonner, ‘The Local and Global Commerce of Arabia before Islam’ (2002) Pacific 
Neighborhood Consortium < http://pnclink.org/annual/annual2002/pdf/0922/11/s221102.pdf>, accessed 02 
September 2018. 
19 See chapter 2, sections 2 and 3. See generally Salamah Salih Sulayman Aladieh, Mecca Trade Prior to the 
Rise of Islam (University of Durham 1991). 
20 Hideyuki Shimizu, ‘Philosophy of the Islamic Law of Contract: A Comparative Study of Contractual Justice’ 
(1989) 15 IMES Working Paper Series 112, 112. 
21 Arbitration Law (issued by Royal Decree No. M/46 of 12/07/1403H (April 24, 1983). 
22 See Royal Decree No. M/46 on April 25, 1983. 
23 Faris Nesheiwat and Ali Al-Khasawneh, ‘The 2012 Saudi Arbitration Law: A Comparative Examination of 
the Law and Its Effect on Arbitration in Saudi Arabia’ (2015) 13(2) Santa Clara Journal of International Law 
443 ,445. 
24 See Tim Taylor ‘The Confluence of Civil and Common Law and the Influence of Shariah Law on Middle 
East Construction’ (2017) 1 BCDR International Arbitration Review 217, 217-244.  
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7.3 The ARAMCO Decision 
The reluctance to embrace international arbitration standards was not exclusive to Saudi 
Arabia, but was a trend that prevailed throughout the Middle East in the 1950s and 1960s.25 
Western European and US companies had begun to expand into the growing Saudi oil 
industry at the time as a global hegemony of capitalist trade regimes and international 
standards became increasingly common.26 Unlike other Middle Eastern countries,27 the 
concept of international law was seen by influential Saudi scholars as a threat to the 
foundational principles of the Kingdom (and by extension, the sovereignty of the King)28 and, 
as a result, a literal and rigid juristic interpretation of Hanbali jurisprudence was promoted in 
an attempt to ensure that the Kingdom’s sovereignty was maintained.29  
This approach resulted in an increasingly insular and archaic stance, with Hanbali principles 
being applied by the Saudi judiciary to the exclusion of not just international law, but also the 
other Shari’ah schools of interpretation.30 According Vogel, this meant that the courts failed 
to address new developments in international law ‘because of the notion of the law subsisting 
in scholarly opinions’.31 They were therefore incapable of providing judgments that are 
flexible and suited to modern conditions. This conflict between Shari’ah and international 
law came to a head in the context of ARAMCO arbitration. 
The ARAMCO arbitration of State of Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co concerned a 
dispute between Onassis, a Greek transport company and Saudi Arabia.32 Onassis claimed 
exclusive rights to transport oil from the country. Saudi Arabia counterclaimed, arguing that 
it exercised the final right to choose the applicable method of transportation. Subsequently, 
the dispute went to arbitration in Geneva, where the tribunal decided in favour of the foreign 
company, on the basis that contract was not a public concession.33 The tribunal arrived at its 
                                                
25 Arthur J Gemmell, ‘Commercial Arbitration in the Islamic Middle East’ (2006) 5(1) Santa Clara Journal of 
International Law 169, 179. 
26 Ibid. 
27 See Francis A Boyle, ‘Upholding International Law in the Middle East’ (1982) 4(4) Arab Studies Quarterly 
336, 336-349. 
28 Nesheiwat and Al-Khasawneh (n 23) 445. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Gemmell (n 25) 179. 
31 Frank E. Vogel and Samuel L. Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance, Religion, Risk, and Return. (Kluwer law 
International, 1983).14. 
32 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), reprinted in 27 I.L.R. 117, 169 (1958). 
33 Julio Colon, ‘Choice of Law and Islamic Finance’, (2011) 46 Texas International Law Journal 411, 423. 
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decision by subjecting ‘the law of Saudi Arabia to the general principles of jurisprudence as it 
knew them’.34 
In many respects, the dispute raised important questions around the exclusivity of the legal 
system to apply its own laws to a contract, with Schwebel noting that the ARAMCO tribunal 
rejected the Kingdom’s contention that its own laws applied to contracts over which it 
exercised full control and sovereignty.35 By doing so, the Tribunal disregarded the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. The doctrine of exterritorialy precludes the 
extraterritorial application of local laws to disputes involving foreign jurisdictions, 
particularly when the subject matter of the case falls within the ambit of a State’s public 
policy or other regulatory purposes, unless the legislature’s contrary intent can be inferred.36 
In respect of the ARAMCO arbitration, the Kingdom clearly expressed its intent in a 
ministerial resolution that stipulated that all contractual matters relating to natural resources 
were to be governed by Saudi law.37 Colon notes that the Tribunal effectively refused to 
apply Saudi law to the contract in dispute, despite the clear mandate, on the basis that 
ARAMCO’s rights could not be ‘secured in an unquestionable manner by the law in force in 
Saudi Arabia . . . [and that Saudi laws] must be interpreted or supplemented by the general 
principles of law, by the custom and practice in the oil business and by notions of pure 
jurisprudence’.38 In effect, the Tribunal found that state sovereignty over the subject matter of 
a contract did not preclude, ab initio, it from arbitration. After determining that Shari’ah 
lacked sufficient provisions or settled standards to be effective in governing complex 
commercial instruments,39 the ARAMCO panel went on to apply general principles of lex 
                                                
34 Ibid. 
35 Stephen M Schwebel, ‘The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Aramco Arbitrate the Onassis Agreement’ (2010) 
3(3) Journal of World Energy Law and Business 245, 251. 
36 See Erez Reuveni, ‘Extraterritoriality as Standing: A Standing Theory of the Extraterritorial Application of 
the Securities Laws’ (2010) 43 University of California Davis Law Review 1071, 1071-1072. See also, SD 
Sharma, ‘Applicability of the Doctrine of Extra-Territoriality to Legislation by the Indian Legislature’ (1946) 
28(3/4) Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 91, 91-92; Susan Lorde Martin, ‘The 
Extraterritoriality Doctrine of the Dormant Commerce Clause is Not Dead’ (2016) 100(2) Marquette Law 
Review 497, 502-505. 
37 Council of Ministers Resolution No. 58 dated 17/1/1383H (25 June 1963). The choice of law governing any 
dispute to which a government authority is party is to be determined ‘in accordance with the established general 
principles of private international law’, the most important of which … is the principle of the application of the 
law pertaining to the place of execution [execution meaning place of performance]…Government authorities are 
not permitted to choose a foreign law to govern their relationship with individuals, companies or private 
organisations… No government authority is permitted to conclude a contract that contains any clause subjecting 
such authority to the jurisdiction of any foreign court or other adjudicatory body…” 
38 Julio Colon (n 33) 423. 
39 Baamir (n 9) 130. 
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mercatoria (e.g. pacta sunt servanda) applied to international oil and petroleum contracts.40 It 
is should be stressed, however, that the Tribunal considered the pronouncements of the 
Hanbali school of Islamic law as the governing law of the arbitration/the Concession 
Agreement, but simply disqualified its applicability in favour of ‘general principles of law’.41 
With regard to the concession’s compatibility with Islamic law, the Tribunal ruled as follows: 
The concession is compatible with two fundamental principles of Islamic law: 
The principle of liberty to contract and the principle of respect for contracts. But 
it was not a public service concession, because there were no users42.  
The approach adopted by the Tribunal in ARAMCO may be described as ‘shopping’ between 
laws otherwise expressly held to be inapplicable, in order to nit-pick and choose an otherwise 
inapplicable law on the basis of what appears to that tribunal to satisfy its own standard of 
‘reasonableness’ or sensibilities. This neither appears to be technically sound in law nor was 
it heard of in practice.43 It is doubtful that it was ever intended that the arbitrators should, in 
the first place, have the power to assume discretion to render an applicable law inapplicable, 
or an inapplicable law applicable, based on an improvised test of common sense, against all 
practice and norms and stipulations of the parties. However, Saudi Arabia complied with the 
award and honoured its Agreement with ARAMCO.44  
It is perhaps unsurprising that the Saudi Arabian authorities reacted negatively to the decision 
of the tribunal in ARAMCO. If the old imperialism was forged through territorial control and 
annexation, there was now a justifiable concern in Saudi Arabia that economic control would 
instead be enforced through international law.45 From a Middle Eastern perspective, 
international trade and investment agreements appeared to protect the rights of foreign 
investors and corporations, enabling them to exploit the natural resources of sovereign states, 
with the international tribunals consistently disqualifying applicability national laws such as 
                                                
40 Mert Elcin, Lex Mercatoria in International Arbitration Theory and Practice (European University Institute 
2012) 343 
41 Maxi Scherer, International Arbitration in the Energy Sector (Oxford University Press 2018) para 14.17. 
42 Schwebel (n 35) 251. The Tribunal seemed to argue that the Saudis were interpreting Islamic law in a manner 
that suited their national interests only. 
43 It must however be noted that the award was of declaratory effect only. Neither party wanted to jeopardise 
their continuous trading relationship, so they agreed to limit the scope of the arbitration to the question of what 
their legal position was. See Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration (4th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2004) 361. It is uncertain whether the Tribunal would have been as 
dismissive of the Shari’ah if it was called upon to impose the execution of obligations.  
44 Maxi Scherer (n 41) para 14.18. 
45 Michael E Dickstein, ‘Revitalizing the International Law Governing Concession Agreements’ (1988) 6(1) 
Berkeley Journal of International Law  54, 54. 
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those of Qatar, Libya and Kuwait, for lacking ‘notions of pure jurisprudence’ or simply, for 
being ‘primitive’.46 The customs and laws of Arab society, and the sovereign powers of its 
rulers, were dismissed in favour of Western legal doctrine, often with no equivalent in 
Islamic law.47 Thus, the autonomy of Middle Eastern States, and the exclusivity of their own 
national laws, was at risk of being cast aside.48 
The importance of the ARAMCO case in the history of arbitration is not solely due to the 
approach taken by the Tribunal but stems equally from the reaction of the Kingdom to the 
decision.49 The ruling was used by the traditionalist members of the Saudi government as an 
example of the negative effects of embracing international law. This conservative approach 
resulted in Resolution No. 58 in 1963 that effectively restricted all arbitration clauses and 
agreements in contracts entered into by the Saudi government by subjecting any such clauses 
to public policy reviews.50 The power to enact public policy measures or issue ad hoc 
decisions in the public interest was construed broadly by Saudi officials to cover an ever-
expanding category of ‘state contracts’ and often, seemingly, without a proportionate legal 
justification or published reasons.51  
Although the restrictions on arbitration set down by the Saudi government in the aftermath of 
ARAMCO were applicable only to the government or its instrumentalities, there were 
generally very few arbitration proceedings in Saudi Arabia.52 The lack of clear procedures 
and judicial support meant that arbitration proceedings between international and domestic 
companies operating in Saudi Arabia were infrequent while there were several attempts by 
local courts to declare null and void arbitration agreements or clauses between international 
                                                
46 See Sanghi Polyesters Ltd. (India) v. The International Investor KCFC (Kuwait) and Texas Overseas 
Petroleum Co. v The Gov’t of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 ILR 389. The case is analysed in Gemmel (n 25) 
177. 
47 Steven P Ladas, Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights: National and International Protection (Harvard 
University Press 1975) 14. See also, Katherine L Lynch, The Forces of Economic Globalization: Challenges to 
the Regime of International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2003) 265. 
48 See Petroleum Development Ltd v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1951) 18 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 247. In this dispute, the arbitrator, Lord Asquith, was highly critical of Dubai’s legal system which he 
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51 Baamir (n 9) 183; and Schwebel (n 35) 251. 
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companies.53 The Board of Grievances, which was given increased responsibility to oversee 
international arbitration disputes in the aftermath of ARAMCO,54 was unwilling to enforce 
the internal procedural rules agreed by parties to govern the day-to-day workings of the 
arbitration. Hence, there was much uncertainty about how arbitral awards were to be 
enforced, and whether they were granted inside Saudi Arabia (being the seat of arbitration) or 
in a foreign jurisdiction.55 
The uncertainty of the rules governing the enforcement of all arbitral awards inside the 
Kingdom was aggravated by the operation of more than one system of law (Shari’ah and 
civil law systems) and multiple reviews by local Shari’ah courts and administrative bodies 
such as the Board of Grievances that dealt with complaints against the government. Courts 
generally adopted a cautionary approach to ensure that ‘foreign elements’ do not abrogate 
from Islamic principles.56 Hence, awards with a Saudi element were potentially subject to de 
novo review by the courts applying Saudi law to the substance of the dispute.57 However, 
despite these obstacles, there was still considerable support for the concept of international 
arbitration in the Saudi business community, with most domestic companies voluntarily 
complying with any awards rendered against them in order to ensure that their international 
reputation was not damaged.58 Foreign companies also tended to comply, because they feared 
the repercussions for their business, although they had concerns about the partiality of the 
Saudi system.59  
7.4 The Old Arbitration Law & The New York Convention 
Against this backdrop, the Old Arbitration Law was therefore intended to improve 
commercial relations between foreign and domestic companies and ensure that there were 
legislative provisions that covered procedural, curial and enforcement issues.60 For the first 
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54 See section 4.8, Chapter 4. 
55 Al-Ammari (n 49) 259. 
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57 Ibid. 
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time in the Kingdom’s history, the Old Arbitration Law expressly recognised the validity of 
arbitration clauses or agreements.61  
However, the effect of the Old Arbitration Law was restricted by a number of limitations that 
allowed the Saudi courts to continue to intervene throughout the arbitration process, resulting 
in arbitration proceedings being obstructed on numerous occasions.62 The very limited 
number of cases in which Saudi public entities were involved in disputes with foreign 
investors did not usually reach the stage of arbitration.63 The Old Arbitration Law retained 
the restrictions on the use of arbitration by government entities without permission from the 
Council of Ministers.64 These restrictions were such that, in practice, Saudi public entities 
could not enter into arbitration agreements, thereby limiting the Old Arbitration Law’s 
effectiveness in a country where much commerce is carried out through public entities.65 
Under the Old Arbitration Law, the Board of Grievances was entitled to exercise exclusive 
jurisdiction over matters relating to the enforcement of international arbitral awards rendered 
in foreign jurisdictions.66 Furthermore, as a result of the requirement that the arbitral awards 
had to satisfy the Shari’ah and other public policy considerations peculiar to the Saudi legal 
system, there was little comfort or assurance available to international companies that any 
arbitration agreements or clauses entered into with Saudi companies would even be validated 
by the Board of Grievances, let alone that arbitral awards rendered outside Saudi Arabia 
would be recognized and enforced.67 
Furthermore, even if a party were successful in submitting a complaint to a non-Saudi 
arbitrator or tribunal, the enforcement of such the tribunal’s award remained within the remit 
of the Board of Grievances, and there was a very real possibility that an award rendered by an 
international tribunal would be declared unenforceable by the Board on the basis that the 
parties had attempted to avoid the jurisdiction of the Saudi courts.68 Confronted with this 
reality, international companies had strong reasons to bypass the Saudi legal system, for 
instance through the incorporation of ‘stabilisation’ clauses in investment arbitration 
                                                
61 Royal Decree No. M/46, Article 1. 
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agreements.69 The purpose of such clauses was to ensure that any future dispute be resolved 
in accordance with a non-Saudi choice of law.70 While this did not resolve the problem of a 
foreign award being denied enforcement by the Board of Grievances, it certainly reduced 
Saudi court intervention from two counts to one. This problem could be resolved by foreign 
parties choosing not to enforce awards in Saudi Arabia (such as when only part of the assets 
to be recovered was located in Saudi). 71 
Among the most glaring deficiencies of the Old Arbitration Law was the uncertainty that 
surrounded the matter of which courts had competence to hear arbitral award challenges or 
indeed the grounds on which challenges to the validity of an award, or the contract 
underlying it, could be initiated. The assumption was that national law and public policy 
prevailed over treaty obligation, including the Saudi government’s ratification of the New 
York Convention.72 According to Roy, the Saudi government used national security as an 
excuse ‘to refuse enforcement of non-domestic arbitral awards’73.  
The Old Arbitration Law was also silent on the question of refusal of enforcement, and failed 
to enumerate exhaustive grounds on which a competent court was required to refuse the 
enforcement of an award.74 There was little certainty over whether a court had competence to 
hear enforcement petitions in the first place. Moreover, Saudi courts exercised a wide margin 
of discretion to strike down awards (granted in Saudi Arabia) or refused recognition or 
enforcement of foreign awards.75  
An example of this discretion is evidenced by the Saudi courts interpretation of the New 
York Convention after the Kingdom acceded to the Convention in 2007. The New York 
Convention allows for Contracting States to make reservations to the effect that: 
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71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid, 217. 
73 Kristen Roy, The New York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Country Use Public Defence Policy to 
Refuse Enforcement of Non-domestic Arbitral Awards’ (1994) 19 The Fordham International Journal 920, 920. 
74 Farhangpur (n 70) 219. 
75 Frank E Vogel, ‘Saudi Arabia Decision No. 822 on Banking Deposits: An Analysis’ (1986) Middle East 
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Any State may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will apply the 
Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the 
territory of another Contracting State.76 
Upon becoming a signatory of the New York Convention, Saudi Arabia made such a 
reservation. As a combined result of this reservation as well as a failure to publish decisions, 
it was unclear under the Old Arbitration Law whether the Board of Grievances even accepted 
whether accession to the New York Convention by other signatories was sufficient evidence 
of reciprocity between the member states, or whether the Board of Grievances required 
factual evidence of Saudi Arabian awards being enforced in the relevant jurisdiction.77  
Examples of the Saudi courts considering reciprocity can be seen in a number of cases that 
occurred subsequently to Saudi Arabia acceding to the New York Convention in 1994. The 
Board of Grievances recognised a judgement of the US District Court for the District of 
Columbia78 where it held that, as the US District Court judge had a sworn statement 
providing that Saudi judgments would be enforced in the District of Columbia; reciprocity 
had been established.79 However, a separate ruling from 2004 involved the Board of 
Grievances demanding a specific example of an enforcement of a Saudi judgment in a US 
court, and refusing a legal opinion from the US State Department that the US Courts would 
recognise and enforce Saudi judgments.80 These two rulings both suggest that the Board of 
Grievances would look at the individual country in each case as opposed to relying on 
reciprocity under a treaty such as the New York Convention.  
However, perhaps even more importantly, the rulings in these two cases illustrate the lack of 
clarity available to parties seeking enforcement in Saudi Arabia. Despite having ostensibly 
similar facts, the Board of Grievances took two different approaches to considering 
reciprocity, thereby highlighting the uncertainty of the Saudi position. The Board of 
Grievances’ approach of taking each application for enforcement on a case-by-case basis and 
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considering it on a de novo basis, may be said to have further muddied the waters for parties 
on what precedent was applicable when considering reciprocity. 
As a consequence of these issues, the practical result of the Old Arbitration Law was that it 
was no more advantageous to enter into international arbitration proceedings than it was prior 
to the implementation of that new legislation. Although the Old Arbitration Law supported 
the concept of international arbitration on its surface, by establishing (and failing to 
discourage) the power of the judiciary to intervene in an arbitration, the legislation was 
ineffective in persuading international companies that the legislative support for international 
arbitration in Saudi Arabia was anything more than superficial.81 Doubts as to the 
effectiveness of the Old Arbitration Law were such that legal practitioners often 
recommended to their clients not to pursue arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism 
when entering into agreements with Saudi companies, since the dispute would likely end up 
in the Saudi court system with a full re-trial ordered by the Board of Grievances, thus making 
the arbitration procedure an expensive waste of time and money.82  
The crucial point being argued by this researcher is that there was no effective mechanism 
available under the Old Law for a foreign party seeking to enforce an award against a Saudi 
party, apart from (1) arbitrating, which under the Old Law was toothless and resulted in 
effectively being prolonged in an over-burdened court system, and (2) the Saudi courts 
themselves. This called for an alternative which would, at the very least, ensure that the 
arbitration process itself was followed with respect towards party autonomy and in a time-
bound and predictable manner, which would minimise (if not eliminate) the frustrations of a 
foreign investor in dealing with the Saudi courts. In the face of the uncertainties and 
inefficiencies of the old arbitral framework, the Saudi Arbitration Law enacted in 2012 
promised an expeditious arbitral process. The next section determines whether this goal has 
been achieved. 
7.5 The Arbitration Act 2012 
As set out above, the lack of effectiveness of the Old Arbitration Law eventually resulted in 
the introduction of the New Arbitration Law in 2012,83 with the intention of reducing much 
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of the unpredictability involved in arbitration and the enforcement of arbitral awards in Saudi 
Arabia.84 The New Arbitration Law would appear to be part of wider reforms being 
introduced with a view to modernising the laws of the Kingdom, beginning with judicial 
reforms in 2007 (which resulted in a reorganisation of the hierarchy of the Saudi court system 
and the establishment of a Supreme Court and regional appellate courts) and including 
amendments to foreign investment law and company law.85 
The New Arbitration Law distinguishes between international and domestic arbitration under 
Saudi law for the first time, as well as arbitration proceedings that take place in Saudi Arabia 
and proceedings held elsewhere.86 The legislation sets forth a comprehensive set of 
provisions that is intended to encourage parties to embrace arbitration in Saudi Arabia and 
ensure that Saudi Arabian arbitration law is more in line with international standards. This 
section will consider some of these provisions in greater detail in order to highlight how the 
drafters have attempted to reconcile Hanbali principles with international arbitration 
standards. 
The New Arbitration Law is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration (the Model Law), 2006.87 The Model Law is the basis for arbitration 
law in 94 countries,88 with many countries incorporating the Model Law into their legal 
systems verbatim.89 It should be noted that although practices of arbitrators have not been 
harmonised, the widespread adoption of the Model Law has brought about a certain level of 
international consensus around procedures and primary rules governing arbitration 
proceedings. This has significantly impacted court practice and reduced variance between 
domestic laws.90  
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However, as a result of Saudi Basic Law requiring that all its laws must comply with the 
Shari’ah, the New Arbitration Law does include some modifications to the Model Law.91 As 
a result of these modifications, the New Arbitration Law may be considered to be somewhat 
of a hybrid between the international standards set out in the Model Law and Shari’ah 
principles that are based on the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence. It is worth noting 
that despite the wide recognition and acceptance that the Model Law has come to receive, it 
remains ultimately a standard or model, a guiding document which states can use as 
reference, making it ultimately the state’s decision to carve out its own arbitration policy and 
legislation. Thus, the Saudi government has with the 2012 law, integrated parts of the Model 
Law into local law as long as ‘it does not violate public policy or Shari’ahh’.92 
The New Arbitration Law broadly consists of eight chapters and has 58 articles. The 
Implementing Rules to the Law, issued in May 2017, provide a number of clarifications.93 
Some of the clarifications include the statement that the Court of Appeal is the competent 
court as regards the supervision of Saudi-seated arbitration.94 If the Court of Appeal 
recognises an award it will order its enforcement and its decision will be final and non-
appealable. Furthermore, the Implementing Rules provide that if the Court of Appeal decides 
to set aside an award, its decision can be appealed within 30 days following the date of 
notification of the decision.95  
This section will consider the key issues arising as a result of the implementation of the New 
Arbitration Law, with particular focus on the substantive scope of the legislation, the 
procedural rules contained in it and, in conjunction with the Enforcement Law of 2012, the 
provisions relating to the finality and enforcement of international arbitral awards. 
7.5.1  Scope of the New Arbitration Law  
The first point worth noting is that Article 2 of the New Arbitration Law provides that the 
legislation is subject to ‘…international conventions to which the Kingdom is a party’, 
thereby establishing, for example, the New York and Riyadh Conventions as overarching 
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international regimes that Saudi Arabia is subject to.96 Where parties have not expressly 
provided for the preferred choice of lex arbitri, the New Law will apply as a default to any 
Saudi-seated arbitration, in other words to any arbitration proceedings commenced in the 
Kingdom’s territories or otherwise commenced outside the Kingdom but where the parties 
have specifically agreed to apply the New Arbitration Law.97 As Harb and Leventhal note, 
the New Law provides for a definition of international arbitration which is broadly equivalent 
to similar provisions in the 2006 UNICTRAL Model Law.98  
In effect, this suggests that the New Law has coverage over disputes of an international 
commercial nature seated in Saudi Arabia; disputes involving international parties; and 
disputes in which parties, have designated the rules of non-Saudi international arbitration 
regimes such as ICC and LCIA as internal rules of procedure, but are nonetheless subject the 
arbitration to a Saudi seat / arbitration law / lex arbitri.99 As Harb and Leventhal note, this 
provision has far reaching implications, since the use of these rules will automatically 
exclude application of the non-mandatory procedural rules provided for under the 2012 New 
Law, to the extent that these are in conflict with the rules of any international arbitration 
institution that the parties may choose to apply.100 Moreover, parties to an international 
dispute involving Saudi Arabia may, in theory at least, agree to apply the New Law to arbitral 
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proceedings, thereby significantly improving their chances for successful enforcement of an 
arbitral award in Saudi Arabia.  
It is worth noting, however, that Article 2 of the New Law states that the provisions of the 
New Arbitration Law apply ‘without prejudice to provisions of Islamic Shari’ah’, thereby 
reinstating Shari’ah as the highest law of the Kingdom. In other words, mandatory principles 
of Shari’ah, as distinct from fiqh (which relates to juristic interpretation of Islamic legal 
sources), must be taken into consideration when applying the legislation and ensuring the 
following hierarchy of applicable laws: (i) Shari’ah law; (ii) international conventions; and 
(iii) domestic law.101 The relationship between domestic law, international law and the role of 
the fiqh in the implementation of the New law has not yet been fully worked out according to 
Chedrawe and Tannous.102 However, the hierarchy of laws has a profound effect on the 
fundamental principles and interpretation of the legislation, as one must consider Shari’ah 
principles when interpreting every provision of the legislation, much like the position under 
the Old Arbitration Law.103 
In the Saudi context, it is incumbent upon parties, particularly private parties to an arbitration 
agreement, to ensure that an arbitration clause satisfies the formality requirements, as 
specified under Saudi regulations and the Shari’ah.104 While the New Law affirms the right 
of parties to arbitrate future disputes and to have the award enforced on its conclusion, any 
‘arbitral award supporting an aleatory contract or aleatory clauses,105 other than the 
arbitration clause itself considered contrary to public policy’ may be subject to enforcement 
challenges.106 In the above regard, Article 49 of the New Arbitration Law provides that  
Arbitration awards rendered in accordance with the provisions of this Law are not 
subject to appeal, except for an action to nullify an arbitration award filed in 
accordance with the provisions of this Law.107  
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Article 50(2) specifies that the competent court must, on its on motion, nullify an arbitral 
award which is not compliant with the Shari’ah or public policy.108 This general ground for 
setting aside the arbitral award is in furtherance of the grounds stated in Article 50(1). 
Another example can be found in Article 8, which allows for arbitral awards to be reviewed 
by the Court of Appeal.109 However, unlike the Old Arbitration Law, under which the Board 
of Grievances frequently heard appeals of arbitral awards, Article 8(2) provides that, in 
international arbitration proceedings, 
…within the Kingdom or abroad, the court of appeal originally deciding the 
dispute in the city of Riyadh shall have jurisdiction, unless the two parties to 
arbitration agree on another court of appeal within the Kingdom. 
This is designed to introduce a degree of flexibility into the arrangement for arbitrating a 
dispute.  
7.5.2 Reforms Introduced By the New Arbitration Law 
7.5.2.1 Arbitrability of disputes not yet arisen 
Article 9 of the New Arbitration Law provides that parties may agree to arbitration either 
prior to the occurrence of a dispute or after.110 This is a helpful clarification as one of the 
perceived issues concerning arbitration under the Old Law was that in order for an arbitration 
clause or agreement to be valid, the dispute must already have arisen.111 The arbitration 
agreement must be submitted for approval to the competent authority responsible for the 
subject matter of the dispute.112 According to Baamir, this apparent conflict is solved by the 
fact that:  
…arbitration clauses are recognised as valid…as long as they are not contrary to 
public order and do not permit a prohibited action under Shari’ah. Risk and 
uncertainty make a transaction void and it is obvious that an arbitration clause 
does not involve any risk.113 
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7.5.2.2 Appointment of Arbitrators 
Under the Old Law, refusal to arbitrate by a party after concluding a binding and approved 
arbitration clause allowed the other party to compose the compromise unilaterally, under the 
supervision of the competent authority.114 Article 13 of the New Arbitration Law provides 
that the parties are also free to agree to the arbitrators of their choice, although there must be 
an uneven number of arbitrators; for the failure to have an odd number of arbitrators will 
result in the arbitration being void. 115 The rule is based on plain logic, and is widespread 
across many jurisdictions, to avoid deadlocks in adjudication, due to conflicting decisions of 
an even number of arbitrations and to ensure that an award can still be made based on the 
decision of the majority.116  
The New Arbitration Law requires that at least one arbitrator (or the chair of a multi-
arbitrator tribunal) must hold a degree in either Shari’ah or Islamic law (fiqh).117 Under the 
Old Law, all arbitrators had to be Muslims 118 However, this was not seen as discriminatory, 
indicating that it was not completely at variance with international standards.119  
The importance of the adjudicator’s qualifications in Shari’ah has always been present in the 
Saudi legal system. Even prior to this being legislated for, commentators have recommended 
that tribunals include members qualified in Shari’ah or fiqh, based on the fact that by failing 
to do so, it is more likely that an award may be rendered that is not compliant with Islamic 
law, and therefore awards rendered by non-Muslim arbitrators might draw a larger number of 
Shari’ah or Court of Appeal interventions.120 Whilst arbitrators must be qualified in Shari’ah 
law, real life considerations may motivate the parties to an international arbitration 
proceeding to select arbitrators that are moderate in their application of Shari’ah. Thus, 
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although a requirement to ensure an arbitrator is proficient in Shari’ah may appear at first 
glance to be more restrictive than the previous legislation, in practice it is suggested that by 
ensuring that an arbitrator is qualified in Shari’ah, there would be a lesser need for the Saudi 
courts to ensure that arbitral awards are in compliance with the Shari’ah.121 
7.5.2.3 Choice of governing law  
Arbitrations, by their nature, require application of a set of multiple laws governing the 
conduct of arbitration. While the substantive law relates to the law applicable to the 
underlying contract, the procedural rules applicable in an arbitration are further divided into 
two kinds: the law governing the procedure of the arbitration (including procedural public 
policy such as due process or substantive public policy such as public morality), and the law 
governing the procedure in the arbitration. The latter are rules that are subject to party 
autonomy and tribunal’s decision,122 while the former are not.  
The main contract may be subject to the application of mandatory aspects of the Shari’ah, 
mostly notable the injunction on interest related clauses. Mayer defines mandatory law as 
follows: 
[a]n imperative provision of law which must be applied to an international 
relationship irrespective of the law that governs that relationship. To put it 
another way: mandatory rules of law are a matter of public policy (ordre public) 
and moreover reflect a public policy so commanding that they must be applied 
even if the general body of law to which they belong is not competent by 
application of the relevant rule of conflict of laws.123  
Article 38 of the New Arbitration Law permits parties to choose the governing law of the 
arbitration agreement (i.e. the applicable substantive law).124 Nonetheless, the choice of law 
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rules of a different legal system, including rules of private international law will not have 
automatic effect or applicability, save in those instances where parties’ have agreed to be 
bound by those relevant conflict of law rules in their selection of the applicable substantive 
law.125 In a sense, this requirement can be seen to enhance certainty of legal outcomes, 
compared with equivalent provisions under the UNICTRAL model law under which tribunals 
are given authority to determine the applicable conflict rules.126 The legal position of the 
parties is less clear cut in disputes involving a conflict between the choice of law referred to 
in an arbitration clause or agreement and mandatory norms of Saudi law or the Shari’ah, 
since the latter must necessarily be construed as the mandatory law of the Saudi legal 
order.127  
Private international law refers to the body of rules used to decide the laws applicable to 
arbitration.128 Concerning the application of these rules, a tribunal may apply foreign or host 
state’s conflict rules in order to determine the applicable substantive law of the arbitration. 
The governing law of the contractual relationship and the basis on which the substantive 
rights and obligations of both parties will be construed and decided is known as the lex 
causae.129 Under accepted principles of private international law, the law of the contract is 
typically the legal system in which the contract is being performed, a principle known as the 
‘closest connection’ rule.130  
In the above light, a Saudi arbitrator may determine that mandatory provisions of Saudi law 
are applicable to contractual disputes, even where the parties have chosen the rules of another 
legal system as the law governing their contractual relationship. 131  
An arbitral award enforced on its conclusion may be subject to a challenge should the 
‘aleatory contract or aleatory clauses, other than the arbitration clause itself be considered 
contrary to Saudi Arabia’s public policy’, extending to rules and rule-interpretations of 
Islamic legal sources or the Shari’ah.132 To take one example, while the New Arbitration Law 
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allows for parties to choose a governing law that is not Shari’ah law, where one party to the 
dispute is Muslim, any provisions of the chosen governing law which are contrary to public 
policy or the Shari’ah are, in theory, unenforceable.133  
As previous chapters have demonstrated, arbitration has been long practiced in the pre-and 
Islamic era and theological justification for the practice in verses of the Qur’an. Looking to 
the rulings of the Hanbali School, parties to a covenant – which would include both the main 
contract, any aleatory and arbitration agreement – are free to select the terms of their 
choosing, providing that these terms do not transgress established Islamic legal principles of 
the Shari’ah read with Saudi’s lex arbitri, when the arbitration is seated in Saudi Arabia. The 
Hanbali Islamic position on ‘freedom to contract’ principle mirrors the Western concept of 
‘freedom to contract’ and its doctrinal derivatives - the principles of arbitral finality134 and 
party autonomy.135  
The most cited example of aspects of the Shari’ah that influence contract law or public policy 
include the prohibition of riba in relation to arbitral awards rendered in Saudi Arabia. The 
position of the Saudi government was set out as follows: 
The Shari’ah’s Islamic law forbids usury in any form or manner whatsoever, 
whether or not it is gained or in secret. The defendant asserted that a position of 
the amount claimed by the claimant [….] is illegal. If the defendant’s contention 
properly invokes Shari’ah provision, then the Arbitral Tribunal must apply it 
since it relates to the public order of the Kingdom.136  
Wakim elaborates further: 
[i]t is a must for all Muslims to comply with contractual provisions except for 
those which authorize what is forbidden or forbid what is authorized, for example 
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those which prohibit speculative contracts (Gharar) and those that forbid usurious 
interest (Riba).137  
Taken together, one can easily see why a foreign party, outside of the Muslim world, would 
look to bypass the local laws and disputes resolution mechanisms of Saudi Arabia. Not only 
have such parties historically faced the risks of being subject to unfamiliar contract rules as 
well as uncertain conflict of law rules, they have also been prone to have their foreign arbitral 
awards (secured outside the Kingdom) denied recognition enforcement on grounds unknown 
to the rest of the world. Subsequent sections of this chapter will attempt to apply these 
theoretical insights to study how the new arbitration and enforcement regime has dealt with 
these issues in the context of award enforcement and challenge, in order to prepare the 
ground for discussion of judicial and religious perspectives on the above mentioned conflicts, 
theoretical and doctrinal, in modern day Saudi Arabia. 
7.5.2.4 Choice of procedural rules  
In what has been described as a welcome development, the New Law adopts the principles of 
finality, party autonomy and freedom of contract.138 Parties are afforded considerable 
freedom, including the freedom to choose the applicable substantive law of the arbitration,139 
the seat of arbitration,140 and the procedural rules, subject to the proviso that such rules are in 
substantial compliance with mandatory aspects of Saudi law and the Shari’ah.141  
As stated earlier, international arbitrations are subject to more than one system of law or legal 
rules applicable at the same time. Modernity of arbitration law-making allows party 
autonomy to the extent where parties and arbitrators may themselves decide on their own 
detailed rules of procedure to be followed in the arbitration. These detailed rules are however 
subject to the law of the seat of arbitration, also often referred to as ‘curial law’,142 an 
example of which is the New Arbitration Law.  
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The law of the seat of the arbitration or lex arbitri lays down a body of rules which sets a 
standard external to the arbitration agreement, which is beyond the wishes of the parties, in 
relation to the conduct of the arbitration. This is the law governing the arbitration, and 
extends to matters such as the definition and form of an agreement to arbitrate, arbitrability of 
a dispute, constitution of tribunal and grounds for challenge, competence of tribunal to rule 
on its jurisdiction, equal treatment of parties and due process, court assistance, form and 
validity of arbitral award, and challenge to the arbitral award.143 This law of the seat of 
arbitration, should be distinguished from governing law or law applicable to the substance 
(lex causa), as well as from the procedural rules employed in the arbitration based on the 
parties’ wishes (substantiating the principle of party autonomy) or by adoption of institutional 
rules such as those of LCIA, ICC or SIAC. 144 
In order to align the Saudi arbitration legislation with international standards of practice, 
expansion of party autonomy and minimal judicial intervention are important objectives, 
which the New Law has attempted to meet by streamlining and vastly improving parties’ 
rights under the New Law. For instance, the Old Arbitration Law was restricted to domestic 
arbitrations, while the New Law expanded the scope of the legislation to domestic as well as 
international commercial disputes.145 One key advantage that this provides to the parties is 
the choice of forum; parties in an international arbitration may now choose not to initiate 
proceedings in Saudi Arabia by agreeing to a certain foreign seat or lex arbitri,146 where the 
parties have not designated a choice of forum (or other relevant terms of reference) or the seat 
of arbitration (or if the applicable seat is a disputed fact). Tribunals are also empowered to 
determine the seat of the arbitration.147  
Another example of increased party autonomy is Article 29 of the New Law, which allows 
the parties or the tribunal to decide the language of the arbitration. Although the default 
language applicable to all arbitral proceedings involving Saudi Arabia is Arabic, the tribunal 
                                                
143 Nigel Blackaby et al, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2009) 17, 
179.  
144 Jan Paullson, ‘Arbitration in Three Dimensions’, (2011) 60 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
291, 291; Alastair Henderson, ‘Lex Arbitri, Procedural Law and the Seat of Arbitration’, (2014) 26 Singapore 
Academy of Law Journal 888, 889. 
145 Royal Decree No. M/34, Article 2.  
146 Al-Ammari and Martin (n 10) 390. 
147 Royal Decree No. M/34, Art 28. Also see, Goswami Al-Husiki (n 85); White & Case, Reform of the Saudi 
Arbitration Law, Insight: International Arbitration (September 2014) 1, 
<https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/alert-Reform-Saudi%20-
Arbitration-%20Law.PDF>, accessed 08 April 2018. 
 232 
or parties may decide that the proceedings should be conducted in an alternative language or 
languages.148  
By granting parties and tribunals greater freedom to determine the language, venue and seat 
of arbitration, the new law is landmark on the road to modernising Saudi Arabia’s arbitral 
process. Foreign parties, for instance, are more likely to participate in arbitral processes if 
they are able to shape those processes by choosing appropriate procedural rules and with 
higher decision-making during the conduct of the arbitration, and if the relevant national laws 
respect established principles and customs of international commercial laws, including 
freedom of contract and party autonomy.149 These principles are fundamental to the success 
of international and domestic arbitral processes, giving force and effect to the legitimate 
expectations and intent of contracting parties, whilst reducing uncertainty of outcomes from 
one legal system to another.150 After all, parties will seek to arbitrate their dispute in forums 
that apply rules and procedures with which they are familiar. This, in turn, will enable parties 
to anticipate how legal points will be decided, and plan for any damages that may be awarded 
against them.151 
The New Arbitration Law allows for parties to select their own internal rules of procedure to 
govern the conduct of the arbitral proceedings. Parties may also nominate the rules of any 
organisation, agency or arbitration centre in Saudi Arabia or abroad such as the International 
Chamber of Commerce of the London Court of International Arbitration.152 As mentioned 
above, if there is any inconsistency between the procedural rules agreed by the parties and the 
New Arbitration Law, the procedural rules agreed by the parties will only take precedence so 
long as they do not contravene the Shari’ah and Saudi public policy.153 Neisheiwat and Al-
Khasawneh give the example of such a contravention where the procedural rules ‘deprive a 
party of the opportunity to set out its case in full, or to cross-examine a witness, or if a 
tribunal permits a witness to testify without taking a solemn oath’.154 
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7.5.2.5 Default applicable rules  
If no procedural rules are chosen by the parties to an arbitration, the tribunal is empowered to 
apply default conflict rules (of private international law), which may apply the applicable law 
most closely connected to the subject matter of the dispute but will remain subject to the 
Shari’ah and public policy where relevant (such as when enforcing an award).155  
As is common international practice, in the absence of any particular substantive law 
specified by the parties, the arbitration tribunal applies what is known as the ‘closest 
connection test’ to ascertain the parties’ intention (at the time of entering into the contract) as 
to their preferred choice of substantive law.156 The evolution of this test can be traced back to 
the 2012 English Court of Appeal decision in Sulamerica,157 where the Court formulated a 
three-stage test to determine the governing law of the arbitration agreement. In the first 
instance, it checked whether there was an express of governing law. If not, whether a choice 
of law could be ascertained by implication from the contract terms, failing the courts 
determined which country’s law the arbitration agreement has the closest and most real 
connection with.158 A similar test is enshrined in Article 38(2) of the New Arbitration Law.  
In the event the parties have also not specified the internal procedural rules applicable to the 
conduct of the arbitration, the arbitration tribunals apply the same test, through which the 
non-mandatory aspects of the abovementioned substantive law (as ascertained to be the most 
closely connected) are held to be the applicable procedural rules to govern the arbitration.  
Quinlan et al note that even if parties exclude Shari’ah law from their arbitration agreements, 
at least one arbitrator (or member of the arbitral tribunal) should have Shari’ah law expertise 
in order to inform tribunals whether any such procedural rules might be in conflict with the 
Shari’ah.159 
7.5.2.6 Minimisation of judicial intervention 
Departing from the Old Law, the 2012 Arbitration Law limits the circumstances under which 
local courts may set aside or annul an award (in case of a Saudi-seated arbitration) and goes 
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further to exclude judicial review on the merits or subject matter of foreign arbitral award at 
the enforcement stages. While this will be discussed in more detail below, it is noteworthy 
that this change in Saudi arbitration law brings greater harmonisation between Saudi Arabia’s 
arbitration and the UNCITRAL Model Law provisions governing grounds of review of 
domestic / foreign award.160 The New Law also brings Saudi Arabia in line with Western 
legal systems and institutionalised international commercial arbitration frameworks.161  
The New Law attempts to implement this broad policy of ring-fencing the arbitral process 
from excessive judicial administration through various provisions. For instance, under the 
previous law, parties were required to submit the arbitration agreement with a competent 
Saudi court, and obtain that court’s approval before any arbitral proceedings could be 
commenced.162 The New Law explicitly provides that Saudi courts must decline jurisdiction 
to hear a dispute relating to an arbitration clause, except when some manifest evidence of 
procedural impropriety or irregularity can be demonstrated or, more contentiously, when any 
formality or public policy requirements have been breached, discussed below.163 Thus, while 
on the one hand (under the Old Law) the onus was on the party to first successfully plead the 
validity of arbitration agreement in a court of law before the arbitration could be commenced, 
the duty on the other hand now rests with the court to adjudicate the issue suo motu, and 
decline to interfere if it satisfied with the validity of arbitration agreement on a preliminary 
review.164 
However, the New Law deviates from the UNCITRAL Model Law in one crucial respect. 
Under the Model Law, tribunals are vested with broad powers to issues interim or provisional 
measures, such as injunctions.165 Pursuant to Saudi law, this power is reserved for the 
competent Court whom retains jurisdiction to issue interim measures, subject to the proviso 
that any measures requested by parties were made prior to the commencement of arbitral 
proceedings, or otherwise issued on direct request of the tribunal with the consent of all 
                                                
160 See Nesheiwat and Al-Khasawneh (n 23) 450 (discussing the New Law, Royal Decree No. M/34, Article 11). 
161 UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 8. For an example of national arbitration law, Belgium amended its 
Uniform Law of 1972 in 1985, thereby drastically narrowing any scope or possibility for an arbitral award to be 
set aside (which were limited to those procedures where a party with a connection to Belgium was party to the 
dispute). 
162 Saudi Arbitration Law of 1983 (the “Old Law”), Art. 9. 
163 Royal Decree No. M/34, Article 11. See Saudi Arbitration Law of 1983 (the “Old Law”), Articles 5, 6, 7, 9, 
17 and 22. 
164 Muhammad Raheem Awan, ‘Judicial Activism In Pakistan In Commercial And Constitutional Matters: Let 
Justice Be Done Though The Heavens Fall’, (2014) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice Research  1,8 
165 UNCITRAL Model Law, Article. 17. 
 235 
parties.166 Nonetheless, it is worth noting that even though the New Law grants power to the 
arbitral tribunal to issue interim measures during the arbitration proceedings, provided such 
power is envisaged in the arbitration agreement, parties would be required to move the 
appropriate court to enforce such an order of the tribunal.167  
7.5.2.7 Tribunal to determine its own jurisdiction (kompetenz – kompetenz) 
Another point of departure from the Old Law relates to the tribunal’s competence to 
determine its own jurisdiction (or lack thereof), commonly referred to as the kompetenz – 
kompetenz principle.168 Whereas the Old Law remained silent on the subject, Article 20 (3) of 
the New Law permits the arbitrator the power to hear different grounds / pleas of objection to 
his own jurisdiction. Any challenge raised to a tribunal’s jurisdiction, moreover, must be 
raised with certain time limits, thus safeguarding the stability of arbitral processes from 
undue interference or delay.169  
Similar to the Old Law, Saudi Arabia’s New Law precludes certain disputes from being 
arbitrated on account of their subject matter or because such disputes are, for reasons of 
public policy or sovereignty, regarded as falling with the exclusive jurisdiction of Saudi law 
or its national courts.170 In the ARAMCO decision, one of the (arbitrability and public policy) 
defences invoked by the Saudi government was that the concept of national sovereignty 
under international law is beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.171 By vesting arbitral 
tribunals with authority to determine their own jurisdiction, Article 20 demonstrates a 
dramatic shift in the Saudi position since the ARAMCO decision. As with much of the New 
Arbitration Law, however, this shift must be viewed within the prism of the fact that the 
enforcement of arbitral awards is subject to an increased margin of review by the Saudi 
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judiciary, compared to non-Islamic nation states that are not bound by the additional 
overarching restrictions of compliance with Shari’ah law. 
7.5.2.8 Time-bound arbitrations  
In a welcome development, Article 40 of the New Arbitration Law provides that awards must 
be rendered within 12 months of the commencement of the arbitration proceedings, with 
there being some discretion to extend proceedings if necessary.172 This discretion rests, first, 
with the parties who can decide the amount the period within the final award should be 
rendered, or by agreeing to a period of extension after termination of the prescribed period. 
The discretion also lies with the arbitral tribunal which can extend the period of arbitration by 
not more than six months, unless the parties have agreed to a longer period. The discretion 
also lies with the competent court which, upon application, extends the time period or 
otherwise terminates the proceedings.173 Although this is a longer time period than that 
provided under the Old Arbitration Law, the duration of proceedings, in practice, was much 
longer than what the legislation provided for (often due to the high workload of the Board of 
Grievances),174 with the significant delays discouraging parties who might otherwise have 
initiated arbitration proceedings in Saudi Arabia.175  
7.5.2.9 Disqualification of arbitrators 
Consistent with equivalent provisions of the UNICTRAL Model Law,176 the new law 
stipulates that an arbitrator may be disqualified only when the impartiality and independence 
of the arbitrator is in doubt, or if the arbitrator does not possess the required qualifications.177 
7.5.2.10 Non-Arbitrable Subject Matter 
Another change is brought by Article 37 which specifically addresses matters which fall 
outside of the jurisdiction of the tribunal, including challenges to probity of documents due to 
forgery or other criminal proceedings or any point of law or contractual issue deemed ultra 
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vires or non-arbitrable under the relevant provisions of Saudi law, code or ministerial decree. 
If such issues are non-material to the dispute, the tribunal may persist with the arbitral 
proceedings, excluding consideration of any issues that lie beyond the scope of its 
jurisdiction. If determination of the ultra vires issue is considered necessary for the issuance 
of its award, the tribunal is obliged to suspend the arbitration and refer the matter to the 
competent court pending resolution of the matter.178 
One notable instance in which formality requirements may be brought to bear on the 
jurisdiction of a tribunal concerns arbitral agreement(s), or underlying contract(s), entered 
into with the Saudi government, or its representatives. Pertinently, any issues relating to 
aspects of public concession agreement or state contract, for instance, fall beyond the scope 
of a tribunal’s jurisdiction, except with the prior and express consent of the Saudi 
government.179 In this instance the proceedings are governed by Saudi law, and cannot be 
contracted out of, which in accordance with Resolution No. 58 passed by the Saudi 
government in the aftermath of the ARAMCO case.180 It should be noted that the effect of 
Resolution No. 58 has been somewhat diminished by Article 10 of the New Arbitration Law 
which provides that public entities may enter into arbitrations with private entities providing 
that they have obtained the prior approval of the Prime Minister.181 Notably, no equivalent 
rule is provided for under UNCITRAL Model Law. 
7.5.3 Annulment of arbitral awards 
The provisions of the New Arbitration Law appear to affirm arbitral awards as res judicata; 
in other words as having an equivalent force to binding court judgement. Article 11 of the 
New Arbitration Law limits the rights of the Saudi courts to interfere with arbitration 
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proceedings.182 As a result of this provision, if both parties agree to arbitration, the Saudi 
courts are obliged to decline jurisdiction over the dispute. Commentators have noted that this 
provision has been effective, with Goswami and Al-Husiki stating that: 
In contrast to previous practice, Saudi courts have recently shown a systematic 
refusal to take jurisdiction over matters where parties have opted for arbitration in 
a contract.183 
Moreover, recent judgments (discussed below) suggest that courts are willing to accept 
arbitration as a legitimate alternative to formal court-based litigation, and to respect the 
wishes of parties who have chosen to arbitrate their disputes in a non-Saudi seated forum, 
using a non-Saudi choice of law. However, as has been noted previously on numerous 
occasions, any uncertainty over legal outcomes is somewhat lessened by the fact that the new 
law allows for de minimis review into the validity of arbitral awards. 
Article 49 of the new 2012 Saudi Arbitration legislation provides as follows:  
Arbitration awards rendered in accordance with the provisions of this Law are not 
subject to appeal, except for an action to nullify an arbitration award filed in 
accordance with the provisions of this Law.184  
As noted previously, this provision effectively affirms that awards will be treated as final and 
non-appealable, subject to the proviso that they are substantially and procedurally in 
compliance with requirements of the Shari’ah. It is worth noting, however, that Article 50 
(1)(a-g) of the new laws enumerates an (presumptively) exhaustive set of grounds which may 
trigger review of an otherwise unappealable award. The following circumstances may 
warrant nullification of an award before a competent court of proper jurisdiction: invalidity of 
arbitration agreement, incapacity of the parties, breach of due process, beyond scope of 
submission, irregularities of tribunal’s composition, and totality of the circumstances. 185 
However, the drafting of the New Arbitration Law suggests that there was an intention 
amongst the drafters to narrow the remit of the domestic courts to review the underlying 
dispute. Article 52 of the New Arbitration Law provides that awards issued subject to the 
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New Arbitration Law would have an effect equivalent to a judicial ruling and would therefore 
be enforceable and not subject to appeal to the Court of Appeal.186 Furthermore, the New 
Arbitration Law states that an application for setting aside an agreement would only be 
allowed on certain limited grounds,187 and the Implementing Rules confirm that it is a matter 
for the Court of Appeal to hear those grounds (a more expedient court than the Board of 
Grievances).188 However, Article 55 continues to apply the pre-existing position that no part 
of the arbitral award shall violate Shari’ah principles or public policy.189 
7.5.4 Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
As noted earlier, one of the primary conflicts between the Old Arbitration Law and 
international arbitration standards related to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards made outside Saudi Arabia. Under the Old Arbitration Law, Saudi courts had the 
authority to reconsider or re-litigate an arbitral award subsequent to an award being made, 
regularly resulting in the Board of Grievances setting aside awards on the basis that they did 
not comply with the Shari’ah.190 As a result of these powers, parties were wary of 
committing to arbitration proceedings in Saudi Arabia, notwithstanding Saudi Arabia’s 
accession to a number of international arbitration treaties, including the New York 
Convention in 1994.191  
The risk of a refusal by Saudi courts to enforce an arbitral award is one of the greatest 
concerns of parties to international arbitration proceedings with Saudi Arabian companies.192 
For example, in Jadawel International (Saudi Arabia) v. Emaar Property PJSC (UAE), the 
Board of Grievances refused to enforce an award against the Saudi Arabian company Jadawel 
following a re-examination of the case and, furthermore, reversed the award entirely, 
resulting in the awardee (Emaar) being ordered to pay damages to Jadawel.193 This begs the 
question of whether the Court of Appeal’s reversal of an arbitration award, whereby the 
judgment reverses a claim to award a counterclaim, is enforceable. Parties only agree to 
arbitration (by contract) and that the award be set aside (by application of lex arbitri); they do 
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not agree to be bound by a money decree, for instance, awarded by a court of law sitting in 
challenge. In any case, a court order would also need to be enforced in the foreign party’s 
state, where the latter’s court may find an irregularity with the way Saudi courts have 
awarded a counter-claim in appeal after reversing an award on the appreciation of merits? 
These issues have yet to be fully tested in the courts.  
Although the New Arbitration Law does not make all international arbitral awards 
enforceable, it does provide much-needed clarity on the requirements and the process of 
enforceability.194 Under the New Arbitration Law, the Saudi courts are required to recognise 
and enforce awards made outside of the Kingdom.  
Article 50(4) of the New Arbitration Law provides that if a Saudi court with appropriate 
jurisdiction to determine whether or not an award is enforceable under the Shari’ah is not 
empowered to re-examine the case itself, with Article 50(2) providing that the Courts may 
only carry out such an examination if it considers that the decision itself violated the Shari’ah 
or public policy or if the subject matter of the dispute is considered to fall outside the remit of 
the New Arbitration Law.195 
As noted in Section 1 of this chapter, the Old Arbitration Law failed to establish a clear and 
transparent procedure for the enforcement of arbitral awards. This was problematic since 
awards would most often fail at the enforcement stage of judicial proceedings in Saudi 
Arabia. Furthermore, the fact that most enforcements were appealed to the Board of 
Grievances resulted in an effective ‘clogging’ of the system and a backlog of cases, causing 
significant delays in the enforcement process.196  
As a result of the issues relating to the enforcement of awards under the Old Arbitration Law, 
the Enforcement Law was also enacted in 2012 to supplement the New Arbitration Law by 
establishing a procedure for enforcement.197 Although much attention has been directed to 
reforms introduced by way of the New Arbitration Law, the effects of the Enforcement Law 
may prove equally significant due to its attempts to modernise the Saudi judiciary thereby 
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ensuring that all decisions, judgements and arbitral awards rendered in Saudi Arabia are 
enforced in a timely and judicious fashion.198  
Article 9(2) of the Enforcement Law stipulates that all awards, and accompanying 
enforcement orders, be executed in accordance with the process set forth in the New 
Arbitration Law.199 In perhaps the most institutional reform to Saudi Arabia’s judicial system, 
the Enforcement Law establishes a dedicated enforcement circuit court structure that has 
exclusive and final jurisdiction to deal with all matters related to the enforcement of arbitral 
awards.200 This stands in contrast with the previous system, under which jurisdiction of 
enforcement of awards and decisions was shared, with the Board of Grievances having 
jurisdiction to hear challenges relating to state contracts and commercial disputes,201 and the 
Shari’ah courts exercising general jurisdiction to determine issues of contractual validity, 
capacity, finality and enforcement.202  
As a result, a combination of the provisions set out in the New Arbitration Law and the 
Enforcement Law results in a system whereby, in practice, once an arbitral award is approved 
in the Court of Appeal, an enforcement order shall then be issued by the competent court 
under the Enforcement Law 2012. That court will then submit the arbitration award to the 
Enforcement Court for overseeing the enforcement of awards issued by arbitration 
tribunals.203 Under Article 11 and 12 of the Enforcement Law, a party seeking enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards issued outside Saudi Arabia must also satisfy the requirements under 
the Enforcement Law in addition to the requirements under the New Arbitration Law.204  
In order to enforce a foreign arbitral award, the Enforcement Court must verify a number of 
matters: 
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- that the Saudi courts did not have competency to hear the matter and that the court that 
issued the award was competent in accordance with the international rules of jurisdiction 
set down in the laws of said court; 
- that the parties to the case were afforded due process in the foreign proceedings; 
- that the arbitral award is final in the country where it was issued and was issued in 
accordance with the laws of that country; 
- that the award is in compliance with the Shari’ah and Saudi public policy; and 
- that the award is not in conflict with a judgement previously issued by a Saudi court, 
committee or commission which had jurisdiction to decide the dispute.205  
According to Goswani and Al-Husiki, the effect of the New Arbitration Law and the 
Enforcement Law has been that judges are unwilling to consider the merits of an award 
unless there is a clear violation of Saudi law.206 They quote the Board of Grievances in 
Jeddah as stating: 
…the role of the judiciary when hearing the suit by the Arbitration Tribunal shall 
be overseeing whether the legal procedures are taken and no violation to the 
definite provisions of the Holy Qur’an, Sunnah, applicable laws or public morals, 
without touching the factual aspects of the motives (or the judgment) or 
process…it is normal not to touch such issues from the part of the judiciary, 
otherwise arbitration should have no effect for quick settlements of disputes.207 
This quote suggests that the Saudi courts should have been reluctant to interfere in the 
arbitration process, even at the enforcement stage. Enforcement courts have discretion to 
refer a challenge to an enforcement petition to the competent courts, normally the Court of 
Appeal. The enforcement judge may still execute an award if an Appeal court’s ruling is 
deemed unpersuasive or if the court is judged to have exceeded the bounds of the review 
powers. This suggests that the New Arbitration Law has been effective in reducing the level 
of judicial interference in the arbitration procedure. However, the above quote also suggests 
that the courts may still interfere in the event of a perceived violation of the Shari’ah and 
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public policy and it is this continuing Shari’ah and public policy primacy that the next 
section considers.  
7.6 ‘Gaps’ in the New Arbitration Law: Two Steps Forward and One Step Back? 
By basing the New Arbitration Law on the principles of the UNCITRAL Model Law, there is 
a clear indication that the New Arbitration Law is an attempt to bring Saudi arbitration law in 
line with international standards.208 Given that the New Law applies together with the 
Shari’ah, it may be contended that any unqualified claim that international arbitration 
practices are inconsistent with the Shari’ah is unjustified.209 It has also been suggested that 
Shari’ah law, and the Hanbali interpretation especially, is eminently flexible when it comes 
to incorporating new laws. As section one of this chapter outlines, this inherent flexibility 
was subjugated in the aftermath of the ARAMCO case or perhaps correctly to ensure the 
supremacy of Saudi law where Saudi Arabia is the selected forum or seat of arbitration or 
Saudi law is the applicable law.210 As discussed earlier, in response to the perceived 
interference by the international tribunal, the Saudis prohibited its ministries and agencies 
from seeking international arbitration for many years and ‘imposed strict requirements, 
founded in Islamic law, for the appointment of arbitrators’.211 There were also tighter rules 
for the appointment of arbitrators, and women were excluded from domestic arbitrations.212 
Therefore, Saudi arbitration law could be said to have regressed and became less flexible.213 
Whatever the merits of Saudi Arabia’s somewhat understandable reaction to international 
arbitration and its dismissive view of Shari’ah, the consequences of the decision did lead to a 
resurgent judiciary.214 Taking into account the fact that government entities in Saudi Arabia 
were willing to enter into concession agreements prior to the ARAMCO decision, it would 
appear clear that the catalyst for a clampdown on international arbitration in its aftermath was 
politically rather than religiously motivated.215 
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For a number of decades after ARAMCO, international awards were effectively not 
enforceable by international companies dealing with Saudi state entities and private 
companies, meaning that parties had to rely on the good faith of their counterparties to abide 
by any such rulings. However, in recent decades, and especially since 1980, gradual steps 
have been taken by the Kingdom to remove the restrictions on international arbitration in 
order to attract foreign investment. These steps culminated in the New Arbitration Law.216 
Nonetheless, any attempts at modernisation of Saudi law, including arbitration law, are bound 
to be fraught with difficulties due to the rigid application of juristic perspectives on, for 
instance, contractual uncertainty, sale of debt or interest based clauses which have long been 
endorsed or implemented in Saudi Arabia.217 The four Sunnah schools have issued numerous 
opinions on the range of contract forms permitted by religious law, and conditions which 
apply to the formation or performance of a contract.218 As suggested above, a central tenet of 
Islamic contract law is the elimination of contractual uncertainty or future clauses (i.e. no 
future payment or sale of an unowned thing can be the subject-matter of a contract).219 This is 
linked to the principle of Gharar, which can be understood as any uncertainty in wording or 
with regard to liability.220 In order to promote certainty in contracts, they should contain 
elements such as offer and acceptance and capacity of contractors.221 Yet, it is impossible to 
envision many situations in which all kinds of uncertainty, whether in respect of an 
arbitration agreement or main contract, can be truly averted or eliminated.  
In recognition of practical limitations of this principle, a number of Islamic jurists, across all 
schools, have looked to chasten the application of the gharar (material uncertainty) in favour 
of a more flexible approach.222 Accordingly, any future clauses incorporated in a contract are 
treated as valid or severable, providing that the material clauses of the contract or entirety of 
the contract are not predicated on uncertainty, risk or speculation.223 It is clear, however, that 
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there is no definitive ‘Shari’ah position’ on issues of validity and enforcement. While parties 
always enjoy the choice of setting out their respective cases based on a large number of 
juristic opinions and schools of thought, that choice must not be unbridled. In an arbitration 
friendly legal system, the grounds to challenge enforcement must have a pre-specified body 
of rules in order that parties may have legitimate expectations before entering into an 
arbitration agreement with a Saudi party, or in relation to an arbitration seated in Saudi 
Arabia.224 The non-provision of these matters in Shari’ah or in the codified law leaves the 
door open for parties (or authorities) to contest enforcement of arbitral awards by appealing 
to whatever juristic opinion is most advantageous to their interests.  
Let us then consider the practical effects of the strict enforcement of Islamic juristic 
perspectives on a range of contract law issues, covering, for instance, injunctions on 
contractual uncertainty, debt-based financing in concession contracts or, relevantly, the 
Hanbali position on the ineligibility of female arbitrators. These rulings do not only offend 
Western liberal sensibilities, they render Saudi arbitration processes unattractive or 
inaccessible to foreign parties.225 Attempts by Saudi authorities to adhere to international 
standards, either through legislation or accession to international conventions, are moreover 
undermined by way of reservations, vetoes or expansive judicial discretion.226  
In the above light, one must also have regard to the idea that Islam aspires to provide rules for 
all times and places. Gradualism is a principle inherent to Islamic interpretative tradition, and 
allows for new rules to be developed, and old ones phased out, in certain cases.227 
Nonetheless, it is uncertain whether the New Arbitration Law was enacted in order to fully 
implement the principle of gradualism or Saudi Arabia is simply renewing and reviving the 
trade and dispute resolution practices of Early Islam. 
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7.7 Limitations of the New Arbitration Law 
Despite being an attempt to ensure that Saudi arbitration law reaches international standards, 
the first flaw in the New Arbitration Law is the failure to define a number of basic principles 
contained in the Law, such as ‘commercial’, ‘arbitration’ and ‘public policy’.228 Al-Eisa notes 
that although Article 2 of the New Arbitration Law states that the Law shall apply to an 
‘international commercial arbitration…’ but the failure to define the terms ‘commercial’ and 
‘arbitration’ leaves an element of doubt on the scope of the Law.229 It should be noted that the 
UNCITRAL Model Law provides for a definition of ‘arbitration’230 as well delineates the 
scope of the term ‘commercial’.231 While ‘commercial’, for instance, may be a term with 
(arguably) general and commonly accepted meanings, ambiguity as to what constitutes 
commercial and what does not may have far reaching consequences on the fate of an 
arbitration. Are all disputes involving profit-making and trade commercial in nature, 
regardless of the nature of parties involved? Are investments made in public or private 
entities that involve larger public interests or public policy still understood to be commercial 
in nature, and therefore covered by the New Law? These are questions which decide the 
arbitrability of the underlying dispute and go to the root of the matter. They are the very 
issues that have yet to be precisely defined under the existing provisions of the 2012 
Arbitration legislation. 
The failure to clearly define ‘public policy’ is perhaps even more fundamental an issue. 
Although this will be considered in further detail below, the authorities have, by not defining 
‘public policy’ in the legislation, failed to draft a legislation that can operate transparently 
and independently, leaving open the possibility that the Saudi courts may continue to 
indiscriminately refuse to apply arbitration clauses or decline to enforce tribunal rulings on 
indeterminate public policy grounds. 
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7.7.1 Procedural Gaps in the New Arbitration Law 
As noted above, the Old Arbitration Law did not legislate on restrictions to be placed on the 
powers of the Saudi judiciary to supervise arbitral proceedings and review the merits of 
arbitral awards.232 These broad powers have been somewhat limited by the New Arbitration 
Law.233 According to Article 52 of the Law, an award issued under the legislation is 
considered to be ‘final’ and ‘non-appealable’,234 which brings the legislation broadly into line 
with international standards in that the role of the courts in procedures is reserved to when 
arbitral proceedings require the support of the courts.235 In other words, the role of the courts 
has been watered down from proper judicial examination to providing supervisory or 
administrative assistance to the arbitral process. 
However, there is still some uncertainty about exactly how much discretion the Saudi courts 
are empowered with to intervene in international arbitration proceedings under the New 
Arbitration Law. For example, although Article 38 of the New Arbitration Law allows parties 
the right to agree on the substantive law that should be applied to their case. This provision is 
subject to the consistency of the relevant elements of the chosen law with the Shari’ah, 
meaning that Saudi courts may continue to interfere in arbitration proceedings where the 
parties have agreed not to apply Saudi law on the grounds that the agreed substantive law is 
not in compliance with the Shari’ah.236  
By failing to clarify these issues under the new arbitration law, including through codification 
of the Shari’ah or defining the limits of public policy, there remains a risk that the courts may 
not continue to narrowly interpret the grounds under which they may review arbitral 
proceedings. This potential ‘gap in the law’ may deter investors for dealings with Saudi 
nationals or from choosing Saudi Arabia as their seat of arbitration, even though there may be 
evidence to suggest that the judicial intervention of the post-ARAMCO period is being 
restrained, as will be discussed in greater detail below. 
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7.7.2 Applicability of the Lex Arbitri under the New Arbitration Law 
Under Shari’ah law, one of the perceived advantages of the Hanbali school of interpretation 
is its flexibility. According to Al-Sanhury: 
[T]he Hanbali doctrine has come quite close to the Western doctrines: any clause 
which accompanies the contract is valid unless it is impossible or contrary to 
public order or good morals.237 
Article 28 of the New Arbitration Law provides that disputing parties are entitled to agree on 
the seat of arbitration, whether it is domestic or abroad.238 However, it may be argued that 
such a provision may be unenforceable. According to Salah, lex arbitri is considered to be 
immaterial under the Shari’ah given that the resolution of disputes under Islamic Law is 
exclusively subject to the Shari’ah, which must be applied to Muslims (including non-Saudi 
citizens) regardless of where they live.239 Taken to its logical conclusion, this suggests that 
any agreement on lex arbitri could be overturned on Shari’ah grounds, which would appear 
to be a limitation on the flexibility of the Hanbali pronouncements.  
However, a conventional reading would suggest that lex arbitri is not immaterial when the 
Shari’ah comes into play. It is only subject to the Shari’ah and therefore should be 
completely valid and enforceable as long as it is within the tenets of the Shari’ah. This 
researcher supports this conclusion. In this regard, the notion that the resolution of disputes 
under Islamic law is exclusively subject to Shari’ah would seem to conflict with the 
Kingdom’s obligations under the New York Convention. Furthermore, Shari’ah as a set of 
general principles derived from the revelations of the Qur’an or narration of the Sunnah does 
not provide specific provisions on governance of arbitration beyond formality-based 
requirements for a valid arbitration agreement.240 It does not provide concrete legal guidance 
on the number of arbitrators and power to issue interim measures. 241 
In the absence of a clear rule derived from the Qur’an or narration of Sunnah, or consensual 
position of the schools on these issues, it seems reasonable that the lex arbitri would continue 
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to regulate all these aspects, with an overarching restriction that all mandatory procedural 
rules must be in congruence with Shari’ah law. It would then also be incorrect to state that a 
provision allowing parties to contract out of Saudi Arbitration Law in favour of a foreign 
arbitration law (lex arbitri) would be unenforceable because of the applicability of 
Shari’ah.242 This question would only become material at the time of the enforceability of the 
award by Saudi courts, where (in any event) a party may challenge the award on the grounds 
that the lex arbitri was not in compliance with the Shari’ah.  
According to Al Eisa: 
The question that may be raised now is whether or not the [New Arbitration Law] 
will resolve the conflicting decisions in Saudi courts due to it expressly providing 
for the disputing parties to agree on the seat of arbitration within Saudi Arabia or 
abroad.243 
The most striking limitations of the New Arbitration Law relate to the finality and 
enforceability of international arbitral awards, as will be considered in later detail below. 
Although anecdotal evidence appears to suggest that the courts are restraining from re-
litigating arbitration proceedings or overturning lex arbitri agreements,244 both the Court of 
Appeal and the Enforcement Court continue to have sufficient power to review proceedings 
or refuse to enforce awards based on public policy and the Shari’ah. As a result, it is 
suggested that at least one arbitrator should be knowledgeable in Shari’ah law in order to 
ensure that the award, although it may have been rendered in a non-Shari’ah state, does not 
contravene the Shari’ah, or alternatively that any proceedings not held in Saudi Arabia situate 
the arbitration seat in another Arab GCC country.245 All of the Gulf countries’ legal systems 
have been influenced by the Hanbali School. However, because of Saudi’s unique history, the 
Hanbali School is exceptionally influential.246 The Hanbali School and its recommendations 
are both reasonable and not unduly demanding, but on a practical level, its influence does not 
make Saudi Arabia more attractive to international companies, which remain reluctant to 
trade with Saudi counterparts due to the uncertainty about the arbitration procedure under the 
New Arbitration Law.  
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7.7.3 Reciprocity – Does The New Arbitration Law Succeed Where The New York 
Convention Failed? 
Recall that the New York Convention requires the reciprocal recognition of arbitral awards 
issued by member nations, subject to a number of reservations.247 These requirements are 
mirrored by the Riyadh Convention and are set out in Article 11 of the Enforcement Law.248  
Some commentators have suggested that Saudi Arabia’s membership to such international 
conventions is sufficient to establish the necessary reciprocity.249 The above notwithstanding, 
since Saudi Arabia’s accession to the New York Convention in 1994, there have been a 
number of cases that appeared to suggest that the Kingdom would not solely rely on 
conventions to establish reciprocity but that the Saudi judiciary may also require factual 
evidence of reciprocity on behalf of the other jurisdiction. In 2008, the Board of Grievances 
(Diwan) found that there was no reciprocity between the US and Saudi Arabia, despite that 
fact that the US is also a signatory of the New York Convention.250 It should be kept in mind, 
however, as will be considered in more detail below,251 that the Court of Appeal held in 2016 
that reciprocity did exist between the UK and Saudi Arabia as a result of the two countries’ 
membership of New York Convention.252 The latter case would suggest that, under the 
Enforcement Law, membership of international conventions is not ipso facto sufficient 
evidence to establish reciprocity between the states in question. Tellingly, the Saudi courts 
have not yet clarified whether there are any instances in which they would refuse to apply this 
principle.253 In the absence of settled law on the matter of any permitted exceptions to Article 
11, the New Law leaves it open to Saudi courts to determine whether reciprocity has been 
established, and to do so moreover on a case-by-case basis. 
A whole other set of issues are presented when considering whether a foreign court or 
arbitrator would take mandatory aspects of Saudi statutory law or the Shari’ah into 
consideration in the resolution of contractual disputes, thus fulfilling its own reciprocity 
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obligations.254 These reciprocity obligations also extend to recognition and enforceability in a 
reciprocating state but do not mandate the foreign tribunal to apply Shari’ah law. If the lex 
arbitri is foreign, the tribunal has no obligation to (nor should it) apply Shari’ah law since it 
is not the law of the seat. No conflict occurs when any mandatory rules applied form part of 
the chosen substantive law since an arbitrator is bound to apply such law in its entirety, even 
if this runs counter to the contractual stipulations and the terms of references chosen by the 
parties.255 The only exception to this rule is when the very act of giving effect to the relevant 
mandatory rules would in of itself lead to a violation of international public policy, including 
the principle of pact sunt servanda or sanctity of contract.256 Good faith is an essential part of 
Islamic contract law.257 This is seen in the fact that all contracts are concluded with a word or 
act. There is less formalism in Islamic law as a simple valid expression of an offer (ijab) and 
its acceptance (qabul) is seen as sufficient from a legal perspective.258 Establishing trust is 
very important in Saudi business culture and this can have implications for the arbitration of 
disputes. Acting in good faith can be more important than conforming to the legal formalities. 
This is an important distinction between Saudi and western models of arbitration.259  
Respect for the sanctity of the contract, as discussed in chapter 4, finds theological support in 
several verses in the Qur’an and therefore constitutes an obligatory rule of the Shari’ah.260 
Indeed, the Saudi courts have ruled that the duty to perform contractual undertakings in good 
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faith as specific requirement of Islamic law prevail over other mandatory rules of Saudi law, 
including sovereignty-related defences to the enforcement of foreign or domestic arbitral 
awards or judgements.261 Recognition of the choice and intent of contracting parties leads to 
would seek to enforce a principle-based understanding of Islamic law. In other words, 
religious authorities should seek to interpret Islamic rules of law flexibly, unless some 
fundamental or mandatory principle of Shari’ah has been violated.262 This would seem to 
indicate that questions of good faith can occasionally take precedence over formalities, and 
according to Al Enazhi, allow parties to ‘push the boundaries of arbitration law and 
practice’.263 This indicates that the Saudi arbitral process is less rigid and even more flexible, 
than often supposed.  
Contrary to popular conceptions, accordingly, there is no conflict to be found between 
mandatory Islamic principles of contract (which an arbitrator may be forced to apply in its 
entirety, even if this runs contrary to contractual stipulations of the parties) and other 
mandatory rules of international law and public policy (such as the international legal 
principle of pacta sunt servanda).264 As noted in chapter 3 and 6, the Prophet himself 
practised reciprocity in respect of any obligations concluded under treaty, including those 
formed in partnership with non-Muslim nations or powers.265 The assumption that all 
obligations made under covenants, whether by treaty or by contract, are binding is, therefore, 
entirely consistent with the early history of Islam. Nonetheless, Shari’ah implementation in 
Saudi Arabia remains an incomplete and sometimes discretionary model of justice.266 Indeed, 
this was one of the reasons why international arbitrators in the ARAMCO case favoured 
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‘modern’ principles of international commercial law.267 It is incumbent upon Saudi courts 
and legislators to continue efforts in the direction of clarifying applicable rules of the 
Shari’ah, and scope of these rules, in the context of commercial and investment treaty 
arbitration.  
Despite the relatively slow progress after the New Law’s adoption, which may have raised 
concerns that the New Law had not engendered the expected change, recent cases and legal 
reform discussed above would suggest that the arbitration law may now be taking root. The 
next section will consider some salient issues with bearing on the potential reach and legal 
effects of the New Law in the coming decades. 
7.7.3 Severability of Interest-Based Clauses From Main Contract 
It is an open question whether Saudi arbitrators will treat interest-based clauses as severable 
from the main contract, except for those portions of an award found to contravene explicit 
requirements of the Shari’ah.268 Since interest-related transactions are in direct contravention 
of Islamic religious law, should we also assume that an arbitrator is obliged to invalidate the 
offending terms of a contract, and that this obligation would apply equally to any foreign-
seated tribunal bound by Saudi’s reciprocity reservations under the New York Convention?269 
Moreover, a tribunal’s decision upholding the validity of interest-based claims or related 
contractual provisions may provide sufficient grounds to Saudi courts on which to annul a 
domestic award or refuse enforcement of a domestic or international award on constitutional 
or public policy grounds, respectively. Under the Old Law, any contract, or any clauses 
contained therein, with ‘impurities’ were at risk of bring rendered void and unenforceable 
under a strict application of the Shari’ah.270 It remains to be seen whether such remedies will 
be recoverable under Saudi arbitral processes as governed by the New Law. Most 
jurisdictions do not prohibit such speculative damages.271 They only set a default rule where 
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special damages (which are not foreseeable or are too remote) cannot be claimed unless a 
contrary agreement exists. Claims arising out of indemnity clauses are classic examples.  
7.7.4 Separability of the Arbitration Agreement 
Although an arbitration agreement may be contained within a contract, Article 21 of the New 
Law provides that any such clauses will be interpreted separately to any contract within 
which it is contained.272 This is to ensure that the arbitration element of an agreement is valid 
even if the contract within which it is contained is nullified or otherwise rendered invalid. 
The need for treating arbitration clauses as separable from the main contract is crucial; it 
would be self-defeating if a breach of contract or a claim of voidability of the contract was 
sufficient to invalidate the arbitration clause as well. A fundamental reason of allowing 
arbitration clauses to be treated separately, is that while the purposes of the main contract 
may be said to have failed by an invalidation of the contract, the arbitration clause must 
persist since it is not a purpose of the contract273 (although it should be noted that some 
commentators have suggested that when a contract is declared void under Shari’ah law, it 
applies to all of the clauses in the contract).274 It has not been clarified how Article 21 will 
apply in practice and there have been no reported cases thus far. Harb and Leventhal noted 
that: 
It has yet to be seen whether a Saudi judge would view as separable and valid an 
arbitration agreement found in a contract that would be invalid due to its violation 
of Islamic law.275  
7.8 Gaps in the Substantive Law 
7.8.1 The Applicability of Shari’ah 
Despite the clear intentions of the drafter of the New Arbitration Law to create an arbitration-
friendly environment, the significance of the legislation is potentially diminished by the rigid 
enforcement of the Shari’ah by Saudi authorities.276 However, as previous chapters have 
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illustrated, the Hanbali school of interpretation is considered to be the most flexible in terms 
of commercial trade, with an emphasis on the Islamic principle that ‘all things not 
specifically prohibited are allowed’.277 Furthermore, Hanbali jurist Ibn Taymiya averred that 
‘all contracts entered into, or conditions attached thereto, are permissible unless specifically 
prohibited by either the Qur’an or the Sunnah’.278  
The Hanbali School is regarded and often vilified for being too inflexible, however, as we 
have seen earlier the foundational texts of Islam are very practical when it comes to trade, 
and traditionally, the school is flexible with regard to commercial laws.279 While the Hanbali 
School has resisted reasoning by analogy, they have accepted new ideas and practices that 
may be necessary for the development of trade and commerce as enjoined by the Qur’an.280 
The above notwithstanding, however, this thesis has contended that the particular history of 
the Hanbali fiqh as it has developed in the Saudi legal system suggest some resistance to 
innovation and change. 281It became associated with the reform efforts of the first Saudi state, 
and this led to the Hanbali School becoming more rigid, despite it being originally a very 
practical and even flexible school of jurisprudence.282  
As set out in Chapter 6, the Saudi position subsequent to the ARAMCO arbitral decision until 
the Old Arbitration Law was that, as arbitration is dealt with in the Qur’an, siyasa (secular 
law) was not applicable when it was inconsistent with the Shari’ah.283 However, as 
previously noted, the Saudi government’s changing position on international arbitration 
would appear to be based on political, as opposed to religious, concerns. By subjecting the 
New Arbitration Law to the Hanbali interpretation of the Shari’ah, the Saudi legislator 
effectively privileges judicial autonomy (to determine the limits of the jurisdiction) over party 
autonomy.284 Although the New Arbitration Law has limited the court’s discretion to review 
arbitral proceedings, it has left with the judiciary the ultimate power of review by having the 
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right to overturn arbitral awards due to non-compliance with the Shari’ah. As noted by Al-
Eisa: 
…the circumstances under which courts could reject decisions under the [New 
Arbitration Law] can just as easily be rejected on the grounds that they are 
against Shari’ah law, which is highly unspecific.285 
This need not be taken as a criticism of Islamic law per se but the inconsistent manner in 
which it has been invoked, for instance to deny recognition of foreign courts. After all, why 
would domestic courts not utilize the power to overturn awards when they are against the 
Shar’iah? This is not a privilege or a power but a duty to see that compliance with the 
Sha’riah is ultimately preserved. This is also clear from the fact that the judiciary is to take 
suo motu cognizance of non-compliance with the Shar’iah. Nonetheless, while courts have a 
duty to uphold the laws of the local legal system - an entirely legitimate exercise - judicial 
discretion must be delimited by legislation and other forms of judicial precedent, without 
which foreign parties may fear the consequences of a judiciary run amok.286 In this sense, the 
silence of the new arbitration law is symptomatic of the uncertainty regarding the scope of 
Saudi arbitration law. The underlying principles of the Shar’iah are neither codified nor 
fleshed out through judicial principles. There is no body of Hanbali jurisprudence on which a 
foreign party engaged in a dispute can rely, nor the possibility that the same party might 
‘shop’ for a particular school of Islamic jurisprudence which specifies the party’s preferred 
interpretation of Islamic legal sources.287  
These broader constitutional challenges generate uncertainties at the level of practical 
outcomes. For example, the Shari’ah must also be taken into account when calculating 
awards. Hence, arbitral awards that contain any consequential, indirect, punitive and 
speculative damages will not be enforced by Saudi courts. In addition, the charging of interest 
(riba) continues to be prohibited under Saudi law, unlike other Middle Eastern countries 
whose laws provide for certain level of flexibility when considering commercial interest.288 
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Under the Old Arbitration Law, the inclusion of such pre-estimated damages was considered 
by the Board of Grievances to be a ground for refusing the enforcement of an award. The 
New Arbitration Law has clarified the Saudi position meaning that any elements of awards 
that are not in compliance with the Shari’ah are severable from the award, meaning that the 
award can still be enforced without the elements that are considered to be in breach of the 
Shari’ah.289 However, as noted by Nesheiwat and Al-Khasawneh: 
There is a risk…that where an element of an award cannot be severed, such as if 
the award for interest is completely imbedded within the award for damages, then 
the entire award could be opened up by the courts at the enforcement stage.290 
It should be reiterated that an international tribunal is expected to apply the law of the seat. 
Where it is not Saudi law, the tribunal will have no need to concern itself with the questions 
of what is and what is not severeable under the Shar’iah. The question of enforceability is a 
separate question where this becomes relevant, whereby the reviewing authority, in other 
words the local Saudi court, may need to consider which elements of an award would be 
severable under the Shari’ah. This would require an understanding of the above factors, 
which is a further reason why at least one expert on the Shari’ah should be recommended 
when dealing with an international arbitration involving a Saudi disputant or Saudi-based 
assets.291 The fact that these issues are unique to Saudi Arabia illustrates why there may 
continue to be some reluctance amongst some international companies to trade with Saudi 
companies. Al-Ammari and Martin therefore concluded that ‘An award that cannot rely upon 
the muscle of the local courts where the assets of the losing party are located is of little or no 
value’.292 
7.8.2 Public Policy 
Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention provides that a member state to the Convention 
is not required to recognise non-domestic arbitral awards that are contrary to that country’s 
public policy.293 Article 37(2) of the Riyadh Convention includes similar provisions, although 
it extends the public policy exemption to distinguish public policy and Islamic public policy, 
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which is ‘the provisions of the Islamic Shari’ah [and] the public order or the rules of 
conduct…’294  
What amounts to public policy under these international conventions is not clear. However, it 
is generally accepted295 that international public policy is narrower than domestic public 
policy, since domestic public policies of the respective states adopting the conventions would 
vary and would, put together, take in its fold a larger scope than those public policy notions 
that are internationally and universally accepted by all state parties to the respective 
convention. Furthermore, the general pro-enforcement bias informing the New York 
Convention points towards a narrow reading of the ground of public policy. 296A broad 
reading of the public policy defence would also vitiate the New York Convention’s basic 
effort to remove pre-existing obstacles to enforcement. 
There is then the question of whether local courts should apply the public policy ground to 
reject enforcement differentially to domestic awards vis-à-vis foreign awards. As noted by 
Born: 
…it is well-settled that a narrower concept of public policy should apply to 
foreign awards than to domestic awards.297 
However, some commentators have suggested that Saudi Arabia’s utilisation of the 
exemption is contrary to the spirit of the New York Convention.298 According to Roy, writing 
prior to the implementation of the New Arbitration Law: 
Saudi Arabia's adoption of the New York Convention is intended to give the 
international community security in commercial contracts with Saudi Arabia… 
Article V(2) (b) of the New York Convention, however, appears to nullify this 
assurance by permitting Saudi Arabia to reject all arbitral awards that are against 
its public policy. As Saudi Arabian law and policy is diametrically opposed to the 
rules and laws of many member nations, Saudi Arabian courts may find it easy to 
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reject non-domestic arbitral awards pursuant to the New York Convention. In 
essence, Saudi Arabia may not be required to enforce any more non-domestic 
arbitral awards than it did prior to its 1994 accession to the New York 
Convention.299 
One of the reasons that commentators believe that Saudi Arabia is exploiting the drafting of 
the New York Convention is because what falls within public policy in Saudi Arabia is also 
unclear. As noted by Harb and Leventhal, the inextricable link between religion and 
government makes it hard to differentiate between the Shari’ah and public policy.300 
However, it is considered that public policy in Saudi Arabia goes beyond the Shari’ah to also 
consider concepts such as royal prerogative, public morals, interests and customs.301 
According to Baamir and Bantekas: 
…refusals to enforce are more common when setting aside foreign arbitral 
awards [than domestic awards], because public policy in Saudi Arabia covers a 
vast area of practice that might be unknown to foreign arbitrators sitting abroad 
and applying non-Saudi lex arbitri.302 
According to Wakim:  
Critics condemn the New York Convention for allowing Saudi Arabia to 
accomplish the goal of ‘modernizing’ its international dispute resolution methods 
while concurrently providing a ‘safe harbor’ for the country to electively enforce 
foreign arbitral awards that are contrary to public policy.303 
Moreover, Alqudah contends that public policy issues relating to the Shari’ah should be 
limited based on ‘what is allowed and what is prohibited in the Qur’an and the Sunnah’ or 
where is a ‘flagrant injustice’.304 He argues that there is no religious reason why the public 
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policy exception needs to be interpreted broadly by the Kingdom, and that this has stemmed 
from decisions by arbitral tribunals such as ARAMCO.305 
Güzeloğlu states that, in order to comply with the narrow interpretation of the New York 
Convention preferred by other member states, Saudi Arabia is required to:  
…implement a more transparent case law and codify the established Shari’ah 
rules categorically in order to avoid any arbitrary practice, encourage consistent 
rulings and secure legal certainty. If the rules are persistently applied in this 
transparent manner, necessary precautions may be taken by the arbitrators, such 
as rendering an award that is separable in its parts which may potentially be 
considered to be in violation of Saudi Arabian public policy rules so that the rest 
of the award remains executable.306 
However, the question that is being considered here is whether there is sufficient appetite 
within the Kingdom to implement any changes such as those recommended by practitioners 
such as Güzeloğlu.307 By refusing to clarify what amounts to public policy in Saudi Arabia, 
the Saudi government is effectively empowering itself with the ultimate authority to review 
the enforcement of arbitral awards beyond Shari’ah requirements. Although the decisions 
considered in the next section suggest that the Saudi courts are respecting the wishes of the 
parties in international arbitration proceedings, the fact that such powers remain available to 
the Saudi courts would mean that it may not be surprising if there was a continued reluctance 
in the international business community to deal with Saudi companies or apply Saudi law to 
foreign-seated proceedings due to the risk of excessive judicial interference at the time of 
enforcement.308  
7.9  Finality and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
As noted previously, Article 49 of the New Arbitration Law provides that parties seeking to 
challenge an arbitral award can only do so through a nullification process, which, compared 
to the Old Arbitration Law, greatly diminishes the extent to which a supervising court can 
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reconsider or re-try the substance of an arbitral case. However, the New Law allows a certain 
level of discretion to the local courts to refuse enforcement.  
Enforcement of international arbitral awards therefore remains complicated in Saudi Arabia. 
Although the New Arbitration Law and the Enforcement Law (and the accession of the 
Kingdom to the New York Convention and the Riyadh Convention) appear to confirm that 
the Saudi government seeks to put in place the infrastructure to recognise and enforce foreign 
arbitral awards, there appears to be much difficulty in ensuring that this occurs in practice, 
with Kutty noting that: 
…all indications are that Saudi courts will continue to review the merits of 
arbitral decisions to ensure that decisions are consistent with Saudi public policy 
as determined in accordance with the Shari’ah.309  
However, the New Arbitration Law distinguishes between the power of the court to review 
the merits of arbitral decisions versus the merits of arbitral disputes. While Article 50(1) 
limits the grounds of review to certain generally accepted and internationally recognized 
grounds on which a local court may annul the award, this limitation may be rendered 
ineffective by a somewhat umbrella provision contained in Article 50(1). It provides inter 
alia that the Enforcement Court has the power to review an arbitral award if it is deemed that 
the award violates the Shari’ah or public policy.310 Article 50(4) provides that such a review 
should not assess the facts and subject matter of the dispute.311  
This progress brings Saudi arbitration law more into line with international standards. 
However, the question remains as to the level of interference that Saudi courts under the New 
Arbitration Law.312 As set out above, under the Law, the Shari’ah and public policy provide 
the Saudi courts with ample grounds to interfere with the enforcement of an award, even 
without having to consider the merits of the dispute. Although there is commentary from 
Hanbali commentators that an arbitrator’s ruling should be final,313 there remains a fear that 
the Saudi courts may continue to interfere in arbitral proceedings on a case by case basis. A 
review of the decisions that were published prior to the enactment of the New Arbitration 
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Law indicated that there were contradictory verdicts issued in respect of the position of the 
judiciary.314 This shows that either (i) there is no uniform approach to the enforcement of 
arbitral awards, which means that the judge’s opinion and discretion are fundamental to the 
proceedings, or (ii) judges may be influenced by social, economic and political interests, such 
as issues related to Saudi public policy that fall outside the remits of the Shari’ah, when 
considering the enforcement of awards.315 
Neither of these approaches are ideal from an international party’s perspective as they result 
in a lack of clarity and transparency. By the same token, one can easily anticipate instances 
wherein a party, and one especially not confident of its claims might insist on a Saudi seat as 
this unbridled scope of interference may well work in its favour. This de-facto prejudices the 
rights and legitimate expectations of the non-Saudi party. It is hopeful that the 
implementation of the New Arbitration Law will provide a level of certainty for parties. 
However, the situation remains that the risk of an arbitral award not being enforced in Saudi 
Arabia is potentially higher than in other jurisdictions, in spite of the New Arbitration Law 
and the Enforcement Law.316  
Furthermore, since parties are entitled to agree that the Shari’ah is not applicable to 
international proceedings under Article 8 of the legislation, the re-introduction of a form of 
judicial review based on a broad interpretation of Article V(2)(b) of the New York 
Convention at the enforcement stage may result in parties having to endure a potentially 
arduous and expensive arbitration process only to see the enforcement of their award fail on 
the basis of the application of undefined principles of the Shari’ah or public policy.317 
Depending on the level of interference demonstrated by the courts, it is debatable whether 
such an outcome is any preferable than the outcomes when the Old Arbitration Law was in 
force. This ultimately will be a matter taken into account by international entities when 
considering whether to apply Saudi law or whether to trade with or invest in Saudi 
companies.318  
This section illustrates a major theme running through arbitration law in Saudi Arabia (and 
Saudi law in general), namely that Saudi judges are still empowered with a level of discretion 
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to interfere with the arbitral process on the grounds of uncodified principles based on the 
Shari’ah and Saudi public policy. In order to effectively engage with unfettered discretion, it 
would be useful to provide a body of case law that illustrates that the Saudi courts are in fact 
complying with the spirit of the legislation (against its form), which is to provide a seat of 
international dispute resolution that reflects international standards. The next section will 
consider a number of cases to this effect that have been reported by the Saudi courts 
subsequent to the implementation of the New Arbitration Law. 
7.10 Effect of the New Arbitration Law: A Qualified Success? 
Subsequent to the implementation of the New Arbitration Law and the Enforcement Law, 
further steps were taken to promote arbitration in Saudi Arabia in 2016, with the opening of 
the Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration (SCCA).319 The SCCA comprises of a 
permanent committee, including representatives qualified in both the Shari’ah and fiqh and 
other representatives nominated by the Council of Saudi Chambers. The SCCA was set up 
with the intention of providing for efficient, transparent and flexible dispute resolution 
procedures and is intended to ensure that any arbitration proceedings carried out through the 
SCCA are enforceable pursuant to both domestic arbitration laws and international treaties 
such as the New York Convention.320 It has been suggested by some commentators that the 
SCCA was necessary in order to ensure confidence in the New Arbitration Law, with 
Elshufara noting that: 
…the absence of a recognised arbitral institution and the uncertain intervention of 
the state courts in arbitration proceedings can leave skeptics weary of the New 
Arbitration Law.321 
An issue which on its surface may appear irrelevant to the arbitration procedure but is telling 
when viewed within the prism of a broader liberal attitude being exhibited by the drafters, is 
that Article 14 of the New Arbitration Law is silent on the issue of the gender of the 
arbitrator(s). Although the Qur’an and the Sunnah do not explicitly prohibit female 
arbitrators, as noted previously, the Hanbali school of interpretation espoused by Saudi 
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Arabia has generally enforced such a restriction.322 However, female arbitrators may arbitrate 
on international disputes under Saudi law and this means that there may be some way for 
women to become more involved in the arbitration process, especially with regard to foreign 
companies323. This has been perceived by some to be an important step both in Saudi Arabia, 
which has a history and outside perception about gender-inequality within the Kingdom, and 
in the arbitration field in general, which has been criticised due to the underrepresentation of 
female arbitrators.324 The above notwithstanding, some legal scholars noted that, despite the 
drafters framing the New Arbitration Law in a gender-neutral manner, there remained an 
assumption that women were prohibited from being arbitrators in Saudi Arabia.325 Baamir 
noted as follows:  
In accordance with Shari’ah ruling, women cannot be appointed as judges or 
arbitrators. This is not a matter for discussion in Saudi Arabia.326 
Arguably, these fears may appear to be unfounded as in May 2016 the Court of Appeal 
recognised an arbitral tribunal comprising of a female arbitrator.327 This was a case before the 
Administrative Court under Section 15(1) of the Arbitration Law, wherein the Court was 
required to rule on the appointment of the arbitral tribunal. In reaching its decision, the Court 
of Appeal implicitly approved the appointment of a female arbitrator on the panel. This 
decision achieved finality in view of Section 15(4) of the Law which states that a decision on 
the appointment of arbitrator in accordance with its provisions is a final determination and 
not subject to appeal.  
By reaching this decision, the Court of Appeal indicated that the gender of the arbitrator was 
immaterial when considering the legitimacy of the award.328 This decision appears to be 
somewhat of a departure from the Hanbali position on female arbitrators (or at least the Saudi 
interpretation of it), which may imply that the Saudi courts are becoming more open to 
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applying the Hanbali approach in a more flexible way329 – rooted in freedom of contract and 
sanctity of contract - as opposed to the rigid post-ARAMCO approach.330 However, the 
Hanbali School is not flexible with regard to some issues such as family law and gender 
equality in general.331 Regarding the issue of female arbitrators, there are sufficient historical 
precedents in the holy texts to indicate that the Hanbali School’s attitude to women in 
arbitration is rooted in expedience and not on precedent. For instance, there were female 
arbitrators in the early years of Islam.332 There is no explicit prohibition of female arbitration 
in the holy texts and this could mean that the rules on women’s participation in arbitral 
processes could be enhanced. It may also imply that Saudi courts are more open to 
considering the position of the other Islamic schools, such as the Hanafi School, which allows 
female arbitrators, given that this is not explicitly set out in the Qur’an.333 
It is striking, therefore, that the court in question (the Saudi Court of Appeal) refused to 
accept an interim challenge to the validity of a final award based on the identity of the 
arbitrator, presumptively on the basis that: i) Article 50(1) provides for exhaustive procedural 
grounds on which an award may be challenged, thus imposing statutory limits on the scope of 
judicial review, and the ground of invalidating an award based on the identity of an arbitrator 
is beyond the scope of Article 50(1); and ii) any challenges raised in respect of the validity of 
an arbitral award should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the broader policy aims of 
the new arbitration law, including the need to ensure certainty and stability in arbitral 
outcomes for the benefit of both foreign and Saudi parties.334 However, it must be noted that 
the Law of 2012 reiterates the primacy of Shari’ah law. The Law circumscribes the 
supervisory power of the local courts but does not clarify the relationship between the 
Arbitration law and the Shari’ah.335 This means that there could be difficulties ahead with the 
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arbitration laws. This analysis is supported by interviews with Saudi court professionals as 
shown in chapter 8. 
Although the Court of Appeal’s decision recognising (albeit indirectly) a female arbitrator 
represents something of a turning point.336 Given that the decision is not binding, it should 
not, however, be simply presumed that challenges against the appointment of female 
arbitrators may not succeed in the future.337 Furthermore, with the statistics indicating that 
parties in international arbitration cases appoint a very small percentage of female arbitrators, 
Almulhim cautions reading too much in the decision, noting that:  
While this remarkable case shows that the path for women to participate in 
arbitration is not blocked by any legal hurdles, time will tell whether parties will 
commit to appointing female arbitrators, particularly given the possibility that 
another court might reach a different conclusion.338 
However, regardless of whether this decision is reflective of the future approach of Saudi 
courts, it is important in illustrating that the often-rigid interpretation of the pronouncements 
of the Hanbali school may be changing. It is also worth noting that the acceptability of female 
arbitrators in Islamic law is itself contested among the various schools.339 This is to say, that 
it has not yet been affirmed as an obligatory requirement of Islam but is instead a matter of 
competing interpretations. Thus, while the Hanbali school posits that women cannot arbitrate 
disputes based on an interpretation of Islamic legal scholars, the Hanafi schools reject this 
position, thereby taking a more flexible position on the validity of arbitral awards issued by 
female arbitrators.340 The growing number of female judges in the majority of Muslim 
countries means that the prohibition of female arbitrators in Saudi Arabia could be seen as a 
requirement which is no longer a necessity, as defined with the framework of Shari’ah.341 In 
other Muslim countries, the courts may be de facto engaged in ijtihad; the dynamic process 
of evolving rules and customs derived from Islamic sources to more accurately reflect the 
needs and demands of Islamic societies. In support of this idea, Ayad argues as follows: 
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The realities of globalisation cannot be ignored and though they did not exist at 
the time of the founding of Islam, Islam, if interpreted properly, can provide tools 
applicable to a modern age to allow appropriate jurisprudence to address modern 
problems. One of the themes within classical Islamic jurisprudence in terms of 
adjudication and discretion is that Shari’ah law is divinely inspired, and as such, 
its interpretation is not left to the personal opinion of the jurist or the arbitral 
tribunal, but rather to discovery of the intent behind the divine law and its 
appropriate application…. Discovery of the intent of the law is more important 
than a literal interpretation.342 
In the aforementioned dispute, the challenge centred on legal points on which there is no 
clear Islamic scholarly consensus is one reason why Saudi courts may have felt justified in 
rejecting one interpretation of Islamic sources (the Hanbali position on female arbitrators) in 
favour of a different interpretation that is more consistent with emerging norms and 
expectations of Saudi society and the wider international community, without also having to 
reject Shari’ah-related considerations as a permitted ground of challenge per se.343 Hanbali is 
the preeminent legal school but the Saudi government recognizes other schools and is 
sometimes prepared to recognise their legitimacy. The different hierarchy of sources means 
that every school has a different interpretation of the Shari’ah and even Saudi courts can be 
flexible with regard to decisions.344 For example, while the pronouncements of the Hanbali 
School may take precedence in most matters, the courts may adopt Hanafi principles with 
regard to commercial law. This could introduce a greater degree of flexibility into the arbitral 
system without apparently abandoning many of the principles of Islamic courts, which are 
important in a Saudi context. It could open up the possibility of female arbitrators for 
example. This flexibility is in line with traditional Islamic teaching in the Golden Age.345 
The implication is that Saudi courts may be becoming more open to embracing a more 
pluralistic approach to Islamic scholarly positions or Fiqh, as part of the Vision 2030 plan to 
modernise the Kingdom. Indeed, it is established that judges, Islamic or otherwise, will apply 
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rules in accordance with established customs and usages.346 This is immanent in the Islamic 
tradition and method of rule construction. The 13th Century Hanafi jurist, AH Abid 
countenanced that a widely adhered to custom, or emergent norm derived from juristic 
consensus (ijima), may indeed crystalise into a general rule over time.347 
As such, international contract and commercial arbitration can and must be reconciled with 
the Shari’ah. Indeed, some kind of rapprochement between modern commercial realities and 
Islamic jurisprudence will be increasingly vital if Saudi Arabia is to emerge a regional leader 
in this area. Deeper awareness of Islamic jurisprudence, both of its flexibility as embodied by 
itijhad and of hardened rules or customs qua urf348will further facilitate arbitral award 
enforcement particularly in the arena of international commercial and investment law.349 
Saudi courts may yet play a crucial role, bridging the gap between the Saudi government’s 
new willingness to participate in the international legal order and past assertions of the 
exclusivity of its sovereign laws and authority.350 This could be resolved by more 
transparency in the legal system and applying Hanafi principles in relation to commercial law 
cases, including arbitration, in recognition of factors such as globalisation.  
One practical example of the more modern approach being taken by the Saudi authorities is 
in respect of efforts to improve transparency within the legal system (including in respect of 
arbitration) through the publication of hundreds of Saudi court judgements.351 Previously, 
because Saudi legal cases were not published in the public domain, there was uncertainty 
about the rationale behind decisions made by the Board of Grievances. Although these cases 
are not recent cases, a number of cases have since been published indicating that the 
Enforcement Court is not excessively interfering in arbitral awards. The cases reported in this 
section appear to indicate a more liberal approach of the Saudi courts under the New 
Arbitration Law.352 
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7.11 Recent Case Law 
In a decision rendered in December 2016, the Enforcement Court confirmed that an award 
rendered to International Transit S. A., an overseas company, would be enforced against the 
Saudi Al-Nashmi Company.353 The parties had agreed to be bound by the ICC Rules in 
Geneva. However, the defendant Saudi company claimed that, among other things, the 
arbitral ruling did not comply with the Shari’ah on the basis that it included elements of riba 
and usury.354 Relying on Article 9 of the Enforcement Law, the Enforcement Court found that 
that the award could be partially rendered, less the parts of the award that were not in 
compliance with the Shari’ah.  
The defendant appealed the decision of the Enforcement Court to the Court of Appeal who 
requested that the Enforcement Court reconsider the case on the basis that it may have 
contradicted the Shari’ah.355 Upon remand to the Enforcement Court, the latter Court 
clarified that their decision was based on the New Arbitration Law and Article 32 of the 
Riyadh Convention and emphasised that they were obliged to enforce any valid international 
arbitral awards that do not conflict with public policy, including the Shari’ah. The court 
further clarified that its jurisdiction was limited to ensuring that the award was valid and that 
they were not empowered to review the substance of the decision but limited only to testing 
the award against the Shari’ah.356 
This decision touched upon a number of matters that have been discussed in this chapter. 
First of all, the Enforcement Court was willing to uphold international arbitral awards handed 
down under non-Saudi rules. Second, the Enforcement Court allowed the award to be 
rendered despite elements of the award being contrary to the Shari’ah, thus indicating that the 
concept of severability provided for under Article 55 of the New Arbitration Law is being 
successfully applied by the Courts.357 Third, the Court of Appeal clarified that the decision 
itself was not contrary to the Shari’ah or public policy, thereby implying that the concept of 
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public policy could be subject to a narrower interpretation in the aftermath of the New 
Arbitration Law.358 
Of perhaps even greater significance was that the Court of Appeal confirmed that it was not 
entitled to re-try the case on the basis of the claims of the Saudi company that the 
proceedings did not comply with the Shari’ah. This indicates that the Saudi judiciary is 
willing to refrain from considering the merits of international arbitration proceedings and 
accepting that their sole remit is to review awards and consider whether any elements of such 
awards are enforceable. 
Also in 2016, an $18.5 million arbitral award rendered by the ICC against a Saudi Arabian 
party was enforced by the Enforcement Court in Saudi Arabia within three months of the 
grant of the award. This was the first example of the recognition of a foreign award in Saudi 
Arabia under the New Arbitration Law. Although the reasoning of the decision is not publicly 
available, this case indicates that Saudi courts are willing to accept the merits of international 
arbitration proceedings, regardless of Saudi’s local law. This case is also important in that the 
Enforcement Court confirmed that reciprocity was established by reference to the UK’s 
membership of the New York Convention, which implies that reciprocity may now be 
established by treaty.359 It is also illustrative of an increasingly efficient enforcement of 
awards under the newly-established Enforcement Court. However, it should also be noted 
that the reports did not indicate whether any award had actually been paid under the order or 
whether the respondent had entered an ‘enforcement dispute’ i.e. an argument relating to the 
conditions of enforceability of the award (as opposed to an appeal).  
Further reported arbitral awards include two awards rendered in 2016 and January 2018, the 
former requiring a Saudi company to pay an award to a Chinese company,360 while the latter 
required a Saudi company to pay more than $74m to two Japanese companies.361 Again, 
although the reasoning of the Enforcement Court was not published for these decisions, they 
are further examples of the Enforcement Court’s willingness to enforce awards against Saudi 
companies without resorting to considering the merits of the decision. Furthermore, with both 
China and Japan being members of the New York Convention, the enforcement of these 
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awards may provide further evidence that Saudi courts are willing to accept that reciprocity is 
established by treaty. 
Thus far, the case law appears to suggest that the New Arbitration Law has had the intended 
effect in modernising the arbitration procedure in Saudi Arabia and providing more certainty 
regarding the enforceability of arbitral awards against Saudi Arabian companies, and that 
courts will no longer intervene or effectively re-try the decisions of international arbitral 
tribunals. 
Furthermore, the case law appears to suggest that Saudi courts are willing to accept that 
parties to an international arbitration are free to agree to their own procedural rules, which 
will not be challenged by Saudi courts when considering whether to enforce the award. This 
is more reflective of early Islamic practices that are discussed chapters 2 and 3. Rules that 
obtained at the time were sufficiently flexible to allow parties to invoke the principle of 
‘freedom of contract’,362 a principle that is shared with the principle of the right of party 
autonomy under international arbitration norms.363 
It is stated above that potential ‘gaps’ exist in the New Arbitration Law, but much of these 
depend on the exercise of the powers of the judiciary to interfere in arbitration procedures. 
The case law thus far indicates that the judiciary appears to be willing to accept its limited 
role in arbitration proceedings, which is more in line with the spirit of international 
conventions such as the New York Convention. As noted previously, the fact that the 
decisions of these courts are not binding means that some doubts still exist as to whether the 
courts will continue to apply this narrow interpretation. However, these doubts can be 
assuaged by a more transparent court process that provides the rationale for court decisions 
and an element of precedent being applied to court decisions. Although there does appear to 
be some appetite for this level of transparency, it may take several years before international 
companies are generally happy to accept that the New Arbitration Law has truly resulted in a 
turning of the corner in terms of international arbitration. However, it is clear that it is a 
positive step towards reviving historic trade practices in the Arabian Peninsula and embracing 
the ‘true Islam’ envisaged by the Kingdom under the Vision 2030 programme.  
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7.12 Conclusion 
This chapter illustrates that the Saudi courts appear willing to adopt a more flexible approach 
to interpretation of arbitration under Shari’ah law. This supports the contention that the 
distrust of the international regime has diminished and the attitude towards international 
arbitration is ‘progressively reversing’.364 The willingness of the drafters of the New 
Arbitration Law to adopt and enforce UNCITRAL standards suggests a change of approach 
by the Saudi authorities when considering international standards, evidenced by a number of 
judgments between 2012 and 2018. The courts are taking into account the Kingdom’s 
obligations under international treaty law, such as the New York Convention and the Riyadh 
Convention. Furthermore, the willingness to appoint (or at least not reject the appointment of) 
female arbitrators is another example to support the contention that the Kingdom’s often rigid 
adherence to a traditional interpretation of the Hanbali school is being reconsidered in the 
face of increased requirements to modernise and reconstruct the Saudi economy under the 
Vision 2030 Programme.  
However, as this chapter demonstrates, there is still some uncertainty about when Saudi 
courts may consider it appropriate to invoke their powers to intervene or to refuse to enforce 
an international arbitral award. The few reported cases thus far appear to suggest that the 
courts require real and compelling reasons to do so but they constitute only a small sample. 
Thus, it is difficult to establish the boundaries at which Saudi courts may choose to intervene. 
Previous chapters have shown how early Islam both adapted and encouraged international 
trade and the use of arbitration as an effective dispute resolution mechanism.365 Whilst it is 
accurate to state that early Islamic scholars could not have envisaged the globalised 
commercial environment that exists in the modern world, they arguably incorporated 
sufficient level of flexibility into their interpretations of the Qur’an to ensure that future 
societies could adapt the Shari’ah to changing economic conditions. It is open to Islamic 
nations to embrace or reject this flexibility. Historically, it has appeared to be the position of 
Saudi authorities rejected the flexibility in favour of a rigid interpretation in an attempt to 
adhere to a classical interpretation of the Qur’an. However, in the face of economic realities 
and developments, it has gradually become clear that elements of the Saudi legal system need 
to develop and adapt in order to reflect the globalised trading system. Although intended to 
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protect its citizens, the strict enforcement of the Shari’ah has the potential to harm Saudi 
businesses from trading with international companies that are not subject to the Shari’ah. 
To some, the gap between the literalist and the modernist interpretation of the Shari’ah in 
Saudi Arabia may appear to be impossible to reconcile. However, this chapter shows that the 
bridge to this gap in terms of embracing international arbitration standards can be found 
within the principles of Islamic law itself. By ensuring that basic principles of the Shari’ah, 
such as party autonomy and the good faith enforcement of contractual undertakings are 
enforced as mandatory law, and allowing for the flexible interpretation of Shari’ah law 
through ijtihad,366 Saudi Arabia may place itself in a position within which it can embrace 
modern arbitration practices and protect foreign investors without having to abandon its 
founding principles. 
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Chapter 8: 
Fieldwork Chapter 
8.1 Introduction 
As stated in chapter 1, this study examines the implications of the Shari’ah in commercial 
law by considering the extent to which it constitutes an obstacle to foreign investment and the 
use of arbitration to settle commercial disputes in Saudi Arabia. Also, it is shown in chapters 
2 and 3 that the disconnect between Islamic law and ‘free market’ principles in Saudi Arabia 
may be traced to the rigid interpretations by Hanbali scholars. Hence, the argument that Islam 
is antithetical to free trade and competition is misguided. Then, it is suggested in chapters 5 
and 6 that the government of Saudi Arabia should codify Islamic commercial rules and train 
judges in the use of the Shari’ah to resolve complex commercial disputes. It is noted that 
despite King Abdul Aziz’s decision to prioritise the Hanbali jurisprudence, the Shari’ah is 
still largely discursive and scholastic. This explains why it is difficult to determine how the 
Shari’ah may be used to fill the gaps in the New Arbitration Law and Enforcement Law as 
shown in chapter 7. Lastly, it was argued in chapter 6 that a transparent court process that 
provides the rationale for judicial decisions is also required.  
Thus, despite the absence of a Shari’ah authority invested with the power to create juridical 
norms, the previous chapters show that the Shari’ah remains the highest law of the land, and 
any provision in a treaty or clause in an agreement or any arbitral award that is inconsistent 
with the Shari’ah will be unenforceable in Saudi Arabia. An attempt was therefore made to 
ascertain the perception of members of the Saudi legal community toward the Shari’ah. 
Emphasis was placed on the relationship between the Shari’ah and free trade and its appeal to 
foreign investors, the importance of codification, the use of the Shari’ah to settle investment 
disputes, the training and knowledge of judges in Shari’ah courts, and the importance of 
establishing precedent. The meanings given by a convenience sample to key terms related to 
these issues were captured. The qualitative study was based on the contention that the 
perception of participants in the Saudi legal community may help to provide a better 
understanding of the flexibility of the Shari’ah. 
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8.2 Research Journey 
 
The process for conducting the study involved planning, developing the interview guide and 
drafting the questions, sampling, collecting the data, analysing the data and determining the 
findings. The planning lasted for more than six months because the University had to be sure 
that the research met the ethical standards. Given that the study involved human participants 
and personal data, the researcher applied for ethical approval from the University’s Ethics 
Committee. The application form and guidance helped the researcher to understand what was 
required. The researcher was required to demonstrate that he intended to respect the 
autonomy of the participants. This was achieved by the researcher undertaking to provide the 
participants with information that was sufficient to obtain informed consent. Thus, the 
participants made informed decisions regarding their participation in the project. The 
researcher also undertook to ensure that the participants knew that they were free to withdraw 
from the study at any time without prejudice and without explanation. Lastly, the researcher 
undertook to protect the personal data volunteered by the participants through appropriate 
procedures for anonymisation and confidentiality. 
The researcher also demonstrated to the Committee that the study would have benefits that 
outweighed any risks. It was stated to the Committee that Saudi legal scholars, judges, 
arbitrators, members of the public, government officials and drafters of policy would benefit 
from the results of the interviews and the study. In this light, the researcher undertook to 
design and conduct the study in such manner as to maximise the likelihood of obtaining 
benefits and disseminating the findings appropriately. The researcher demonstrated that the 
research aim, hypothesis and questions are transparent, and the methodology employed 
would be appropriate for achieving the aim and testing the hypothesis. The researcher also 
demonstrated that he had considered the potential for harm to come to the participants, 
especially those who decided to criticise government policy or the principles of the Shari’ah. 
The researcher also kept in mind that harm may sometimes be subjective and hard to predict. 
The risk of such harm was avoided by the anonymisation of the responses of the participants. 
Lastly, the researcher had no potential conflict of interests to declare. 
The perceptions and beliefs of judges, arbitrators, legal scholars and members of the public 
including journalists and investors, were captured and examined within structures of 
meaning. A convenience sample of fifty-five potential participants was prepared for the 
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purpose of obtaining meanings of key concepts relating to the interpretation and application 
of investment and arbitration laws in the Saudi Arabia. Twenty-five of the fifty-five potential 
participants consented to participate in the study and were interviewed. Each individual who 
agreed to participate was invited to participate in an interview to discuss their perceptions of 
the investment and arbitration laws, and policy implications of the Vision 2030 programme. 
In general, the interviewees had adjudicated on and resolved disputes as judges or arbitrators 
or analysed statutes and dicta as scholars and investors or reported on laws and court dicta as 
journalists. The journalists and investors represented the members of the public in the sample. 
All the participants had in their respective capacities faced the dilemma of applying the law 
of the Saudi Arabia based on the strict interpretation of the Shari’ah or the law of another 
Muslim-majority State that is more suitable for investment or arbitration. 
 
In conducting the research, random sampling was not used to recruit the participants. This is 
because randomisation was not possible due to the large size of the target population, judges, 
arbitrators, legal scholars and members of the public. Moreover, time and resources were 
limited, and there was no intention to create generalisations that relate to the entire 
population. It follows that non-probability sampling, whereby all the members of the target 
population were not given an equal chance to be selected, was used together with subjective 
methods to determine which members of the target population met specific criteria.1 The 
criteria used to select participants include knowledge of the investment and arbitration laws 
of the Saudi Arabia, willingness to participate and assess government policies objectively, 
availability at the time of the study, and easy accessibility. Potential participants who were 
not willing objectively to assess the policies endorsed by the King and the interpretation of 
the Qur’an and Hadiths by the Hanbali school were excluded before arriving at fifty-five 
potential participants. The sampling was therefore affordable since the subjects were readily 
available. Non-probability convenience sampling was adopted on the ground that the 
members of the target population constitute a homogenous group.2 As noted above, it was not 
possible to determine whether the convenience sample was representative of the target 
                                                
1 Mike P Battaglia, ‘Non-Probability Sampling’ in Encyclopedia of Survey Research Methods (SAGE 2008) 1-
4. 
2 Ilker Etikan et al (n 1) 1, 2. 
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population. Nonetheless, the homogeneity of the group helped to overcome the problem of 
generalising findings based on convenience sampling.3 
 
Notwithstanding, in conducting this research it was uncertain how well the convenience 
sample would represent the target population given that apart from knowledge of the 
investment and arbitration laws, skill and experience, the most influential factors in recruiting 
the participants were availability and convenience. Hence, recruitment and retention were 
optimised by using a large sampling frame including hundreds of men and women who had 
knowledge of the investment and arbitration laws and were willing to critically assess 
government policies objectively. Material was provided in Arabic and English, and reminders 
were sent. Effective recruitment techniques for non-intervention or observational studies 
generally target specific demographic groups such as minority groups4 or adolescent 
mothers.5 Nonetheless, it was difficult to use recruitment and retention techniques that are 
relevant to specific demographic groups. Also, this was not necessary because the criteria 
used for selection were knowledge of the law and ability to critical assess policies. 
 
The interviews were semi-structured. Thus, they had an explicit structure in regard to theory 
and method, but they were not structured. In other words, open-ended questions were used 
and they varied according to participants’ responses and developed according to the direction 
the conversation took. Hence, the perspectives and opinions of the participants led the 
interviews and emerged from the interviews. This method is appropriate because it facilitated 
the process of extracting information from participants using guided conversations.6 The 
researcher was therefore the main data gathering instrument7 and was able to obtain personal 
and insightful access to data on the perceptions and experiences of the adjudicators, scholars 
and members of the public in Saudi Arabia.  
 
                                                
3 On the generalisability of homogenous convenience samples, see Justin Jager, Diane L Putnick and Marc H 
Bornstein, ‘More than Just Convenient: The Scientific Methods of Homogenous Convenience Samples’ (2017) 
82(2) Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development 13, 13-30. 
4 See Antronette K Yancey et al, ‘Effective Recruitment and Retention of Minority Research Participants’ 
(2006) 27 Annual Review of Public Health 1, 10-15. 
5 See Mary Seed et al, ‘Improving Recruitment and Retention Rates in Preventive Longitudinal Research with 
Adolescent Mothers’ (2009) 22 Journal of Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Nursing 150, 150-153. 
6 Maryam Diko, ‘Establishing Construct Validity and Reliability: Pilot Testing of a Qualitative Interview for 
Research in Takaful (Islamic Insurance)’ (2016) 21 The Qualitative Report 521, 523-524. 
7 Daniel W Turner, ‘Qualitative Interview Design: A Practical Guide for Novice Investigators’ (2010) 15 The 
Qualitative Report 754, 754-760. 
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The interviews were conducted within a period of six months divided into two fieldwork 
trips. A sequence of open-ended questions was used that required the respondents to provide 
information that was both factual and conjectural.8 The use of open-ended questions is also 
important because they enabled the researcher to ask follow-up questions, change the time 
allocated to each question and sequence on the basis of the needs of each session. The 
questions are also appropriate for cases where the analysis is geared towards ascertaining the 
nature of a concept from the respondent’s unique perspective.9  
 
With regard to the setting, Jacob and Ferguson note that it is better to use a setting that is 
comfortable for the participants and makes recording data easy.10 Thus, the respondents were 
allowed to choose the settings. The interviews were conducted in board rooms and offices 
based on the participants’ choice. Signed permissions were obtained from the participants, 
and in some cases their employers, to taking part in the interviews. They were all conducted 
face-to-face, most of them were recorded, transcribed verbatim, and translated from Arabic to 
English. The translation was done by the researcher. Transcribed interviews in the original 
Arabic version were sent to the respondents for their approval before the interviews were 
analysed. 
 
8.2.1 The Interviews 
The guidelines that were used to conduct the interviews are contained in the interview guide 
shown in Table 8.1 below. The set of questions asked are shown in Appendix I. The 
interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 1 hour; the open-ended questions enabled the 
researcher to probe and obtain more information from the respondents in order to minimise 
the impact of any potential biases. The responses are discussed below. 
 
Table 8.I Interview Guide 
Topic Guide Subject of Discussion 
Respondent characteristics Reasons for working as a judge, adjudicator, 
scholar or journalist 
                                                
8 Barbara DiCicco-Bloom and Benjamin Crabtree, ‘The Qualitative Research Interview: Medical Education’ 
(2006) 40 Medical Education 314, 315-320. 
9 Ronald J Chenail, ‘Interviewing the Investigator: Strategies for Addressing Instrumentation and Researcher 
Bias Concerns in Qualitative Research’ (2011) 16 The Qualitative Report 255, 256-261. 
10 Stacy A Jacob S and Paige S Furgerson, ‘Writing Interview Protocols and Conducting Interviews: Tips for 
Students New to the Field of Qualitative Research’ (2012) 17 The Qualitative Report 1, 2-9. 
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 Decision-making model used (logic, statutory 
interpretation rule, ideology) 
 Importance of a participant’s religion 
  
Theory guiding decision-making by 
legislators and judges 
Realism vs formalism 
 Duty as a Muslim 
 Importance of free trade  
 Importance of recognising foreign awards 
 Why laws should protect local trade 
  
Thoughts on free trade and foreign arbitration The role of Islam 
 The goals of Vision 2030 
 How does the law promote trade responsibly 
 
The above table shows the structures of meanings11 that the researcher sought to identify. 
This was followed by capturing the various perspectives on the rule of interpretation favoured 
by judges and arbitrators, the way they interpreted or applied the law, the decision-making 
model and theory often used, and their perspectives on the role of the Shari’ah, and the 
importance of free trade and the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards. The 
perspectives of pundits (scholars, journalists and investors) were also captured in relation to 
the role of the Shari’ah, the importance of free trade and recognition and enforcement of 
foreign awards. The relations of the different and similar perspectives all depict the social 
meanings that guide the actions of the participants.  
 
However, it was important to distinguish between the perceptions of adjudicators who apply 
the meanings of texts to actual cases in a legally binding manner and the pundits who simply 
act out their lives on their understandings of the meanings of texts. The perspectives of the 
latter are akin to public perception (informed members of the public), and it has been 
                                                
11 The term ‘meanings’ is used interchangeably with ‘social meanings’. The term is defined in section 8.2.1 
above. 
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demonstrated that this perception is essential to judicial reform efforts.12 Hence, legal culture 
is not only affected by the historical context and the structure of the judiciary but also by 
public perception. This is because public perception of the justice system is a proxy for court 
users’ perception of quality.13 It is also important to ascertain the perception of adjudicators 
on the other hand. They are rational decision-makers who apply the law, as well as policy 
preferences.14 They may choose between the policy of the law formulated by the government, 
the policy received from the Shari’ah, and the policy reflected in the statute. As such, 
ascertaining the driving forces behind judicial decisions may ensure certainty and stability of 
the rule of law.15 Thus, the interaction between the structures of meaning and the actions of 
adjudicators and pundits produce the dynamic transformation of the field of meaning. In other 
words, the way these structures of meaning interact with each other determine whether an 
international instrument or arbitral award is accepted or rejected under the Shari’ah. 
 
Each interview was conducted as a meeting between an expert or consultant and the 
Researcher. The participant and the researcher exchanged ideas and viewpoints, and, in the 
process, the participant constructed meanings that are contextually grounded. This is what 
Elliot Mishler described as the ‘discussing joint construction of interview discourse’.16 
Hence, the social meanings of free trade and international arbitration are like separate 
component parts that the interviewees put together with the researcher’s help. After the 
interviews, the meanings put together by each participant were then synthesised. 
 
The interviews began with the use of the free association narrative method or relational 
experimental technique.17 The association in this study was that judges, arbitrators, scholars 
and members of the public that favour foreign investment and the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards are more likely to interpret the Shari’ah in a progressive manner. For 
example, as shown below, the participants who favoured increased foreign investment stated 
                                                
12 John M Scheb II and William Lyons, ‘Public Perception of the Supreme Court in the 1990s’ (1998) Judicature 
66, 67; Maria Dakolias, ‘Court Performance Around the World: A Comparative Perspective’ (1999) 2(1) Yale 
Human Rights and Development Journal 87, 92. 
13 Edgardo Buscaglia and Maria Dakiouas, Judicial Reform in Latin American Courts (World Bank 1996) 4. 
14 Brian Leiter, ‘Positivism, Formalism, Realism’ (1999) 99 Columbia Law Review 1136, 1145- 1146. See also 
Holmes’ quote that ‘the life of law has not been logic; it has been experience’. Oliver Wendel Holmes, The 
Common Law (Dover Publications 1991) 1. 
15 Vitalius Tumonis, ‘Legal Realism and Judicial Decision-Making’ (2012) 19(4) Jurisprudence 1361, 1378-
1379. 
16 Elliot G Mishler, Research Interviewing: Context and Narrative (Harvard University Press 1986) 526. 
17 This is defined in section 8.2 above. 
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that foreign arbitral awards granted by female arbitrators should be reviewed on their merits, 
while participants that were concerned about the impact of external impulses on the 
development of the Shari’ah adopted a formalist approach by stating the Hanbali position, 
which is the applicable law. The use of the relational experimental technique involved 
beginning with short questions relating to the history of the institution that employed the 
interviewee, marital status and job description. The interviewees were then asked whether 
they had heard and read about the vision of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. This 
was followed by relational prompts about whether the government of the King or Custodian 
of the Two Holy Mosques should encourage foreign investment in order to achieve the 
outcomes of Vision 2030. The relational questions allowed the respondents to discuss their 
understanding of Vision 2030, their support or concerns about the Vision 2030 programme, 
and the meanings they associate with trade liberalisation. This study shows that the relational 
technique offers commendable insight into the viewpoints and concerns of adjudicators, legal 
scholars, and members of the public. Respondents were encouraged to lead the discourse 
while the Researcher focused on the nexus of meanings that the respondents associated with 
free trade and the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.18  
 
After the free relational prompts, the respondents were asked about the efficiency of the 
Saudi Economic and Development Council and Saudi Commercial Arbitration Centre, and 
the reliability of the judicial system in comparison to the judicial systems of other countries. 
They were also asked about the constraints on judicial decision-making: whether judges in 
Saudi Arabia have decisional freedom: whether they are obliged to rely on precedent set by 
previous judges: what margin of discretion (if any) judges in Saudi Arabia enjoy regarding 
the application and interpretation of foreign investment law and law of arbitration? Are they 
guided by realist or formalist objectives? In the same vein, the respondents were asked 
whether they believe the new arbitration system sufficiently empowers arbitrators.  
 
                                                
18 Wendy Hollway and Tony Jefferson, Doing Qualitative Research Differently: Free Association, Narrative and 
the Interview Method (Sage 2000) 36-37, 152. The genesis of the method may be traced to Anton O Kris, Free 
Association: Method and Process (Karnac Books 1982). 
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8.3 Theory and Design 
Contemporary legal scholarship increasingly focuses on extracting the social meanings of 
institutions and practices in order to better understand the role of law and policy in society.19 
Researchers seek to determine how law and policy interact and how the interaction regulates 
the behaviour of individuals in society.20 Thus, certain regulatory techniques are effective 
because they change social meaning and encourage obedience to the law.21 This follows from 
the interpretive turn in the social sciences and the law in the middle of the twentieth century, 
and the interpretive turn in law and economics, and law and sociology a few decades later.22 
It has, for example, been established that one of the main reasons why the public is less 
interested with the experimentation of a replacement of imprisonment is that the social 
meaning of prison is linked to the categorical denunciation of crime.23 Nonetheless, 
measuring interpretive variables is still very challenging given that variables such as 
meanings are not readily quantifiable.  
One of the earliest researchers who attempted to measure the variables within the scope of 
symbolic interactionism,24 Herbert Blumer, favoured a naturalistic approach.25 He noted that 
the validity of interactionist premises cannot be tested in a laboratory setting but by observing 
actual human group life or social life. However, he did not recommend the testing of a 
hypothesis and ensuring that the premises fit a protocol of research procedure.26 He simply 
observed actual human group life and determined how the meanings of things that guided 
human action are derived from social interaction and are handled in an interpretive process.27 
However, symbolic interactionism now relies on the testing of hypotheses, protocols of 
research procedures, and schemes of operationalising concepts in order to implement multiple 
                                                
19 Bernard E Harcourt, ‘After the “Social Meaning Turn”: Implications for Research Design and Methods of 
Proof in Contemporary Criminal Law Policy Analysis’ (2000) 34 Law & Society 179-212; Bernard E Harcourt, 
Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken Windows Policing (Harvard University Press 2001) 112-116. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Dan M Kahan, ‘Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence’ (1997) 83 Virginia Law Review 349, 349-
393. See also, Julien Etienne, ‘The Impact of Regulatory Policy on Individual Behaviour: A Goal Framing 
Theory Approach’ (2010) Discussion Paper No 5, Centre for Risk Analysis and Regulation 1, 7-9. 
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/36541/1/Disspaper59.pdf>, accessed 05 September 2018.  
22For an analysis of the interpretive turns, see Dan M Kahan, ‘Between Economics and Sociology: The New 
Path of Deterrence’ (1997) 95 Michigan Law Review 2477 
23 William A Bogart (n 3) 109. 
24 This is defined in section 8.2 above. 
25 Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method (University of California Press 1969) 49-
50. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
 283 
method designs and expand the understanding of human behaviour.28 In the same vein, 
testing of hypotheses, protocols of research procedures, and schemes of operationalising 
concepts are important in applying a mixed methods model with the aim of demonstrating 
that a group of related persons involved in social interactions and social justice may be 
viewed as part of one cohort.29 In the present study, the cohort under consideration is Saudi 
Arabia’s adjudicators. However, adjudicators operate in a context where their decisions 
impact on the social interactions and sense of social justice of others, namely, the general 
population of Saudi Arabia and important elite members of society. Laws and policies must 
therefore, in the first instance, reflect the social meanings of the judicial cohort in order to be 
effective when perceived by others in Saudi Arabia. In other words, the law is based on the 
‘plurality of equally valid perspectives’.30 This is important because laws and the policies 
behind the laws retain an important place in social life. This aligns with the contention above 
that legal culture is affected by the historical context, the structure of the judiciary, and public 
perception.31 It also aligns with Holmes’ quote that ‘the life of law has not been logic; it has 
been experience’. 32 
It is important for this researcher to determine whether the study will yield significantly 
original findings with important policy implications. That should be the objective of 
exploring social meaning. The interpretive variables (participants’ perception of the law) 
must be measured and assessed in regard to how they relate to relevant legal institutions and 
practices. In this light, the qualitative responses of the participants are integrated with an 
experimental association or relational component, and then the responses and the experiment 
are analysed using a multivariate approach to mapping relations between variables in 
different categories. The Researcher set out to identify a causal relationship by showing that 
the independent variable, the respondent’s appreciation of free trade and foreign investment, 
has an important impact on the dependent progressive interpretation of the Shari’ah. Thus, 
the progressive interpretation of the Shari’ah may be explained by respondents’ belief that 
free trade and the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards have a beneficial effect on Saudi 
Arabia.  
                                                
28 See Joseph A Kotarba, ‘Symbolic Interaction and Applied Social Research: A Focus on Translational Science 
Research’ (2014) 37 Symbolic Interaction 412, 412-423. 
29 See Clarence St Hilaire, ‘What is the Role of Reflective Equilibrium and Symbolic Interactionism in a Society 
in a Quest for Justice? A Mixed Methods Analysis’ (2014) 4 Journal of Social Justice 1, 13-18. 
30 Eugene McLaughlin and John Muncie (eds), The SAGE Dictionary of Criminology (3rd edn, SAGE 2013) 
288. 
31 See Edgardo Buscaglia and Maria Dakiouas (n 19). 
32 Ibid. 
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In order to establish causality, the researcher demonstrated association between the 
independent variable (appreciation of free trade and foreign investment) and dependent 
variable (perception of the Shari’ah) using the experimental relational component. Illias 
Bantekas notes that many Gulf States, such as Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
that have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
(after placing credence on free trade),33 had previously removed the obstacles imposed by 
conservative Islamic law.34 The Supreme Court of Abu Dhabi held, in a judgment in 2000, 
that the current international business environment, involving fast and voluminous 
transactions, may sometimes necessitate the imposition of interest.35 Also, Ali Kadri 
promotes free trade in the Islamic world by arguing that Islamic free-trade precepts are 
grounded in the Hadith or declarations of the Prophet.36 He notes that the Hadith emphasises 
that profits are the primary concern of commerce, and many schools of the Shari’ah 
encouraged merchants to travel and exchange commodities without constraints.37 On the 
other hand, regional Conventions such as the Riyadh Convention on Judicial Cooperation 
between States of the Arab League were unable to remove barriers to the enforcement of 
foreign awards because of their (the League’s) obsession with particular Shari’ah-inspired 
rules.38 Article 37(e) of the Convention for example states that foreign arbitral awards that 
conflict with the principles of the Shari’ah or with the public order or rules of conduct of the 
forum State shall neither be recognised nor enforceable.39 
 
Once an association has been established between the independent and dependent variables 
by observing that the progressive interpretation of the Shari’ah may be explained by 
                                                
33 The Model Law was prepared and adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) in 1985 and amended in 2006. States may adopt the Law by incorporating it into their national 
law. Bahrain and the UAE (Dubai, specifically) adopted the 1985 version, and the UAE has recently adopted the 
2006 version. See Hasan Ali Radhi, Judiciary and Arbitration in Bahrain: A Historical and Analytical Study 
(Kluwer Law International 2003) 198; Gordon Blonke and Kohl Mechantaf, ‘United Arab Emirates’ in 
Lawrence W Newma and Colin Ong (eds), Interim Measures in International Arbitration (Juris 2014) 796. 
34 Ilias Bantekas, An Introduction to International Arbitration (Cambridge University Press 2015) 59-60. The 
obstacles mostly relate to the charging of interest. For example, the Federal Law No. 18/1993 of the UAE 
(Commercial Code) allows interest on delayed payment and states that Article 714 of the Civil Code that 
prohibits the charging of interest does not apply to matters that fall within the scope of the Commercial Code.  
35 See Case no. 245/2000, Supreme Court of Abu Dhabi, Judgment of 7 May 2000. See also, the Federal 
Supreme Court Decision No. 14/9 on 28 June 1981 where the Federal Supreme Court held that allowing the 
charging of simple interest was crucial for the country’s economic survival and the wellbeing of its people. 
36 Ali Kadri, ‘Islam and Capitalism: Military Routs, Not Formal Institution’ in Erik S Reinert, Ghosh J and 
Kattel R (eds), Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic Development (Edward Elgar 2016) 161. 
37 Ibid. See also, chapters 2, 3 and 4. However, making profit in this context does not include profiting from 
earning interest. It is limited to the excess of the selling price over cost. 
38 Ilias Bantekas (n 40) 60. 
39 Although the Convention does not define the terms ‘rule of conduct’ and ‘public order’, it is suggested that 
they refer to public policy. 
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respondents’ belief that free trade and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards are beneficial to 
society, the time order (sequence) of the variables can be established. The independent 
variable (appreciation of free trade and foreign investment) ought to occur first in time in 
order to cause the dependent variable (perception of the Shari’ah). Thus, respondents must 
have adopted a favourable view of free trade and foreign investment before holding that the 
Shari’ah should be interpreted in a progressive manner. This finding aligns with the UAE 
Federal Supreme Court Decision No. 14/9 on 28 June 1981 cited above40 to the effect that 
allowing the charging of simple interest was crucial for the country’s economic survival and 
the wellbeing of its people. Thus, the UAE Federal Supreme Court adopted a realist or 
pragmatic approach in adapting the Shari’ah to the circumstances, since it held that that 
allowing the charging of simple interest was not inconsistent with the Shari’ah because it was 
crucial for the country’s economic survival and the wellbeing of its people. Hence, although 
the outcome is derived from authoritative premises, the court ensures that it best promotes 
public welfare.41 This approach is somewhere between formalism42 and attitudinalism.43 
Thus, judicial outcomes are determined by both judicial doctrine and the judges’ attitude.  
It is assumed that the above competing theories of judicial decision-making also apply to the 
pundits, persons who are not adjudicators as noted above. Their interpretation of the law is 
also based on formalist assessments of the provisions of statutes and court decisions and 
attempts to adapt the law to the circumstances. In order to operationalise concepts about how 
the law is related to human behaviour, many legal theorists have borrowed from Kahneman 
and Tversky.44 The latter observed that humans use two things to assess the world around 
them: heuristic reasoning (System 1 or fast thinking) and conscious reasoning (System 2, 
slow thinking, including beliefs).45 The heuristic involves speeding up the process of making 
                                                
40 See (n 41). 
41 Richard A Posner, ‘Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution’ 
(1986) 37 Case Western Reserve Law Review 179, 181. 
42 This may be defined as deductive reasoning based on legal prescription or strong formal assumptions. See 
Victoria Frances Nourse and Gregory C Schafer, ‘Empiricism, Experimentalism, and Conditional Theory’ 
(2014) 67 SMU Law Review 141, 142-143. 
43 This is a strand of legal realism that borrows from political science literature where it has been argued that 
ideology is an important determinant of whether a judge will decide for or against a right holder. See Mathew 
Sag et al, ‘Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property: An Empirical Study’ (2009) 97 California Law 
Review 801, 847. Thus, judges ‘should be viewed as promoters of their personal policy preferences rather than 
as interpreters of the law’. Frank Cross, ‘The Ideology of Supreme Court Opinions and Citations’ (2012) 97 
Iowa Law Review 693, 697. 
44 See for example, Russell Korobkin, ‘Daniel Kahneman’s Influence on Legal Theory’ (2013) 44 Loyola 
University Chicago Law Journal 1349, 1351-1356; Jeremy A Blumenthal, ‘Emotional Paternalism’ (2007) 35 
Florida State University Law Review 1, 35-36. 
45 See Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2011) 20-21. See also, Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’ (1974) 185 Science 1124. 
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a decision because of the absence of an optimal solution. Thus, people faced with difficult 
questions sometimes substitute easier questions. For example, when faced with the difficult 
question of whether insurance is prohibited under the principles of gharar (speculation),46 the 
government official, journalist or scholar may instead answer the easier question of whether 
he or she thinks insurance companies play an important role in modern commerce and can be 
of great benefit to policyholders.47  
Conscious reasoning or System 2 involves making decisions on the basis of existing 
contextual features. The latter represent preferences based on individual circumstances or 
subjective assessments of social needs, and a choice must be made between the known 
preferences.48 This explains why different people will make different recommendations 
regarding the preference function that the law should seek to maximise. It also explains why 
the participants in this study made different recommendations regarding the application of the 
Shari’ah to investment and arbitration issues. Kahneman and Tversky said that the ‘prospect 
theory’ predicts that people will elect to retain an entitlement rather than lose it and gain 
another one in uncertain terms.49 Hence, the judges that were interviewed by the Researcher 
expressed preference for judicial review of arbitration awards (with the power to vacate 
awards based on their substance) over the conceptualisation of arbitration as an independent 
extra-judicial proceeding that requires very limited judicial supervision. 
Given that the association or relational component was experimental, exposure to the 
independent variable before measuring the dependent variable was controlled. In other words, 
the Researcher first ascertained whether the respondent favoured free trade and increased 
foreign investment. That is why the first and second questions asked were concerned with 
what the respondent thought about the Vision 2030 programme50 that seeks to liberalise trade 
and attract foreign investment. Those questions sought to ensure that there was no third, 
                                                
46 See Peter D Sloane, ‘The Status of Islamic Law in the Modern Commercial World’ (1988) 22 The 
International Lawyer 743, 749-750. 
47 See Kristin T Roy, ‘The New York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can A Country Use the Public Policy 
Defense to Refuse Enforcement of Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards’? (1994) 18(3) Fordham International Law 
Journal 920, 948, who pointed out that the Saudi Arabian government relaxed its restrictive policies on 
insurance on realising that insurance companies play a crucial role in modern commerce and industry. 
48 See also, Sarah Lichtenstein and Paul Slovic, ‘The Construction of Preference: An Overview’ in Sarah 
Lichtenstein and Paul Slovic (eds), The Construction of Preference (Cambridge University Press 2006) 1. 
49 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: Analysis of Decision Under Risk’ (1979) 47 
Econometrica 263. 264-265. See also, a treatise on the layperson’s behavioural approach to law: Richard H 
Thaler and Cass R Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (Yale 
University Press 2008). 
50 See Appendix I. 
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extraneous variable that would otherwise cause the association between the independent and 
dependent variables, thereby creating a spurious or false relationship. In this case, a possible 
third extraneous variable was the fear of criticising policies endorsed and promoted by the 
King. Hence, follow-up questions were asked about specific aspects of the Vision 2030 
programme that respondents liked in order to attempt to ensure that the respondents did not 
simply declare their support because the programme represented the vision of the Custodian 
of the Two Holy Mosques.  
The responses of the participants were then integrated with an analysis of the responses. The 
latter enabled the Researcher to decode the messages relayed by the respondents by 
tabulating the various structures of meanings and their intricate relations to the legal contexts 
in which the meanings are embedded. This draws upon a technique that is generally referred 
to as ‘correspondence analysis’. It is used to assess data such as social meaning variables that 
have been cross-tabulated or systematised.51 The variables are represented in a table52 and the 
Researcher was able to interpret the relationships between the social meaning variables 
within different institutional settings.53 The analysis therefore enabled the Researcher to 
capture and compare social meanings in different contexts. For example, the meaning given 
by a Dean of a Faculty of Law to the concept of judicial discretion was captured and 
compared with meaning given to the same concept by an employee of the legal department of 
an investment authority, as well as the meaning given to that concept by a member of the 
Shura Council. The Researcher then identified the interpretative repertoire that emerged from 
the analysis of the various responses.54  
The main unit of analysis is neither the response nor the behaviour of a single participant but 
the interpretative repertoire of the responses of all the participants.55 In using these methods, 
the Researcher sought to identify whether there was a systematised and common 
interpretation or perspective. Given that the relations among the social meanings ought to be 
measured and analysed in a correspondence analysis, different methodological techniques 
                                                
51 Michael J Greenacre, ‘Correspondence Analysis and Its Interpretation’ in Michael J Greenacre and Jorg 
Blasuis (eds), Correspondence Analysis in the Social Sciences (Elsevier 1994) 3-8. 
52 See Table 8.II below. 
53 Bernard E Harcourt, ‘Measured Interpretation: Introducing the Method of Correspondence Analysis to Legal 
Studies’ (2002) University of Illinois Law Review 979, 983. 
54 Talja S, ‘Analyzing Qualitative Interview Data: The Discourse Analytic Method’ (1999) 21 Library & 
Information Science Research 1, 3. 
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.471.9910&rep=rep1&type=pdf>, accessed on 08 
June 2018. 
55 Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter, ‘Discourse Analysis and the Identification of Interpretive 
Repertoires’ in Charles Antaki, Analysing Everyday Explanation: A Casebook of Methods (SAGE 1988) 169. 
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may be used. This enhances the process of validating the data through cross-verification.56 
This approach also has the benefit of minimising the impact of false or spurious relationships 
between the independent and dependent variables. The theory and design of this enquiry, as 
well as the techniques employed, have delineated the frame in which the correspondence 
analysis was used as shown in the next section. 
8.3.1 Exploring Social Meanings 
As noted above, the study was designed for implementation in the real world. The aim was to 
identify causal relationships by showing that the independent variable, respondents’ belief 
that free trade and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards are beneficial to the economy, has a 
marked impact on the dependent variable, the progressive interpretation of the Shari’ah. As 
noted in chapters 2 and 3, the shortcomings of the secular law in Saudi Arabia governing 
investment and arbitration may be explained by the unremitting battle between attempts to 
modernise Saudi Arabia’s legal system whilst also ensuring respect for Shari’ah. It is shown 
in chapters 2 and 3 that conservative forces within the country who favour literalism are 
hostile towards any standards of rules that are contrary to their strict or literal interpretation 
of the Qur’an and other sacred texts such as the Hadiths. It was noted that the application of 
the principles of the Shari’ah in Saudi Arabia is largely based on the interpretation of the 
Hanbali School or the fourth orthodox school in Sunni Islam. This is largely due to the 
Decree issued by King Abdul-Aziz in 1345H (1926) that designated the School that was 
under Imam Ahmed ibn Hanbal as the official orthodox School for Islamic courts in Saudi 
Arabia.57 The objective was to prevent the inconsistent interpretation and application of the 
Qur’an and Hadith and delineate the process by which Islamic courts apply the Shari’ah.58 
As such, judges are required to defer to the Hanbali School’s interpretation, although it has 
also been argued that judges have a certain margin of discretion given that they have a duty to 
make decisions that in good conscience represent the will of God.59 Hence, judges in Saudi 
Arabia believe they are morally guided and ought to place emphasis not on the fiqh of the 
Hanbali School but on the Qur’an and Hadiths.60 This comforts them with the thought that 
                                                
56 Bernard E Harcourt, note 59 above, 983. 
57 Abdullah F Ansary, ‘A Brief Overview of the Saudi Arabian Legal System’ (2008) Hausa Global Law School 
Program, para 3.2. <http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Saudi_Arabia.html#_ednref88>, accessed on 04 
June 2018). 
58 Ibid. 
59 Charles P Trumbull, ‘Islamic Arbitration: A New Path for Interpreting Islamic Legal Contracts’ (2006) 59 
Vanderbilt Law Review 609, 629-630. 
60 Frank E Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Brill 2000) 142-143, 370-373. 
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their judgments are based on what is written in the Qur’an and Hadiths rather than in the fiqh. 
It will be argued that Trumbull’s61 conception of the role of judges may persuade the latter to 
interpret the Qur’an and Hadiths in a manner that exegeses of other schools (other than the 
Hanbali school) are taken into account. 
Beyond the argument that Islamic courts enjoy a wide margin of discretion in interpreting the 
Qur’an and Hadiths, Islamic legal jurists, whether classical or liberal, combine belief and 
reason to hold that the Shari’ah is an interpretive jurisprudence that clarifies or explains the 
rules as stated in the Qur’an and other sacred texts.62 In some instances, moderation and 
value judgements are required. Muqtedar Khan notes as follows: 
The Qur’an does not invite blind followers; it demands and exhorts us to reflect 
and use our reason to read God’s signs in nature, history and text (12:109). In all 
its presentations, the Qur’an presents evidence and proofs, and indeed, demands 
arguments and proofs from those who disbelieve its message. There is no 
suggestion or explanation in the Qur’an that the human being ceases to be the 
best of creations and becomes an ape (reversing evolution!).63 
Hence, the Qur’an states that it is the bearer of the truth and Furqan. The latter describes the 
criterion for judgement or the ability to distinguish between right and wrong, and good and 
evil.64 In this light, the Qur’an also provides as follows: 
O ye who believe! If ye fear Allah, He will grant you a criterion (to judge 
between right and wrong), remove from you (all) evil (that may afflict) you, and 
forgive you: for Allah is the Lord of grace unbounded. (Qur’an 8.29). 
As such, the interpretation of the Shari’ah is a legal fiction; which is to say that it is open to 
challenge by other equally valid interpretations of Islamic legal sources (by both Muslims 
and non-Muslims), including those which rely on consensus and reasoning by analogy. By 
extension, a specific interpretation of the Shari’ah (tatbiq al-Shari’ah, which conflicts with 
trade-friendly verses of the Qur’an) ought to be open to challenge, even if that interpretative 
                                                
61 Trumbull (n 65) 629. 
62 Roy Jackson, Nietzsche and Islam (Routledge 2007) 135. 
63 A Muqtedar Khan, ‘What is Enlightenment? An Islamic Perspective’ (2014) 16 Journal of Religion & Society 
1, 4 Khan AM, ‘What is Enlightenment? An Islamic Perspective’ (2014) 16 Journal of Religion & Society 1, 4. 
64 Ibid. 
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position has crystallised as a norm under a particular Islamic School of law.65 The 
interpretation of the Hanbali School is often assumed to justify the decisions of judges or 
other arbiters who adopt a strictly formalist approach. It follows that the shortcomings of the 
law in the Saudi Arabia governing investment and arbitration may be explained by the 
incidence of rigid interpretations of Islamic legal sources.  
 
8.4 Analysis 
The analysis enabled the Researcher to decode the meanings given by the participants and 
place them within the proper context.66 The meanings were then conveyed in terms of 
categories and themes.67 Categories constitute the primary product of the analysis.68 They 
were used at the beginning of the analytical process to develop themes and classify the 
results. Since the Researcher was the point of origination, the categories were developed on 
the basis of the Researcher’s review of the extant literature.69 Hence, they were developed 
from existing theories in the literature reviewed in chapter 1, as well as the assessment of the 
evolution and implementation of investment and arbitration laws in the other chapters. 
Themes, on the other hand, are concepts or descriptors that organise repeating ideas and 
enable the Researcher to answer the research questions.70 Each theme may be said to be a 
thread of meanings that the Researcher discovers at the interpretative level.71 Thus, the 
themes represent the participants’ subjective understandings.72 
                                                
65 Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder (University of 
California Press 2002) 189. 
66 Hence, the research report conveys the subjective meanings and social reality of the participants. See Dorothy 
Horsburgh, ‘Evaluation of Qualitative Research’ (2003) 12(2) Journal of Clinical Nursing 307, 307-3012. 
67 There are variations in the use of both terms. See Patricia Bazeley, ‘Analysing Qualitative Data: More than 
“Identifying Themes”’ (2009) 2(2) The Malaysian Journal of Qualitative Research 6, 6-22. 
68 Diana M Bailey and Jeanne M Jackson, ‘Qualitative Data Analysis: Challenges and Dilemmas Related to 
Theory and Method’ (2003) 57(1) The American Journal of Occupational Therapy 57, 58. 
69 For details of the categorisation process, see Mojtaba Vaismoradi et al, ‘Theme Development in Qualitative 
Content Analysis and Thematic Analysis’ (2016) 6(5) Journal of Nursing Education and Practice 100, 102. 
70 Ayres L, Kavanaugh K and Knafl KA, ‘Within-case and Across-case Approaches to Qualitative Data 
Analysis’ (2003) 13(6) Qualitative Health Research 871, 872-873. 
71 Gerry W Ryan and Russell H Bernard, ‘Techniques to Identify Themes’ (2003) 15(1) Field Methods 85, 86. 
72 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’ (2006) 3(2) Qualitative 
Research in Psychology 77, 78. 
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8.4.1 Categories 
The categories shown in Table 8.II below were developed from theories and arguments in the 
literature rather than from the data.73 In other words, they were developed by the Researcher 
as broad guidelines for the semi-structured interviews and analysis of the data. The theories 
and arguments are discussed in chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
Table 8.II: Categories 
Categories Associated Definitions/Explanations from 
the Literature 
Judicial discretion and independence There is no such thing contemplated by 
Islamic law as the absolute freedom of 
judges. Judges must comply with the law, as 
well as principles established by the Supreme 
Judicial Council. 
Hierarchy of sources of law The main source of law is the Shari’ah. 
However, this is based on the interpretation 
of the Shari’ah by the Shura Council or 
Council of Experts which is tasked with 
proposing laws to the monarch. 
Codification of Islamic law Although codification may provide a suitable 
level of predictability for local and foreign 
investors, Islamic law cannot be codified 
since this will stall the development of the 
law. 
Free Trade  This is crucial for foreign investment. 
However, the law should prioritise the 
protection of the local industry and capacity 
building. 
Compatibility with the Shari’ah The Islamic legal system is integrated and 
hierarchical and comprises elements of 
capitalism and socialism. Hence, most 
principles of the Shari’ah are compatible 
with international law and promote trade 
liberalisation. 
Enforcement of foreign awards Foreign awards should be enforced in Saudi 
Arabia in accordance with the MITs and 
BITs ratified by the Saudi Arabian 
government unless the awards conflict with 
the Shari’ah or public policy 
                                                
73 Hsiu-Fang Hsieh and Sarah E Shannon, ‘Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis’ (2005) 15 
Qualitative Health Research 1277, 1277-1287. 
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8.4.2 Themes 
The above categories enabled the Researcher to classify meanings and develop themes.74 This 
went through three phases, namely initialisation, construction, and finalisation. Initialisation 
involved careful reading of the transcripts, highlighting meaningful recurrent ideas and 
concepts, considering possible meanings and identifying links between ideas. The latter part 
involved coding, whereby the Researcher converted the participants’ responses into incidents 
or segments and examined the similarities and differences of the segments.75 The coding 
process therefore revealed meanings, both explicit and implicit.76 Then, in order to find the 
appropriate answers to the hypothesis and research questions discussed in chapter 1, the 
Researcher addressed important codes for further consideration.77 Open coding was used to 
establish the relationship between the data (participants’ responses) and theory (categories 
shown in Table 8.II above). The technique used for coding was conventional content 
analysis.78  
 
8.4.3 Coding 
Some of the responses given by the participants were in conflict with each other. Thus, the 
participants’ range of responses were fractured, and the underlying patterns of indicators or 
ideas within the responses were conceptualised as a theory (in light of the guidelines shown 
in Table 8.II) in order to explain what the participants generally suggested.  
 
8.4.3.1 Judicial Discretion and Independence  
With regard to the category of judicial discretion and independence, many of the respondents 
did not agree with the proposition that there is no such thing contemplated by Islamic law as 
the absolute freedom of judges. A majority of them noted that what is important is that judges 
cannot rule without justification and must comply with the law, as well as principles 
                                                
74 Green J et al, ‘Generating Best Evidence from Qualitative Research: The Role of Data Analysis’ (2007) 31(6) 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 545, 545-550. 
75 For qualitative data management and coding, see Mojtaba Vaismoradi et al (n 80) 103-105. 
76 Ibid. 
77 See Zane R Wolf, ‘Exploring the Audit Trail for Qualitative Investigations’ (2003) 28(4) Nurse Educator 175, 
175-178. 
78 This is a method where the coding categories are derived directly from the data. See Hsiu Fang Hsieh and 
Sarah E Shannon, ‘Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis’ (2005) 15(9) Qualitative Health 
Research 1277, 1277-1279. 
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established by the Supreme Judicial Council. Also, they generally noted that the broad 
interpretation of the Shari’ah largely depends on the power of judges to make decisions 
according to their discretion. Thus, despite the fact that courts are required to comply with the 
interpretations of the Hanbali scholars, many respondents held that judges still exercised a 
reasonable margin of discretion: 
 
Some judges see ijtihad [independent reasoning or exertion of mental faculty] as 
one of the sources of the law. So, if a business does not exercise due diligence, 
the judge may hold that this is against Islamic law. (Dean). 
Judges do not need anything except the principles established by the Supreme 
Judicial Council if they have been established. It is true that the judge is obliged 
to check previous decisions of the Cassation courts. If the judge has another point 
of view, he is free to write and justify the position. If the judge has violated the 
principle established by the Supreme Judicial Council, both the principle and the 
judge’s new principle will be examined on appeal. So, the judge is free to identify 
new legal classifications independently of previous categorisations. (Legal 
Scholar #1). 
There are four doctrines from the different schools of Islamic law and they all 
vary. Taking into account the fact that King Abdul Aziz selected some books 
such as Migdami and others, judges are bound by the Hanbali doctrine. It is 
permissible to take from the other doctrines if it is in the interest of the public. 
This is good, but it is left to the judge who is the investigator seeking to protect 
the interests of the people. (Member, Shura Council). 
All judicial systems in the world with inequality give the judge discretionary 
power … In the law, the notion of expectation is reinforced by practices. In all 
countries of the world, there will be one court that issues a judgement by 
applying a law and another court issues a different ruling applying the same law. 
The role of the Supreme Judicial Council is to unify and promote expectation. 
This is reinforced by training of judges and continuous consultation. (Director, 
Saudi Arbitration Centre). 
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The decisions of King Abdul Aziz still stand. They are part of the Islamic 
jurisprudence. Some judges may rely on them. Of course, many scholars oppose 
the idea of judges exercising wide discretion. They have stopped the ijtihad. 
Some judges have also closed the door of ijtihad. The difference of opinion is due 
to training and educational level. (Judge #2). 
However, despite the consensus on the fact that judges exercise a reasonable margin of 
discretion, it was uncertain whether such discretion extended to the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards: 
The Kingdom is one of the members that signed and implemented a number of 
foreign enforcement provisions. But if you take a closer look, you will find that 
there are problems regarding implementation because of the fact that the foreign 
arbitration must not conflict with Islamic law or public order in the Kingdom. 
(Member, Shura Council). 
The arbitration law is for local arbitration, although it deals with foreign 
arbitration in certain parts. But Islamic law does not prohibit the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards because they were granted by a non-Muslim or a woman. 
They are enforced out of necessity in order to meet obligations under 
international covenants … I find the Kingdom more flexible than many countries. 
(Judge #1). 
The Kingdom in the field of arbitration is still taking steps forward and the best 
proof is that the Kingdom has recently introduced a new arbitration law. I believe 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is still in the process of attracting investors. 
However, in the current arbitration system, we need to develop to be the most up-
to-date and most attractive system for all types of investment. I believe the 
problems of Article 24 and Article 42 of the Arbitration Law have to be 
remedied. (Member, Shura Council). 
 
The conceptual code extracted from the above data is as follows: although the Qur’an 
promotes the principle of independence and impartiality of adjudicators and empowers them 
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to make decisions according to their discretion, they must justify their decisions and comply 
with the the law, as well as principles established by the Supreme Judicial Council. 
 
8.4.3.2 Hierarchy of the Sources of Law 
With regard to the category of the hierarchy of the sources of law, all the participants agreed 
that the main source of law is the Shari’ah. 
 
The Kingdom is based on Shari’ahh and Shari'ah depends on the status of 
stability and flexibility on the fixed evidence and the change is governed by 
objective judgments, and the procedures that are in the best procedures are in 
flexible legislations. (Member of the Senior Council of Ulema)  
Shari’ah cannot be overridden. It can be applied differently or reinterpreted in 
line with a set of rules and principles (Judge #2) 
The second Islamic Imam did not overrule the Shari’ah principles when he did 
not apply the Hudud of theft and burglary in that time because of famine. His 
decision could be said to be based on an interpretation of the punishment 
prescribed by the Shari’ah: Hudud being the upper limit rather than the automatic 
punishment. This is evident from many sources looking at how the punishment 
can be imposed, and to what amounts and so on. (Official, Saudi Arbitration 
Centre). 
There is no such thing as the Islamic Shari’ah system, which is the Islamic 
Shari’ah. It is a complete system of life. It is not only a judicial system that is 
valid for all times and ages, it is a general rule that governs all aspects of life, 
both in terms of transactions and investments. It promotes the interests of 
individuals and the community in general. (Former Judge/Lawyer) 
However, one participant noted that despite the primacy of the Shari’ah, judges must 
consider whether an act that is inconsistent with the principles of the Shari’ah promotes 
public welfare. Where it does, the Shari’ah should not be applied rigorously: 
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If my action is contrary to Shari’ah law but will improve the commercial 
environment and the economy of the country, the rigour of the Shari’ah will be 
disadvantageous. That is why the Shari’ah is not codified. It gives judges the 
flexibility to consider such things. (Legal Scholar #2) 
It is noted in chapter 3 that the rise of more rigid interpretations of the Shari’ah led to 
closures of commercial markets in Saudi Arabia. The respondents echoed the same view, 
although they maintained that Islamic law may be interpreted broadly to protect diverse 
interests: 
 
Foreign investment has been adversely affected by conservative interpretations of 
the Qur’an. So economic liberalisation policies cannot be effective with the same 
conservative interpretations holding sway. (Legal Scholar #2). 
Judicial and administrative authorities may always interpret the Shari’ah in a 
different light if they want to promote those policies that encourage investment. 
(Arbitrator #2). 
The rules of Islamic jurisprudence are broad, and judges may dismiss most of 
what is presented to them. We may need to codify these provisions in such a way 
as to make them accessible to others, whether in the judicial system, the allies, or 
the investors … There is codification now of the legal provisions of the Hanbali 
regime, and there is also a committee that is studying the process. It was formed 
under the Sami Order. (Dean). 
It is time to codify the Islamic Shari’ah law, especially the rules governing 
commercial matters such as in the pre-state era of the Ottoman Empire … 
Codification will prevent ambiguity and close potential loopholes. (Member, 
Investment Authority). 
The Shari’ah may be interpreted broadly. Although the interpretation may be 
constrained by the Hanbali doctrine, the ideas of other schools are sometimes 
considered to promote the best interests of the people. (Legal Scholar #1). 
Islamic law comprises principles that lead to justice and equity. They are valid 
for all times and places. Legislation must keep pace with developments in the 
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commercial world provided it does not violate the general principles of the 
Shari’ah. But we must remember that there are several interpretations of the 
principles. Some activities that were haram in the past are now legal and 
acceptable. This shows that Islamic law is flexible. If there was only one 
interpretation, then it may have become outdated over time. (Member, Shura 
Council). 
 
The conceptual code extracted from the above data is as follows: the Shari’ah comprises the 
basic principles and laws of Saudi Arabia. However, it is not just religious law. It regulates 
all aspects of life, including personal life and commercial activities. Also, some amount of 
flexible interpretation is necessary in order for the judge to apply Shari’ah principles to the 
situation before him. 
8.4.3.3 Codification of Islamic Law 
With regard to the category of the codification of Islamic law, many of the respondents stated 
that it was feasible and would be beneficial to the Kingdom’s judiciary: 
 
I think the rationale for codification is simple. When you are codified, you can 
amend the laws after two years to suit the times. I think that supporters of the idea 
of non-standardisation are afraid that their interpretations will not be favoured in 
the process of codification. (Member of the Shura Council). 
There is no doubt that codification will enhance the administration of justice and 
dissemination of key principles of the Shari’ah. It will also enable non-Muslims 
who have been fed falsehoods to have better understanding of the Shari’ah. The 
codification of the Shari’ah and publication of the code will highlight the 
flexibility of principles of the Shari’ah and enable judges to use their knowledge 
to establish precedents. (Judge #1). 
Any formal or informal codification is useful for the judicial system, whether this 
entails elaborating on the legal provisions of the Qur’an and reconsidering some 
existing decisions. But the people involved in the process must be respected and 
qualified to do so. This will prevent the judiciary from being subject to legislators 
who are not jurists and have no knowledge of the Shari’ah. (Judge #2). 
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There is nothing preventing the codification of the principles of the Shari’ah. 
Many Muslim countries have done so. I do not know of any sources that prohibit 
codification in accordance with the development of the community’. (Legal 
Scholar #2). 
Codification will essentially provide two benefits. First, it will provide a good 
level of predictability for all parties or stakeholders. Second, codification, it is 
hoped, will provide some truer reflection of the realities of the time, as Islamic 
law must always take into account current practice. (Legal Advisor) 
However, eleven of the twenty-five participants disapproved of codification because they 
believed the principles of the Shari’ah had already been systematised in different forms, or 
they thought codification defeated ijtihad, which is the independent reasoning by jurists 
geared towards finding solutions to incidental legal questions.79 Among the eleven dissenters, 
the five most pertinent responses are provided below: 
The interpretations by Hanbali scholars have been published. That is codification. 
The Saudi judicial system has a system of pleadings governed by more than two 
hundred Articles. The Articles have been fully catalogued. It is a codified system. 
Lawyers can learn about the nature of Shari’ah contracts and requirements of 
Islamic law by reviewing the commercial rules published by the Board of 
Grievances. (Legal Scholar #2). 
Those looking to codify any rules are motivated by the benefits of predictability 
and clarity. I would like to mention here an example of a legal system that is very 
influential. That of Britain. It has no written constitution but is more influential 
than the systems of countries that rely on codes such as France. Judgments are 
made without codes and they are effective … Codification may eliminate 
differences of opinion and reduce the margin of inconsistency in judgment. But it 
does not eliminate uncertainty because the codes themselves must be interpreted. 
(Official, Saudi Arbitration Centre). 
The Hanbali doctrine is well archived. I was a member of the scientific 
committee at the Ministry of Justice that assessed the doctrine. There are 
                                                
79 See Wael B Hallaq, ‘On the Origins of the Controversy about the Existence of Mujtahids and the Gate of 
Ijtihad’ (1986) 63 Studia Islamica 129, 129-139. 
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approximately three thousand Articles that govern the sale of goods, warranties, 
criminal punishment, tenancy agreements. (Legal Scholar #1) 
The most cogent dissent was as follows: 
In the absence of codification, there will be different interpretations of the same 
principle. The judgment of one court may be inconsistent with the judgment of 
another court. But codification is inconsistent with ijtihad because it prevents 
independent reasoning. Codification is unnecessary. Ijtihad is allowed where the 
provisions of the Qur’an and Hadith are ambiguous. But where they are 
unambiguous or there is consensus (Ijma) [among scholars], Ijtihad is important 
because scholars have an obligation to perform it. Codification is like taqlid.80 
(Retired Judge/Lawyer)  
The conceptual code extracted from the above data is as follows: the principles of the 
Shari’ah are broad and sometimes ambiguous. Hence, codification is important because it 
will require the adoption of interpretations that simplify and modernise the system and enable 
non-Muslim communities to have a better understanding of the Shari’ah. However, it must be 
done in such a way that it does not defeat ijtihad.  
8.4.3.4 Trade Liberalisation 
As regards the category of free trade, all of the respondents agreed with the contention that 
free trade was important for foreign investment. The respondents were surprisingly very 
optimistic about the liberalisation of trade in the Saudi Arabia and strongly believed that the 
new laws and regulations governing foreign investment and arbitration have laid the 
groundwork for achieving the objectives of the Vision 2030 programme. Following the free 
relational prompt, ‘What do you think about the vision of the Custodian of the Two Holy 
Mosques or Vision 2030’? all of the respondents stated that it is a realistic and auspicious 
project. Hence, they all expressed support for the programme and its objectives. Some of the 
responses are: 
 
                                                
80 Taqlid may be defined as one person’s conformity to the teachings or interpretations of another person. It was 
traditionally obligatory for persons who are not people of knowledge or qualified to interpret the Qur’an and 
Hadith. See Peter Rudolph, ‘Ijtihad and Taqlid in 18th and 19th Century Islam’ (1980) 20(3/4) Die Welt des 
Islam 131, 139. 
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The programme will support the Kingdom in the competition with the big 
countries, especially in the field of investment. (Judge #1).  
The programme is active in the process of modification and development of 
systems and activation, and there is also a study conducted by the Riyadh 
Economic Forum on the relationship of the legislative system to economic 
development in the country. It is supported by several ministers and government 
departments. (Legal Scholar #1).  
The 2030 Vision is a good programme for the future. It is a good approach taken 
by the government and I think any country in the world should have such a long-
term plan. In 2030, the programme will achieve economic strength and solve the 
existing problems, unemployment, housing and economic prosperity. (Member of 
the Shura Council).  
Yes. I think it sets a great example of a national initiative, which, regardless 
whether it delivers or not, does present a nationally shared will to transform the 
economy across all sectors and classes. (Legal Advisor) 
Saudi Vision 2030 represents new hope for Saudis to move them to advanced 
levels in education, leisure, industry and the services economy. All the idle 
wealth will be invested. There is a thirst for entertainment and science for the 
Saudis, and for tourists from all over the world. (Journalist). 
It’s a step forward from the government of Saudi Arabia to diversify the 
economy. (Arbitrator #2). 
It has a great ambition and blessed plans that return to the country and its projects 
with development, blessing, service and well-being. (Legal Scholar #2). 
It is a step that will strengthen the market in Saudi Arabia and make it 
competitive internationally. We are opening up the opportunity to enter value-
added projects to serve the country as a general direction for the General 
Investment Authority, which is interested in mega-investments. (Member, 
Investment Authority). 
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Although their responses were generally vague, the enthusiasm for trade liberalisation and 
foreign investment was strong. Thus, they supported the Vision 2030 programme because 
they believed it would modernise and liberalise the economy of Saudi Arabia and facilitate 
foreign investment without compromising on Islamic principles.  
The conceptual code extracted from the above data is as follows: trade liberalisation may be 
problematic for adjudicators, legal scholars and members of the public given the need to 
balance liberalisation against the need for Shari’ah-compliant projects that enhance economic 
development and promote public welfare.81  
 
8.4.3.5 Compatibility with the Shari’ah 
The respondents generally agreed with the contention that the Islamic legal system is 
integrated and hierarchical and comprises elements of capitalism and socialism. They also 
agreed with the contention that the principles of the Shari’ah are generally compatible with 
international law and promote trade liberalization. However, they did not show how the 
Shari’ah is compatible with specific international instruments despite several attempts by the 
Researcher to get specific examples: 
 
Absolutely. The Islamic legal system is a disciplined system. It has compliance 
requirements that apply to trade and commerce. Foreign investors should know 
these requirements. Islamic law is easy to understand. The requirements are 
compatible with many international laws and laws of the countries of investors. 
(Official, Saudi Arbitration Centre). 
Anyone who knows Islamic jurisprudence or Islamic law has no doubt that the 
law is firmly established. We have a lot of jurisprudential wealth. There are many 
opinions that reflect international norms and standards. Investors can easily find 
the opinions. (Member of the Shura Council). 
                                                
81 Similar concerns were raised in some previous studies. See Kholoud T Hilall et al, ‘The Political, Socio-
economic and Sociocultural Impacts of the King Abdullah Scholarship Program (KASP) on Saudi Arabia’ 
(2015) 4 International Journal of Higher Education 254, 254; Steffen Hertog, ‘Two-level Negotiations in a 
Fragmented System: Saudi Arabia’s WTO Accession’ (2008) 15 Review of International Political Economy 
650, 665. 
 302 
The Islamic Shari’ah is a complete system of life. It is a judicial system that is 
valid for all times and ages. Its rules apply to all transactions and investments and 
prioritise the interests of the community in general. The rules protect individual 
interests. What is important is fairness and justice. These are the same objectives 
of all important international conventions. (Legal Scholar #2) 
I believe that the Shari’ah is good and compatible with the laws of most 
countries. Some changes are needed in arbitration such as fixing the dates for the 
adjudication of disputes at certain times in order to ensure rapid resolution and 
conform with practices in many countries. These are compatible with the 
Shari’ah. Rapid resolution enhances justice, which is good for society. (Legal 
Scholar #3). 
The most pertinent statement was as follows: 
I think the Shari’ah is already appropriate for use. However, one could say, that 
in the context of an international global financial and economic system that is 
based on certain tenets and practices, that, the Shari’ah is not suitable. It is not so 
much a problem with the Shari’ah which is deemed unsuitable. It is a problem 
with the international systems that prioritise unequal wealth distribution and 
opportunism. (Legal Advisor). 
 
The conceptual code extracted from the above data is as follows: the Shari’ah is a complete 
way of life. It is an ethical system that contains remedies for all difficulties and requires 
routine changes in the interpretation of its principles to meet contemporary needs. Hence, 
foreign or international laws may only be deemed incompatible with the Shari’ah where they 
promote unethical goals and methods or inadvertently serve as a vehicle for inequality. 
8.4.3.6 The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
 
All twenty-five respondents agreed with the contention that foreign awards should be 
enforced in Saudi Arabia in accordance with the MITs and BITs ratified by the Saudi Arabian 
government. However, only one respondent stated his opinion in detail despite several 
prompts to other participants by the Researcher:  
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The Kingdom’s judicial system is a modern system but is still being developed. I 
know of many foreign judgements that have been implemented. But we face 
many issues because the judgments may include the use of foreign bonds and 
interest. Also, there are problems in the implementation that are present in all 
systems and can only be resolved through treaties. I expect the continuous 
modernisation of the judicial system and the implementation of more foreign 
decisions. The system is more flexible than many others and God knows … Also, 
Islamic law does not require the refusal to implement only foreign arbitral 
judgements issued by Muslims or men. They are implemented in order to fulfil 
covenants or treaties in good faith. There is no obstacle on the part of the 
Shari’ah if we realise that the implementation of the foreign judgment is a duty 
under a treaty. The requirement of a male arbitrator or Muslim judge applies only 
in the Kingdom. Here we have a foreign judgment with a foreign rule. We have 
to implement the judgment because we trust the foreign country with which we 
have a covenant or treaty that ensures reciprocity. (Judge #1) 
The respondents did not raise the public policy exception in the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards. They generally held that the award should be enforced in Saudi Arabia if 
there is a treaty to that effect.  
The conceptual code extracted from the above data is as follows: foreign awards should be 
enforced in Saudi Arabia in accordance with the MITs and BITs ratified internationally by 
the Saudi Arabian government. The Shari’ah requires parties to abide by the terms of their 
agreement in good faith.  
 
8.4.4 Construction and Finalisation 
After the interviews, the Researcher proceeded with transcribing, translating and coding the 
responses as shown above. Some challenges confronted by all researchers in qualitative 
studies include accessing the thoughts of participants, developing an understanding of the 
meanings that the latter ascribe to their experiences, and interpreting these meanings in the 
context of the study. Hence, the Researcher did not simply relay the participants’ responses 
but actually ascertained the intention of the participants and interpreted their responses from 
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their unique perspectives.82 Also, the Researcher’s own bias was reviewed in order to ensure 
that the meanings that were captured emerged from the respondents, rather from my analysis. 
In his seminal work addressing the complex relationship between truth and methodology, 
Hans-Georg Gadamer noted as follows: 
 
We find that meanings cannot be understood in an arbitrary way. Just as we 
cannot continually misunderstand the use of a word without affecting the 
meaning of the whole, so we cannot stick blindly to our own fore-meaning about 
the thing if we want to understand the meaning of another …But this kind of 
sensitivity involves neither ‘neutrality’ with respect to content nor the extinction 
of one’s self, but the foregrounding and appropriation of one’s own fore-
meanings and prejudices.83 
 
Following the review of literature in chapter 1 and the analysis of the historical development 
of the laws governing investment and arbitration in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 6, the Researcher was 
biased towards the progressive interpretation of the Shari’ah. This is because it is 
demonstrated in the previous chapters that early Muslims were generally progressive towards 
free trade and arbitration. Thus, the Researcher ensured that the respondents who favoured 
the progressive interpretation of the Shari’ah or shift from the literal or strict interpretation of 
the Qur’an imposed by the Hanbali fiqh had to justify their stance. As such, any prejudice of 
the participant against fundamentalism or progressivism had to come from the respondent 
rather than the Researcher. 
 
The codes were compared in terms of similarities and differences as shown in Table 8.III 
below. Each code was then assigned a place with regard to the research hypothesis. A label 
was also assigned to the code. The themes were then created by the descriptions of the labels. 
In other words, the themes were recurrent unifying ideas that characterised the respondents’ 
experiences 
 
                                                
82 See Michael Larkin et al, ‘Giving Voice and Making Sense in Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis’ 
(2006) 3 Qualitative Research in Psychology 102, 118. 
83 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (Continuum 2006) 271 
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Table 8.III: Codes, Labels and Themes 
Categories Codes Labels Themes 
Judicial discretion 
and independence 
The Qur’an 
promotes the 
principle of 
independence and 
impartiality of 
adjudicators, but 
they must justify 
their decisions 
Shari’ah compliance 
and justification of 
decision 
Justification 
Hierarchy of sources 
of law 
Shari’ah regulates 
all aspects of life but 
interpretation is 
necessary 
Judges must find 
rather than create 
Shari’ah principles 
Uniform 
interpretation 
Codification of 
Islamic Law 
Codification is 
important but must 
not defeat ijtihad 
Unpredictability is 
resolved by 
codification, but 
ambiguity is 
resolved by ijtihad 
Flexibility and 
certainty 
Trade liberalisation It is important to 
balance 
liberalisation against 
Shari’ah 
requirements 
The Shari’ah is 
flexible enough to 
accommodate new 
commercial realities 
Economic 
development and 
public welfare 
Compatibility with The Shari’ah is an 
ethical system with 
The Shari’ah is a 
universal equitable 
Flexibility and 
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Categories Codes Labels Themes 
the Shari’ah remedies for all 
difficulties but 
requires  
system adaptation 
The enforcement of 
foreign arbitral 
awards 
Foreign awards 
should be enforced 
in accordance with 
treaties 
Agreements must be 
kept 
Good faith, trust and 
reciprocity 
 
As noted in chapter 1, the hypothesis that is being tested in this study is as follows:  
 
The Shari’ah is fundamentally flexible, and the rigid interpretation subsequently 
imposed by doctrinaire conservatives explains why the use of the Shari’ah to 
settle disputes constitutes an obstacle to FDI in Saudi Arabia.  
The above themes fit into the whole data in relation to this hypothesis. They suggest that the 
reforms should expand judicial discretion but require judges to justify their decisions. Hence, 
most of the participants believed that judges should be required to give reasoned judgments 
showing how they addressed the arguments of the parties and explaining whether the latter 
have a basis for appeal. This will enable non-Muslim legal communities to understand why 
Islamic courts reach decisions, eliminate suspicion of arbitrary conclusions, and promote 
confidence in the integrity of courts that apply the Shari’ah. The themes also suggest that 
investment and arbitration laws may become more efficient where the reforms affirm the 
primacy of the Shari’ah under all circumstances and ensure uniform interpretation by courts. 
This is because the Shari’ah is fundamentally flexible, although its rigid interpretation may 
be detrimental to trade given its overarching role. 
The themes also suggest that unpredictability may be resolved by codification, but the ijtihad 
must not be eliminated or closed since it is the best way of resolving ambiguity. The 
participants also frequently referred to the flexibility of the Shari’ah and argued that non-
Muslim legal communities do not appreciate how the Shari’ah can be adapted to changing 
conditions in positive manner. Thus, trade liberalisation and international legal rules that seek 
to promote economic development and public welfare are consistent with the Shari’ah. The 
participants also generally used the terms good faith, trust and reciprocity to explain when 
foreign arbitral awards are enforced in Saudi Arabia. 
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It must also be noted that it was uncertain whether the participants were reluctant to criticise a 
programme endorsed by the King. The Researcher observed that some reactions were not 
visceral. In other words, they related to the intellect rather than any deep inward feelings. 
These responses reflected what the participants thought was appropriate to say rather than 
what they seemed to feel. Notwithstanding, the respondents generally observed that the 
Vision 2030, a major progressive initiative,84 shows that the Shari’ah can coexist with free 
trade and a limited form of secularism. One respondent (a legal scholar) also noted that the 
Shari’ah has always promoted free trade: 
  
The Islamic Shari’ah is a set of guiding moral principles that prevent 
deceitfulness, dishonesty and exploitation. If the trader is honest, the Islamic 
Shari’ah will not stop him from trading but will encourage others to do business 
with him. That is how it has always been. (Legal Scholar #1).  
 
8.4.5 Relational Levels of Meaning 
Relational analysis enabled the Researcher to determine the relations between the categories 
and themes.85 In this light, the Researcher identified three relational levels of meaning.  
The primary level comprised meanings that the participants easily volunteered after they were 
prompted by free association such as when they were asked what they thought about Vision 
2030. They repeated and laid stress on their support of free trade and foreign investment 
within the ambit of the Vision 2030 programme. No participant repeated or emphasized any 
criticism of the programme.  
The secondary level comprised meanings that the participants were cognisant of but did not 
have a good grasp of the underlying concept or purpose. Thus, they mentioned the terms 
when prompted but could not explain further whether it represented progressive development 
of Islamic law or a fundamentalist conception or had no direct relationship with Islamic law. 
A good example is the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. The 
participants mostly supported the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
                                                
84 Progressive from an economic perspective. See chapter 6. 
85 Kathleen Carley, ‘Coding Choices for Textual Analysis: A Comparison of Content Analysis and Map 
Analysis’ (1993) 23 Sociological Methodology 75, 78. 
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insofar as it complied with the principles of the Shari’ah. However, they did not discuss 
questions of capacity or coercion, fraud, and misrepresentation that may also affect the 
enforceability of a foreign award. Also, they did not discuss specific reservations that should 
apply in Saudi Arabia to ensure that awards that conflict with the Shari’ah are not enforced in 
the Saudi Arabia. Thus, they merely restated certain Articles from the new arbitration law: 
Article 2 of the Arbitration Law that requires all arbitrations conducted in Saudi Arabia to 
comply with the principles of the Shari’ah; Article 25(1) that requires the set of procedural 
rules chosen by the parties to be compatible with the principles of the Shari’ah; and Article 
38(1) that requires any finding or determination made by a foreign arbitral tribunal to be 
compatible with the principles of the Shari’ah and public policy in Saudi Arabia.  
The participants were reluctant to discuss whether they believed the procedural rules chosen 
by the parties or findings of foreign arbitral tribunals must be assessed only in light of the 
interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadiths by the Hanbali School. They were also reluctant to 
state whether a foreign arbitral award should be enforceable in the Saudi Arabia if it is shown 
to comply with the interpretation of the Qur’an by a School of Islamic jurisprudence other 
than the Hanbali School, say for example, the Maliki that has a more moderate approach to 
how ribawi commodities may be traded. In the same vein, they were reluctant to state 
whether an award granted by a female arbitrator sitting in a foreign country should be 
enforceable in Saudi Arabia. It is stated in chapter 6 that although Article 14 of the 
Arbitration Law is silent on the issue of gender, and the Qur’an and the Sunnah do not 
expressly prohibit female arbitrators, the Hanbali School is opposed to the idea of female 
adjudicators. Also, some commentators such as Baamir are cited in chapter 7 as stating that it 
may still be assumed that female arbitrators are not accepted in Saudi Arabia. The 
respondents were reluctant to engage in the debate. Judge #1 simply stated as follows: 
Yes, there is no problem with this, but the decision will be reviewed if there is a 
defect or if it is in violation of the public order or the provisions of the Shari’ah. 
The other respondents give similarly terse answers. As such, the meanings given by the 
respondents regarding the content of foreign arbitral awards and the identity of the arbitrator 
that did not comply with the Shari’ah were therefore categorised at the secondary level. 
However, it is uncertain whether the participants did not have a good grasp of the underlying 
purpose of the restrictions imposed by Islamic law or they were simply reluctant to criticise 
the prescriptions made by the Hanbali School. 
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At the tertiary level are meanings that the participants attributed to other people or organs 
such as the judge in a particular case, the Council of Ministers, or the Supreme Judicial 
Council. One participant for example stated that Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz had held that 
there is nothing preventing the codification of Islamic law where the codification is not 
innovative.86 The participant was therefore aware of the importance of legal innovation but 
attributed the idea to Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz. It was uncertain whether the participant 
was reluctant to discuss his own ideas about the importance of legal innovation and how 
Islamic law that applies in the Saudi Arabia ought to be innovated.  
In light of the above, the Researcher placed emphasis on the meanings at the primary level 
given that they were volunteered by the participants when prompted and the participants were 
able to provide details to support their answers. The most common primary meanings 
observed are commercial matters/transactions, arbitration, and the Shari’ah. The participants 
spoke about commercial transactions and the arbitration of disputes as being crucial for the 
liberalisation of the market in the Saudi Arabia and the increase of foreign investment. 
However, they noted that the transactions and awards must comply with the Shari’ah. Hence, 
free trade is important and the concept of buying and selling of goods without quotas and 
other restrictions does not conflict with the Shari’ah per se, unless haram elements such as 
risk and speculation are introduced in the process of liberalisation. This is in line with the 
provisions of the Arbitration Law cited above which are to the effect that foreign arbitral 
awards are enforceable in Saudi Arabia unless they conflict with the principles of the 
Shari’ah. It follows that parts of the Shari’ah as shown in chapters 2 and 3 support trade, and 
problems relating to commercial transactions and the settlement of commercial disputes arise 
from the disregard or wrongful interpretation and application of the Shari’ah. One participant 
noted as follows: 
 
Islamic Shari’ah is in the best interests of the people and the achievement of 
justice. If you rely on this principle of justice, which is sought by the investor, 
there will be no problem. But if you introduce new interpretations, then the 
problem is not with Islamic law but with you who take a different view and apply 
the law in a flawed manner. (Member of the Shura Council #1). 
                                                
86 In 1727, King Abdul Aziz stated his intention to establish a codified system of Islamic law. See Maren 
Hanson, ‘The Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia’ (1987) 2(3) Arab Law 
Quarterly 272, 273. 
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It must however be noted that one of the problems in the implementation of the Shari’ah (as 
shown in the previous chapters) is that of uncertainty. This stems from the fact that the 
Shari’ah is not codified, and courts are not required to follow precedents. Thus, on the one 
hand, adjudicators are given too much interpretive liberty, while on the other hand, it may be 
difficult to determine in advance whether a new interpretation is flawed.  
 
8.5 Limitations 
Biases87 and the probability of biases (of the Researcher and respondents) were not quantified 
despite the fact that convenience samples may be vulnerable to important hidden biases.88 
The most obvious bias as shown above is the participants’ prejudice in favour of the policies 
endorsed by the Supreme Judicial Council and King. There was also a risk of social 
desirability bias whereby participants behave obsequiously in order to present themselves in 
the best possible light. Also, it is uncertain whether the enthusiasm was not due to the 
respondents’ visceral fear of confuting the vision of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. 
This may explain why they were all reluctant in suggesting any shortcomings of the Vision 
2030 programme. Where the Researcher suspected such bias, the Researcher asked more 
questions in order to minimise the impact of the bias.89 The participants did not change their 
approach but provided more information to justify their stance. 
Also, it was agreed that the identities of the respondents will not be disclosed. Hence, they 
were more likely to assess laws and policies objectively if they knew that their identities 
would remain confidential. That is why they are referred to in this study as respondents, 
interviewees or participants. Nevertheless, many participants refused to be more forthcoming. 
Given that the questions were open-ended, the Researcher asked follow-up questions to elicit 
additional information. This was important because it is sometimes difficult for the 
interpreter to determine whether the respondent is honest or has an important hidden bias. 
Thus, the follow-up questions ensured that the respondents reiterated their ideas and 
perceptions, and also strengthened my faith in their interpretation, given that as they 
                                                
87 The term ‘bias’ here refers to the systematic error that is introduced into sampling or responding by selecting 
or focusing duly on one outcome or answer over others. See Nigel Norris, ‘Error, Bias and Validity in 
Qualitative Research’ (1997) 5(1) Educational Action Research 172, 173-175. See also, Malcolm Williams, 
Philosophical Foundations of Social Research Methods (SAGE 2005) 180. 
88 Marc H Bornstein, Justin Jager and Diane L Putnick, ‘Sampling in Developmental Science: Situations, 
Shortcomings, Solutions and Standards’ (2017) 33(4) Developmental Review 357, 358. 
89 Donna M Randall and Maria F Fernandes, ‘The Social Desirability Response Bias in Ethics Research’ (1991) 
10 Journal of Business Ethics 805, 805-806. 
 311 
volunteered more information I became confident about their stated convictions. The fact that 
the respondent was made to reiterate an idea confirmed that the idea could be ascribed to the 
respondent.  
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
Andrew Abbott in his seminal essay on ambiguity stated as follows: 
 
Proclamations against positivism often mask an arbitrary unwillingness to think 
formally about the social world. One asserts that the world is constructed of 
ambiguous networks of meaning, argues for the complexity of interpretations and 
representations, and then simply assumes that formal discussion of the ensuing 
complexity is impossible. But this is obviously untrue. Many people have thought 
formally about ambiguity, representation, and interpretation. Nothing in those 
phenomena militates against thinking in a rigorous, even disciplined fashion as 
we see in the work of Empson, Barthes and many others.90 
 
The above statement by Andrew Abbott describes succinctly the stance of conservative 
adjudicators and pundits in Saudi Arabia as shown in previous chapters. They reject 
positivism and are unwilling to think formally about the diverse representations and 
interpretations of the Shari’ah in the Muslim world. This chapter attempts a formal 
discussion of the complexity between networks of meaning related to investment and 
arbitration laws in Saudi Arabia. It identifies key terms and meanings that are associated with 
investment and arbitration. A sample of twenty-five participants provided meanings to key 
terms related to the interpretation and application of investment and arbitration laws. 
Potential participants who were not willing to assess objectively the policies endorsed by the 
King and Government and the interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadiths by the Hanbali 
School were excluded. All the participants had in their respective capacities faced the 
dilemma of applying the law of the Saudi Arabia based on the strict interpretation of the 
Shari’ah or the law of another State that is more suitable for investment or arbitration. The 
Researcher identified causal relationships by showing that the independent variable, 
                                                
90 Andrew Abbott, ‘Seven Types of Ambiguity’ (1997) 26 Theory and Society 357, 358. 
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respondents’ belief that free trade and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards are compatible 
with the principles of the Shari’ah, has a marked impact on the dependent variable, the 
progressive interpretation of the Shari’ah.  
The Researcher measured the social meanings of the terms used by the participants to discuss 
the enforcement provisions of the investment and arbitration laws in Saudi Arabia. It has 
been revealed that the following categories of meanings determine whether a transborder 
transaction or foreign arbitral award is compatible with the principles of the Shari’ah: (1) the 
judge’s discretion, (2) the source of the law (accepted interpretation of the Qur’an and 
Hadiths), and (3) certainty as regards how Islamic law ought to apply. 
It has also been revealed that reforms that seek to enhance the efficiency of investment and 
arbitration laws should expand judicial discretion but require judges to justify their decisions. 
This will enable non-Muslim legal communities to understand why Islamic courts reach 
decisions, eliminate suspicion of arbitrary conclusions, and promote confidence in the courts’ 
integrity. Also, although the reforms should affirm the primacy of the Shari’ah under all 
circumstances, they should ensure uniform interpretation by courts. It was equally revealed 
that although unpredictability may be resolved by codification, the ijtihad must not be 
eliminated since it is the best way of resolving ambiguity. Lastly, it was noted that trade 
liberalisation and international legal rules that seek to promote economic development and 
public welfare are consistent with the Shari’ah where they focus on concepts such as good 
faith, trust and reciprocity. 
Also, there is a disconnect between the perception of, on the one hand, adjudicators, legal 
scholars and reporters in Saudi Arabia and, on the other hand, foreign investors and analysts 
regarding the effectiveness of the Shari’ah.91 The qualitative responses of adjudicators and 
pundits in Saudi Arabia reflect an optimistic and almost idealistic perception of the Shari’ah, 
while the latter generally view the Hanbali fiqh as commercially disadvantageous.  
 
In this light, it may be important to determine whether adjudicators in Saudi Arabia may refer 
to another School of Islamic Jurisprudence other than the Hanbali School in order to invoke 
another interpretation of the Shari’ah that is more advantageous to trade and commerce. 
Although the Decree issued by King Abdul-Aziz in 1345H (1926), that designated the 
                                                
91 The perceptions of foreign investors and scholars are discussed in chapter 7. 
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Hanbali School as the official orthodox school for Islamic courts in Saudi Arabia, sought to 
prevent the inconsistent interpretation and application of the Qur’an and Hadith and delineate 
the process by which Islamic courts apply the Shari’ah, it has led to a limited kind of legal 
formalism that is disadvantageous to investment and arbitration. It may then be argued that 
codification is important since it will provide greater predictability and certainty in law. 
Nonetheless, the codification of the Hanbali jurisprudence may not be helpful since, as 
shown in chapter 7, it is considered by many non-Muslim legal communities as commercially 
disadvantageous.  
The fact that the Shari’ah is still subject to variable interpretations may therefore better 
ensure that it is used to settle commercial disputes efficiently.92 In this regard, it may be 
suggested that the Royal Decree of 1930 and the Judicial Board Decision no. 3 of 1928 give a 
margin of discretion to judges and arbitrators regarding the interpretations of the Shari’ah by 
other Schools of Islamic Jurisprudence. Hence, to the extent that this contention is justified, 
Saudi Arabian judges and arbitrators may be able to defer to the opinion of another School of 
Islamic Jurisprudence other than the Hanbali School where the former is more advantageous 
to trade and commerce. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
92 However, the fact that there is no clear body of texts for interpretation also means that it is difficult to predict 
outcomes, which may constitute a deterrent to foreign investors. 
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Chapter 9: 
Conclusion 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes this thesis by showing how the hypothesis was tested and the research 
questions answered in order to achieve the aim. Also, it shows how the results of the study 
may be integrated with the findings of key studies and provides support to and differ from the 
theoretical positions of the studies. It concludes with recommendations for further studies. 
9.2 Background  
It is shown in chapters 1 and 2 that previous studies have investigated the Saudi 
government’s response when confronted with the dilemma of applying parochial Shari’ah 
principles or international law that aligns to business interests.1 It was noted that some studies 
have argued that the parochial or rigid approach to the interpretation of the verses of the 
Qur’an may be explained by the designation of the Hanbali school of (Sunni) Islamic 
jurisprudence as the official fiqh,2 while other studies observed that this may be explained by 
the rise of the Ulama or scholars who believed God’s will had been completely revealed in 
the Qur’an, but only they (the Ulama) had the capacity to interpret the holy book.3 Since, the 
                                                
1 The studies that most influenced the Researcher in this regard include, George Khoukaz, ‘Sharia Law and 
International Commercial Arbitration: The Need for An Intra-Islamic Arbitral Institution’ (2017) Journal of 
Dispute Resolution 181; Arthur J Gemmell, ‘Commercial Arbitration in the Islamic Middle East’ (2006) 5(1) 
Santa Clara Journal of International Law 169; George Sayen, ‘Arbitration, Conciliation, and the Islamic Legal 
Tradition in Saudi Arabia’ (1987) 9(2) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law 211; 
Saad U Rizwan, ‘Foreseeable Issues and Hard Questions: The Implications of US Courts Recognising and 
Enforcing Foreign Arbitral Awards Applying Islamic Law under the New York Convention’ (2013) 98 Cornell 
Law Review 493. 
2 See Nayla Comair-Obeid, ‘Salient Issues in Arbitration from an Arab Middle Eastern Perspective’ (2014) 4 
The Arbitration Brief 52, 58; Bryant W Seaman, ‘Islamic Law and Modern Government: Saudi Arabia 
Supplements the Shari’a to Regulate Development’ (1980) 18 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 413, 422.  
3 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, ‘The Ulama and Contestations on Religious Authority’ in Muhammad Khalid 
Masud, Armando Salvatore and Martin van Bruinesen (eds), Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates 
(University of Edinburgh Press 2009) 206-207. See also, Jared Rubin, Rulers, Religion and Riches: Why the 
West Got Rich (Cambridge University Press 2009) 13 [Rubin blames the conservative jurists in both Mecca and 
the Ottoman Empire]; and Ken Malik, The Quest for a Moral Compass: A Global History of Ethics (Atlantic 
2014) 56 [Malik blames the influence of conservative thinkers in the thirteenth century such as Al-Ghazali]. 
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Ulama did no use a codified system, they often interpreted the Qur’an by filling the gaps 
with their strictly conservative views, pre-suppositions and preunderstandings.4 
With regard to the Hanbali school, it was founded by students of Ibn Hanbal as a 
conservative alternative to other Sunni schools that were deemed to engage in speculative 
theological innovations.5 Thus, it is a strict traditionalist school that derives the Shari’ah 
essentially from the Qur’an and the Hadiths, with exceptions made with the views of the 
Prophet’s companions or early Muslims.6 Unlike, the other schools, the Hanbalites do not 
accept that a judge may use his discretion or refer to the local customs to fill in gaps in the 
sacred texts.7 It follows that since the Hanbali is the official fiqh in Saudi Arabia, and the 
Qur’an is the constitution as per Article 1 of the Basic Law, all laws and regulations must 
comply with the Hanbali interpretation of the specific legal prescriptions of the Qur’an and 
Hadiths (and the consensus of the Prophet’s companions). This leaves little room for reforms 
based on changing social and economic circumstances. 
However, Ayab has argued that it would be unrealistic to overlook the realities of 
globalisation since they did not exist at the time of founding of Islam.8 She notes further that, 
if interpreted properly, Islam, may provide sufficient tools that allow the suitable 
jurisprudence to address the problems of the modern age.9 This argument is based on the 
contention that classical Islamic jurisprudence did not favour deference to the personal 
opinion of certain jurists (such as the Ulama and Hanbalites) to interpret the divinely-inspired 
Shari’ah, but emphasised the importance of discovering the intent behind the divine law and 
the appropriate way of applying the intent. Thus, “Discovery of the intent of the law is more 
important than a literal interpretation.”10 
Many commentators have focused on the classical Islamic jurisprudence or the practices of 
early Muslims to demonstrate that the rigid and literal interpretation of the Qur’an is a more 
recent phenomenon than the progressive interpretation of the book’s verses. Younes for 
                                                
4 Zaman, ibid, 206-207. 
5 See Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law: 9th-10th Centuries CE (Brill 1997) 182; 
Francis Robinson, Atlas of the Islamic World Since 1500 (Facts on File 1984) 29. 
6 See Hisham M Ramadan, Understanding Islamic Law: From Classical to Contemporary (Rowman Altamira 
2006) 24-29. 
7 See Chiragh Ali, ‘The Proposed Political, Legal and Social Reforms’ in Charles Kurzman (ed), Modernist 
Islam 1840-1940: A Sourcebook (Oxford University Press 2002) 281-282. 
8 Mary B Ayad, ‘Harmonisation of International Commercial Arbitration Law and Sharia The Case of Pacta 
Sunt Servanda vs Ordre Public: The Use Of Ijtihad to Achieve Higher Award Enforcement’ (2009) 5 Macquarie 
Journal of Business Law 93, 102-103. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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example demonstrated that the medieval Islamic pragmatics became bound with the fetters of 
rigidity due to subsequent hermeneutical innovations.11 Weeramantry argued that a closer 
examination of the Shari’ah reveals the high degree of intercommunication between Western 
and Islamic legal cultures over the centuries, as well as the congruence of the two legal 
cultures on some key principles of international law such as fairness and justice.12 
Notwithstanding, the Shari’ah as practised in Saudi Arabia (in accordance with the Hanbali 
pronouncements) has proved to be at odds with international (Western) standards. Opwis 
argued that this is because of the Saudi government’s oscillating approach to modernity.13 
She contended that there was an internal struggle at the administrative level requiring the 
government to embrace international standards of commercial law needed to compete in the 
global marketplace whilst maintaining a strict adherence to the Hanbali interpretation of the 
Shari’ah.14 Also, Elshufara maintains that the rigidity of the (Hanbali version of) the 
Shari’ah creates tension between the legislative and the judicial approaches.15 Thus, the 
government has acceded to various international treaties, while on the other hand, an 
interventionist (rather than supportive) judiciary has limited the principles enshrined in the 
country’s municipal arbitration laws by adopting an ambiguous stance on public policy.16 In 
the same light, Mahassni and Grenely concluded that Shari’ah implementation in Saudi 
Arabia remained an incomplete and sometimes discretionary model of justice.17  
The Hanbali school requires adjudicators (whether judges or arbitrators) to be fully trained in 
Islamic law. Thus, they are less likely to recognise judgements or arbitral awards granted by 
non-Muslim adjudicators. However, the Board of Grievances rejected the argument made by 
the Saudi government that an award granted by a non-Muslim was inconsistent with the 
Shari’ah since the arbitrator had insufficient knowledge of Islamic law.18 The Board held that 
since there is a general consensus among Muslim scholars on the sanctity of contract, an 
                                                
11 Soualhi Younes, ‘Islamic Legal Hermeneutics: The Context and Adequacy of Interpretation in Modern 
Islamic Discourse’ (2002) 41(4) Islamic Studies 585, 585. 
12 Christopher Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective (St Martin 1988) xv, 160. 
13 See Felicitis Opwis, ‘Islamic Law and Legal Change: The Concept of Maslaha in Classical and Contemporary 
Islamic Legal Theory’, in Abbas Amanat and Frank Griffel (eds), Shari’a Islamic Law in the Contemporary 
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15 Dina Elshufara, ‘The 2012 Saudi Arbitration Law and the Shar’ia Factor: A Friend or Foe in Construction’ 
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16 Ibid. 
17 Hassan Mahassni and Neal Grenely, ‘Public Sector Dispute Resolution in Saudi Arabia: Procedures and 
Practices of Saudi Arabia’s Administrative Court’ (1987) 21(3) The International Lawyer 836, 838. 
18 See Board of Grievances Case No. 235/2/Qhaf/1416 H Saudi Arabia. 
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arbitral decision based on a contract should bind the parties.19 It is argued here that the 
decision failed to clarify the ambiguous Hanbali stance on judgements and awards granted by 
non-Muslims. Moreover, unlike the government, the Board seemed to have suggested that the 
Hanbali doctrine recognises the consensus of later generations as valid. The Researcher was 
unable to find evidence supporting this stance. Hence, it remains uncertain whether the Board 
acted with unfettered discretion in this case. 
Nonetheless, Al-Ramahi intimates that there are decisions of Hanbali judges that recognise 
the right of non-Muslims to arbitrate at least in commercial matters, outside Muslim 
territories.20 Also, Hanson noted that the flexibility of the Hanbali school extends only to 
awards granted in non-Islamic jurisdictions that are not inconsistent with the Shari’ah.21 
Then, Saleh pointed out that recourse to a non-Muslim court, in contractual disputes is 
allowed only as long as there are no non-Islamic clauses such as riba.22 Although this 
demonstrates flexibility, it excludes most commercial contracts concluded in Western 
countries. Coulson on his part observed that Shari’ah courts in Saudi Arabia retained a broad 
discretion to reject arbitration clauses on the grounds that these did not constitute valid 
contracts under (the Hanbali interpretation of) Islamic law.23 This shows the Hanbali 
doctrine may be more ambiguous than rigid. Hanbali scholars generally hold that women are 
ineligible to become judges and arbitrators or hold any public office because the Prophet said 
“people will not prosper if they appoint a woman in charge of them.”24 It is uncertain whether 
the latter verse may be interpreted in such categorical manner. 
The incomplete and discretionary Hanbali model may therefore, logically, constitute an 
obstacle to FDI given the emphasis on literalism. The rejection of arbitration clauses because 
the contract contains non-Islamic elements such as riba, the failure to recognise arbitration 
agreements because they are not based on an existing dispute, the rejection of arbitral awards 
granted by women, and the silence on the form and degree of uncertainty disallowed in 
respect of a dispute under the Shari’ah have all adversely impacted upon the autonomy and 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
20 20 Aseel Al-Ramahi, ‘Sulh: A Crucial Part of Islamic Arbitration’ (2008) LSE Law, Society and Economy 
Working Papers 1, 78. 
21 Maren Hanson, ‘The Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia’ (1987) 2(3) Arab 
Law Quarterly 271, 273. 
22 Samir Saleh, Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East (Hart Publishing 1984) 111. 
23 Noel J Coulson, Commercial Law in Gulf States: The Islamic Legal Tradition (Springer 1984) 44. 
24 Rawya Al-Zahhar, ‘Women under Saudi Legal System’ in Abdulla Al-Khunain et al (eds), Judicial System in 
Saudi Arabia (Center for Global Thought on Saudi Arabia 2015) 339.  
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integrity of arbitration as an alternative to Shari’ah court-centered litigation, and constitute a 
strong disincentive to FDI. 
9.3 Testing the Hypothesis 
In light of the above, the hypothesis tested in this study is that the Shari’ah is fundamentally 
flexible, and the rigid interpretation subsequently imposed by Hanbali doctrinaire 
conservatives explains why the use of the Shari’ah to adjudicate on or settle disputes 
constitutes an obstacle to FDI in Saudi Arabia. 
It is shown in chapters 2 and 3 that the parochial or rigid approach to the interpretation of the 
verses of the Qur’an may not be fully explained by the designation of the Hanbali school as 
the official fiqh or the rise of the Ulama. It is suggested that they are both related by mutual 
causality given that the rise of the conservative Ulama who prioritise the literal interpretation 
of the Shari’ah may be attributed to the prevalence of dogmatism; and the latter became 
prevalent because of strict traditionalists such as the Hanbalites. Notwithstanding, it is shown 
in chapter 2 that both factors became operative due to the economic decline of the Islamic 
empire after the 16th century and the growing influence of jurists who interpreted the Qur’an 
in inflexible ways and discouraged innovation. In fact, this rigid (Hanbali) legal culture 
stands in sharp contrast to the pluralism of early Islamic thought. This affirms the findings of 
researchers such as Hallaq,25 as well as Younes, Elshufara, and Weeramantry cited above. 
Also, other commentators such as Kuran and Cooper and Yue have demonstrated that the rise 
of a more rigid interpretation of Islamic legal sources, and corresponding ‘closure’ to market-
orientated policies only gained traction at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of 
the twentieth century.26 Cook on his part noted that following the rise of political Islam in 
seventeenth century in Western Arabia, rigid literalism came to dominate religious-legal 
discourse and that continued well into the next centuries.27 Abdullah states that religious 
                                                
25 Wael B Hallaq Authority, Continuity and Change in the History of Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press, 
4ed 2004), 127-128. See also,  
26 See Timur Kuran, The Long Divergence: How Islam Held Back the Middle East (Princeton University Press, 
2012) 3-24; William Wager Cooper and Piyu Yue, Challenges of the Muslim World: Present, Future and Past 
(Emerald Group Publishing 2008) 272. See also, Mohamed A. Moustafa, ‘Upholding God’s Essence: Ibn 
Taymiyya on the Createdness of the Spirit,’ Journal of the History of (2017) 3 Islamic Philosophy and Sciences 
1. 
27 Michael Cook, ‘The Expansion of the First Saudi State: The Case of Wahabishm, in (edited by Bosworth, C. 
E. et al) Islamic World from Classical to Modern Times: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lewis (Princeton: Darwin 
Press, 1989), 661–700. 
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literalism actually emerged sometime between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries with the 
‘closing of the gates of ijtihad.’28 
While many societies, and then countries, would abandon the Hanbali school as being 
excessively prescriptive, the Al-Saud rulers of Saudi Arabia (beginning with King Abdul 
Aziz) entered into a pact with the Hanbali in the nineteenth century, and the Hanbali was 
designated as the official school of law of the Kingdom. However, it is shown in chapters 6 
and 7 that Saudi Arabia v Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco Case) equally 
strengthened the conservative (and anti-Western) model. In fact, it is argued here that this is 
an even stronger cause of the rigid interpretation of the Shari’ah. This is because the ruling 
was used by the traditionalist members of the Saudi government as an example of the 
negative effects of embracing international law.29 This led to the enactment of Resolution No. 
58 in 1963 which effectively restricted all arbitration clauses and agreements in contracts 
entered into by the Saudi government and subjected any such clauses to public policy 
reviews. The power to enact public policy measures or issue ad hoc decisions in the public 
interest was then construed broadly by Saudi officials to cover an ever-expanding category of 
“state contracts” and often, seemingly, without a proportionate legal justification or published 
reasons.30  
As such, the use of the Shari’ah to adjudicate on or settle disputes constitutes an obstacle to 
FDI because of the rise of the conservative movement after the closing of the gates of ijtihad, 
and the prominence of anti-Western (international) doctrinaire scholars in early twentieth 
century who imposed a rigid interpretation. This study has demonstrated in light of previous 
studies that the application of a flexible and pragmatic form of the Shari’ah has existed since 
the earliest Islamic jurisprudence, where the eschatological debate was not confined to the 
four recognised schools of jurisprudence. Also, it has been shown that outside the Muslim 
world, Islamic scholars influenced, and were influenced, by the theological, philosophical 
and economic insights of earlier or contemporaneous civilisations. These interactions 
provided fertile grounds for the development of trade relations between Muslim and non-
                                                
28 Ismail Abdullah, ‘Tawhid and Trinity: A Study of Ibn Taymiyyah’s al-Jawab al Sahih’, (2006) (4) Intellectual 
Discourse 191, 192. See also, Vikor who contends that the gates of ijhitad had been closed by the tenth century 
because jurists were already bound to follow the edicts of the schools of jurisprudence. Knut Vikor ‘Inscrutable 
Divinity or Social Welfare: The Basis of Islam’ in Guttorm Fløistad (ed), Philosophy of Justice (Springer 2015) 
146. 
29 Saud Al-Ammari, ‘Saudi Arabia and the Onassis Arbitration – A Commentary’ (2010) 3(3) The Journal of 
World Energy and Business Law 257, 257-259. 
30 Abdulrahman Yahya Baamir, Saudi Law and Judicial Practice in Commercial and Banking Arbitration 
(Brunel University 2008) 183. 
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Muslim merchants. They were formalised through trade treaties, further strengthening the 
foundations of mercantile law in the region. Trust between trading partners was furnished 
through the customary law principles of reciprocity, freedom of contract and good faith.31  
However, despite the fact that the Shari’ah is fundamentally flexible, it was not until 1983, 
and then 2007 and 2012 that the Saudi government implemented a set of comprehensive rules 
to attract FDI and govern arbitration. The investment and arbitration regulations were drafted 
with the intention of providing a level of comfort to international companies from outside the 
Kingdom who were trading with or looking to trade with Saudi counterparts, and to ensure 
that there were provisions governing both the arbitration procedure and the actual 
proceedings themselves. This is evidence that incongruences between the Shari’ah and 
international law are not insurmountable obstacles, though there remain issues around the 
meaning and scope of public policy and the lack of precedent. Nonetheless, this study has 
shown that by identifying common areas, it is possible to align Saudi courts with 
international norms. Chapter 2 cites Skeen to the effect that many of the trading practices 
developed in the Islamic world about trusts, banking and dispute resolution were later on 
adopted by European merchants.32 Banaj is also cited demonstrating how Islam shaped the 
tradition of early capitalism both by preserving the monetary economy and through the use of 
arbitration.33 As such, early Islamic law shared many similarities with the modern Western 
arbitration. As shown in chapter 4, some of the similarities include: 
The Qur’an promotes arbitration:  
You should always refer disputes to God and to his Prophet. And obey Allah and his 
messenger; And Fall into no disputes, lest you lose heart and your power to depart; 
and be patient and persevering, for Allah is with those who patiently persevere.34  
The Qur’an also requires judges (and arbitrators) to apply justice:  
                                                
31 See Hideyuki Shimizu, ‘Philosophy of the Islamic Law of Contract: A Comparative Study of Contractual 
Justice’ (1989) 15 IMES Working Paper Series 112, 112. 
32 Bradley Skeen, ‘Trade and exchange in the medieval Islamic World’ in Pam J. Crabtree, Encyclopedia of 
Society and Culture in the Medieval World (Facts on File, Inc., 2005) 345. 
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Surely Allah commands you to make over trusts to their owners and that when you judge 
between people you judge with justice; surely Allah admonishes you with what is excellent; 
surely Allah is Seeing, Hearing.”35 
The Qur’an empowers judges (and arbitrators) to make decisions according to their 
discretion:  
“If they come to you, judge between them or turn away from them. If you turn away from 
them, they can do you no harm. But if you judge, judge between them with justice. Surely, 
Allah loves those who do justice.”36  
The Qur’an promotes the principle of independence and impartiality of judges (and 
arbitrators):  
“And when you pronounce judgment, pronounce it with justice even if a near relation is 
concerned, and fulfil the covenant of Allah.”37 
9.4 Achieving the Research Aim 
This study has examined the nature and significance of the legal framework for FDI in Saudi 
Arabia by analysing the history of Saudi Arabian secular and theological laws, and the Arab 
philosophy outside of the Shari’ah in the context of foreign investment and dispute 
resolution. This enabled the Researcher to achieve the aim of showing how the government 
of Saudi Arabia can effectively strike a balance between protecting the Kingdom’s Islamic 
heritage and attracting FDI.  
Despite the shift towards extremism over the past five centuries and the designation of the 
Hanbali jurisprudence as the ius commune or secure point of reference in the Saudi legal 
system, there are many instruments (that are consistent with the Shari’ah) that protect the 
investments of foreign businesses and guarantee their access to international arbitration. 
                                                
35 Qur’an 4: 58. This is similar to Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law (1994) which requires the arbitrator 
to treat all parties with equality, and Article 1.7 of the Principles published by the International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) that requires fairness in arbitration proceedings. 
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discretion where the parties have not agreed on procedural rules. See for example, Article 44 of the ICSID 
Convention, Article 14.2 of the LCIA Rules, Article 20 of the ICC Arbitration Rules, and Article 18 of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
37 Qur’an 6: 152. This is similar to Articles 6 and 11 of the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; Article 14(1) of 
the ICSID Convention; Article 6(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules and Articles 7(1) and 11(1) of the ICC 
Arbitration Rules. 
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These instruments are critically analysed in chapters 5 and 7. It is noted that foreign investors 
may rely on the New York Convention and Riyadh Convention which require Saudi Arabian 
courts to recognise private agreements to arbitrate and enforce the awards granted by 
arbitrators in other signatory states. Also, two important MITs protect investors from MENA 
countries in Saudi Arabia. These include the OIC Agreement and the Arab Investment 
Agreement. They provide protection against expropriation and contain an MFN clause, 
whereby Saudi Arabia is required to accord foreign investors treatment no less favourable 
than that accorded to investors of any third state. 
Where a BIT is not available to a foreign investor and the Arab Investment Agreement or 
OIC Agreement do not constitute an important source of right, the investor may rely on the 
protections in the New Arbitration Law. Article 25(1) of the Law, in accordance with the 
Shari’ah, recognises the autonomy of parties in choosing the procedure to be followed by the 
arbitral tribunal. They may agree that the proceedings are subject to the rules of any 
arbitration centre, whether in Saudi Arabia or abroad.  
However, awards granted under the above MITs shall be enforced in accordance with the 
Shari’ah. Equally, the enforcement of arbitral awards under the New York Convention 
remains unpredictable. This is because section V(2)(b) of the Convention provides a “public 
policy” exemption that allows Saudi Arabia to refuse to recognise or enforce arbitral awards 
that conflict with public policy. As such, an award granted in a non-Muslim jurisdiction must 
take into account Shari’ah concerns where the host or source country is Saudi Arabia, else 
the award may not be enforced in Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, the primacy of the Shari’ah 
ensures that the government protects the Kingdom’s Islamic heritage. 
Foreign investors may be protected with the the Shari’ah as the highest law of the land 
because the Shari’ah is fundamentally flexible. However, the long history of the negative 
depiction of the Shari’ah may be attributed to the rigid interpretation imposed by the 
doctrinaire conservative and the lack of knowledge in the non-Muslim community about the 
Shari’ah’s flexible nature. In Petroleum Development (Trucial Coasts) Ltd v Sheikh of Abu 
Dhabi, Lord Asquith recognised the applicability of the Shari’ah but refused to apply it 
because, in his opinion, the primitive region of Abu Dhabi could not possess any settled body 
of law that could be applied to the construction of modern commercial instruments. In the 
Aramco Case, the arbitration panel were reluctant to apply the Shari’ah as interpreted by the 
Hanbali school because the panel believed that the Hanbali law contained no provisions 
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governing mining and oil concessions. Thus, Aramco’s rights could not be secured in an 
unquestionable manner by Shari’ah law. Ironically, the panel turned to a variant of lex 
mercatoria, placing emphasis on accepted principles and contractual usages in the West. As 
such, the local laws of Saudi Arabia were disregarded because of their ambiguity but general 
principles of law derived broadly from precedent and legislation in different Western 
jurisdictions were deemed to be sufficiently unambiguous to govern the subject matter of the 
dispute.  
In Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Shamil Bank of Bahrain E.C., the contract provided that 
English Law would be the governing law “subject to the glorious principles of Shari’ah 
Law.” This raised a choice-of-law problem that the English Court resolved by turning to the 
Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations that requires the parties 
to choose the law of a specific country. The Court then held that Shari’ah law was not a law 
of any specific country and was repugnant to English law. Thus, the Shari’ah could not apply 
together with English law. In the Court’s misguided opinion, the Shari’ah represented a 
religious code, and where it was included in the arbitration clause as the parties’ choice of 
law, the clause had to be interpreted as one that did not have a choice-of-law provision.  
The above decisions may however be contrasted with that in Musawi v. RE International 
(UK) Ltd, where a more knowledgeable English Court maintained that the choice-of-law 
clause that identified the Shia Shari’ah law as the applicable law is valid under the UK 
Arbitration Act 1996. Nonetheless, the Court did not state whether the decision would have 
been different if the clause had identified the Sunni Shari’ah law rather than Shia Shari’ah 
law as the applicable law. Despite the fact that these cases have been cited in many studies 
analysed in chapters 5 and 7, they did not provide any clear directions regarding the 
shortcomings of the Shari’ah that impede arbitration. Answering the research questions 
enabled the Researcher to identify the shortcomings of the Shari’ah that impede FDI and 
arbitration and proposed ways in which they may be rectified. 
9.4.1 Answering the Research Questions 
This study examined the implications of the Shari’ah in commercial law in Saudi Arabia in 
order to determine whether the primacy of the Shari’ah constitutes an obstacle to FDI, and 
whether the government is able to achieve a balance between attracting foreign investment 
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and protecting the Kingdom’s Islamic heritage. In order to achieve this aim, four questions 
were answered as shown below. 
The Protection of Foreign Investors in Saudi Arabia 
It was noted that the Prophet himself practised reciprocity in respect of obligations concluded 
under treaty, including those formed in partnership with non-Muslim nations or powers.38 
Thus, the binding nature of obligations made under covenants, whether by treaty or by 
contract, are entirely consistent with the early history of Islam. Also, governments are 
required to protect foreign nationals due to the legal protection of Dhimmis which is a duty 
imposed on all Muslims to protect and secure non-Muslims living in Islamic state. 
Accordingly, private property rights are sacred under the Shari’ah.39 In light of these 
imperatives, the government of Saudi Arabia has since the early 1980s revised the existing 
laws in order to be able to successfully implement the changes set out in the BITs and MITs 
that they have ratified for the purposes of enhancing the access to investment opportunities 
for non-Saudi investors.40 
Although the Foreign Investment Law distinguishes between Saudi and non-Saudi investors, 
different categories of foreign investors are treated differently, with special provisions and 
preferential treatment available to investors from countries in the GCC and the Arab League. 
Thus, the preferential treatment is based on nationality as opposed to religion. As a result of 
the preferential treatment, investors from GCC and Arab League countries are treated the 
same as Saudi citizens under the Foreign Investment Law. Preferential treatment for these 
categories of investors includes the right to invest in opportunities listed in the Negative List. 
Furthermore, investors from these countries are exempted from paying income tax. 
Nonetheless, it is uncertain whether an investor from a non-GCC state may forum-shop and 
establish a holding company in a GCC state in order to acquire the status of GCC foreign 
investor. Also, neither the GCC Agreement nor the Foreign Investment Law addresses the 
question whether a joint venture between a (non-Saudi) GCC national and a non-GCC 
national may be considered a foreign investor. 
                                                
38 See Robert Hunt, ‘The Covenants of the Prophet Muhammad’ Patheos, 13 December 2013, 
<http://www.patheos.com/blogs/roberthunt/2013/12/the-covenants-of-the-prophet-muhammad/>, accessed 25 
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39 See Saba Habachy, ‘Property, Right and Contract in Muslim Law’ (1962) 62 Columbia Law Review 450, 
458. 
40 Hussain Agil and Bruno Zeller, ‘Foreign Investments in Saudi Arabia (2012) 15 International Trade & 
Business Law Review 60, 61. 
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It must also be noted that the local remedies that foreign investors in general may seek are 
limited. Contracts containing the payment of riba will not be enforced under the Shari’ah. 
Also, foreign investors must exploit natural resources on behalf of the Islamic community 
that holds the ultimate right of property.41 It is noted in chapter 5 that this is the Hanbali 
interpretation of the Qur’an. It may be distinguished from the interpretations of other schools 
such as the Hanafi and Shafi which hold that mineral ownership depends on land 
ownership.42 The latter interpretation is more progressive and closer to what obtains in 
Western states. Thus, foreign investors are likely to receive better protection in Islamic 
societies that apply the opinions of all schools such as the Hanafi and Shafi schools rather 
than those that apply only the opinions of the Hanbali school. 
In order to protect its investment, the non-GCC and non-Arab League investor may rely on 
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States. This Convention provides a means of settling investment disputes between 
signatory states such as Saudi Arabia and nationals of other signatory States: ICSID. Saudi 
Arabia acceded the Convention in 1980.43 Article 25(1) requires the disputing parties to 
consent in writing to submit disputes to ICSID. This may be done in the investment contract 
between the foreign investor and signatory state or in the investment treaty under which the 
foreign investment is made. Also, Article 25(4) provides that the contracting state is entitled 
to notify ICSID of any categories of disputes that it may not submit to ICSID. Thus, at the 
time of ratification, Saudi Arabia notified ICSID that it will not submit disputes pertaining to 
oil exploration and production, and acts of sovereignty.44 Thus, the claims of foreign 
investors (whose state has ratified the Convention) may be submitted to ICSID, unless they 
result from acts of a governmental nature carried out within Saudi Arabia.45 Nonetheless, it is 
uncertain how acts of a governmental nature may be distinguished from acts of a commercial 
nature.  
Notwithstanding, what the above treaties and cases show is that the Shari’ah is neither an 
obstacle to free trade and liberalisation nor the protection of foreign investments in Saudi 
                                                
41 See El Walied W El-Malik, Mineral Investment under Shari ‘a Law (Graham and Tortman 1993) 54. 
42 See Mike Bunter, ‘The Islamic Sharia Law and Petroleum Developments in the Countries of North Africa and 
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2000) 671. 
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Arabia. Foreign investors are protected under the various MITs and BITs on the basis of their 
nationalities rather than religion. They are able to agree on future arbitration although there is 
no existing dispute, and they can bring claims against the government of Saudi Arabia 
without regard to the Shari’ah. It is true that in the absence of a civil code or specific statute 
in Saudi Arabia, foreign investors ought to have a good grasp of the relevant Shari’ah 
principles in order to gauge the extent to which their investments will be protected. In this 
regard, it may be argued that the government has failed to educate the international 
community on the Shari’ah and the common principles it shares with the lex mercatoria as 
shown in chapters 2, 3 and 6. However, what is important is that parties may submit disputes 
against the government of Saudi Arabia to international tribunals depending on whether the 
former’s investments are protected by a MIT or BIT. It is shown in chapter 7 that although 
the awards must be consistent with the Shari’ah, where the part that is inconsistent with the 
Shari’ah can be severed from the award, it may be enforced in Saudi Arabia. 
The Legal Factors Deterring Foreign Investment 
Chapter 2 examines the history of Islamic legal thought as shaped a plurality of cultural 
influences as well as a plurality of religious opinions, both at odds with orientalist 
conceptions of Islamic history as endlessly defined by stagnation and intellectual sterility. 
Chapter 3 outlines the rules governing trade from the time of the Prophet Mohammed. 
Chapter 6 identifies the roots of arbitration in Saudi Arbitration as having a basis in pre-
Islamic and Islamic practices. As such, disputes between people from the same tribe in the 
pre-Islamic and early Islamic periods were often referred to the head of the clan or tribe 
(sulh) to pass judgment. It is then argued that the Shari’ah is commonly misrepresented as a 
system that is directly opposed to free trade. This may be explained by the rise of the power 
and influence of empires in the West and the corresponding increasing poverty and 
diminishing power of Islamic empires. This motivated insularity and the rigid interpretation 
of the Islamic rules governing trade.    
Similarly, although the Saudi government adopted a free trade policy in the 1930s, the Ulama 
became dominant in the legal sphere and asserted their authority in commercial courts. This 
explains the conservative approach adopted in Saudi Arabia in interpreting the Shari’ah. The 
Ulama undermined the autonomy of contractual parties and were suspicious of commercial 
arbitration. The application of the Shari’ah in commercial courts became unpredictable. This 
discouraged enterprise since innovation was presented as un-Islamic. Also, the discretion of 
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judges was reduced, and the interpretation of the law did not take into account the reality 
faced by traders.  
It is therefore submitted that the ‘disconnect’ between Islamic law and free trade is the main 
factor deterring foreign investment. However, as mentioned above, this is a phenomenon that 
developed between the late tenth and early twentieth centuries and is at odds with early 
Islamic teachings. This is when the Ulama and Hanbali jurists ensured that the Saudi legal 
system was not pluralistic. It remains that traditional Islamic teachings recognise the 
importance of free trade and arbitration. The Qur’an prohibits monopolies and emphasises 
the role of the entrepreneur. It condemns hoarding, cheating, bribing or any other unethical 
trading practices.  
Rizwan’s study was important in devising mechanisms that Saudi Arabia can implement to 
eliminate or mitigate the effects of the rigid interpretation of the Shari’ah by the Hanbalites 
and Ulama.46 Rizwan noted that the shortcomings of the Shari’ah include: the existence of 
multiple schools of Islamic law with diverse interpretations, the fact that the concept of 
binding precedent is not recognised under Islamic law, and the absence of a clear choice-of-
law rule.47 This implies that the reform of investment and arbitration laws in Saudi Arabia 
ought to codify the law or at least designate one school as more important than others, 
establish a system that enhances predictability by requiring judicial adherence to rules 
established in previous cases, and set out rules governing the choice of law by the parties.  
With regard to multiple schools of Islamic law, courts in Saudi Arabia are required to adopt 
the interpretations of the Hanbali School. Thus, this is not a problem in Saudi Arabia. 
Moreover, the Hanbali School recognises the finality of arbitral awards and its position on 
the party autonomy principle mirrors the Western concept of freedom to contract.  
Regarding the rules of precedent and choice of law, the New Arbitration Law of 2012 has 
largely met these requirements. It is noted in chapter 7 that the New Arbitration Law is part 
of wider reforms that were introduced with a view to modernising the laws of the Kingdom. 
They began with judicial reforms in 2007 that resulted in a reorganisation of the hierarchy of 
the Saudi court system, the establishment of a Supreme Court and regional appellate courts, 
and amendments to the Foreign Investment Law and company law. Also, Article 2 of the 
                                                
46 See Rizwan (n 1). 
47 Ibid, 503-504. 
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Implementing Rules to the New Arbitration Law provides that the Court of Appeal is the 
competent court referred to in the New Arbitration Law, and if the Court of Appeal 
recognises an award, it will order its enforcement and its decision will be final and non-
appealable. Although it does not specifically introduce the doctrine of binding precedent, it 
may be argued that adjudicators in or outside Saudi Arabia may refer to the decisions of the 
Court of Appeal (regarding awards recognised and enforced) in order to decide similar cases. 
Also, parties are free to choose the institutions and rules governing their arbitration. These 
may include UNCITRAL Rules, ICC Rules or LCIA Rules that are widely used in the 
international community. The rules governing the SCCA suggest a model arbitration clause 
that includes the law governing the contract, the number of arbitrators, seat of the arbitration, 
language of the arbitration, and applicable institutional rules. Parties may choose the 
governing law. Article 25(1) of the New Arbitration Law recognises the autonomy of parties 
in choosing the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal. They may agree that the 
proceedings are subject to the rules of any arbitration centre, whether in Saudi Arabia or 
abroad. Moreover, where the rules agreed by the parties are inconsistent with the procedural 
rules in the New Arbitration Law, the former will prevail. 
In light of the above, it is suggested that the modernisation of the law in Saudi Arabia will 
logically enhance the understanding and acceptance of Saudi law by non-Islamic legal 
communities. More so, the New Arbitration Law is largely based on the UNCITRAL Model 
Law (2006 version), which (together with the older version) is the basis for arbitration law in 
many countries.48 Also, the SCCA Arbitration Rules are largely based on the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules. It is also important to note that under Article 38 of the New Arbitration 
Law, the choice of law rules of a different legal system, including rules of private 
international law do not have automatic effect or applicability, save in those instances where 
parties have agreed to be bound by these relevant conflict of law rules in their selection of the 
applicable substantive law. This requirement enhances certainty of legal outcomes, compared 
with equivalent provisions under Article 28 of the UNICTRAL Model Law that requires 
tribunals to assert authority to determine the applicable conflict of law rules. 
                                                
48 See Dana Renee Bucy, ‘How to Best Protect Party Rights: The Future of Interim Relief in International 
Commercial Arbitration under the Amended UNCITRAL Model Law’ (2010) 25 American University 
International Law Review 579, 591-603. 
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Nonetheless, these reforms are not perfect. Although the New Arbitration Law recognises the 
right of parties to choose the governing law (which may be the law of another country), 
Article 38(1) provides that the findings or determinations of the arbitral award must be 
consistent with the principles of the Shari’ah. Thus, an award that recognises the charging of 
interests (riba) or investment in gharar products would not be enforced in Saudi Arabia, 
unless the riba or gharar elements can be severed from the award. Also, in recognising an 
award, the enforcement judge must satisfy himself in light of Article 11 of the Enforcement 
Law of 2012 that the country in which the award was granted would reciprocate in enforcing 
the awards that are granted in Saudi Arabia. In other words, it must be shown that the courts 
of that country must enforce awards based on the Shari’ah. 
As such, the reforms do not change the underlying Shari’ah law, which remains the highest 
law of the land. However, they demonstrate the flexibility of the Shari’ah in accommodating 
changes in light of the circumstances. They show that the system by which cases are decided 
according to consistent principles or rules is compatible with the Shari’ah, as well as the 
principle of party autonomy. The fact that these changes were made in Saudi Arabia implies 
that they are compatible with the Shari’ah. Regarding the question of reciprocal enforcement 
of arbitral awards, it may be fair to submit that countries that have ratified the New York 
Convention will generally enforce awards granted in Saudi Arabia, unless findings or 
determinations in the awards are inconsistent with their public policy. 
The modernisation of the laws of Saudi Arabia is not limited to arbitration. In chapter 5, it is 
noted that other reforms have resulted in a steady increase in FDI in Saudi Arabia in the past 
two decades. These reforms include the Foreign Investment Law that allows foreign investors 
access to the same incentives that are available to local investors, including the right to own 
property directly. Also, Saudi Arabia has signed 24 BITs (19 are currently in force) and 13 
other treaties that provide protection to foreign investors in Saudi Arabia.49 Amongst these 
treaties are the OIC and Arab Investment Agreement that provide protection against 
expropriation and contain an MFN clause, whereby Saudi Arabia is required to promote the 
investments by investors of other signatory states and accord such investments treatment no 
less favourable than that accorded to investors of any third state. 
                                                
49 See Jean Benoit Zegers, ‘Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ (2018) Arbitration Guide: International Bar Association 
1, 26. 
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It is noted in chapter 5 that the Saudi government’s Vision 2030 plan also aims to increase 
the contribution of the private sector to 65% of capital investments, promote foreign direct 
investment, with an expected increase in FDI from 3.8% to 5.7% as it attempts to increase 
non-oil exports from 16% to 50% of the export economy. The Vision 2030 plans include 
further incentives for foreign entities through preferential regulation. The above changes have 
been introduced to achieve this goal. This further demonstrates that the increased protection 
of foreign investors and enhancement of access to international arbitration are not 
incompatible with the Shari’ah. Thus, the Shari’ah is fundamentally flexible and does not 
constitute an obstacle to FDI unless it is interpreted rigidly with the objective of holding to 
traditional (and non-Western) values. 
Enhancing the Arbitration Model in Saudi Arabia 
It is noted in chapters 2, 3 and 6 that Islamic law adopted many customary practices of the 
pre-Islamic period. The Shari’ah was used to regulate these practices, enhancing the good 
social norms and undermining the bad ones. Also, the practices reinforced the strength of the 
Shari’ah as a means of social control.50 The system of dispute resolution in the pre-Islamic 
and early Islamic eras was based on a customary practice known as tahkim. This practice 
shares many similarities with the modern Western arbitration. For example, tahkim was 
considered to be a conciliatory practice whereby the disputants were free to choose an 
independent third party to help settle their dispute through negotiation. This is comparable to 
the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules and the ICC Conciliation Rules that provide that the 
conciliator appointed by the parties may assist them in an independent and impartial manner 
to reach an amicable settlement.51 In the early Islamic society, the disputants could mutually 
agree to appoint as conciliator a reputable member of a revered tribe. This individual was 
generally referred to as the hakam – a ruler or judge.  The hakam administered justice 
through conciliation or peace making known as sulh. Given that the hakam was not a judge or 
an official appointment, he was not in a position to enforce his pronouncements.  
However, Gemmell52 is cited in chapter 6 as intimating that the parties were required to 
provide a type of security or guarantee to ensure that they would abide by the decision of the 
conciliator. As such, Sayen stated that incentives to negotiate a settlement rather than litigate 
                                                
50 For the complementary strengths of the law and social norms, see Robert D Cooter, ‘Three Effects of Social 
Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and Internationalization’ (2000) 79(1) Oregon Law Review 1, 21-22. 
51 See Article 7(1) of the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules. See also, Article 1(2) of the ICC Mediation Rules. 
52 See Gemmell (n 1). 
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was built in the hakam system.53 This shows that the Shari’ah can accommodate the concept 
of party autonomy. Nonetheless, as noted in chapter 6, although the four major schools of 
fiqh all accepted the concept of tahkim, it was classified under the laws of agency rather than 
the laws of contract; only the Hanafi School favours the latter approach. Hence, conciliation 
is now mostly used for disputes arising from agency agreements. Also, the prevalence of the 
Hanbali fiqh in Saudi Arabia culminated in an increasingly dogmatic interpretation of Islamic 
law administered by informal religious authorities who exercise power without 
accountability. As such, although a decision or award was binding on the parties, they 
required the intervention of the court to be enforced. The supervisory power of the court 
implied that a judge may set aside a decision if in his opinion it conflicts with the Shari’ah.54 
The problem of judicial interference has been rectified by Article 2 of the New Arbitration 
Law that provides that that the Court of Appeal is the competent court as regards the 
supervision of Saudi-seated arbitration, and Article 55 that states that an application for 
setting aside an agreement would only be allowed on certain limited grounds. The 
Implementing Rules confirm that it is a matter for the Court of Appeal to hear those grounds. 
The Court of Appeal is a more expedient court than the Board of Grievances that was the 
competent court under the Old Arbitration Law. Also, the Implementing Rules provide that if 
the Court of Appeal decides to set aside an award, its decision can be appealed within 30 days 
following the date of notification of the decision. Furthermore, the Enforcement Court has 
discretion to refer a challenge to an enforcement petition to the Court of Appeal, and the 
enforcement judge may still execute an award if the Court of Appeal is judged to have 
exceeded the bounds of the review powers. Although the Court of Appeal and the 
Enforcement Court continue to have sufficient power to review proceedings or refuse to 
enforce awards based on public policy and the Shari’ah, in a decision rendered in 2016,55 the 
Court of Appeal agreed with the Enforcement Court’s judgment upholding an international 
arbitral award handed down under non-Saudi rules, despite the fact that elements of the 
award (usury) were inconsistent with the Shari’ah. This indicates that the concept of 
severability provided for under Article 55 of the New Arbitration Law is being successfully 
applied by the Courts and may help to mitigate the rigour of the Shari’ah in certain cases. 
The Flexibility of the Shari’ah 
                                                
53 Sayen (n 1) 224. 
54 Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (Kluwer Law International 1999) 16. 
55 Decision Number 38158742 dated 02/03/1438H (2 December 2016). 
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It has been demonstrated in this study that whilst it is accurate to state that early Islamic 
scholars could not have envisaged the globalised commercial environment that exists in the 
modern world, they arguably incorporated a sufficient level of flexibility into their 
interpretations of the Qur’an to ensure that future societies could adapt the Shari’ah to 
changing economic conditions. It is open to Islamic nations to embrace or reject this 
flexibility. Historically, it has appeared that Saudi authorities have rejected the flexibility in 
favour of a rigid interpretation in an attempt to adhere to a classical or post-tenth century 
interpretation of the Qur’an (after the closing of the gate of ijtihad). However, there are some 
indications that this may be changing. As the Kingdom continues to embrace globalisation 
with the increased interconnectedness of the global economy, its economic and legal systems 
of Saudi Arabia may be unable to revert or stagnate in the way that its predecessor after the 
Golden Age. Thus, over the past three decades, the government has introduced large volumes 
of landmark legislation (such as the Foreign Investment Law and the New Arbitration Law 
and Enforcement Law) with the objective of facilitating trade and promoting FDI within the 
Kingdom. Given that these statutes apply together with the principles of the Shari’ah, it may 
be suggested that the Shari’ah is sufficiently flexible to accommodate modern international 
practices. 
Despite the literalism and conservative approach favoured by the Hanbali school, it is shown 
in this thesis that it upholds flexible principles governing commercial trade. For example, the 
principle that “all things not specifically prohibited are allowed,”56 enabled the renowned 
Hanbali jurist, Ibn Taymiya, to hold that “all contracts entered into, or conditions attached 
thereto, are permissible unless specifically prohibited by either the Qur’an or the Sunnah.”57 
Also, it is noted in chapter three that the Hanbali doctrine comes quite close to the Western 
doctrines on the validity of contractual clause, given that under the Hanbali doctrine, any 
clause which accompanies the contract is valid unless it is impossible or contrary to public 
order or good morals. Equally, questions of good faith may occasionally take precedence over 
formalities, allowing parties to extend the boundaries of arbitration law and practice. This is 
because their contract may still be enforced where the party in breach acted in good faith.58 
                                                
56 Hanson (n 21) 271. 
57 Ibn Taymiya, cited in Bryant W Seaman, ‘Islamic Law and Modern Government: Saudi Arabia Supplements 
the Shari’a to Regulate Development’ (1980) 18 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 413, 422. 
58 Hideyuki Shimizu, ‘Philosophy of the Islamic Law of Contract: A Comparative Study of Contractual Justice’ 
(1989) 15 IMES Working Paper 1, 17. 
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The Shari’ah is also flexible where judicial discretion, or istihsan is recognised. This enables 
Islamic judges to choose more equitable solutions where a literal application of the verses 
may not promote the public good or cause a detriment to the general public.59 Istihsan 
therefore allows judges and scholars some flexibility when interpreting the law to integrate 
elements deemed useful in order for the spirit of the law to prevail over its letter.60 It may be 
contended that the inherent flexibility is due to the fact the Islamic contract law is intended to 
promote efficient economic activity. Thus, riba and hoarding are prohibited because they are 
deemed to hinder economic activity. Also, the easy formation and cancellation of contracts 
contribute to efficiency because more people may be willing to enter into contracts where 
restrictions on them are minimal. 
The Shari’ah (and in particular the Hanbali principles) is also flexible because it allows 
commercial agreements to be structured in any way that the parties to the agreement deem 
necessary. This inherent flexibility is evidenced by the fact that in recent decades many 
Muslim-majority nations have adapted their Shari’ah-based laws in order to embrace 
European-influenced international commercial law and practices.61  
As such, by ensuring that basic principles of the Shari’ah, such as party autonomy and the 
good faith enforcement of contractual undertakings are enforced as mandatory law and 
allowing for the flexible interpretation of Shari’ah law through ijtihad,62 Saudi Arabia may 
place itself in a position within which it can embrace modern practices and protect foreign 
investors without having to abandon its founding Islamic principles. 
9.5 The Meaning of the Results 
The results discussed above demonstrate that the Shari’ah is more than just a religious law 
because it regulates personal life, as well as commercial and political activities. Also, it is 
neither representative of a homogenous society nor exclusive to a geographic location or 
national origin. Thus, it is fundamentally an evolutionary system.  
                                                
59 Khurstid Iqbal, The Right to Development in International Law: The Case of Pakistan (Routledge, 2010) 175 
60 Abdulrahman Baamir & Ilias Bantekas, ‘Saudi Law as Lex Arbitri: Evaluation of Saudi Arbitration Law and 
Judicial Practice’ (2009 25(2) Arbitration International 266. 
61 Muhammad Bilal, ‘International Trade under Islamic Banking’ (2016) 21 Journal of Philosophy, Culture and 
Religion 18, 19. 
62  At present part autonomy is respected in the Saudi arbitration process and this can help it to become more 
aligned to international norms. See Faisal M. Al-Fadhel, ‘Respect for Party Autonomy under Current Saudi 
Arbitration Law’ (2009) 20(2) Arab Law Quarterly 31, 31-57. 
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The results are also to the effect that the land of Arabia which is now mainly Saudi Arabia 
has a long history of open trade with different empires. Thus, the advent of Islam was 
characterised by free trade and economic prosperity with many successful Islamic traders 
engaging in arbitration and conciliation to settle disputes, one of them the Prophet 
Muhammad, peace be upon him. After the sixteenth century, many Islamic empires became 
increasingly poor and underdeveloped while Western empires rose in prominence across the 
world. This resulted in the rise of extremism in Islamic societies marked by insularity and a 
literal interpretation of the Shari’ah. Islamic governments then became heavily involved in 
regulating trade and directing dispute resolutions. Although the Hanbali jurisprudence 
became the secure point of reference in the Saudi legal system, the Shari’ah rules governing 
commerce were not codified and the principle of binding precedent was not recognised, 
making it difficult to predict the procedures and outcomes of cases. These are the major flaws 
of the Shari’ah that impede FDI in Saudi Arabia.  
However, the flaws are not beyond repairs. With regard to precedent, it is shown foreign 
investors and arbitrators may refer to the decisions of the Court of Appeal to determine which 
awards are enforceable in Saudi Arabia and which are not. Despite the lack of codification, 
important reforms have been implemented over the past two decades, with important MITs 
and BITs providing protections to investors and guaranteeing access to international 
arbitration. Equally, the Foreign Investment Law, Vision 2030 programme, New Arbitration 
Law and Enforcement Law ensure that foreign investors are adequately protected in Saudi 
Arabia. Despite the fact that the Shari’ah remains the highest law of the land and the 
conservative Hanbali jurisprudence remains the point of reference, these laws enable foreign 
investors to choose the laws of any other country to govern their disputes or submit claims to 
tribunals outside of the Kingdom. 
In chapter 8, it is shown that the qualitative responses of adjudicators, scholars and reporters 
in Saudi Arabia reflect an optimistic and almost idealistic perception of the Shari’ah, 
although the literature review shown in chapter 1 reveals that non-Saudi legal communities 
generally view the Hanbali fiqh as antithetical to free trade. Also, it is noted above that 
although the Hanbali fiqh is flexible in regard to commercial matters, other schools such as 
the Hanafi are much more flexible. As such, it is important to determine whether adjudicators 
in Saudi Arabia may refer to another school of Islamic Jurisprudence other than the Hanbali 
school in order to invoke another interpretation of the Shari’ah that is more advantageous to 
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trade and commerce. The Judicial Board’s decision63 approved by the Royal Decree of 
September 8, 1928, provided that Islamic courts could apply the opinions of schools other 
than the Hanbali school where the courts determined that applying the opinions was fair and 
served the public welfare best. This is in line with the Istihsan that allows judges and scholars 
some flexibility when interpreting the law to integrate elements deemed useful in order for 
the spirit of the law to prevail over its letter. As such, it is suggested here that judges in Saudi 
Arabia have a margin of discretion as regards adopting the interpretations of the Shari’ah by 
other schools of Islamic Jurisprudence. Also, it is noted in chapter 8 that theoretically, judges 
in Saudi Arabia have a duty to make decisions that in good conscience represent the will of 
God. They believe that they are morally guided and ought to place emphasis not on the 
Hanbali fiqh but on the spirit of the Qur’an and Hadiths. Hence, giving the Islamic judge a 
wider margin of discretion to apply opinions of other schools may ensure that decisions are 
more equitable. This shows that there is more to adjudication under the Shari’ah than the 
mechanical application of Hanbali principles. This may enable judges to avoid the rigour of 
the Hanbali fiqh in order to protect foreign investments that benefit the society as a whole. 
9.6 Recommendations for Further Research 
It has been shown that the land of Arabia which is now mainly Saudi Arabia has a long 
history of open trade with different empires. Even early Muslims were influenced by previous 
civilizations and thoughts and conveyed these to different parts of the world. Thus, it may be 
important to conduct further studies on the historical trade links between Arabs and other 
parts of the world and show how these were affected by the advent of Islam. 
 
It was also demonstrated that in the beginning of Islam, the Islamic country was 
economically prosperous and there were many successful Muslim traders, one of them the 
Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. It may therefore be important to test the hypothesis 
that economic stagnation in some Islamic countries is the result of the approach that the 
government of the country has adopted as regards the interpretation of the Shari’ah and 
interaction with the non-Muslim world. This will involve determining how such an approach 
impacts on the procedures of investment and dispute resolution. 
 
                                                
63 Decision no. 3 (17/1/1347/ June 25, 1928). 
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It was also argued that the codification of the Shari’ah is imperative, especially the principles 
of commercial, contract and corporate law. In order to facilitate the process, it has been 
suggested that the Kingdom should adopt the principle by which judges of Shari’ah courts 
are required to abide by precedent. The latter should be on equal footing with legislation and 
regulations. However, in the interim, it is suggested that judges should be given the requisite 
flexibility to apply the principles of other Sunni schools. It is therefore important to 
determine the extent to which judges may exercise discretion to look beyond the Hanbali 
jurisprudence. 
 
It was noted that objectively, the New Arbitration Law is much better on its face than its 
predecessor. However, there is still a need to clarify its articles in order to minimise 
uncertainty and arbitrary ruling. It is important to provide concise definitions of key terms 
such as public policy and religion, and also address the question of the gender of arbitrators. 
 
This study has also provided evidence that the Saudi government has sufficiently reformed its 
investment and arbitration laws over the past two decades to attract foreign investment on a 
larger scale than in the past. In light of the ongoing reforms within the Vision 2030 plan, it 
may be important to determine whether the decision prohibiting governmental bodies from 
arbitration without permission from the President of Council of Ministers may be repealed 
and how this may be achieved. It may also be important to determine whether SAGIA may 
simply be exempt from the decision or an impartial arbitration committee may be set up 
within SAGIA to resolve disputes between the SAGIA and investors. In the same vein, 
further research is required to determine how new commercial law modules may be 
developed in the Higher Judicial Institute to enhance the training of law graduates in regard 
to working as judges in Shari’ah commercial courts. It is especially important for judges of 
these courts to appreciate the link between the Shar’iah and free trade. The hypothesis that 
should be tested in this regard is that the effective application of the Shari’ah to complex 
commercial transactions is a function of the adjudicator’s margin of discretion. Lastly, it is 
important to critically analyse the Enforcement Law to determine why and when foreign 
awards are enforced and whether like cases are treated alike. 
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Glossary 
Islamic Legal Terms: 
Al-Mutaqaddimun Habit of the ancient jurists to remain silent. 
Fatwa Interpretations of Islamic religious opinions. 
Fiqh Collective body of Islamic jurisprudence literature. 
Gharar Uncertainty 
Haad Fixed punishment 
Hadith The practices and teachings of Islam by the Prophet Muhammad 
(also known as Sunna’h). 
Hakam Third-party arbitrator 
Hanbali Hanbali School of religious thought. The most popular in Saudi 
Arabian law. 
Harbi Non-Muslim. 
Hasan Morally right action. 
Ijima Islamic legal scholars 
Ijma Secondary religious sources. 
Isharat Al-Nass Alluded, contextual meaning 
Jahallah The unknown facts of a case. 
Maslaha Public interest. 
Qabih Morally wrong action. 
  
                              Qiyas The process of analytical reasoning by a group of scholars based 
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on the primary sources of Shari’ahh law. 
Riba Charged interest. 
Siyasa Shar’iyya Governance in accordance with divine law. 
Takhim Negotiated self-help resolution mirroring mediation. 
Methodology Definitions: 
Convenience sample: this is a type of non-probability sample that is drawn from a part of the study 
population that is easy to reach or close to hand. The only criterion was that the respondents agreed to 
participate. It is also known as an ‘availability or grab sample’ and it is not important that a simple 
random sample is generated.64 
Free association narrative method: this is a relational technique by which the researcher allows the 
participant to set the agenda. The participant chooses the subjects and the researcher follows the 
association between the various subjects. This is based on the contention that the participant’s free 
association of subjects is more revealing than meaning that the researcher introduces.65 
Social meaning: the meaning attributed to the phenomenon that is studied by the participants based 
on their subjective knowledge and experiences.66 This also include their understandings of the 
propriety of acting on the basis of the meanings. 
Structure of meanings: the arrangement of interrelated expressions and meanings that constitute 
practices and institutions.67 
Symbolic interactionism: this is based on the contention that the actions of individuals are motivated 
by the meaning that things have for the individuals.68 It examines how individuals interact with each 
other and create symbolic worlds which then shape their behaviours.  
                                                
64 Ilker Etikan et al, ‘A Comparison of Convenience Sampling and Purposive Sampling’ (2016) 5 American 
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Statistics 1, 2. 
65 Wendy Holloway and Tony Jefferson, Doing Qualitative Research Differently: A Free Association, Narrative 
and the Interview Method (Sage 2000) 309-310. 
66 Kaya Yilmaz, ‘Comparison of Quantitative and Qualitative Research Traditions: Epistemological, 
Theoretical, and Methodological Differences’ (2013) 48(2) European Journal of Education 311, 312-313; 
William A Bogart, Permit but Discharge: Regulating Excessive Consumption (Oxford University Press 2011) 
109. 
67 See Jaroslav Peregrin, ‘Structure and Meaning’ (1997) 113(1/2) Semiotica 71, 73-75. 
68 See Benzies KM and Allen MN, ‘Symbolic Interactionism as a Theoretical Perspective for Multiple Method 
Research’ (2001) 33 Journal of Advanced Nursing 541, 541-541; Fusun Alver and Sebnem Caglar, ‘The Impact 
of Symbolic Interactionism on Research Studies about Communication Science’ (2015) 8 International Journal 
of Arts and Sciences 479, 479-480. 
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Target population: the theoretical population or entire group of individuals for which the data was 
used to make inferences.69 The group is as follows: judges, arbitrators, legal scholars and members of 
the public including journalists and investors in Saudi Arabia. The results of this study therefore apply 
as a pointer to further research on this group from which the sample was taken. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
69 Amitay Banerjee and Suprakash Chaudhury, ‘Statistics without Tears: Populations and Samples’ (2010) 19(1) 
Industrial Psychiatry Journal 60, 61. 
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Appendix I: Interview Questions 
 
Translated from Arabic 
 
1. Have you heard about the vision of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques? 
 
2. How do you see the success of the vision in light of the development of the Saudi legal 
regimes? 
 
3. How should foreign investment in the Kingdom be protected? 
 
4. Do you think that the government of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques should 
stimulate more foreign investors to achieve the vision? 
 
5. Do you think that the Saudi Economic and Development Council will increase the efficiency 
of government departments and ministries? 
 
6. Do you think that the Saudi justice system is qualified to keep pace with the era and the first 
flag countries? 
 
7. Do you think that the Islamic Shari’ah law in force in the Saudi Arabia may be an obstacle 
and not compatible with the modern world? 
 
8. Do you think that regulations should be enacted to protect and promote investment? 
 
9. What are the advantages of regulation of systems? 
 
10. Will this remove any ambiguity in the current laws? 
 
11. Do you think that use of the Shari’ah in commercial matters is generally acceptable, as was 
the case in the magazine or the journal of legal rulings obtained before? 
 
12. Why do you think that Saudi Arabia is not a popular seat of arbitration? 
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13. Do you think that it is time to repeal the decision of the Saudi government to stop government 
agencies from submitting disputes to international arbitration without prior approval by the 
Council of Ministers? 
 
14. Do you think that the current judicial system is committed to the NYC Convention for the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments issued by foreign and non-Muslim judges and 
arbitrators? 
 
15. Do you think judgments made by non-Muslims or women can be enforced in Saudi Arabia? 
 
16. Do you think the religious authority represented by the senior scholars has a direct influence 
or influence in the enactment of laws and regulations in Saudi Arabia? 
 
17. Can you identify any laws or regulations in the Kingdom that are in conflict with Islamic law? 
 
18. Do you think that the regulations of SAMA violate the principles of Islamic law? 
 
19. Do you think that the Kingdom is an attractive environment for foreign investors? Why? 
 
20. How do you assess the government’s policy on investment in general? 
 
21. In general, what are the legal barriers to attracting foreign investors and are we still suffering 
from administrative bureaucracy? 
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Appendix II: Responses 
 
Translated from Arabic 
 
Dean of the Faculty of Law 
 
 
1. Have you heard about the vision of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques? 
 
Yes 
 
2. How do you see the success of the vision in light of the development in the Saudi 
regimes? 
 
I think there will be progress in this area, because the movement is active in the process of 
modification and development of systems and activation, and there is also a study from the Riyadh 
Economic Forum on the relationship of the legislative system to economic development in the 
country, such studies and initiatives by several ministries and government departments support these 
Vision These systems undoubtedly constitute a cornerstone in achieving this vision, and the vision has 
indicated this. 
 
3. How should foreign investment in the Kingdom be protected? 
 
It should be expanded in this area and should activate bilateral agreements and activate collective 
agreements that support and facilitate the investment process. Also, attention should be given to 
infrastructure and services to facilitate investors, whether citizens or foreigners. 
 
4. Do you think that the government of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques should 
stimulate more foreign investors to achieve the vision? 
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I think there should be facilities and tax cuts and support for transportation and energy sources so that 
these investors have the ability to compete with the regional environment because there are countries 
that offer them better advantages, if there are no better benefits there will be (Hijab?) 2:24 
 
5. Do you think that the Saudi Economic and Development Council will increase the 
efficiency of government departments and ministries? 
 
There is effective oversight from the Council for Economic Affairs and Development and there is a 
continuous presentation of the initiative of the parties and their plans and therefore the control will be 
effective and I think there is progress required from each ministry in its area of competence and this 
makes the process continuous and monitoring and follow-up and therefore expect better results. 
 
6. Do you think that the Saudi justice system is qualified to keep pace with the era and the 
first flag countries? 
 
There is a development, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques program to develop the judiciary the 
latest kind of development and there are attempts to support the judiciary. We still need to expedite 
the dissolution of disputes and there is slow in the adjudication of disputes, the sessions apart, the 
judge can study the case means needs to be reconsidered there must be a time limit for the settlement 
of disputes and obligate the judiciary in a certain period to arbitrate the case if there are shortcomings 
He should ask the litigants if there is no deficiency in it. 
 
7. Do you think that the Islamic Shari’ah law in force in the Saudi Arabia may be an 
obstacle and not compatible with the modern world? 
 
No, the rules of Islamic jurisprudence are broad and judges are able to dismiss much of what is being 
offered to them. We may need to codify these provisions in such a way as to make them accessible to 
others, whether in the judicial system, the allies, or the investors. The provisions of Islamic law and 
the jurisprudence of Islamic jurisprudence is broad and it is of scientific abundance and jurisprudence, 
which is much, which offers many solutions to the economic realities emerging in the world today. 
 
8. Do you think that regulations should be enacted to protect and promote investment? 
 
I think that is needed 
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9. What are the advantages of regulation of systems? 
 
Pros of limiting the judiciary in a specific area, informing the public about the application of their 
issues, supporting scientific research and jurisprudence in the field of blogging also prevent 
differences in provisions, there are many advantages in this area! 
 
10. Will this remove any ambiguity in the current laws? 
 
Yes I think so 
 
11. Do you think that use of the Shari’ah in commercial matters is generally acceptable, as 
was the case in the magazine or the journal of legal rulings obtained before? 
 
There is a codification now in the magazine of the legal provisions of the Hambali range, and there is 
also a committee that is studying and has come a long way in blogging which was formed by Sami 
order. I think that we are in this directon and will achieve many benefits from the codification process. 
Including interdiction by a number of judges, including the unification of sentences in similar cases. 
 
12. As you know, commercial arbitration is the preferred means of resolving disputes for 
foreign investors. Why do you think that Saudi Arabia is not a popular seat of 
arbitration? 
 
The Kingdom was interested in arbitration. The previous arbitration system was issued. It was one of 
the applications and texts of many problems. It did not benefit from arbitration as an adjunct to 
adjudicating disputes for the judiciary. Thus, the new arbitration system was issued. It facilitated 
many obstacles and removed many of the previous obstacles. With the issuance of the executive 
regulations recently that there will be better application and better speed in the process of separation 
of disputes and arbitration will be one of the effective means to resolve disputes between investors 
and those who deal with them, and I think that the system should be published and the text of the texts 
to be recourse to contracts with the parties or investor relationship with national parties and it could be 
an alternative to spend and is characterized by an appropriate speed. Then it is uncertain whether 
judges have discretion. Some judges see ijtihad [independent reasoning or exertion of mental faculty] 
as one of the sources of the law. So, if a business does not exercise due diligence, the judge may hold 
that this is against Islamic law. 
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13. Do you think that it is time to repeal the decision of the Saudi government to stop 
government agencies from submitting disputes to international arbitration without prior 
approval? 
 
I think that first of all this should be studied carefully. Of course, there was a condition to prevent 
government entities from resorting to arbitration without the approval of the Council of Ministers. 
This is still in place, but it may be reconsidered, which will bring justice to the government agencies. 
With these organs to enter into a relationship that benefits the national economy and support 
investment to the possibility of resolving the dispute easily in this aspect However, we can say that 
"administrative issues" can be better separated than they were to shorten the duration. 
 
14. Do you think that the current judicial system is committed to the NYC Convention for 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments issued by foreign and non-Muslim judges 
and arbitrators? 
Yes, after the jurisdiction of the implementation of foreign judgments from the judiciary and 
implementation, I think there is a kind of speed and rapid separation in this subject, but we may need 
more awareness on the implementation of foreign judgments in the Kingdom. 
 
15. Do you think judgments made by non-Muslims or women can be enforced in Saudi 
Arabia? 
 
Yes, with the current situation there is no problematic, it is important that the foreign referee fulfills 
his ribbons under the law that was issued under him and therefore does not conflict with the public 
order or the system of arbitration of Islamic law and therefore my issuers are not considered in this 
aspect on the border as far as I know. 
 
16. Do you think the religious authority represented by the senior scholars has a direct 
influence or influence in the enactment of laws and regulations in Saudi Arabia? 
 
Is limited only if there are aspects requiring a fatwa. 
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17. Can you identify any laws or regulations in the Kingdom that are in conflict with 
Islamic law? 
 
Under the Basic Law of Governance, if it is found to be contrary to the Basic Law of Government, 
and therefore should be amended but not there, there may be some applications and interpretations but 
not a clear text containing explicit opposition. 
 
18. Do you think that the regulations of SAMA violate the principles of Islamic law? 
 
There is no explicit violation while there are explanations in this aspect but there are some 
applications regarding commission and interest rates maybe these points but not a specific legal text 
while regulated by instructions and so on. The government and Islamic law are characterized by the 
existence of rules that deal with such situations, and therefore "necessity is always appreciated". 
 
19. Do you think that the Kingdom is an attractive environment for foreign investors? 
Why? 
 
Yes, it is an attractive environment, huge economic opportunities, double profits, an early 
environment to create a lot of business, good cash money, reasonable taxes on investors, and a very 
good legislative system. Therefore, the Kingdom is taking a place there, but in practical applications 
and administrative bureaucracy we may face some difficulties, but with the vision of 2030, I think the 
situation might improve. 
 
20. How do you assess the government’s policy on investment in general? 
Of course, there are good attempts by the Ministry of Trade and Investment to try to reduce the steps 
to complete the investment procedures and therefore I think we need to support this area and attract 
companies. Now we have noticed that some foreign companies have been attracted to the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia for investment; the transfer of military industries, the establishment of joint ventures and 
the city of entertainment. These initiatives will generate investment opportunities in the Kingdom. We 
believe that the legislative structure is capable of fulfilling but does not prevent improvement and 
development. Such an area. 
 
21. In general, what are the legal barriers to attracting foreign investors and are we still 
suffering from administrative bureaucracy? 
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Administrative bureaucracy Yes, there is still suffering, but we can limit this through training and 
guide development through effective oversight by developing a complaint mechanism and responding 
to it and finding the immediate situation. 
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Legal Advisor 
 
 
1. Have you heard about the vision of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques? 
 
Yes. I think it sets a great example of a national initiative, which, regardless whether it delivers or not, 
does present a nationally shared will to transform the economy across all sectors and classes. It is a 
step that will support Saudi Arabia in the competition of the big countries, especially in the field of 
investment. We are opening up the opportunity to enter value-added projects to serve the country as a 
general direction for the General Investment Authority, which is interested in mega-activities. Like 
what we have talked about the fear of coming to Saudi Arabia for fear of the regime does not support. 
The opening of the field, including the "Cardine Card", supports small and medium enterprises that 
support the state, and I believe that the national transition serves this idea very much. 
 
2. How do you see the success of the vision in light of the development of the Saudi legal 
regimes? 
 
I think it is the government link, instead of the investor coming here and continuing, we are serving 
him in the same place, and completing his treatment in all relevant sectors, whether the Ministry of 
Labor or the Ministry of Commerce, the authority of the cities, a unified portal for government 
services in general so that the service is provided at the same time, Complete to the investor that the 
environment attractive and easier solutions. 
 
3. How should foreign investment in the Kingdom be protected? Do you think that the 
current judicial system is suitable? 
 
As for the judicial system we have a problem prolonging the duration of the dispute. Any problem 
facing investors in general terms is that the lawsuit is possible today and remains in the court for a 
period of two years. Three years are not decided upon, so the investor asks for what follows the 
Kingdom and is afraid of these procedures. Therefore there must be a mechanism Short and the 
translation then in all countries of the world is for arbitration, we in the judicial system must apply the 
system of arbitration. 
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4. Do you think that Islamic Shari’ah is consistent with the modern age in regard to the 
protection of foreign investors? 
 
The regulations of legislation are consistent with every age, but we need to apply them. Their 
application is the problem, not the existing ones. The systems are all good and effective. They go 
beyond external systems, but it is the method of application that distinguishes. 
 
I mentioned that these systems are appropriate, but who applies them or how they are suitable for the 
application. How do you think they are suitable for implementation and by whom? 
The people implementing them must have an internal culture and not just a foreign culture. There 
must be knowledge of external systems so that they can benefit quickly from the procedures and how 
they are implemented. We have distinct systems, but when applying this system, Foreign culture and 
benefit from the experiences of others also and these systems are competitive as Singapore's leading 
investment, but to what we apply to reality, where the convergence of common teams attract and 
achievement and investors stay longer in the market. When the systems are not fast and their 
application is fast and appropriate and flexible, we will not reach the required point. 
 
5. Do you think that the Islamic Shari’ah law in force in the Saudi Arabia may be an 
obstacle and not compatible with the modern world? 
 
The ease of deriving judgment in the case before you, rather than subject to interpretation and 
different doctrines of jurisprudence such as some commercial cases in the sale and purchase, the 
transfer of quotas, however, if it is written will not be subject to the field of diligence, it is possible to 
meet a legal case applies the same rule and thus the same ruling in the end , The same reality has a 
different judgment and therefore you will have double judgments, so as a reader I will have a 
conception of judgment and this frightening aspect of jurisprudence, an unexpected judicial judgment 
comes an unpredictable answer but if you are comfortable you will be aware of what will happen in 
your judgment. 
 
I think the Shari’ah is already appropriate for use. However, one could say, that in the context of an 
international global financial and economic system that is based on certain tenets and practices, that, 
the Shari’ah is not suitable. It is not so much a problem with the Shari’ah which is deemed unsuitable. 
It is a problem with the international systems that prioritise unequal wealth distribution and 
opportunism 
 
6. What are the shortcomings of codifying the Shari’ah? 
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It is possible to show a case of cases that do not have a case law. You will find that this situation has 
no treatment for you and its gap in the system is not clear interpretation, especially because, for 
example, some heirs in some cases will enter into many things and whether this article will serve them 
or will not serve them Details you need to enter. Regulation may create a state of inertia that cannot 
be decided. Consequently, there will be inflexibility and close all potential areas. 
 
7. Do you think that the Islamic Shari’ah law in force in the Saudi Arabia may be an 
obstacle and not compatible with the modern world? Is it possible for some judges to 
overlook the Shari’ah? 
 
It is possible because the judges always see that the field of ijtihad is one of the sources of the law, so 
if they say that you have closed the door of diligence and will reflect negatively thinking that Islamic 
law did not address all cases. 
 
8. Is it possible to refer to civil law dicta and regulations in the Kingdom that are good for 
investors and the economy but contradict the principles of Islamic law? 
 
No, this is a basic rule of government, any system that violates the Shari’ah is null. 
 
9. Do you think that the regulations of SAMA violate the principles of Islamic law? 
It does not contradict, but it can be in practice inconsistent but as systems that do not conflict 
specifically with the interest of interest, such as the loan system applied that it takes a commodity, but 
reality will not take a commodity like the system (Tawarruq?) From the point of view of legitimacy 
there are systems that do not conflict with Islamic law, Conflicts but is processed in form. 
 
10. Do you know any of the Islamic countries that have laws that do not conflict with the 
Shari’ah and have proved to be successful in stimulating foreign investment? 
 
The Turkish investment law, the Egyptian investment law which is in conflict with Islamic law has 
prohibitions, also Kuwaiti and Qatari investment law, but success is not a measure once the system 
does not conflict. 
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11. Do you think that the current judicial system is committed to the NYC Convention for 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments issued by foreign and non-Muslim judges 
and arbitrators? 
 
Arbitration in the foreign investment, in which the law of the Council of the Ministry do not resort to 
arbitration only with the approval of the arbitration system for us is not effective but in the next phase 
will be activated by God willing There will be a committee to resolve disputes during arbitration in 
the body and this is our proposal and we will submit to amend the foreign investment system issued in 
21 Thus, the arbitration system is one of the essentials for resolving disputes that arise between the 
foreign investor and his partners and the government or the body in particular. 
 
12. Do you think that it is time to repeal the decision of the Saudi government to stop 
government agencies from submitting disputes to international arbitration without prior 
approval by the Council of Ministers? 
 
For the current stage, the transformation of the country and the vision of the Kingdom must be 
reconsidered, we are dealing with foreign investors, investors came from systems almost entirely 
approved arbitration, so it does not benefit that we have as investment systems in which the arbitration 
must be modified and make this decision Investors resort to arbitrage from the outset as a primary 
solution. In my opinion, when this decision was made, I feared that there would be duplication in the 
judiciary. I think that the decision was aimed at a stage where there was no approved arbitration center 
in the arbitration system. The decision was appropriate in a previous period. 
 
13. Do you think that the Kingdom is an attractive environment for foreign investors? 
Why? 
 
The Kingdom has several investment opportunities but lacks how to market them externally. We lack 
how we know the investor with the advantages and the investment climate in the Kingdom and there 
are some regulations that have to be amended so that we attract investors to the Kingdom. If it is an 
attractive environment, but lacks some simple fringes for marketing and nothing more. 
 
14. How do you assess the government’s policy of issuing licenses and allowing companies to 
enter the field of investment in general? 
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It is an instant license in minutes. We have taken several procedures in line with the vision of the 
Kingdom, including the issuance of an immediate license after answering some questions and some 
older women. A flexible and flexible license is issued for one year and then the claim is made. In 
return for the material as well as the link between the government agencies so that the investor does 
not take time to extract the necessary licenses we are in the stage of linking between us and other 
parties to change the conviction of previous investors to the difficulty of procedures and conditions, 
we try to open investment activities, unless Zaretha. 
 
As you expedited the issuance of licenses, speeding up administrative procedures, this is very 
stimulating to the foreign investor, but there are statements from some legislators in the state that we 
still suffer from the administrative bureaucracy, do we still suffer from the Authority and the field of 
investment? I think we have gone a long way, but 100 percent is being worked on according to the 
national transition. I think the bureaucracy is the manual work that creates them, but if we adopt all 
the services, I do not think there will be bureaucracy. We are now going to the auto mission, not the 
work of hand. In the past we were providing files, now there is only soft copy, and we do not need 
paperwork and there are not many requests basically. 
 
15. In general, what are the legal barriers to attracting foreign investors and are we still 
suffering from administrative bureaucracy? 
Activities related to public security Petroleum ... We have a number of exempted activities, which 
activity can enter the foreign investor and does not harm the public security in the country. There are 
things that the Saudi society does not accept in general, such as wines, and because of our nature as 
Muslims we do not accept. 
 
 Do we lack awareness of the activation of alternative systems such as arbitration in local companies 
that may contract with foreign companies and thus may deprive foreign companies of the ease of 
communication within the country of the ease of asylum and dispute resolution, we can find that there 
are companies that have no successor to arbitration always resort to the judiciary. The foreigner 
wishes to arbitrate, so there is no dispute. A lot of awareness in awareness is still needed. 
 
16. Why do you think that Saudi Arabia is not a popular seat of arbitration? 
Parties may agree to arbitrate in the event that the arbitration took a real picture in Saudi Arabia that it 
is certified and available to deal with it, it is referred to in the contract of incorporation of this foreign 
company and this is a Saudi company wishing to resort to arbitration in the event of a dispute or 
dispute. 
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 It may be a subsequent order to sign the agreement between them, this is due to their flexibility with 
each other. Arbitration is often optional and may lead to litigation in case of conflict and one of the 
parties refuses to arbitrate. For consciousness in this stage exists but we need to change some systems 
that allow us to take serious steps in the application of the arbitration system, but awareness at the 
current stage on the contrary I see there is awareness and awareness and acceptance from all parties. 
 
17. What are the biggest legal barriers to dealing with foreign investors? 
 
  Such as owning land there is no system of ownership for non-Saudis ability to own land as a foreign 
investor subject to the regime there are other systems that allow the foreign investor to own land, 
these are long procedures and the complexities also subject to the sponsorship of the foreign investor 
on the facility, "we still suffer from administrative bureaucracy," but we At this stage we are working 
on it and soon the national transition will be eliminated. 
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Legal Scholar #1 
 
 
1. The Vision of the Kingdom 2030, what do you think about it? 
 
 It has a great ambition and blessed plans that return to the country and its projects with development, 
blessing, service and well-being. The programme is active in the process of modification and 
development of systems and activation, and there is also a study conducted by the Riyadh Economic 
Forum on the relationship of the legislative system to economic development in the country. It is 
supported by several ministers and government departments 
 
2. Do you think the government of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques in supporting 
the vision can stimulate foreign investment? 
 
 Yes, foreign investment has many advantages and the government has directed it in recent years. We 
call for controlling this with programs, regulations and legislations that will benefit the citizen and the 
local investor with the foreign investor and give everyone who has the right to the right and the matter 
will be fair and mutual interests with other countries and reciprocity. Those foreign investments, 
which will eliminate high unemployment and take the necessary expertise from foreign investors. 
 
3. Do you think that the Saudi Economic and Development Council will increase the 
efficiency of government departments and ministries? 
 
It is possible to improve it through the control of legislation, regulations and laws which include 
compatibility, non-conflict and facilitate the procedures and does not complicate through the 
development of a legislative system and harmonized systems and the rapid access through the 
computer and sites and authorized entities such as the Investment Commission or the Supreme 
Council of the economy so that things directly people end quickly and take the answer Reply or 
approve very quickly. 
 
4. Do you think that the Saudi justice system is qualified to keep pace with the era and the 
first flag countries? 
The fact is that what we are proud of in this benevolent country is that the Saudi judicial system, 
which is the reference of Islamic law, has a system of pleadings in more than two hundred articles. It 
is in fact a legal organization and a draft of articles of paragraphs. It is a codified system. Books of 
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jurisprudence studied by the judges and seized. The judicial system in Saudi Arabia, God willing, 
conforms and harmonizes with the trading system and solves all its problems in the widest way and 
best practices. However, lawyers need to know the nature of Shari'ah contracts and the provisions of 
Islamic jurisprudence by reviewing the codes in the commercial provisions issued by the Board of 
Grievances. Very show the persistence of the provisions and the difference does not find that the 
difference does not exceed 3% as evidenced by some studies must vary some of the provisions 
because the facts are different and different do not find two realities the same circumstances 
circumstances vary as much as there is no disparity as we hear in some media. The Saudi judicial 
system is also considered one of the best systems for the achievement of cases due to its number. If 
you look at the relative view and compare the achievement of the issues with many countries with the 
Kingdom, you will find that the Kingdom is at the top of the list. 
 
5. By virtue of the fact that you mentioned the completion of the issues for me, how many 
do you need to increase the number? 
 
 Yes, the judiciary needs to increase the qualification of judges with the increase in the number of 
judges with the increase of the specialization of judges and determine the scope of the substantive 
judiciary and this is what the state went through in the new system. The cases were divided into five 
sections: financial, commercial, penal, general and personal status, with a financial and monetary 
judiciary In the institution of criticism, and insurance in the institution of insurance, and some of the 
judicial committees that are working and are still working are serving specialization and this gives 
them quality in the commercial judiciary. Yes, so it was in the Office of Grievances now in the 
Ministry of Justice harmonious consistent with all commercial systems and in accordance with 
Islamic law and there is no conflict between them and no difference, but the nature of the judiciary 
that he needs the concentration of listening to statements, preparing witnesses, studying contracts, it is 
natural to delay and normal to set dates Between the Phineas and the other this would be the 
elimination of all the world. 
 
6. Does the existence of such committees, such as committees of the money in insurance 
disputes, challenge the authority of Shari’ah courts? 
 
 This is not an exception. The original is that the judiciary is independent of all government 
departments. The government is executive. When the dispute is going to the judicial authority, these 
committees and specialized courts are supposed to be under the jurisdiction of the judiciary. Even the 
royal order issued was so suggestive that it must be addressed. But the existence of specialization is 
very important in understanding the nature of companies and ruling systems and commercial 
knowledge and understanding the facts The existence of specialist in the commercial judiciary is very 
important, because the specialization is accurate and needs to experience and needs to know and the 
facts are repeated if the specialization of a judge and the most beautiful sector will serve a very large 
service. 
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7. Is there now a qualification for judges and arbitrators? 
 
 Yes, there is a qualification and there is a commercial department at the Higher Institute of Judiciary. 
This section qualifies the judges in general in all disciplines and increases in relation to the 
commercial system and related regulations. Graduated from this department is qualified to take up the 
position of commercial judiciary, the original in the judiciary is indivisible studying in the Faculty of 
Shari’ah stage of public study, and then comes to the Institute of Higher Judicial Research is the 
general study in some disciplines to increase, What is related to the commercial judiciary so that the 
general specialization and exact specialization are well done. In fact, for all his face, we see that the 
law does not compete with legal articles that may overwhelm the legal specialization, the judge must 
first come out legitimately and then feed the law so that the law will be increased and the capacity and 
experience will not contradict. But if a student takes a school out of law, schools differ and premises 
differ, so I see that he does not study law until he finishes the law. He specializes in a year that 
teaches him principles in law and then he has brought the two things together. I see that there is no 
contradiction between Shari’ah. In the second law. 
 
8. Is it true that previous court decisions are binding on judges? 
 
 The original is that the judges do not need anything except the principles established by the Supreme 
Court if there is a principle based on the Supreme Court as the text of the system, it is true that the 
judge is obliged to even the Court of Appeal so check it if the judge has another point of view, the 
freedom of writing and to be judged and raised to appeal and justify Why did he contravene the 
principle and when the two principles conflict, he is brought before the Supreme Court for 
examination and adjudication in any two principles. The old principle or principle proposed by the 
judge. He is free to choose, write and justify. He is not afraid, but is contrary to justification, study 
and proof, and then he is brought before the Supreme Court, which approves any of the two previous 
principles or decides on cases and this development. However, he must follow the Hanbali doctrine. 
The Hanbali doctrine is well archived. I was a member of the scientific committee at the Ministry of 
Justice that assessed the doctrine. There are approximately three thousand articles that govern the sale 
of goods, warranties, criminal punishment, tenancy agreements 
 
9. So, do you think judges should enjoy a wide discretion? 
 
This talk is not precise, there is no absolute freedom judge in its provisions. The judge cannot 
contravene the general principles of Islamic law and the general judicial principles that have been 
established and acted only with strong justification, and often he does not dare this strong but 
distinguished justification of judges. The judiciary here gives freedom of expression to the judge with 
evidence, proofs and persuasion, if he can convince his face and his appeal to the Supreme Court and 
a group of judges, this is a creative judge in his criticism and criticism of the previous provisions with 
evidence and legitimate premises that he learned. He has no freedom to rule without justification, 
causing, persuasion, and above him an appeal, and above him a Supreme Court, we see that on the 
contrary this right to change the principles of new persuasion. 
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Judges do not need anything except the principles established by the Supreme Judicial Council if they 
have been established. It is true that the judge is obliged to check previous decisions of the Cassation 
courts. If the judge has another point of view, he is free to write and justify the position. If the judge 
has violated the principle established by the Supreme Judicial Council, both the principle and the 
judge’s new principle will be examined on appeal. So, the judge is free to identify new legal 
classifications independently of previous categorisations.  
 
10. Are you satisfied with the qualification of judges, especially in commercial and 
commercial courts? 
 
The relative satisfaction and experience of his speech, is not enough theoretical study must be 
practical. As a student when he graduated from the law and study without the application is far from 
the judicial scientific side. I am not satisfied with the practical experience that I give them from the 
institute, but the scientific experience I am satisfied with, but the practical experience is not satisfied 
with them. Do not take many experiences entrenched in them. Practical experience is important and I 
see that after the College of Shari’ah asks him to keep up with his age and this year opens his horizons 
and comes to study and has news of what is in the courts and the information comes to address the 
problems that he had previously seen in his environment. Therefore, taking the experience before 
entering the Institute or passing through it for a certain month makes the candidate of the Judiciary 
benefit greatly from the valuable information he studies at the Higher Institute. He can criticize and 
discuss, and we have seen some of those who have been prosecuted and then studied more 
comprehensively and more frequently on scientific subjects than those who study and keep and test. 
To the working environment. 
 
11. Can you identify any laws or regulations in the Kingdom that are in conflict with 
Islamic law? 
 
I cannot identify any this except in some contracts of companies and banks that indulge in delay 
penalties in some interest contracts. This is contrary, and often is not apparent and frank, but worn for 
another bulb and this is one of the reasons for the existence of these committees in fact, the fear that 
the contracts of banks face some direct response from the judges resort to something like this so as to 
ease the differences and be resolved and reform. I do not know many of the infractions. The Shari’ah 
has wide meanings. They constrain it with the Hanbalis doctrine by the majority and expand the other 
sects in order to achieve the interests of the people, and they are not closed to the doctrine. 
 
12. How much authority does the senior scholars have in influencing the enactment or 
amendment of a law or reforming a system? 
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 The body of senior scientists are diligent scientists and diligent is the one who has the ability to make 
it easier to know the legitimacy of the evidence. The authority of senior scholars is revealed by the 
rule of God and has no right to change the rule of God, but provide us the rule of God Almighty 
according to their diligence in the texts before them and they decide and strive based on the texts and 
not based on the whims. They decide in a question such as, divorce three how fall is said three are 
considered three or one time, here differ because he did not utter only once and said three, this is a 
question in which the difference between scientists and so whether the sale is affirmative and 
acceptance or must be emptied at the point of order The origin of the jurisprudence of sale in 
acceptance and affirmation, but the judiciary now says it must be a formal document, does this 
rationing has an impact on the sale of sales or do not consider sales only here is the jurisprudence of 
scientists based on evidence and review of the statements here are fatwas and fatwa is not binding to 
the judge but May be raped and ruled but may be violated because it does not oblige. The judge is 
hardworking if he has diligence and the ability to diligence and strengthen his words by causing the 
strengthening of the saying in the body of senior scientists have the authority to strive according to the 
evidence and does not come with the acceptance of the best without evidence. 
 
13. Do you think that the current judicial system is committed to the NYC Convention for 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments issued by foreign and non-Muslim judges 
and arbitrators? 
This agreement has not been fully understood, but I know that the arbitration decisions are originally 
in force only if they are contrary to the legitimate rule. 
 
14. Do you think judgments made by non-Muslims or women can be enforced in Saudi 
Arabia? 
 
 Yes, being a window is considered a window provided that it does not violate the legitimate 
principle. If the ruling is invalid, contrary to the texts, it is not binding. If it were approved by the 
Shari’ahh, it would not oppose it. If it was issued by a non-Muslim, and the two litigants are 
arbitrators in their arbitration. In some schools of thought, the ruling of a woman if she judges it is 
carried out like the doctrine of Abu Hanifa, but we differentiate between the optional judiciary and the 
obligatory judiciary. If we find a ruling issued by foreign countries, we are not looking at the origin of 
the ruling, but we are looking at its implementation, although its implementation does not violate the 
law and we do not agree with him originally, but what is an explicit statement of the law, we spend it 
as a rule and accept it. Islamic law has known arbitration for hundreds of years and the Prophet may 
be arbitrated by the Companions and Companions, it is stable in our Shari’ah and the optional 
judiciary has its legal assets and controls and requires what is required in the judge in bulk, but it is 
not a state tempered its impact, so God knows that people may agree to an arbitrator, This is a great 
thing. And the advantages of arbitration it is a way to go away from the embarrassment of the 
prosecution without God, for example, if I wanted to hold a contract with a non-Muslim company 
stipulated that the arbitration in the Islamic law and may support the doctrine of Hanbali and may be 
restricted to the law or the book is so and so the lawyer to the parties know and know what These are 
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the provisions of such and such as the contract. The Muslim does not hesitate to be tried if he is in 
another country and does not resort to courts do not judge except God revealed, arbitration is very 
important and encourage arbitration in accordance with the discipline of Islamic law. 
  
15. Do you think that the Saudi environment is attractive to the foreign investor and why? 
 
 The fact that Saudi Arabia has ambitions and expectations and I expect that the subject of arbitration 
is one of the most serious subjects that make foreign investors come or not come to Saudi Arabia. If 
the foreign investor knows the laws and knows how to solve things and he believes that the arbitration 
will give him a lot of problems and get into the mazes of the courts, it will come next because it will 
impose the system that he wants and the items and principles that he wants to intervene on the basis of 
the existence of arbitration and acceptance and adoption and the existence of good arbitration 
environments In the Chamber of Commerce and in the Saudi Commercial Arbitration Center. I expect 
that it will be a stimulating environment from this angle. I expect that these legislative environments 
will remove any obstacle that may come because most foreign investors think about the system and 
the law and protection and how to exit as entered and when the dispute is how to be liquidated And 
resolve differences if it was quick to spend and an arbitration alternative to spend does not enter the 
courts and the pleadings and either if it was a lock and arbitration is not final, and the rigidity to 
eliminate and prolonged duration will be chased and the environment so we say this, see legislation 
binding considered. The country has great opportunities to attract investors to invest in the country, 
but with such judicial guarantees and alternatives, God willing, will be an attractive environment. 
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Member of the Shura Council 
 
1. Have you heard about the vision of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques? 
Of course, I heard about King 2030's vision. Excellent vision gives strategy, lead to clear goals No 
doubt vision is very important to give the ingredients of your success and the strengths of your 
country as the factors of competition that make you progress, also weaknesses know and deal with the 
obstacles. Vision is very important and coincided with the international program for the year 2030 
which is the new millennium goals emphasizes the importance that there are goals and vision of the 
Kingdom's economic vision in the first place focuses on development I see that development is not 
only economic development, but is the development of social and cultural education policy on all 
aspects of development and process All of which should be supported by education, meeting, politics, 
culture, security, justice and development. The vision is good but focused mainly on the economic 
aspect. The reason for this is that I came out from under the umbrella of the Development and 
Economic Affairs Council Relation to conservation of development. The former state, this is one of 
the disadvantages must be greater development. What does the Kingdom want to be in 2030? To be 
one of the best hundred cities! We have a strong economy and we have a strong JDP and we have two 
laws that need legislative development. The legal structure of the Kingdom, although the basis of 
Islamic law has a common law, but we need to be known as legislation because it is broad, on the 
doctrine of the year there are four doctrines and all vary within the same doctrine in the schools of 
Islamic law is broad for us in the Kingdom, taking into account what was issued by King Saud select 
Some books, such as Miqdami and others, are bound by the Hanbali doctrine. It is permissible to take 
from this other doctrine if it is in the interest of the public. This is good, but it is left to the 
jurisprudence of the judge and every judge who takes what he sees as an investigator for the interest. 
The 2030 Vision is a good programme for the future. It is a good approach taken by the government 
and I think any country in the world should have such a long-term plan. In 2030, the programme will 
achieve economic strength and solve the existing problems, unemployment, housing and economic 
prosperity 
 
2. How do you see the success of the vision in light of the development of the Saudi 
legal regimes? 
We need to deal with international standards such as how to open the work of the state in the factors 
decided by the United Nations to open commercial investments within the taxes dealing with 
intellectual property implementation of the judiciary enforcing contract implementation of the 
provisions of clarity of legislation. This should be dealt with and we put in place the legislation that 
makes these standards achieved and the procedures such as enforcing contract. This Kingdom started 
to develop steps to facilitate the implementation process. Facilitates and encourages foreign 
investment and all through legislation and applications. 
  
3. Do you think that the Saudi justice system is qualified to keep pace with the era and 
the first flag countries? 
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Of course, the development is better now than before, but we still have a long way. We have been 
promised last year and we promised next year, when this is done, I am sure it will have an impact 
because the specialized judiciary represents the developmental stage of any judiciary. Implementation 
has not been implemented before and we have had the execution of this implementation also 
considered development. Therefore, there is a possibility that there will be a development, but the 
journey still has great requirements, the most important of which is the activation of the reform 
decisions that have been made and developing and keeping abreast with the developments that are 
accompanied by judicial developments especially at the level of judicial cadres. It is difficult to attend 
the best judge in personal cases and put it in the commercial or vice versa must be familiar with the 
latest theories in the field. 
 
4. Can you integrate the faculties of science and Shari’ah so that the output will be 
judges who can apply both secular and Islamic law? 
 
 The option of integration is available, but there is a lot of difficulty. As long as we have colleges of 
law and law faculties, and specializations for Shari’ah, which are not specialized in the law, for 
example, a graduate of personal law specialization, the law graduate can not look into personal cases 
or criminal penalties. Of course, there is still a duality between the Shari’ah and the law. I see the 
possibility of their survival, but a graduate of Shari'ah is directed to areas where there is a law such as 
personal status issues, and his face to magazines such as trade should qualify in commercial laws and 
regulations. Therefore, there is a proposal submitted with three members of the Shura Council to open 
a diploma program at the Higher Institute of the Judiciary and to accept graduates of law, law and 
law. After the diploma they become qualified to become judges. E Of course, this is legal as a bridge 
to become unified colleges instead of duplication. 
 
5. Do you think that the Islamic Shari’ah law in force in the Saudi Arabia may be an 
obstacle and not compatible with the modern world? 
Islamic law is the principles and these principles exist in most countries, to achieve justice and equity 
and left the methodology and equations to be valid for all time and place of the various times (you 
know the things of your world) Commercial matters must have legislation to keep pace with 
developments and changes provided they do not violate the general principles in the Shari’ah. There 
are several interpretations of the same doctrine, such as usury, to find some doctrines that permit it 
and some of them prohibit all kinds. In a period of time, all of these types were haraam and after a 
period, some of them became legal in some schools. This shows you that the Islamic law is broad, but 
if one interpretation is taken, it may be hindered in a period of time according to the view that needs 
time. impediment. Anyone who knows Islamic jurisprudence or Islamic law has no doubt that the law 
is firmly established. We have a lot of jurisprudential wealth. There are many opinions that reflect 
international norms and standards. Investors can easily find the opinions. 
 
6. Do you think that Islamic law should be codified? 
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I think that rationing is very important for a reason, when you are codified and after a year and two 
years retreat your judgments and adjust them according to the needs of the times. Vtqnin very 
important and I think that the owners of the idea of non-standardization are afraid that we have the 
sockets as contrary to the general principles. This in itself is the interpretation of a certain opinion can 
develop and take the view of another doctrine of the fittest. This is a stage of development. 
 
7. Would this attract more investors and facilitate trade? 
 
Of course, because the investor always likes to invest in something that is clear. One of the reasons 
why investors are reluctant to invest, uncertainty and ignorance. So they prefer to choose laws they 
know and arbitrators know what the provisions are clear and not ambiguous On the contrary this 
encourages investment. 
 
8. You mentioned some of the advantages of codification, in your opinion what are the 
disadvantages? 
 
 The stalemate may be a rule, and in order to amend this judgment takes a long time, the decision-
maker may prefer a particular point of view or interpretation and apply it and may not be the one who 
achieves interest. I see that Islamic law is oppressed that it carries more than it is innocent. Islamic 
Shari'a is broad if its principles are taken and understood, the necessities allow for things, so the 
Islamic Shari’ah is in the interests of the people and their people and the achievement of justice. If 
you rely on this principle of justice, which is sought by the investor, but if you interpret other 
interpretations, the problem is not in Islamic law or in the global principles, the problem that you take 
a particular look and apply flawlessly. 
 
9. Can you identify any laws or regulations in the Kingdom that are in conflict with 
Islamic law? 
If you take a specific doctrine you will find that it is not permissible, but if you take it with another 
doctrine you will find it permissible. Benefits Some Islamic scholars find it permissible to benefit as 
long as they are in a business and do not exploit the need of people. But if you look at Islamic law as a 
Hanbali doctrine or a particular doctrine, then I say to you that it is a violation of Islamic law. If you 
take this interpretation, it depends on the angle you are considering. 
 
10. How much influence do the senior scholars have in enacting or amending a law, text, 
regulation? 
 Is the authority interpreted is then the fatwa, but not binding no doubt because it is the most 
influential interpretation of the Hanbali doctrine applied in the Kingdom, but from the perspective 
does not interfere in the commercial aspects. It interferes with the citizen and the personal aspects of 
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the situation is undoubtedly influential and whenever issued from them is taken such as the system of 
taxes on land and this is one of the regulations if applied the Hanbali doctrine a large number of those 
who see it is not permissible. 
 
11. By virtue of experience in your area of work in the Shura Council, what is the 
hierarchy of legislation in a new law? 
 
The process of making our systems has several paths. The proposal is from the ministry and the 
concerned authority, for example if the tourist is the tourist body, the health system and the ministry 
of health, and so the ministry proposes it and then it is submitted to the cabinet and he studies and 
enters the Shura Council and studies and then returns to the Council of Ministers if two points of view 
are issued The regime, if it is different, returns to the Shura Council, and this mechanism exists in the 
system of the Council of Ministers and the Shura Council. This is the first and usual course. The other 
track according to article 23 allowed the member of the Shura Council to propose a system or 
amendment of the article in the system and presents it and if approved by the Shura Council in the 
majority go to the Council of Ministers and issued. In the past, only the Council of Ministers issued 
the legislation, but after the formation of the Shura Council, the Shura Council participated in it and 
became involved with citizens and involved civil society associations and institutions in the stages of 
studying the system. This is almost the preparation of regulations. There are few exceptions that a 
royal order is issued to amend the system of these unique cases issued individually after the formation 
of a special committee without. 
 
Concerning the judges, there are four doctrines from the different schools of Islamic law and they all 
vary. Taking into account the fact that King Abdul Aziz selected some books such as Migdami and 
others, judges are bound by the Hanbali doctrine. It is permissible to take from the other doctrines if it 
is in the interest of the public. This is good, but it is left to the judge who is the investigator seeking to 
protect the interests of the people. The Kingdom is one of the members that signed and implemented a 
number of foreign enforcement provisions. But if you take a closer look, you will find that there are 
problems regarding implementation because of the fact that the foreign arbitration must not conflict 
with Islamic law or public order in the Kingdom. The Kingdom in the field of arbitration is still taking 
steps forward and the best proof is that the Kingdom has recently introduced a new arbitration law. I 
believe the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is still in the process of attracting investors. However, in the 
current arbitration system, we need to develop to be the most up-to-date and most attractive system 
for all types of investment. I believe the problems of Article 24 and Article 42 of the Arbitration Law 
have to be remedied. 
 
12. Do you think that the current judicial system is committed to the NYC Convention 
for the recognition and enforcement of judgments issued by foreign and non-Muslim 
judges and arbitrators? 
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 If we take it in its broad sense, the Kingdom is one of the members that signed and implemented a 
number of foreign enforcement provisions, but if we take it deeper, you find that there are problems in 
the Kingdom of implementation, because it linked to the fact that the foreign arbitration and 
arbitration does not conflict with Islamic law or public order in the Kingdom of course this text exists 
In all states so that the New York Convention recognizes that it does not conflict with the general 
order of the terms of implementation, its interpretation and so broad that it does not conflict with the 
provisions or the narrow view so that it takes a particular doctrine or school to narrow the scope of 
Islamic law. For example, the religion of the arbitrator at a certain stage had to be Muslim as well as 
sex courts. The Kingdom is committed in principle, but on the ground implementation requires the 
development of laws to be clearer in the interpretation of Islamic law, such as the benefits now the 
competent court and the banking committees apply, but in the implementation will not apply the part 
of usury, therefore did not implement this because it is contrary to Islamic law. This is one of the 
points that must be dealt with in clear texts, otherwise the Kingdom will not be implemented. And the 
issue of testimony witnesses sometimes Islamic law is involved in the subject of application Do you 
accept the testimony of women as one or not? The details show you some problems so you need to 
have more clarity. 
 
13. Do you think that it is time to repeal the decision of the Saudi government to stop 
government agencies from submitting disputes to international arbitration without 
prior approval by the Council of Ministers? 
 
I understand the disappointment with Aramco in 1403, but after that there were developments in the 
mineral investment system, the electricity system, the arbitration system was approved regarding 
mineral investment and electricity. This is a relaxation or departure from the condition in the approval 
of the Council of Ministers. I think in fact, even helping foreign investment to open the way at this 
time now to eliminate this condition, but in the end this arbitration clause is considered foreign 
investment as a hindrance to take a step forward I see that this condition must be canceled because 
most of the world does not require this condition. 
 
14. How do you see how you assess the new arbitration system?  
 
 I think the system is a step forward but there are still other steps. The system has standards and 
standards that make the system friendly, unfriendly still in the Kingdom we restrict the part of the 
autonomy with many restrictions, including what is contrary to Islamic law and what contravenes the 
public order in large restrictions. In the process of choosing an arbitrator, he must have legal or legal 
qualifications, especially if he is one arbitrator or the chairman of the arbitral tribunal. These are all 
the restrictions of arbitration. One of its criteria and advantages is that it gives greater freedom to 
arbitrators and chooses arbitrators to choose the language. Still respect part of the autonomy. Also its 
role courts evolve but still require significant roles especially in the practical development of 
arbitration, there are still steps. 
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15. Do you think judgments made by non-Muslims or women can be enforced in Saudi 
Arabia? 
I have heard that a number of verdicts have been implemented. As for the mirror, I have seen a final 
judgment from the Eastern Court in the Office of Grievances. I have not confirmed the acceptance of 
a court, but for the level of religion there were issues other than the Saudis. As for the religion, we 
need to see new judgments and we need a clear text in the executive regulations, but the ambiguity is 
still there, we need things to explain. In your view, one of the members of the Shura Council and the 
legislative authority and one of the founders of this vision Is the Kingdom an attractive environment 
for the foreign investor and why? Depending on the type of activity, some activities have facilities but 
some activities have limitations. Before considering the investment, we see the activity that you 
consider and the advantages given to it activity, whether financing loans, the Kingdom in some areas 
to encourage investment in them, such as industrial tourism health investments. The industrial sector 
provides wage services, industrial land and financing is considered an attractive environment for 
certain activities, either in some activities where there are restrictions and tax fees, banks have 
restrictions, but there are certain areas will remain attractive environment for investment. 
 
16. How do you assess the government’s policy on investment in general? 
The real but problematic efforts facing the cooperation of other government agencies. Efforts are 
made to reduce the period of time for granting the license to be electronic, but the licensing problem is 
linked to the civil defense, the Ministry of Health, Education and the Ministry of Education, and thus 
the obstacles come from the process of balancing the interests of the licensed entity. The Investment 
Authority is also trying to speed up the licensing process. There are efforts from the Investment 
Authority but need to be combined by other parties. What are the biggest barriers to the success of 
investment from your personal face and do we still suffer from administrative bureaucracy? The 
investment is facing obstacles, indicating that we find some Saudi investors investing outside the 
Kingdom. There are bureaucratic obstacles, obstacles to government agencies and their requirements 
that can be achieved in easier and more efficient ways. But there are some requirements that 
understand the reasons, such as quality, consumer protection. So I see that there are obstacles, but 
some requirements exist and we want to survive such as protecting consumers from phantom 
investments. So there must be a balanced view of foreign investment. 
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Judge #1 
 
 
1. Do you think that the Saudi justice system is qualified to keep pace with the era and the 
first flag countries? 
 Of course, the judicial systems that affect the foreign arbitral judgments are the bulk of the 
implementation system in the first instance as well as some articles in the system of pleadings and the 
arbitration system, although the arbitration system is for local arbitration, but may deal with foreign 
arbitration in certain parts. What he believes is that the judicial systems in the Kingdom are modern 
systems and are still subject to development and even now the system of pleadings is now a review of 
its executive regulations as well as the system of pleadings. I have noticed through my work in the 
implementation of foreign judgments that there are many particles not exposed to the system of 
implementation because it includes all foreign bonds and provisions are considered a bond of these 
bonds perhaps with practice and work and continuous modernization system to address the full of 
these issues and the particles we face in the implementation of foreign judgments. And also there are 
some problems in the implementation of foreign judgments may not be the Saudi judicial systems is 
the solution or the reason for this because it is reviewed by some of the problems suffered by the 
entire judicial system in the world may be resolved by international law or some treaties. I expect that 
the continuous modernization of the judicial systems will lead to being in the ranks of countries and 
the investigator of vision and foreign investment in full, and I see that in fact the current reality is 
encouraging and that the judicial systems are more flexible than exists in others and God knows.  
You know of the Vision 2030 – the future of the Kingdom is that. The programme will support the 
Kingdom in the competition of the big countries, especially in the field of investment 
 
2. Do you think that the Islamic Shari’ah law in force in the Saudi Arabia may be an 
obstacle and not compatible with the modern world? 
Of course, the Islamic Shari’ah of its advantages and characteristics of flexibility and 
comprehensiveness such as what is known and no one doubts the validity of this all time and place. It 
is more flexible than the statutes that are in stalemate, which, as we mentioned, need constant 
updating. Islamic law is one of its advantages. It does not need to be updated or modified for its 
flexibility in every age, every time and every situation. Through my work and the legal and 
jurisprudential specialist I have touched on the provisions of the Islamic Shari’ahh, even in the 
implementation of foreign judgments, much more flexible than the regulations, even our regulations 
with regard to implementation and in matters related to the provisions of Shari'ah. As is known, the 
advantages of implementation in the Kingdom is called partial implementation, Only in a few 
countries is this unique to the Kingdom. The presence of irregularities does not prevent the 
implementation of foreign judgments because it can be implemented except for the offending part. 
Also, Islamic law does not impose on foreign arbitral judgments to be issued by a Muslim or a man, 
because they are implemented out of the necessity of exception and in order to fulfill the covenants 
and covenants, and therefore many of the restrictions and conditions that some of them are lost by 
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falling under consideration of these two things. There is no obstacle on the part of the Islamic 
Shari’ah in the implementation of foreign judgments if we realize that Islamic law believes that the 
fulfillment of the covenants and agreements with Muslims and non-Muslims duty. And that the 
requirement of masculinity or the requirement of Islam in the judge if the judiciary will be in the 
Kingdom, but here we are in front of the implementation of foreign rule or foreign arbitration rule do 
not look at this aspect of this aspect, but look at the fulfillment of the covenants as an exception to 
these conditions of necessity and it is known that the arbitral award Whether it is male or not. 
 
3. Do you believe that the codification of Islamic law is necessary? 
 
There is no doubt that the codification of judicial rulings will be a propagation of justice and 
dissemination of even the principles in the Shari’ah and the provisions of legitimacy and remove 
something from the stupidity of non-Muslims or those who have no legal background or fancy the 
existence of obstacles. The publication of such provisions will make the vision clearer and shows and 
highlights what we have talked about the flexibility and inclusion in the provisions of Islamic law. 
The judges themselves and the advocates from each side will also use their knowledge of precedents, 
their knowledge of the nature of the judicial work and the use of case law on each subject. 
 
4. What are the most important disadvantages? 
 
 Of course, the most important shortcomings of codification stalemate and lack of flexibility in 
dealing with issues in different circumstances and some aspects, but this can be treated that the 
rationing is not restricted to private particles, but it is a kind of flexibility so that the rules of the 
kidney does not prevent the existence of some exceptions when there are different circumstances. 
 
5. Can you identify any laws or regulations in the Kingdom that are in conflict with 
Islamic law? 
Of course, the regulations in Islamic law do not recognize only after the verification of the absence of 
a statement between the rules and Islamic law. Most systems are issued in accordance with "Islamic 
Shari’ah". Therefore, I do not know that there is a system approved in the Kingdom that is contrary to 
Islamic law. The system does not have a system or approval from the Shura Council until after 
verifying that there is no such thing. If the existence of a statement in a system is imposed, the system 
will find in the same system what is restricted to it according to the Shari’ah. Therefore, the Shari’ah 
governs all systems as stipulated in the Basic Law of the Judiciary and the Judiciary in the Kingdom. 
 
6. Is the establishment of a constitutional court necessary? 
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 This means that whether a constitutional court has been established or dealt with in another way, 
there is no doubt that some systems may be located between them. This exists now, such as the 
system of companies and the implementation system. Some of them are opposed to certain elements. 
This is possible. The system of penal procedures may conflict with other systems. Commercial papers 
may be between him and the implementation system some conflict because of the lack of 
modernization or non-compatibility, this thing exists and must be resolved whether established a 
constitutional or dealt with what is less than this is the existence of some procedures in the treatment 
of regulations and review in the Shura Council and reissue So that this conflict is resolved and if it is 
There is something related to a particular case in which the judiciary is separated. 
 
7. Do you think that the current judicial system is committed to the NYC Convention for 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments issued by foreign and non-Muslim judges 
and arbitrators? 
 
The NYC Treaty, the Riyadh Treaty and the Arab League Treaty are the three most important treaties 
that the judge should not implement foreign judgments without being fully informed of the details. 
The NYC Treaty is characterized by special arbitration provisions and it has already passed a number 
of judgments and we have had to review them more than once in order to verify some of the particles 
and provide some conditions for the conditions of implementation of foreign arbitration provisions in 
the Kingdom's implementation system in Article XI, Has been reformulated and added to certain 
conditions as is the case in most countries. Therefore, if compared to the implementation system, it 
found itself the same conditions agreed upon by all and added the Kingdom's special judicial systems. 
 
8. Do you think the Kingdom is committed to the NYC Treaty regarding the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards? 
 
There is no doubt that from the reality of my work I tell you that the Kingdom recognizes the word 
and deed because we carried out in this department in Riyadh is the first department specialized in 
foreign judgments We have implemented a number of foreign arbitrations in accordance with the 
institutes of NYC after the conditions are met and if there are foreign provisions not implemented, 
NYC and its commitment to it because it stipulated the requirement of certain conditions by the 
agreement of all the signatory states and ratified them and mentioned the conditions and they said that 
the arbitration provisions are only implemented if these conditions are met. If a foreign arbitral award 
is not implemented in the Kingdom, The Implementation of foreign judgments and non-
implementation does not depart from the treaty because it is a commitment to the conditions 
mentioned therein. 
 
The Kingdom’s judicial system is a modern system but is still being developed. I know of many 
foreign judgements that have been implemented. But we face many issues because the judgements 
may include the use of foreign bonds and interest. Also, there are problems in the implementation that 
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are present in all systems and can only be resolved through treaties. I expect the continuous 
modernisation of the judicial system and the implementation of more foreign decisions. The system is 
more flexible than many others and God knows that is the case. Also, Islamic law does not require the 
refusal to implement only foreign arbitral judgements issued by Muslims or men. They are 
implemented in order to fulfil covenants or treaties in good faith. There is no obstacle on the part of 
the Shari’ah if we realise that the implementation of the foreign judgment is a duty under a treaty. The 
requirement of a male arbitrator or Muslim judge applies only in the Kingdom. Here we have a 
foreign judgment with a foreign rule. We have to implement the judgement because we trust the 
foreign country with which we have a covenant or treaty that ensures reciprocity. 
 
9. Do you think judgments made by non-Muslims or women can be enforced in Saudi 
Arabia? 
The question of a non-Muslim arbitrator or a woman is a controversial issue in Islamic jurisprudence. 
Arbitration is a lesser degree than the judiciary, but the judge in the terms of the dispute occurred in 
the fact that the judge is a woman and also non-Muslim, arbitration is less than if the degree of the 
dispute occurred in the condition provided in the judge to be a man and a Muslim also signed the 
dispute in arbitration and dispute the strongest question of being male masculinity Arbitration and 
also Islam. In my opinion, it is permissible to arbitrate a non-Muslim as well as to arbitrate a woman 
if they are experienced and knowledgeable, and the conditions are met by what is stipulated by the 
scholars, and this is not a detailed citizen. Rulings of arbitration If we are received by a woman or a 
non-Muslim, I implement it because the requirement of masculinity and the requirement of Islam 
originally a dispute and then that the implementation of being non-Muslim, this is necessary, and we 
know that the necessity permissible prohibitions take into account the extent. And the other is also 
implemented in fulfillment of the covenants and conventions and this does not consider it being issued 
by a woman or non-Muslim free that the issue within the framework of the fulfillment of the 
covenants and covenants, and if these three things met, we realized with them that the implementation 
of these provisions in the country of Islam there is no objection to this. This aspect. Even if one of his 
executioners has been obstructed, he sees that he does not enforce the sentence for the reason that he 
was issued by a woman. There is a so-called objection or dispute of execution and he is brought 
before the court of appeal. 
 
10. Is this your personal opinion regarding the enforcement of decisions rendered by a non-
Muslim and a woman, or there is a law governing their validity? 
 
 All the universal regulations stipulate that the judge in the execution has no authority to consider the 
invitation and does not consider the call again and this is also applicable to us. The enforcement judge 
does not consider the subject of the dispute is not a source of government, but the executor and this 
issue also in disagreement with Islamic jurisprudence. Is the arbitration judge considered a governor 
or only the executor of the enforcement judge is not a judge in the case, but is an executor. The 
system stipulates that the executive judge does not consider the case, but considers the availability of 
the conditions stipulated by the treaty. His view of the foreign rule is that his comprehensiveness in 
terms of the conditions is available, that the parties got them a pleading, that the regular articles and 
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the applicable law are available and that the judgment has passed the degrees of litigation and that it is 
complete and valid for implementation and final and eliminates the executive formula and that it does 
not violate public order. General includes Islamic law and others. The consideration of these 
conditions is not to look at the subject, but to look at the whole, and consequently the enforcement 
judge has the power to restrict him not reconsider the case again. Is not a judge and a ruler, but is just 
an outlet and implements foreign judgments in order to fulfill the covenants and covenants and the 
necessity of not having a legal liability agreed upon. 
 
11. Is there any Islamic legal guidelines or edicts that prevent women from being 
arbitrators? 
 
This matter has a difference in the Islamic jurisprudence. I see arbitration as less of a matter than 
jurisprudence and jurisprudence. It is one of the four schools of jurisprudence. They see that a woman 
may be a judge if the difference is in the requirement of masculinity in the judiciary. Women are 
arbitrators if they have the experience and know-how to do so. 
  
12. So, is it forbidden by Islamic law to have a non-Muslim settle disputes between Muslims 
or a party? 
 
 Islamic law forbade Muslims to be prosecuted other than Islamic law. (And not your Lord do not 
believe until you rule among them). Then it is permissible to resort to non-Islamic law, but arbitration. 
If it is in a technical aspect that does not have the provisions of the Shari’ahh, it requires the opinion 
of the people of experience. It is not considered arbitration without Shari'ah. What is the matter of the 
world? In matters that are far from the Shari'ah and related to technical matters and matters of 
experience, there is no objection to the dismissal of an expert person, even if he is a non-Muslim. 
Here, he separates experience and knowledge from him, not from the rulings of the Shari'ah. Those 
who reject him among them. 
 
13. Does the law forbid non-Muslims from settling disputes between non-Muslim parties 
within the Islamic jurisdictions? 
 
It is not permissible for the arbitration to take place except in the Shari’ahh. Whoever is the arbitrator 
should be a representative of the Shari'ah. He must be a Muslim. On them in the matter of arbitration. 
How do you describe the establishment of a court of execution in the development of the judiciary in 
Saudi Arabia, which supports the vision that we know that the Court of Implementation established in 
1434 is considered young? In the implementation of foreign judgments is not new was the jurisdiction 
of the Board of Grievances previously and they have been doing this for many years and then the 
work moved to the jurisdiction of the enforcement judge and the formation of a competent department 
in the implementation of foreign judgments. There is no doubt as well as the court of execution. The 
establishment of a new system of implementation. The regulations under review have been amended 
 371 
for the first time and now in the second amendment, and there is no objection to their revision and 
modification. The new work requires practice and application to modify some gaps and increase some 
details and so on. I believe that continuous updating and constant review will be the key to 
development and executive work in the Kingdom. There is no doubt that we suffer from the large 
number of requests for implementation, the number of judges, the diversity of implementation bonds 
and the increase in the number of years of implementation. However, this can be remedied by the 
technical development which we witnessed at the beginning of our work in the court of execution. 
The work was more paperwork. In the evolution of work in the past on the work now. And contributes 
to achievement shorten the human number and shorten the time and effort and connect with other 
bodies that carry out implementation. If the work continues at this pace with the increase in 
development, I expect the execution court the first place among the courts of the Kingdom, because it 
is the fruit because the fruit always be when the fulfillment, if they get their rights quickly has to 
eliminate the fruit and around the judiciary from my perspective to my work scenes and concrete. 
 
14. How do you assess the procedures for the enforcement of arbitral decisions in the Saudi 
courts? Are they flexible and encourage the foreign investor to invest and settle disputes 
in the Kingdom? 
 
The provisions of foreign arbitration conditions of implementation are many and not a few in fact and 
not this is specific to the Kingdom, but in the place of agreement between the countries of the world 
through the institutes of NYC and others have set conditions in which a kind of difficulty and this is 
due to the keenness of each country on sovereignty because the implementation of the state to the 
provisions of other countries, Therefore, you will find a kind of reserve and hardness in this country 
and other countries of the world, whether judicial or arbitration. The solution in dealing with this for 
the foreign investor is to ensure that the arbitration is in accordance with international laws and 
regulations in which the arbitration or the country in which the implementation will take place. There 
must be a keenness of the foreign investor after the arbitration to complete the necessary conditions 
for implementation, in terms of being final in the executive formula does not exist between him and 
the implementing state is opposed if the executor to complete the conditions in consideration and 
apply for implementation we find that many lawyers and agents provide We do not know the terms of 
implementation, although it can be found through the NYC or through the Saudi implementation 
system, which is published in all media and in the means of communication. If the agent or the 
execution applicant is keen to complete the applications and see the conditions, this will help to avoid 
delay. I found the Kingdom more flexible than many countries, and I found that foreign arbitration 
judgments were rejected by other countries with things that we cannot reject in the Kingdom, such as 
requiring some of them to formulate a specific foreign arbitration judgment. Therefore, the Kingdom 
is more flexible than many countries only. The delay is due to many conditions, and the 
implementation student neglects to complete them and shorten their collection before submitting them 
to the court of execution. 
 
The arbitration law is for local arbitration, although it deals with foreign arbitration in certain parts. 
But Islamic law does not prohibit the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards because they were 
granted by a non-Muslim or a woman. They are enforced out of necessity in order to meet obligations 
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under international covenants like New York and Riyadh and others that I cannot recall. I find the 
Kingdom more flexible than many countries 
 
15. By virtue of experience, can you give an estimate of the number of foreign judgments 
and awards that have been recognized and enforced? 
 
 Our number of foreign judgments is few and rare and this is because we have created a new. 
Applications for the past year do not exceed 30 to 40 foreign arbitral judgments, but do not have 
accurate statistics may be at the level of the Kingdom and not only this court. The verdicts presented 
to me in this court may not exceed 20 foreign arbitral judgments, which were implemented within the 
limits of 7 to 8. The rest is not a refusal, but some of them did not see the conditions, leaving the 
application to continue and other ratios in which the dispute took place. The availability of conditions, 
some conditions may be replaced by forms in being verified or not achieved but most are not 
implemented. 
 
16. When do Shari’ah courts intervene in arbitration proceedings and when do you refrain 
from intervening? 
 
 The executive judge does not intervene in the foreign arbitral award in terms of the subject in two 
parts and a very narrow framework, which is the question of Shari’ah. If the questioner said that the 
executive judge refrains from implementing the infringing part and not completely with giving the 
applicant the right to object and appeal and show what he has Not different. In other words, the legal 
violation that prevents implementation is limited to the peremptory violation. A royal decree was 
issued stating that the legal offense is the total violation of the rules of Islamic law. In the 
implementation system, the public order is interpreted by Islamic law. These are general 
interpretations. The rulings of the jurisprudential in the Islamic Shari’ah As for the matters of 
jurisprudence in which there is difference of jurisprudence, this is not considered a legal liability, such 
as commercial insurance is subject to disagreement does not consider the issuance of a ruling in the 
commercial insurance is contrary to Islamic law as long as there is disagreement but the issuance of a 
ruling or an explicit rib It is contrary to Islamic law, because riba, which is agreed upon, is haram, 
and it is considered a categorical statement of Islamic law, as well as gambling and fraud. Therefore, 
we say that the legal violation that prevents the implementation is the peremptory violation of Islamic 
law in matters that do not accept difference and there is no diligent prevailing and also refrain is 
partial, not total. 
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Official, Saudi Arbitration Centre 
 
1. Have you heard about the vision of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques? 
I have not seen all the details of the vision, I have seen elements that intersect with the work of the 
center, I see it as positive and the objectives of the center strategy that supports many of the goals and 
programs in the vision. 
  
2. You have a good understanding of the concept of foreign direct investment. What do 
you think of what the government should go towards promoting foreign investment in 
general? 
 
 From a legal point of view, the promotion of investment is positive. Legally, this encouragement 
requires a specific environment with regulatory controls, dispute settlement and contract enforcement 
controls. It is a step that will strengthen the market in Saudi Arabia and make it competitive 
internationally. We are opening up the opportunity to enter value-added projects to serve the country 
as a general direction for the General Investment Authority, which is interested in mega-investments. 
 
3. Do you think that the government of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques should 
stimulate more foreign investors to achieve the vision? 
 The existence of a clear and encouraging investment environment that includes means of settlement 
is effective and the results can be expected. The judicial system has made great strides in its 
development. Perhaps the most important of which is the adoption of legal proceedings, the 
development of the arbitration system, and the development of the system of implementation if there 
are steps that combine to build a good judicial environment based on its practice. 
 
4. Do you think that the Islamic Shari’ah law in force in the Saudi Arabia may be an 
obstacle and not compatible with the modern world? 
 Absolutely. Islamic legal system is a disciplined system. It has compliance requirements that apply to 
trade and commerce. Foreign investors should know these requirements. Islamic law is easy to 
understand. The requirements are compatible with many international laws and laws of the countries 
of investors. Islamic law is an integrated legal system, like any legal system, in which "expectation" is 
available. Shari’ah is a disciplined legal system and anyone who expects it can deal with compliance 
requirements means that if I am a foreign investor in any country in the world, Investors should know 
the requirements for compliance with this country. Islamic law is an integrated system that is easy to 
read. It is not difficult to read when I enter a country. I must strive to know the requirements of 
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compatibility in this country and this is not difficult. The second Islamic Imam did not overrule the 
Shari’ah principles when he did not apply the Hudud of theft and burglary in that time because of 
famine. His decision could be said to be based on an interpretation of the punishment prescribed by 
the Shari’ah: Hudud being the upper limit rather than the automatic punishment. This is evident from 
many sources looking at how the punishment can be imposed, and to what amounts and so on. 
 
5. Do you think that the current situation, as I mentioned, is likely to be expected, that the 
judge has discretionary power to assess the merits of arbitral awards? Can this be a 
hindrance to the foreign investor?  
 
 All judicial systems in the world with inequality give the judge discretionary power, and there is no 
judicial system in common law or civil law, where common law is less in discretion, and while civil 
law is broader in discretion, In the law, this notion of "expectation" is reinforced by practice and 
practice in tracking practices. In all countries of the world, there will be courts that issue judgments 
that apply a legal text, a court and a second district in the same city. A different ruling is issued. The 
role of the idea of unification and promotion of expectation. This is the role of the Supreme Courts. It 
attempts to eliminate the great differences. This is reinforced by practice, training and continuous 
consultation. Jurisprudence. 
 
6. Do you think that codifying Islamic law in commercial law is important? 
 
Those looking to codify any rules are motivated by the benefits of predictability and clarity. I would 
like to mention here an example of a legal system that is very influential. That of Britain. It has no 
written constitution but is more influential than the systems of countries that rely on codes such as 
France. Judgements are made without codes and they are effective as they can be in such situations. 
Codification may eliminate differences of opinion and reduce the margin of inconsistency in 
judgement. But it does not eliminate uncertainty because the codes themselves must be interpreted. 
 
7. What are the greatest benefits of codification? 
 
Greater predictability, clarity of legal vision, and requirements for compliance with the legal system, 
reduce or eliminate divergence of interpretations. If codification adopts a certain opinion and suggests 
a number of views, it eliminates differences and reduces the margin of difference. Regulation will 
avoid uncertainty and uncertainty but does not completely eliminate interpretations and this in all 
countries of the world. 
 
8. What are the biggest disadvantages? 
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You need to have a clear vision to study the impact of legislation because one of the flaws in one 
country that you are issuing is codified and amended at close intervals, successive amendments 
without relative stability. 
 
9. Do you agree that one of the shortcomings of codification is the rigidity of the Shari’ah 
to some extent? 
 
Never, because it is easy to modify according to time and place. 
  
10.  Do you think that more regulations will help the Kingdom's economy? 
 
 Every step taken in the development of the system has a definite positive dimension. The use of 
discretionary judge is very required, I do not categorize the use of discretionary power as a stressor 
but I consider it more flexible. The existing regime is Islamic law and this is stipulated in the 
Constitution and the Saudi courts take Islamic law as a law in its courts and adjudicating disputes.  
 
11. Can you identify any laws or regulations in the Kingdom that are in conflict with 
Islamic law? 
 As far as I know there is nothing, but I have not studied it deeply. I know the second Islamic Imam 
did not overrule the Shari’ah principles when he did not apply the Hudud of theft and burglary in that 
time because of famine. His decision could be said to be based on an interpretation of the punishment 
prescribed by the Shari’ah: Hudud being the upper limit rather than the automatic punishment. This is 
evident from many sources looking at how the punishment can be imposed, and to what amounts and 
so on. 
      
12. Do you think that the current judicial system is committed to the NYC Convention for 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments issued by foreign and non-Muslim judges 
and arbitrators? 
 I do not have a complete picture of court practice and its response to the treaty. But what is contrary 
to public order (public policy)) is not specific to Islamic law is not implemented. Often, some 
applicants ask for partial implementation. 
 
13. Do you think the Kingdom is considered investment-friendly? 
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 I think there are many articles written about the modern system. 
It places Saudi Arabia in the ranks of countries, and there are positive elements that are not found in 
many regimes in the region. The Saudi regime is the most supportive system for institutional 
arbitration. There are many texts in the system that give greater powers to arbitration institutions in 
the administration. And a survey in all the Arab countries, there is a study did not find an impact on 
this approach and the Saudi regime and the penal system in its support for institutional arbitration. 
Article 4 of the arbitration system states that if the parties agree that the system allows for the 
agreement of the parties to choose parts of the provision of this agreement, assign the arbitration 
center or institution to this agreement and this is a positive point in the Saudi regime. 
 
The attractive environment for investment depends on many interrelated factors. Administrative 
organization of licenses and visas is not aware of the economic situation as well. The dispute 
settlement environment in Saudi Arabia has developed significantly even in courts where there are 
courts that implement and support the effectiveness and support specialization. 
 
 
14. Do you think judgments made by non-Muslims or women can be enforced in Saudi 
Arabia? 
From my information, the sentences are executed if they are issued by a woman or a non-Muslim. 
  
15. What are the main barriers to foreign investment? 
 
To invest in general how can he agree with things and what are the risks he fears. Whenever the 
procedural system, the law and the procedures are clear, declared and transparent, whatever is an 
attractive environment, in the settlement of disputes, I think there is a great deal of development. 
 
16. What are the shortcomings of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms in Saudi 
Arabia? 
 
In the area of dispute settlement, steps have been taken in the judicial system. Steps are still to be 
taken, but additional steps must be taken in the field of arbitration and other alternatives. The 
regulatory environment exists but training and awareness capacities and competencies are required. 
The foreign investor may ask for the foreign option in the settlement to question him or if it is not 
clear to him. The national option I think that if the business field supports the national option, it will 
achieve a good relationship. To support the business sector and raise awareness of the importance of 
this subject and the importance of the conditions of settlement of disputes and there are alternatives 
and conditions to achieve the interests of the parties. 
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All judicial systems in the world with inequality give the judge discretionary power. That is also the 
case here. That is why the courts are reliable. In the law, the notion of expectation is reinforced by 
practices. In all countries of the world, there will be one court that issues a judgement by applying a 
law and another court issues a different ruling applying the same law. The role of the Supreme 
Judicial Council is to unify and promote expectation. This is reinforced by training of judges and 
continuous consultation. 
 
17. Do you think that we have arbitrators who are capable of applying foreign laws in the 
same way? 
 
 Arbitration has no nationality and no homeland, and therefore arbitration in Saudi Arabia or in Saudi 
centers belongs to more than legal systems in different nationalities and national capacities. 
  
18. As you know that there is a decision of the Council of Ministers that government 
agencies should not resort to arbitration without the approval of the Council of 
Ministers. Do you think it needed to reconsider this decision? 
 
This is an article in the arbitration system, some regulations allow entities such as the mining sector 
and cutting electricity. The ban does not include state-owned enterprises. I believe that the idea of 
resorting to the national option must be expanded. The new principle of 2015, if the foreign investor 
chose another national or international arbitration option in accordance with his contract with the state 
and said I will prosecute in the Saudi Center, and resort to this option drops his right to benefit from 
the agreements and this aims to provide a cheaper environment and easier and closer This is a positive 
option for all parties. 
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 Member of the Shura Council #2 
 
1. What do you think about Vision 2030 and reflect on its results? 
 
It is a good vision for the future. This is a benign approach taken by the government and I think any 
country in the world should have a long-term plan. In 2030, there will be goals that will achieve 
economic strength and solve the existing problems, unemployment, housing and economic prosperity. 
It is useful for humanity. 
 
2. What do you think the Kingdom's government should do to attract foreign investment? 
 
The Royal Decree issued the Kingdom's Investment Law and established the General Authority for 
Investment in order to achieve the objective. The reality is that the major objectives of this system 
should be attractive to investments of economic value that the Kingdom needs and seeks to transfer 
technology and its existence to achieve economic support, but there are some systems where there are 
some shortcomings that need the legislative authority to follow and develop. The foreign investment 
system There were problems that did not specify the financial value of the size of the targeted 
projects, it does not make the fact that the existence of investors with small amounts of money and 
instead of adding value to the national economy, they are causing obstacles in the Saudi economy and 
this is not hidden in the competent authorities. I realized that there are projects faltering, projects and 
subjects small and the General Authority for Investment to develop requirements to raise the level of 
investors and I think it has achieved something of achievement and I oversaw a number of issues 
when I was Vice-Chairman of the Committee for consideration of investment violations We 
considered cases involving financial fines or revocation of license and at other times to support the 
investor if legally established properly. 
 
3. Do you think that the Saudi Economic and Development Council will increase the efficiency 
of government departments and ministries? 
 
 The Council of Affairs and Development since its inception has been working on preparing the 
Kingdom's vision and defining the plan to achieve the goals. Answering your question through the 
hard work of the ministries and the concerned authorities to achieve the vision of the Kingdom 2030 
will achieve more economic development as well as the quality of performance which will affect the 
social and economic life and the general welfare in the Kingdom. 
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4. Do you think that the Saudi justice system is qualified to keep pace with the era and the 
first flag countries? 
 
In the Kingdom everyone agrees on the arbitration of Islamic law. The Basic Law of the Judgment 
states in Article 1 and Article 6 that Islamic law is the system which governs regulations. The 
Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Judicial Council and the courts have exerted considerable efforts in 
solving judicial problems. With the rapid economic development witnessed by the Kingdom, the need 
to establish a number of quasi-judicial committees has been reduced to a temporary view, including 
the Banking Committee and the Capital Market Committee, In which the appeal and the destination 
that one day will return to the competent courts and the judiciary, but life needs to develop 
continuously and who does not develop himself will find himself outside the circle of the march this 
subject has a depth I still see the importance of teaching systems in Shari’ah colleges so that we do 
not have Sections of Shari’ah systems and sections, but I request that the College of Shari’ah be 6-7 
years so that the graduate is aware of both law and Shari’ah and this is what we want. The judiciary is 
now in good shape, but we are talking about the best. The best must be to review the qualifications of 
judges and the rehabilitation of schools and scientific curricula that graduate judges. I have spoken in 
more than one place and I said that the colleges of Shari’ah should be reviewed in the Kingdom so 
that we know the director from the college so that the judge. As for the teacher or the preacher, this is 
the matter of the fundamentals of religion in other universities. This requires a re-examination of the 
faculties of Shari'a so that the alleviation and elimination of educational materials according to my 
knowledge constitute 20% of the curriculum and replace it with legal legal materials and increase the 
content in terms of Shari'a and law which is of interest to the four disciplines so that we have the 
judges Advocates are knowledgeable about Shari’ah and the law. Vision 2030. 
 
5. Do you think that the Shari’ah system is sufficiently flexible to accommodate modern 
practices? 
 
Anyone who knows Islamic jurisprudence or Islamic law has no doubt that Islamic law is firmly 
established, and its branches are valid for all times and places. We are through the jurisprudential 
wealth. There are no forms in the application of Islamic law. It is very rich in jurisprudential opinions. 
Jurisprudence to materials so that there is no disturbance in the choice of jurisprudential views, I call 
for the codification of laws and the codification of the civil order and the penal system, but from the 
net source of Islamic law. 
 
6. Do you think that the codification of Islamic law is important? 
 
Of course it is useful, the issue of codification and codification of the judgments there are two 
doctrinal opinions are considered there are those who believe that the codification of jurisprudence 
there are jurisprudence is not afraid of the provisions of the law because the codification derived from 
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the provisions of Islamic law, which is an Islamic law, but by diligent scholars identified and this 
opinion is considered and I tend However, we cannot ignore the point of view that in the codification 
provisions of the jurisprudence of the Queen of Jurisprudence and diligence of the judges through 
previous experiences did not codify the provisions except the magazine legal provisions on the 
doctrine of Imam Abu Hanifa in the late Ottoman Empire is a good jurisprudence experience, but they 
say owners The second view is that this restricts the ownership of jurisprudence and reasoning among 
the judges and so on, and I think that this opinion is taken into account, but the need of people needs 
this opinion. 
I have touched on the subject of the Journal of Legal Judgments. Can the current situation in the 
Kingdom legitimize Shari'ah rulings as was the case in the Code of Judicial Judgments? 
The magazine of the Islamic jurisprudence was prepared on the doctrine of Imam Abu Hanifa. There 
is another magazine called Al-Ahdat Al-Shari’ahh, which was prepared by one of the scholars and is 
based on the doctrine of Imam Ahmad. There are efforts in the Ministry of Justice and orders and 
instructions to prepare the judicial code, we are now talking about something normal work on its 
preparation, which I think is not restricted to a particular doctrine, but a set of doctrines and schools of 
jurisprudence and the search for the right opinion and correct. 
 
I would like to add a point, I found that the document prepared for arbitration on the time of the 
Prophet peace be upon him in Medina is not very different from what reached the human diligence in 
positive law agree in its entirety with Islamic law and its provisions. The realization that the Islamic 
rules in the Shari’ahh is not very different from what the human mind reached by the laws of status, 
but they are consistent in its entirety, except some provisions in the criminal law that relate to him in 
relation to riba and alcohol and so on. 
 
7. Are specialised commercial courts important for the adjudication of trade disputes? 
 
Courts now and work under it to be specialized courts, but there will be labor, real estate and 
commercial courts and there is no doubt that specialization in the courts is necessary because the 
judge himself has experience in the field of the department in which he works. The teaching process 
we have referred to enables the judge to absorb specialization, whether administrative, commercial, 
etc. 
 
8. Can you identify any laws or regulations in the Kingdom that are in conflict with Islamic 
law? 
The Book and the Sunnah govern all systems according to the provisions of the Constitution. Any 
molecule that violates Islamic law is void and can be considered. Through my experience in the 
Council of Ministers there is keenness before issuing any draft law to make sure that it does not 
violate Islamic law. The legislative authority in the Kingdom is keen to ensure that the regulations are 
in accordance with Islamic law and do not violate them. 
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9. Do you think that the regulations of SAMA violate the principles of Islamic law? 
Never read the SAMA system does not find any material contrary to the law, but some banks may 
have some applications may be contrary and may have images need to be adjusted and keep pace with 
the Islamic economy. 
 
10. By virtue of your experience, are the recent reforms important? 
 
It is important to start two methods of legislation in the Kingdom, the first through the ministries and 
the competent authorities, the second method members of the Council can propose a project as 
provided for in Article 23 of the new system and then Approved by the Council and referred to the 
Council of Ministers and then issued a decent approach. But the most important way is that the 
ministries concerned raise the High Commissioner a draft system for his specific needs and after 
meeting the conditions and controls that were received from the Council of Ministers that there be a 
comprehensive legal study of the need of the system and then be submitted to the General Committee 
of the Council of Ministers and then the Committee of Experts and then form a committee of the 
Ministry concerned and ministries concerned. The relationship is taught by the General Body of 
Consultants in the Panel of Experts careful careful examination, the system changes and may develop 
better which is often. The draft law shall then be referred to the Consultative Council for its 
consideration and study, and if approved by the Consultative Council and the Council of Ministers, 
issued by Royal Decree. 
 
11. What is the influence of senior scholars in the enactment or amendment of legislation in 
Saudi Arabia? 
 
In rare cases, the expert body is raised after realizing that this is contrary to the Shari'ah, if there is 
some kind of legal difference such as Zakat and income. The opinion of the senior scholars is 
considered because the council, the legislative authority, the expert body and everyone wants the right 
opinion which does not violate Islamic law. 
 
Opinions submitted are legitimate views and may not represent the Islamic Shari'a Council of senior 
scholars do not represent the only opinion of Islam Foley sees the interest may take the opinion of the 
minority because they are accredited scientists and the question is left to those who matter. 
 
12. Do you think that the current judicial system is committed to the NYC Convention for the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments issued by foreign and non-Muslim judges and 
arbitrators? 
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The Kingdom is bound by this Convention. Saudi Arabia respects the international conventions in 
which it enters and respects treaties and international law. Saudi Arabia is committed to any 
agreement and when it reserves, it reserves a clear reservation in accordance with Islamic law and this 
is the best evidence that the Kingdom is committed to its agreements. Yes, the Kingdom is committed 
to implementing the provisions of the provisions and operates and implements foreign judgments with 
a requirement in accordance with Islamic law. If the foreign provision is in two parts, the Shari'ah-
compliant part that is implemented and that contravenes the Shari’ah is not enforced. 
 
The Kingdom in the field of arbitration is still taking steps forward and the best proof is that the 
Kingdom has recently issued a new arbitration system for arbitration in 31 AH. 28:36). I think that the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is still in the footsteps of attracting countries. However, in the present 
arbitration situation, we need to develop to be the most up-to-date and most attractive to Ali. I refer to 
the problem of Article 24 and article 42 of the arbitration system, Things and modify them. 
 
13. Do you think the arbitral award rendered by a non-Muslim or his wife is enforceable in 
Saudi Arabia? 
 
Yes, the proof is that the meditator in the previous arbitration system found the text to be a Muslim 
arbitrator and the new arbitration system did not provide for the requirement that the arbitrator be 
Muslim. In the past, the Board of Grievances had carried out the sentences without considering the 
arbitrator's religion. The verdicts were exhausted without regard to the sex or religion of the arbitrator. 
 
14. Is there any source or any Qur’anic verse that requires the codification of the Shari’ah? 
 
According to my knowledge, not through my research and my question to some scholars who do not 
see the codification in the Shari’ah there is nothing to prevent the codification of the provisions and 
said Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz, "The codification of the provisions in the law does not violate the 
law is not innovative," but that there are books of scholars to mention the doors. The codification of 
the permissible jurisprudence is permissible and there is nothing wrong with it. 
 
15. Do you know any Shari’ah law that prevents women from going to court? 
 
Arbitration and those who have prevented arbitration have confused arbitration with the judiciary. The 
judiciary resorted to the parties against their will so bound to a number of jurists prevented the mirror 
be a judge and some confused between the judiciary and the judiciary of arbitration and the arbitrators 
choose arbitrators when the women choose a court here the will of the parties decided to choose a 
woman court here the will of the parties decided to choose women as a court may be disputed It is a 
matter that concerns women in their own right, and is competent and knowledgeable, so that they are 
the best to judge them. There is nothing to prevent women from being arbitrators. Shaykh Ibn 
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'Uthaymeen has a letter in the woman's passport that confirms this several months ago, issued from 
the appeal phase of the Eastern Province. 
 
16. Do you think the Kingdom's legal environment is attractive to foreign investors? 
 
The Kingdom is attractive in terms of economic strength, and the Kingdom is an economic force and 
a political force and represents stability in the region and I think many of the giant partnerships have 
created partnerships with the Kingdom, whether through Aramco, SABIC and others. The vision 
continues to attract serious companies with strong investment. The Kingdom has economic power and 
political stability. It is an attractive environment for investment. But legally, you need to regulate 
some systems such as the arbitration system. I think the text of Article 24 if the deletion of the 
registration of the contract between the arbitrator and the competent authority. I think this is a 
condition that should be omitted and an excessive measure of arbitration and therefore reflected on 
investment. Deletion of the text to deal with the arbitrators at the core of the provision in Article 42 
because it does not attract investors to resolve their issues in the Kingdom. 
 
17. How do you assess the government’s policy on investment in general? 
I think that the foreign investors in this part dissolved them and worked in the General Authority for 
Investment so-called basket of government agencies all the parties are in one place there are no 
obstacles in terms of procedures in government agencies. 
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Former Judge/Lawyer 
 
1. Have you heard about the vision of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques? 
The vision of the future has wide ranging dimensions, and a great ambition and I expect an institution 
on the basis that Saudi Arabia enter the global arena in general and open investments and apply the 
international agreements signed by Saudi Arabia such as the Riyadh Convention and other 
international conventions to keep pace with economic growth and the protection of human rights and 
others. 
 
2. How do you see the success of the vision in light of the development of the Saudi legal 
regimes? 
Coordination between the regulations established in the world and the regulations in Saudi Arabia 
does not contravene the basic rule of governance, this is one of the most important points so that he 
briefed on the regulations in countries, especially the countries that need to invest in Saudi Arabia, 
European countries, America, China and other investors and coordinate with the existing basic rules 
In Saudi Arabia and these rules are all explained by the provisions of Islamic law, the book is the 
ruling on all systems as stipulated in the Basic Law of Governance. 
 
3. Do you think the Saudi Economic and Development Council can improve the 
performance of government departments? 
 
Investments in Saudi Arabia, licenses and legislation in general are varied and different. Each system 
and every mechanism carried out by a government entity may occur in a kind of duplication with 
other parties, which causes the disruption of investment and development and therefore the investor's 
disobedience because he is facing different and different organizations. 
The existence of one party that regulates this relationship from government agencies in general and 
coordination between them to achieve this vision and investments in the Kingdom from the external 
parties makes in the process of harmony and harmony of the person when he enters the investment in 
Saudi Arabia achieved several meanings, the meaning of supervision of government agencies in 
general and also easy access to Permits and statutory licenses that allow the investor to enter the Saudi 
market with the investigation of the safety of citizens and government supervision of these 
investments and the investor's freedom to access his rights and investment gains. 
 
4. Do you think that the current judiciary system is appropriate and keeps pace with the 
times and helps the government to achieve to the vision?  
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The system in Saudi Arabia has an advantage that does not exist in any other system that is free and 
will not be found in any country in the free world. Elimination of this feature in the Saudi system The 
basic advantage, the systems in general and especially the judicial systems are developing rapidly in 
the current period during this year issued more than In addition, the Ministry of Justice, the Board of 
Grievances and the judiciary, in general, and development projects such as the King Abdullah 
Development of the Judiciary Project, as well as in the Board of Grievances, Very seen from the 
electronic and hand judicial competencies exceptional manner and also the rapid development carried 
out by the Ministry of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman. 
 
5. Do you think that the Islamic Shari’ah law in force in the Saudi Arabia may be an 
obstacle and not compatible with the modern world? 
There is no such thing as the Islamic Shari'ah system, which is the Islamic Shari'ah. It is a complete 
system of life. It is not only a judicial system that is valid for all times and ages. It is a general rule 
that complies with all aspects of life, both in terms of transactions and investments. But rather in the 
interests of the Community in general, taking into account the interests of individuals. 
 
It combines between individual capitalism and socialism has achieved balance between them and this 
does not exist only by Islamic law is an existing system. There is a code from King Abdullah to form 
judicial scientific committees and to establish the so-called judicial code. They are regular articles 
similar to the legal journal. They are similar to civil regulations in general, civil laws or personal 
status. The jurisprudence is determined by specific texts and jurisprudential differences. . This is 
considered an advanced picture to control the judicial work in general so that the judicial verdicts are 
stable. The Court of Grievances has also sought the judicial codes and is now widely published on the 
Internet. These judicial codes benefit litigants and judges in the stability of judicial decisions in a 
certain way. 
 
6. Is the codification of Islamic law necessary? 
 
The Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Council of Idem have completed the codification of the 
judicial rulings and are now the final review and is a reference to all judges, litigants, lawyers and 
others in the knowledge of the provisions of Shari’ah in all matters and will be initially indicative. 
The Hanbali doctrine has the same division and the same method. As mentioned above, the senior 
scientists and the Ministry of Justice presented them with the subject. I participated in a scientific 
committee in the same code. The final issue is considered as a martyrdom for the judges and others. 
This is a fact in the form of regular articles. The text of the article comes in a specific text, in which 
different doors such as the doors of sale, rent and warranty and other doors are divided in the form of 
regular doors. Article No. 1 Article No. 2 Approximately three thousand articles This is what I am 
reminded of personal circumstances and criminal and criminal aspects of 2000 articles, all based on 
the Hanbali doctrine. 
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7. What are the main advantages of codification? 
 
Advantages: The best advantage of rationing is the stability of work in general, it is a complete system 
of society and individuals of personalities, civil and governmental figures and others and all are 
subject to different problems and conflicts are characterized by the succession of people and the 
inevitable, but the facts one of the requirements of individuals one and rights in one. In the absence of 
codification, there will be different interpretations of the same principle. The judgement of one court 
may be inconsistent with the judgement of another court. But codification is inconsistent with ijtihad 
because it prevents independent reasoning. Codification is unnecessary. Ijtihad is allowed where the 
provisions of the Qur’an and Hadith are ambiguous. But where they are unambiguous or there is 
consensus (Ijma) [among scholars], Ijtihad is important because scholars have an obligation to 
perform it. Codification is like taqlid. There are very few cases but the ad that all cases are equal if we 
give the public interest to the special and most rarely the standardization will be the best in this area. 
The speed of the most important points is the slow decisions or delay in them because of the lack of 
jurisprudence in this clear text leads to the slow issuance of judicial decisions and sentences, the 
existence of codification controls these decisions and also if there is a clear legalization directly 
before the lawyer to whom he is asked to advise that the system in this way. The client falling into the 
violation and opposition to the regime or clear the risks to him and this of the things that I found in 
many cases provide for the absence of a clear regulation in the Kingdom and consider the risks that 
the fact that the judge may strive diligence not found in the law. 
 
8. Do you think there will be any objections to the codification of Shari’ah? 
 
The verdicts in the era of King Abdul Aziz are still present. It is the magazine of Islamic 
jurisprudence. It is present, and it has many conditions. Some judges rely on it, of course, the reason 
for stopping it is the opposition of many scholars. This magazine has stopped the ijtihad. The judges 
have closed the door of ijtihad. Has a large number of parties or other members of society in general 
and the change of judges in terms of educational level and diligence. Most of the respondents need 
reliable references based on which they can rely on existing case law or two or three books as 
references, although if there is a clear law and regulation on financial transactions, a large crop will be 
achieved in the so-called justice interest, which is an essential objective of the Ministry of Justice and 
Justice. On the strength of rapid development and the large number of financial transactions, unlike 
the former now the number of contracts not named much more than Named. Ownership, financing 
record, mortgages, investment units, and a large number of contracts, many and varied, need to be 
devised to achieve the interests of justice and equity, and not to infringe one party on the other or to 
bypass one of the parties on the other by misuse of power or fraud. These are basic principles 
stipulated by Shaykh Ibn 'Uthaymeen in the past so that it is based on any contract based on lifting 
injustice, error and riba and this is the main document in it. 
 
9. Can you identify any laws or regulations in the Kingdom that are in conflict with 
Islamic law? 
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There is no constitutional court in the Kingdom and the existence of this court is necessary because 
the regimes go through a number of phases of the first stage of legitimacy and then move on to the 
Shura Council or the Council of Ministers and then apply to the reality some laws need to filter this 
filter called "constitutional immunity" and this exists in all the world except Saudi Arabia. Saudi 
Arabia their way if there is a mistake in a particular system This body supervising the system or 
responsible for its application to submit its views to the Council and then issue a decision to amend 
the text of article and others. The Constitutional Court will amend any statutory text regardless of the 
text because it applies the official constitution of the government in Saudi Arabia and any system that 
violates this Basic Law sues the Constitutional Court to amend this system in order to produce a 
decision of the Constitutional Court and thus I achieve the regular session by creating a fair system. 
Saudi regimes in general have a compromise path and take a lengthy form of establishment, 
establishment and review in several quarters. I have a system of two main treatment but personal 
treatment is not public I have a system of judicial and legal pleadings in terms of the courts and the 
system of the Board of Grievances and the Administrative Court in terms of administrative justice all 
provide the first or second article that any system contrary to Islamic law and contrary to the Koran 
and the year is considered false and incorrect Fay The adoption or the text of any of the systems in 
Saudi Arabia, the court considers them incorrect material. 
 
10. Do you think SAMA's laws may conflict with some Shari'ah principles? 
 
The system of the monetary institution may be problematic. There are texts found in sub-
organizations and sub-regulations, but they are subject to diligence. The question of ijtihad is broad. If 
there is diligence in the text, it is considered a matter of reference to the guardian, although the 
guardian explicitly states that any system, regulation or regulation Contrary to Islamic law or one of 
these systems invalidate, but as I mentioned earlier the need for a constitutional court is a treatment of 
any regulation or regulation in violation of the Constitution and thus achieve the main purpose of 
discipline. 
 
11. What authority does the Supreme Council of Scholars possess in influencing the 
enactment and amendment of laws in Saudi Arabia? 
 
The Council of Senior Scholars only retracted and did not review everything but it retracted its 
mandate from the Cabinet, but did not legislate the text directly, since it is not a legislative body, but 
it offers a legitimate consultation and does not change the course of procedures in the Kingdom. A 
specific decision. 
 
12. Is the role of the senior scholars consultative? Do you think that the government Saudi 
Arabia may ignore their recommendations? 
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I have never heard of anything 
 
13. Can that be done if it is necessary for the promotion of public interest? 
 
The fundamentals and principles are firm and the foundations of the Saudi people, such as confusion 
and social cohesion, etc. These are the origin of things that individuals and societies cannot change 
because they are rooted in the society since the establishment of the Saudi state and it is difficult to 
stop or change these things in general and I do not think there is anything necessary to change in the 
basic principles that Saudi Arabia. 
 
14. Are you familiar with the NYC convention? 
 
Yeah 
 
15. Do you think that the current judicial system is committed to the NYC Convention for 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments issued by foreign and non-Muslim judges 
and arbitrators? 
All arbitral decisions in the Kingdom implement only those decisions that included a violation of 
legitimacy not implemented by it and have dedicated departments and the observance of two main 
principles of reciprocity and application of the certificate. The ruling is carried out directly and the 
non-violation of Islamic law is taken into consideration. This is the main point in it. If there is a part 
of it, then the rest of the judgment is implemented, such as the principles of benefits and privileges. 
 
16. You referred to another side to consider in this matter? 
 
The side that refuses to consider them. They refuse to implement fully in accordance with the Islamic 
shari’ah law. The text in which there is a violation of this is taken into account in the arbitration 
agreements, especially with the parties to provide in the arbitration clause to be in accordance with 
Islamic law 
 
17. Do you think judgments made by non-Muslims or women can be enforced in Saudi 
Arabia? 
Yes  
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There are opinions in the Hanbali doctrine that the arbitrator is considered in the place of the judge 
and therefore does not have to be a woman.  The days of King Abdul Aziz are based on a collection of 
books, all of which were written in the life of the arbitration system in the previous text on Islam and 
stipulated that the male but the current system did not provide for this 
 
18. Is it possible for judges to exercise discretion? 
 
I do not think that this is necessary in case the judiciary fails to enforce many foreign judgments 
because it was issued by a court or issued by a non-Muslim, but not a previous custom.  
 
19. By virtue of your job as a judge in the Diwan of Grievances, are you aware of any verse 
in the Holy Qur’an prohibiting the codification of Islamic Shari’ah? 
 
As far as I know 
 
20. How do you assess the government’s policy on investment in general? 
The general rule for each reaction is the first of the foreign investment, because a negative image in 
the governmental and supervisory bodies, the income of many foreigners who do not enrich the 
country nor real investments, but fake investments enter in disguise and they distort the reputation of 
foreign investment both inside and outside Saudi Arabia. The establishment of controls where there 
were a lot of foreign investors stopped their licenses and their work because their investments do not 
have the development of the state is then the process of tensile tightening on the license, and has 
become a process of investment verification of the CV to investors And that this person is achieving 
the development of the country and that their investments are real and not fake or cause damage to 
internal investment, I see now that they are much better than the former where the former there is 
random. 
 
21. In general, what are the legal barriers to attracting foreign investors and are we still 
suffering from administrative bureaucracy? 
Investment obstacles Investors do not enter the Investment Authority in a proper manner or through 
persons who are not experienced or fully disabled. The foreign investor must approach the 
experienced lawyers and others to save time and effort. 
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Judge #2 
 
1. Do you think that the Saudi justice system is qualified to keep pace with the era and the 
first flag countries? 
 
The judicial system in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a whole is very suitable for the requirements 
of the modern world and achieves what the judiciary is intended to achieve both in the field of 
development and general development. There are problems and mistakes that are not related to the 
system itself but to the application of some of its fields and the human side. Does not attach to the 
system as much as it relates to the administrative and professional development of its employees. 
 
 
2. Do you think that the Islamic Shari’ah law in force in the Saudi Arabia may be an 
obstacle and not compatible with the modern world? 
 
There is no difference between the work of Islamic law and any judicial system anywhere and in any 
form in the modern world, they are rules and principles that determine the cases of health and 
corruption, prevention and permitting, impact and conditions, and ethical, professional and objective 
controls, and so on, (In the substantive aspect), which is contrary to many contemporary judicial 
systems, such as the prohibition of usury, the facilitator and the conditions of transactions, are not 
related to the procedural aspect of litigation, nor does it prevent the modern world from being kept up 
to two things: the first is that he dealt with the existence of these irregularities and how to deal with 
them, and did not leave them in the legislative vacuum. Second, it is like any objective disparity in the 
various legislations, so there are many examples in the world. No one can claim that the legislation of 
the modern world is united, and that there is no difference between them and may vary in one state 
between its states and regions. 
 
The decisions of King Saud still stand. They are part of the Islamic jurisprudence here. Some judges 
may rely on them. Of course, many senior scholars oppose the idea of judges exercising wide 
discretion. They have stopped the ijtihad. Some judges have also closed the door of ijtihad. The 
difference of opinion is due to training and educational level. 
 
3. Is the codification of Islamic law necessary? 
 
Any formal or informal codification is useful and developed for the judicial field, whether by 
rewriting the provisions of Islamic law in the manner of the law or in any other way, or by 
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reconsidering the existing decisions, but on the one hand it is respected and qualified to do so, because 
In the field of justice, in which it is concerned about its attachment to the rights of the people. 
 
4. What are the benefits and what are its disadvantages? 
 
Codification has several advantages: 
1- Developing judicial skill by presenting it in different ways or ways. 
2 - facilitate dealing with the judicial system for those who have no knowledge other than this 
method. 
3 - Clarifying the truth of the opinion associated with Islamic law for all who wish without being 
subject to misuse of indirect sources. 
4 - Adjust the judicial process by reducing the area of discretion and discretion of the judge in the not 
provided. 
 
Regarding the disadvantages: 
 
1. Preventing judicial development that is parallel to the development of transactions and social 
change. 
2. The judiciary shall be subject to the authority of a non-jurist and not of the Shari'a, since by 
adopting the method of codification, it shall be subject to the methods of legislation and its 
assemblies, whose members have no knowledge of Shari'a or law. 
3 - the possibility of amending the provisions stipulated therein by sovereign political decisions that 
remove the judiciary from the status of independence from the executive authority. 
 
5. Are arbitral awards enforceable in Saudi courts if they are issued by non-Muslim 
arbitrators or female arbitrators? 
 
Yes, there is no problem with this, but the review is due to a defect in the arbitrators regarding their 
safety, or because there is a defect in the arbitral decision itself in violation of the public order or the 
provisions of the Shari’ah. 
 
6. Are there any legal provisions from any of the legitimate sources that prohibit the 
codification of the Shari’ahh? What are the sources? 
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I do not know about it. But I think the opposite, which is generally both when the inhibitor of the 
rationing and discretionary issue of discretion is related to the interest, and is not a matter of 
peremptory and unbearable debate. 
 
7. Do you think judgments made by non-Muslims or women can be enforced in Saudi 
Arabia? 
I do not think so, but I think the opposite is very clear. 
 
8. Does the Shari’ah prohibit non-Muslims from settling disputes involving Muslims? 
No. But it prevents jurists from appointing a non-Muslim judge in the Muslim state, because the 
judiciary is an act of sovereignty. The Muslim is required to prosecute according to the system of the 
state, and the non-Muslim is supposed not to rule by Islamic law because he is not Muslim. But you 
must know that the Shari’a cannot be overridden. It can be applied differently or reinterpreted in line 
with a set of rules and principles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 393 
Legal Scholar #2 
 
1. What do you think about the Vision 2030 programme? 
 
It has a great ambition and blessed plans that return to the country and its projects with development, 
blessing, service and well-being. 
 
2. How much authority does the Council of Senior Scholars have in influencing the 
enactment or amendment of a new law in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia? 
 
They have no power to do so, and the functions of the Supreme Council of Jurists, according to their 
system, are not related to the judicial sphere, nor to the legislation, except as required by the king, for 
any consideration he sees. The government is not merely a decision by the senior scientists. 
 
3. Do you think that the government can ignore the opinion of the Council of Senior 
Scholars? 
 
They can do this, and indeed, the reality is very much. In their opinion, it is not obligatory for 
governmental authority, it is merely a view to be used by it, and the authority can take it or leave it. If 
it is good for the Kingdom, then yes. But that cannot happen with foreign investment. Foreign 
investment has been adversely affected by conservative interpretations of the Qu’ran. So economic 
liberalisation policies cannot be effective with the same conservative interpretations holding sway. 
 
4. Do you think that the regulations of SAMA violate the principles of Islamic law? 
 
I did not review the regulations of that institution so that I could give my opinion.  
 
5. Do you think that government overlook the principles of the Shari’ah in the interest of 
the public? 
 
If the real possibility of application and the possibility of legislation is not a problem that the 
government can do so, it is the authority, and the theoretical judgment without regard to reality, 
governments such as individuals to commit prohibitions or leave duties to the existence of necessity, 
ruling on prohibition, and general necessity is first to rule. But if my action is contrary to Shari’ah law 
but will improve the commercial environment and the economy of the country, the rigour of the 
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Shari’ah will be disadvantageous. That is why the Shari’ah is not codified. It gives judges the 
flexibility to consider such things. The Islamic Shari’ah is a complete system of life. It is a judicial 
system that is valid for all times and ages. Its rules apply to all transactions and investments and 
prioritise the interests of the community in general. The rules protect individual interests. What is 
important is fairness and justice. These are the same objectives of all important international 
conventions 
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Arbitrator #1 
  
 
1.  Have you heard about the vision of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques? 
The objectives of Vision 2030 must be defined to answer the question. 
 
2. Do you think that the Saudi justice system is qualified to keep pace with the era and the 
first flag countries? 
The judicial system is appropriate, but there is a problem with the disparity of judicial rulings and the 
qualification of the judge to hear commercial cases. 
 
3. Do you think that the Islamic Shari’ah law in force in the Saudi Arabia may be an 
obstacle and not compatible with the modern world? 
Yes, because Shari’ah is valid for all times and places, and is the origin of human beings, but the 
weakness of the legitimate background of jurists has led to their ambiguity for them and the foreign 
investor. 
 
4. Is the codification of Islamic necessary? 
 
Yes, it would be useful to reduce the multiplicity of jurisprudence in financial transactions. 
 
5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of codification? 
 
Advantages: Unification of jurisprudence in matters of dispute. 
Disadvantages: the entry of the administrative authority to change jurisprudence jurisprudence. 
 
6. Do you think that the current judicial system is committed to the NYC Convention for 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments issued by foreign and non-Muslim judges 
and arbitrators? 
It is fully committed, unless the arbitral award violates Islamic law or local regulations. 
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7. Do you think that it is time to repeal the decision of the Saudi government to stop 
government agencies from submitting disputes to international arbitration without prior 
approval by the Council of Ministers? 
The administrative contracts have a specificity that has different advantages than ordinary contracts 
for the public interest of the community. Therefore, for the administration of the courts (the Board of 
Grievances) is different from the ordinary commercial judiciary. 
 
 
 
8. Do you see the importance of allowing the General Authority for Investment to resort to 
arbitration to resolve administrative disputes with foreign investors? 
 
No, for the reasons just given 
 
9. Are arbitral awards enforceable in Saudi courts if they are rendered by non-Muslim 
arbitrators or female arbitrators? 
 
Yes. 
 
10. How do you assess the new arbitration system?  
 
Better than the previous system but needs more detail in the procedures. 
 
 
11. How do you assess the work of the Saudi Commercial Arbitration Center?  
 
I do not see any experience in it, but through his visit it is a distinguished center of regulations, 
regulations and facilities. And the most important proposals to be marketed better, many traders do 
not know about. 
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Arbitrator #2 
 
1. What do you think about the Vision 2030 progamme? 
 
It’s a step forward from the government of Saudi Arabia to diversify the economy. 
 
2. Are there any legal provisions that prohibit the codification of the Shari’ahh?  
 
Yes, there is fatwa for the senior scholars. 
 
3. Is there any document of Islamic law that prevents women from being arbitrators? 
 
Arbitration is a judiciary, and the majority of jurists are not women. 
 
4. Does the Shari’ah prohibit non-Muslims from settling disputes involving Muslims? 
 
Friendly settlement like a reconciliation, I do not know who to prevent it. Arbitration is like a 
judiciary, and the judge must be a Muslim. 
 
5. How much authority does the Council of Senior Scholars have in influencing the 
enactment or amendment of laws in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia? 
 
Their name: the senior scholars, not the Council of Senior Scholars. 
They have no authority whatsoever. 
 
6. Do you think that the government can overlook the opinion of the Senior Scholars? 
 
Yes, because the decisions of the Senior Scholars are instructive. 
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7. Do you think that some regulations (SAMA) are contrary to Islamic law and principles? 
 
In terms of regulations, no. But there are some acts that are contrary to the Shari'a, rather than 
regulations. Judicial and administrative authorities may always interpret the Shari’ah in a different 
light if they want to promote those policies that encourage investment 
 
8. Do you think that the government can overlook the principles of the Shari'a in the 
interest of the public? 
 
Yes, it is part of the policy if it sees it as the trusted scholars do. 
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Member of the Ulama 
 
1. How should the government of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques stimulate more 
foreign investors to achieve the vision? 
 
Facilitate the obstacles of procedures for obtaining permits and allowing the investor to innovate 
within the limits of the country's system. Give the investor a safer place in the event of a dispute such 
as to refuse to resort to arbitration even if one of the parties. 
 
2. Do you think the Saudi government should encourage more foreign direct investment to 
achieve the goal of Vision 2030? why? 
 
Yes. Because most of the experiences in other countries proved that investors are competing for the 
best if they have the opportunity. 
 
3. Do you think that the Saudi justice system is qualified to keep pace with the era and the 
first flag countries? 
 
- Of course. The judicial system as in other countries and what we see now the continuous 
development and address some of the obstacles, but the new vision to establish specialized arbitration 
centers give more confidence to judicial development. The Kingdom is based on Shari’ahh and 
Shari'ah depends on the status of stability and flexibility on the fixed evidence and the change is 
governed by objective judgments, and the procedures that are in the best procedures are in flexible 
legislations 
 
4. Do you think that the Shari’ah system in place is suitable for the modern world? Why? 
 
The Shari’ahh system is not an obstacle, and most of it is compatible with international law, for 
example in contracts and in the view of the Shari’ahh (Contract of the Law of Contractors), which is 
part of international law and many more. 
 
5. Do you think it should be suitable for use?  
 
Yes, even for non-Muslims  
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6. Is the codification of Islamic law necessary? 
 
Yes, it leaves no room for different application. 
 
7. What are the benefits and what are its disadvantages? 
 
- Shortens a lot of time trying to make judgments to apply. 
- I do not think there is anything wrong if it does not agree with the Shari’ahh and is not contradictory 
with it. 
 
8. Do you think that the current judicial system is committed to the NYC Convention for 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments issued by foreign and non-Muslim judges 
and arbitrators? 
 
- Signed the Convention and committed to the provisions of the same as other countries. 
 
 
9. Do you think that it is time to repeal the decision of the Saudi government to stop 
government agencies from submitting disputes to international arbitration without prior 
approval by the Council of Ministers? 
 
- Yes and we suggest that 
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Journalist 
 
1. What do you think about the Vision 2030 programme? 
 
Saudi Vision 2030 represents new hope for Saudis to move them to advanced levels in education, 
leisure, industry and the services economy. All the idle wealth will be invested. There is a thirst for 
entertainment and science for the Saudis, and for tourists from all over the world.  
 
2. Are there any legal provisions from any of the legitimate sources that prohibit the 
codification of the Shari’ahh? What are the sources? 
- I do not remember anything like that. 
 
 
3. Is there any document of Islamic law that prevents women from being arbitrators? 
- I did not search legitimately for that. 
 
 
4. Does the Shari’ah prohibit non-Muslims to settle disputes between Muslims? 
- You need a legitimate search and did not touch it. 
 
5. Does the Shari’ah prohibit non-Muslims from settling disputes between non-Muslim parties 
within the Islamic lands? 
- As previously said you need a search. 
 
6. Do you think that the government authority can bypass or reject the opinion of the Council of 
Senior Scholars if it is necessary for the public interest? 
- I do not remember reading or researching about it. 
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Legal Scholar #3 
 
 
1. How do you see the success of the vision in light of the development of the Saudi legal 
regimes? 
 
Different facilities and benefits should be offered to the investors targeted by the Saudi government so 
that the climate becomes attractive for investment such as tax exemption at the beginning of 
continuous activity within the Kingdom 
 
2. Do you think the Saudi government should encourage more foreign direct investment to 
achieve the goal of Vision 2030? why? 
 
Yes, there should be encouragement because it will benefit and benefit the Saudi national economy 
while encouraging the export sector of the Kingdom to all local goods and products 
 
3. Do you think that the current judicial system in the Kingdom is appropriate to the 
requirements of the modern world?  
 
Yes, suitable and good and needs to accelerate the process of activating and developing specialized 
courts such as labor and traffic and the abolition of all judicial and quasi-judicial bodies and give their 
final work to the courts and specialized departments. Yes, it is appropriate because Islamic law is 
valid and applicable at all times and places. I believe that the Shari’ah is good and compatible with the 
laws of most countries. Some changes are needed in arbitration such as fixing the dates for the 
adjudication of disputes at certain times in order to ensure rapid resolution and conform with practices 
in many countries. These are compatible with the Shari’ah. Rapid resolution enhances justice, which 
is good for society. 
 
4. Do you think it is suitable for use?  
 
Yes, it must be kept in line with the latest developments of the current era 
 
5. Is the codification of Islamic law necessary? 
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Yes, provided that the application is appropriate to the contemporary dilemmas of dilemmas and 
issues and modern developments that did not exist in the past. 
 
6. What are the benefits and what are its disadvantages? 
 
The advantages are to establish appropriate command bases that can be applied to each new situation 
or event 
Its disadvantages are inaccuracies in the description of each incident and incident in a clear manner 
simplifies the order of the system to apply its provisions to the registration and description specified 
by the competent authority. 
 
7. Do you think that the current judicial system is committed to the NYC Convention for 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments issued by foreign and non-Muslim judges 
and arbitrators? 
 
The Kingdom is a country that is open to the world, especially in the economic sphere and is a 
member of many international and regional organizations. Since the wise leadership was keen to 
provide and create an environment conducive to commercial activities and enhancing the investment 
environment, Several agreements and international treaties on investment, including the 
implementation of the provisions issued by the League of Arab States in 1952 as well as the New 
York Convention for the implementation of the provisions of foreign arbitrators in 1958, which was 
joined by the Kingdom in 1994 and the inclusion of that denies Foreign judgments within the 
Kingdom as internationally recognized. 
 
8. Do you think that it is time to repeal the decision of the Saudi government to stop 
government agencies from submitting disputes to international arbitration without prior 
approval by the Council of Ministers? 
 
I do not think that the government will repeal the Cabinet Resolution No. 58 dated 1383. The decision 
will not exclude arbitration in disputes of administrative contracts without the rest of the other 
administrative disputes, especially concession contracts that include vital interests of the state. 
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Legal Director (Investor) 
 
1- What is the reason behind choosing the kingdom of Saudi Arabia to invest? 
We have started out investment in Saudi Arabia from 22 years, I personally came here 4 
years ago. With the globalization Saudi Arabia become open market and it has a lot of 
business opportunities for investors therefore we have chosen Saudi to extend our company.  
2- How would you describe your experience investing in Saudi Arabia? is it worth 
doing? And why? 
I think yes. It worth it because its lucrative and the government efficiency is improving so 
much 
3- Did you have any concerns before you decided to invest in Saudi Arabia? What are 
those concerns? 
Yes before the company decided to invest in Saudi Arabia, we expected lots of challenges 
and we have had to come across new cultures barriers and differences.  
4- Do these concerns still exists after you have started investing in Saudi Arabia? and 
how did you overcome them? 
No After the improvement of the governmental bodies, it become compatible with the 
international standards. There is a huge shift and improvement and I like the adea of the new 
vision 2030 
5- How would you describe the administrative procedure in the country? 
Before it was a nightmare here with the complexity of the administrative procedure but new 
its much better and huge development.  
6- How would you describe the administrative procedures in the country? did you sever 
from bureaucracy? 
7- How do you describe the legal system in Saudi Arabia? 
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The legal system here is not comparable. There is no contract law, we need a contract law to 
be the base of businesses and there must be codification in order to anticipate the judgments. 
8- Have you ever faced any problems with the judicial system in Saudi Arabia? 
Yes, the most annoying thing is that the delay of cases and if the judge does not show up the 
trail get postponed for 3 to 6 months and that could cause a delay of finishing the cases  
9- What is your preferable mechanism of dispute resolutions if dispute arises? Why? 
I prefer arbitration, because its faster and more efficient and flexible.   
10- Have you ever settled your disputes through arbitration in Saudi Arabia? How do 
you describe the experience?  
No, there is a new arbitration center here in Saudi but it is  quite new and need a time to be 
appropriate and ready to handle cases. 
11- Do you still prefer to settle any disputes through arbitration in Saudi Arabia? Why? 
I always prefer to resort to arbitration in Dubai because I do not like to have a Saudi’s party 
in the dispute and we settle the dispute in Saudi as well 
12 What are the main differences between arbitration in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere? 
13- Have you faced any difficulties enforcing any arbitration awards in the Saudi’s 
courts?   
No but I think we are forbidden to include an arbitration clause in our contracts with the 
governmental bodies, due to this restriction the government is not encouraging more 
investors to the country. 
14- What impact has the culture had in your performance in Saudi Arabia? 
We have not faced any problems with the cultures here. At the first beginning it had been 
stranges when shops close at the time of prayers but in terms of people Saudis are welcoming 
society and the youth of them are very good in technology and open to the other part of the 
world and as far as I know that the fast majority of the Saudis population are youth. 
 406 
 
#Legal Advisor. 
 
1- Have you heard about the Saudi New Vision 2030? What do you think about it? 
Yes. I think it sets a great example of a national initiative, which, regardless whether it 
delivers or not, does present a nationally shared will to transform the economy across all 
sectors and classes. 
2- Do you have a clear understanding of the concept of FDI? 
Yes 
3- What do you think the Saudi’s Government’s approach to FDI should be in general? 
I think the Saudi government’s approach to FDI should prioritise the domestic market and 
local capacity initially, before liberalizing FDI controls completely.  The Saudi market is 
somewhat nascent across all sectors. Uncontrolled FDI will not allow the market to develop a 
true domestic capacity however way we measure that capacity to be.  
4- How do you think the Saudi Government’s should engage with FDI if they are to achieve 
their goal of Vision 2030? 
The Saudi government should prioritize sectors needed for basic public services, addressing 
shortages in the domestic market and domestic delivery in such services, while enforcing 
elements of localization and local capacity building. 
5- Do you think the Saudi’s government should encourage more FDI in order to achieve the 
goal of Vision 2030? Why?  
More FDI is not necessarily needed to achieve Vision 2030. More FDI, is in fact, only one 
way Vision 2030 may be achieved. There can be many number of ways or theories on how 
the Vision may be achieved. It is a question of choice and analyses, rather than one of fact. 
 
1- Do you think the current legal system is suitable for the modern world and helps the 
government to toward the success of the new vision? And why? 
Suitability for the modern world and achieving the Vision are not neccessaeily intrinsic, 
or mutually or necessarily accompanying. I think the current legal system, like any legal 
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system, may have elements that may be deemed different, rather than unsuitable to the 
modern world. Suitability, is not necessarily what is sought, but one may rather have a 
different ideal on how a legal system could be. Overall, one could say that the legal 
system in Saudi Arabia lacks sufficient input from the domestic and international market 
allowing it to comprehend market realities in some instances. This, however, is not 
always the case. 
2- Do you think sharia law is appropriate for the modern world? 
I think Shari’a law is the most appropriate system for a modern world. 
3- Do you think it should be made appropriate for use? How? 
I think Shari’a is already appropriate for use. However, one could say, that, in the context of 
an international globl financial and economic system that is based on certain tenets and 
practices, that, Shari’a is not suitable, for such a system, through fault of the fact that 
priorities differ. It is not so much a fault of Shari’a that deems it unsuitable for today’s world, 
but rather, the fault of an international system that prioritises unequal opportunities and 
wealth distribution.  
4- Would the codification of the Islamic law in commercial be a useful thing? 
It would indeed would be useful, provided that it remains open to evolve, and “alive”, 
meaning, constantly open to change and adaptation. 
5- What advantages would codification bring?  
Codification would essentially provide two main benefits. First, it provides a good level of 
legal predictability for all parties and stakeholders. Secondly, codification, it is hoped, would 
provide some truer reflection of the realities of one’s time, as it should take into account 
current practice. 
6- Is not it better to codify the Sharia to avoid uncertainty and ambiguity and rigid 
interpretations? 
Not necessarily. Codification, in principle, provides certainty and clear interpretations. 
Deeming this assumption necessary, however, can show a level of ignorance of Islamic 
jurisprudence. Islamic jurisprudence, could be deemed to have achieved a great level of “self-
codification”. Many scholars and jurists, throughout Islamic history, have already written 
volumes, covering different scenarios, derived from real scenarios, and, delivering judgments 
and rulings on such cases. In essence, this is a form of codification. 
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7- What do you think the disadvantages of codification might be? 
There are no disadvantages to codification itself. The only disadvantages are where 
codification is deemed final, and where it defeats “ijtihad” and Islamic jurisprudence 
development. 
8- Do you think a secular commercial system could help the economy of the country and can be 
used in Saudi Arabia? why? 
Only an Islamic commercial system will help the economy of Saudi Arabia. However, a 
secular commercial system derived from codified Shari’a will absolutely help Saud Arabia. 
As mentioned earlier, codification provides a good level of legal predictability that is better 
for the administration of justice overall, and the commercial and investment climate. 
9- How about if the secular laws do not contradict the sharia principles? 
See answer above 
10- How do you think Saudi Arabia is Arbitration friendly country? 
??? 
11- Do you think that it is essential, in order to achieve the goals from the vision 2030, for the 
government of Saudi Arabia to revoke the Minister Council decision No. 58 dated 1383H to 
prevent any governmental body from resorting to arbitration to settle their dispute without 
the full agreement from the council? 
NO. In fact, the stated law above is pretty revolutionary and ahead of its time. While it may 
have mainly been concerned with negative outcomes of any such arbitration, it has foreseen 
the potential of abusing arbitration by private corporations against governments and public 
entities. This is evident in the global movement currently seen, and increased awareness, on 
the dangers of state-investor dispute settlement clauses found in different international 
agreements (See for example TTIP). 
12- Do you think the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) should be given an 
exemption to resort to arbitration with Investors if they have any administrative disputes? 
NO. 
13- How do you think Saudi Arabia is sticking to the New York Convention 1958 in Recognition 
and Enforcement of the Foreign Arbitral Award? 
In my limited understanding, arbitral awards are enforced reciprocally.  
14- Are the arbitration awards enforceable in the Saudis courts if issued by non-Muslim 
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arbitrator or a woman? 
In my uninformed view, they are, provided a right in claim is demonstrated. 
 
 
1- Is there any sharia clause from any of sharia sources forbid the codification of the 
sharia? What is the sources? 
No.  
2- Is there anything from the Sharia’a forbidding a woman from being an arbitrator? 
Only in the case of a judge, or, mandatory arbitrator 
3- Is it forbidden by the Sharia’a for Non-Muslim to settle disputes among Muslims? 
Only in the case of a judge, or, mandatory arbitrator 
4- Is it forbidden by the Sharia’a for Non-Muslim to settle disputes between non-
Muslim parties within the Islamic territories? 
Only in the case of a judge, or, mandatory arbitrator 
 
1- How much power does the Council of Senior Ulema have in enacting a new act, 
regulation or law in Saudi Arabia? 
In theory, great power. 
2- Do you think the governmental authority can override or dismiss the opinion of the 
Council of Senior Ulema if it is necessary for the public interest? 
Yes. In theory, an opinion of the Council will have to be fully informed in the public interest 
and fully accounting of it. 
3- Do you think the authority has dismissed the Council in the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Authority’s (SAMA) regulations? 
In theory, banks and interest regulation perhaps. 
4- How do you think some of (SAMA)’s regulations contradict with Sharia and Islamic 
principles?  
4- Do you think the governmental authority can override some of sharia principle in case 
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of necessity of the society? 
No. suspending or misapplying in certain cases, in fact, is in itself regulated (Example: Umar 
misapplying the punishment of theft during famine). Such “overriding” is only a false view of 
how Shari’a works. Shari’a cannot be overridden. It can be misapplied or applied differently, 
or reinterpreted, in line with a set of rules and principles. 
6- Do not you think the second Islamic Imam had overridden the Sharia principles 
when he did not apply the Hudud of theft and burglary in that time because of famine 
(public interest and necessity)? 
See above. However, NO! Umar had not overridden the Shari’a principles. Umar’s view 
could be seen as an interpretation on the punishment and hudud, in being an “upper limit” to 
such acts, rather than the automatic punishment. This is evident from many sources looking at 
how the punishment can apply, and to wheat amounts and so on. 
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